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Summ a r y
This thesis examines relations between charities and the 
state in Britain and Canada: it challenges a common view that 
government responsibility for welfare provision in this century 
has rendered charities relatively insignificant and isolated from 
the political process in both countries. By focusing specifically 
on medical research charities, evidence is presented to show that 
lobbying has become an increasingly important aspect of their 
activity, in spite of legal limitations restricting much of their 
involvement in the policy process. It is concluded that the law 
restricting charities from engaging in political activities has 
had limited success both because of its 'vagueness' and poor 
enforcement. The only countervailing force keeping medical 
research charities 'out of politics' to any significant degree has 
come from volunteers and the donating public, but, even they have 
had only a limited impact. The degree of political involvement by 
a charity is now contingent on the policy area in which it 
operates, the degree of 'hostility' of government policy towards 
the organisation and its objectives as well as the charity's 
financial resources.
In light of cut-backs in government expenditure to medical 
research in the 1980s, of the need to co-ordinate scientific 
investigations, and of pressures from some volunteers to represent 
the interests of disease sufferers, as well as a number of other 
factors, British and Canadian medical research charities have been 
drawn increasingly into the political process. This evidence 
suggests that charity-state relations have changed dramatically 
since the 19th century when charities not only resisted state 
encroachment into many areas of social welfare, but devoted much 
of their resources towards encouraging state withdrawal from areas 
where tax revenues were already being applied. Now charities 
frequently criticize government policies aimed at cutting-back 
state funding for programmes in policy areas where charities are 
operating and also propose new legislation to ensure minimum 
levels and quality of state-funded services.
Given this, the nature of charity-state relations has changed 
dramatically and has created difficulties for legislators who have 
had to reconcile the non-political qualities of philanthropy- 
including altruism, and community participation - with the reality 
that much charitable activity is devoted to participating in the 
policy process. In conclusion the blurring of the distinction 
between philanthropy and politics has meant that charities have 
begun to resemble more traditional forms of interest groups while 
at the same time maintaining their privileged 'tax exempt status'. 
This is a particularly interesting development given that many 
British and Canadian medical research charities have been co-opted 
by pharmaceutical companies to participate in a number of that 
industry's lobbying campaigns in return for corporate donations.
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Chapter Qna 
Introduction
The subject of this thesis is charity-state relations in 
Britain and Canada. Attention is focused on how and why charities 
- specifically medical research charities - seek to influence 
government in each country. Until now 'charity' has not been the 
concept around which much comparative research has been organized; 
there are at least three reasons for this.
First, there is the possible confusion between a charity as a 
legal entity, and charity as it is often used in popular 
discourse, as an organisation providing benefits to third parties. 
Second, for many purposes of their operations in countries like 
the United States, it is non-profit corporation law rather than 
charity law which is more important for most kinds of 
organisations having purposes which are legally charitable. 
Third, the word charity still has connotations of upper-class 
patronising, and 'Lady Bountifuls' performing good works among the 
recipients of the services of charities. In place of 'charity', 
social scientists have used a plethora of terms including 'third 
sector organisations', 'voluntary sector organisations' and 'non­
profit sector organisations'. The problem with these terms is 
that they are defined loosely and, more often than not, are taken 
to embrace all agencies 'left-over' once market and governmental
1
bodies are excluded.
This thesis presumes that charities, as legal entities, do 
provide the best starting point for an analysis of the relation 
between a particular distinctive kind of social institution and 
the state. This is not to deny that, for those concerned with 
policymaking or implementation, the appropriate starting point may 
be to identify the institutions to be compared with respect to 
function, for example, in terms of the kinds of services they 
provide. 1 Nevertheless, this thesis aims to examine one facet of 
the merger of 'public' and 'private' in the area of medical 
research in Britain and Canada by focusing on charities. Although 
'charities' have been selected as the 'unit of analysis' for this 
thesis reference to a 'charity sector' is avoided. It is 
recognized that charities operating in different policy areas 
function uniquely and enjoy rather different relations with 
government.2
One reason for concentrating on Britain and one of its ex­
colonies is that governmental relations with private agencies 
providing social welfare have been similar in the past. This 
experience is quite different from that in the rest of Europe.
IThis approach is adopted by H.W. Mellor, The Role of 
Voluntary Organisations in Social Welfare. London: Croom, Helm, 
1985.
2This approach towards the study of relations between charity 
and the state is described in more detail in: Tom Deans and Alan 
Ware, 'Charity-State Relations: A Conceptual Analysis', Journal 
of Public Policy,. 6(1986), pp. 121-135. An earlier version of the 
article was presented at the panel on 'Politics, Government and 
Charities' at the Annual Conference of the Political Studies 
Association, Nottingham, 1986.
2
However, in any analysis involving Britain and Canada, there is a 
strong argument for including American examples, since that 
country shares a number of features with Canada, including a 
federal system of government. Nevertheless, in studying charities 
and relations with government there is a specific reason for 
focusing on Canada, rather than on the United States: its
charity laws remain virtually identical to those in Britain, while 
broadly similar American charity laws are paralleled by laws 
relating to non-profit organisations, which have been far more 
important in shaping charity-state relations in the United States, 
(unlike Britain, Canada too has non-profit corporation laws, but 
these have not been the major influences on the nature of 
charitable institutions).
Previous studies that have examined charity-state relations 
as part of larger research projects have either ignored or 
downplayed the lobbying activities of charities. Instead, they 
have choosen to focus on how they organize themselves and operate 
to meet social needs in the presence of a large and comprehensive 
welfare-state.3 Research has focused mainly on ways in which 
charities now complement, supplement and extend the statutory
3D. Gerard, Charities in Britain. London: Bedford Square 
Press/NCVO, 1983; F. Gladstone, Charity Law and Social Justice. 
London: Bedford Square Press/NCVO, 1982; J. Douglas, Why Charity? 
The Case for a Third Sector. London: Sage, 1983; M. Roff, 
Voluntary Societies and Social Policy. London: Routledge, 1957; 
Sheila Moore, Working for Pree. London: Pan Books, 1977; and M. 
Morris, Voluntary Work in the Welfare State. London: Routledge, 
1967. See also, Wolfenden Committee, The Future of Voluntary 
Organisations. London: Croom Helm, 1977.
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systems.4 In doing so, the contributions of charities have been 
evaluated in the context of their role as institutions in a 
pluralistic society and governmental system. Curiously though, 
political scientists have not been at the forefront of this 
research movement. Instead, economists, sociologists, social 
historians and social-science-oriented lawyers have formed the 
vanguard, yet in many cases they have addressed issues which are 
of direct concern to political scientists. This lack of concern 
is surprising given the vast number of registered charities 
operating in Britain and Canada and their enormous financial 
resources. For example, one estimate of the income of the 130,000 
registered British charities is that it constitutes as much as 
three per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP). In comparison 
to Canada, 50,000 registered charities are calculated to have a 
combined income equal to two per cent of GNP.5
In relation to the statutory system, previous studies argue 
that modern-day charities have had three kinds of contributions to 
make. First, they have been able to offer services when little or 
nothing has been available through state mechanisms. In the
4An important example of this kind of research is R. Hadley
and S. Hatch, Social__Welfare__and__the__Fallare__Of the State.
London: Allen and Unwin, 1981.
5See, Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Statistics. 1985/86. 
Tonbridge: CAF, 1986, p. 6; and S. Martin, An Essential Grace.
Toronto: McClelland and Steward, 1985, p. 10. The absence of
detailed empirical research into British and Canadian charities is 
in part attributable to the scant availability of useful data. 
Moreover, it is frequently true that the data that is available is 
produced by interested parties - including government departments, 
politicians and charities themselves.
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context of existing provision, a number of studies have documented 
the capacity of charities to develop innovative programmes and 
services of 'benefit to the community'. For example, the new 
methods of treatment that have been developed in work with 
families, drug addicts and delinquents are at the focus of much of 
the social welfare literature emerging from Britain, Canada and 
the U.S.6 This body of literature has also examined in detail the 
way in which statutory services have been extended by charities 
providing alternatives to statutory services (examples include 
youth clubs and residential care for children, the handicapped and 
the elderly). These studies frequently conclude that charities 
not only extend the quality of provision but extend the choices 
available to service users. Other notable conclusions in this 
literature are that charities further contribute by attracting 
people, ideas and material resources that would not have been 
attracted by statutory organisations. A related theme is that 
people are often more willing to give time, energy and money to a 
charity devoted to a specific cause than to a statutory agency. 
Finally, it is interesting that charities actually offer direct 
support services to statutory bodies; for example, the Women's 
Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS) provides meals on wheels, hospital 
trolleys and so on. However, in all these studies rarely is 
mention made of the lobbying, (and other political) activities of
6See, Deborah A. Stone, The Disabled State. Basingstoke:
MacMillan, 1985; Mildred Blaxter, The Meaning__q £  Disability__A
Sociological Study of Impairment. London: Heinman, 1976; and
Monroe Berkowitz, Public Policy Towards Disability. New York: 
Praeger, 1976.
5
charities.7
The second kind of well-documented contribution that 
charities make is in improving the quality of government 
provision. Many British charities provide 'alternative' services 
to those supplied by the state. The choice for the user means the 
right to turn down the statutory service, a possibility which 
provides an incentive for the state to improve the service and to 
make it more receptive to the user's wants. Another way in which 
the monolithic qualities of statutory provision may be eroded by 
philanthropic actions is revealed in studies where charities are 
observed to be working closely with a statutory body. The very 
presence of outside organisations like charities can prevent 
possible abuses of power and stimulate standards of state 
provision.8
Third, the existing literature dealing with charity-state 
interaction - or lack thereof - has focused most notably on 
examples of charities that are either the sole or the principal 
provider of a service. These studies conclude that some 
recognized social needs have attracted little or no response from 
the state. For example, the 'need' for a particular service is 
often rated by government as a low priority, as is the case with
Committee, The Future___of__Voluntary
8see, hmso, Report of the Committee_on the_Law and.J?ractice
Relating to Charitable Trusts. London: HMSO, Cmnd. 8710, 1952.
6
day-care centres for pre-school children.9 In addition, it has 
been concluded that these same services are often viewed by 
elected and non-elected officials as inappropriate for direct 
statutory involvement as is true of advice and counselling 
services for pregnant women.10 However, in these studies too few 
references, if any, are made to the lobbying activities of 
charities aimed at introducing or improving regulatory and 
statutory reforms in these various policy areas.
Other studies of charity-state interaction have focused on 
aspects of government planning and the role of charities in this 
process. The conclusions are usually that charities are the ideal 
medium for spontaneous, speedy and autonomous action. However, 
these same features have arguably demonstrated there are no 
guarantees that a charitable response will materialize where need 
is greatest, that standards of services will be maintained, or 
that this so-called 'sector' as a whole will operate in a co­
ordinated manner. From this, it is often concluded that in the 
British and Canadian political systems, ultimate responsibility 
for ensuring that formal provision is made to meet social needs 
rests with government. Consequently, it is agreed that national
9See, Mary Ruggie, The State and___Working , Women;-----A
Comparative Study__of Britain__and Sweden. Princeton New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1984; and Laura C. Johnson, The Kin
Iradfii____The__Day__Care__Crisis in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1981.
lOSee, Rosiland P. Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice;
The__State,___ Sexuality__and__Reproductive__freedom- New York:Longman, 1984; and Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics Of 
Motherhood. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
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governments must be ready and willing to assume the responsibility 
of compensating for deficiencies in the pattern of provision.il 
Hence, there must be national policy strategies that include 
charitable provision of services within the broader context of the 
statutory welfare system. These same studies points to the use of 
direct government funding as an incentive for the creation of new 
charities and the maintenance and expansion of others. The main 
object of these studies (most of which are American) is to shed 
light on one of the central issues in political science: 
understanding the blurring of the distinction between public and 
private institutions in liberal democracies. Most traditional 
'liberal' models of democracies have emphasized the separation of 
the state from other institutions and organisations. In the 
United States, where charities have been the focus of more in- 
depth study by political scientists, the main concern about the 
apparent merging of chai ities and the state has been government 
funding of charities. Salamon has argued that the expansion of 
the federal government in America in the period 1954-79 was 
achieved through what he calls 'third party government'. 12 By 
relying on devices such as loans, loan guarantees, insurance
USee for example, D.G. Leat, Smolka and J. Unell, Voluntary
and Statutory__Collaboration;____Rhetoric__or__Reality?• London:Bedford Square Press, 1981.
12See, L. Salamon, 'The Rise of Third Party Government', 
Washington Post. 29 June 1980; L. Salamon, 'Rethinking Public 
Management: Third Party Government and the Changing Forms of
Public Action', Public Policy. 29(1981), pp. 255-75; and L. 
Salamon, 'Government and the Voluntary Sector in an Era of 
Retrenchment: the American Experience', Journal of Public Policy.
6(1986), pp. 40-58.
coverage and the like, the federal government made third parties- 
charities, as well as state and local governments - the agents of 
federal expansion. This placed federal officials in the position 
of being held responsible for federal programmes which they did 
not actually control; in his view the federal government came to 
share its authority with private sector organisations having the 
legal status of charities. Yet surprisingly what is absent from 
Salamon's study, as with most other American studies, is a 
complete explanation as to how this developed and the extent to 
which lobbying by charities themselves created and sustained these 
financial subsidies.
The closest that existing studies of charity-state relations 
come to shedding light on how and why charities seek to influence 
governments are those which examine the contributions of these 
organisations to the maintenance of a pluralistic state. However, 
at the focal point of these writings is the services provided by 
charities and the role of volunteers as opposed to their 
representation of specialized ' interests13 Here, the principal 
benefits attributed to charities have related to their potential 
as a means of enabling widespread direct public participation. 
This is deemed to be especially important in modern industrial 
states dominated by large-scale political, economic and social 
institutions. Specifically, it is suggested that between the 
loosely structured informal system consisting of friends and
13See A. Holme and J. Maizels., Social Workers__and
Volunteers. London: Allen and Unwin, 1978.
9
family and the more formally organized statutory system, 
individuals have been able to utilize charities as a medium to 
associate with others to achieve their own set of altruistic goals 
and aspirations. These research projects (many of which have been 
designed by sociologists within pluralist paradigms) conclude that 
people participating in charitable organisations not only feel 
less alienated from society but are also engaged in altering its 
nature. 14 This 'alteration' has been achieved directly through 
the activities these charities undertake and less directly, 
through the signals sent by these activities to the statutory 
system on the nature of shifts in public concerns. It is here 
that the sociologists' interpretation of charities' contribution 
to pluralism comes close to shedding light on the lobbying 
activities of charities. However, their failure to solidify this 
argument is symptomatic of an assumption that charities are 
passive institutions ill-adept and dis-interested in articulating 
their views to government.
The evidence presented in this thesis regarding British and 
Canadian medical research charities strongly suggests the opposite 
is true. However, if charities are engaged in lobbying 
activities, why have political scientists failed to account for 
this in both their theoretical and descriptive studies of British 
and Canadian interest groups? There are at least two explanations 
for this development. First, social scientists like most lay-
14See for example, R. Hadley, A. Webb, and C. Farrel, Across
ienerations. London: Allen and Unwin, 1975.
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people cling to ill-conceived notions that charities are small, 
loosely-structured organisations, administered principally by 
unpaid volunteers and are 'fuelled' by altruism and public 
benevolence. All these assumptions have forged the misperception 
that charities are generally divorced from the political process, 
and indeed are legitimated by remaining aloof and politically 
independent. Second, some believe that government responsibility 
for welfare provision in this century has rendered charities 
insignificant and isolated from the political process. However, 
by focusing specifically on medical research charities in chapters 
five to eight, evidence is presented to show that lobbying has 
become an increasingly important aspect of their activity in spite 
of legal limitations restricting much of their involvement in the 
policy process. It is concluded that the law restricting 
charities from engaging in political activities has had limited 
success both because of its 'vagueness' and poor enforcement. It 
is argued throughout the thesis that the only countervailing force 
keeping medical research charities 'out-of-politics' to any
significant degree has come from volunteers and the donating 
public, but, even they have had only a limited impact. The degree 
of political involvement by a charity is now shown to be 
contingent on the policy area in which it operates, the degree of 
opposition to new government policies towards the interests of the 
organisation and its objectives, as well as the charity's 
financial resources.
But why study medical__research charities in this context?
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There are at least four answers to this question. First, medical 
research charities represent an interesting sub-sector of 
philanthropy in that they illuminate well the problems associated 
with the involvement of volunteers in the administration of 
charities. Second, medical research is a central area of 
charitable activity in terms of the financial contributions it 
receives from the donating public. Third, medical research is an 
especially important area for understanding relations between 
charities and the state, since the British and Canadian 
governments also participate directly in funding their own 
scientific investigations. Fourth, medical research is an area 
which lends itself to examination by social scientists given that 
the number of organisations is not unmanageably large. As 
explained in more detail in Appendix I, the problem of having to 
take only a 'representative sample' of charities is avoided in the 
case of medical research since virtually all organisations 
operating in Britain and Canada could be included in the interview 
schedule. Thus the difficulty which faces researchers studying, 
for example, poverty relief organisations (where there are a large 
number of disparate organisations in this field) can be 
circumvented.
There is a second question that arises, namely why study 
medical research in a comparative perspective? The most important 
reason is that there is sufficient in common between Britain and 
Canada in terms of a shared legal system, relating to charities 
and some similar social and political structures. At the same
12
time there are, of course, a number of important differences. For 
example, the most important perhaps, includes Canada's bi-cultural 
heritage, which has affected the development of its social 
institutions, as has the federal political system. It is a 
combination of both the similarities and differences between 
Britain and Canada which makes this comparative study of relations 
between charity and state particularly illuminating.
An important initial point to make is that for some purposes 
in this thesis reference will be made to England rather than 
Britain since the legal position of charities is somewhat 
different in Northern Ireland and very different in Scotland (the 
Scottish definition of a charitable trust is broader than that 
adopted in England). However, in discussing specific charities 
that operate in each of the three regions the term 'British 
charity' is adopted.15
In this case study of British and Canadian medical research 
charities, it is argued that, in light of cutbacks in government 
expenditure to medical research in the 1980's, of the need to co­
ordinate scientific investigations and of pressures from some 
volunteers to represent the interests of disease sufferers, as 
well as a number of other factors, charities have been drawn 
increasingly into the political process. This evidence suggests 
that charity-state relations have changed dramatically since the
150n the differences between the English and Scottish 
definition of charity, see G.W. Keeton and L.A. Sheridan, The 
Comparative Law of Trust in the Commonwealth. London: Berry Rose 
Ltd., 1976, pp. 87-88, 96-98.
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19th century when charities not only resisted state encroachment 
into many areas of social welfare, but devoted much of their 
resources towards encouraging state withdrawal from areas where 
tax revenues were already applied. Charities are shown now to be 
frequently critical of government policies aimed at cutting-back 
state funding for programmes in policy areas where charities are 
operating and also propose new legislation to ensure minimum 
levels and quality of state-funded services.
Given this, the thesis argues that the nature of charity- 
state relai ions has been altered and has created difficulties for 
legislators who have had to reconcile the non-political qualities 
of philanthropy - including altruism and community participation- 
with the reality that much charitable activity is devoted to 
participating in the policy process. The thesis concludes that 
the blurring of the distinction between philanthropy and politics 
has meant that charities have begun to resemble more traditional 
forms of interest groups while at the some time maintaining their 
priviledged 'tax exempt status'. This is a particularly
interesting development given that many British and Canadian 
medical research charities have been co-opted by pharmaceutical 
companies to participate in a number of that industry's lobbying 
campaigns in return for corporate donations.
The problems to be considered in this thesis have now been 
described in a general way. The substantive part of this research 
is contained in seven principal chapters while the main
conclusions to be drawn from it are outlined in chapter nine. A
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summary of the subject matter of each of the main chapters is 
given below.16
This chapter has three objectives. First, it provides an 
introduction to a number of institutional actors in each country
included in this study of charity-state relations. Second,, it
illustrates how charity law has developed in response to
reconciling the interests of private ph i1anthropy with the
interests of the state. Third, it demonstrates how charity law in 
its present form, is applied when registering and supervising 
charities. In doing so, it is further demonstrated that Canadian 
law is very similar to English law. However, it is argued that 
there are a number of important differences between the two 
countries regarding the institutional structures responsible for 
registering and supervising charities.
Chapter-Three
The discussion of charity law is continued in this chapter 
focusing specifically on the legal rule restricting British and 
Canadian charities from engaging in political activities. This 
chapter divides into three sections. The first examines the 
development in both countries of the common law restriction placed 
on charities and their involvement in the political process. This 
discussion takes account of the social conditions out of which the
16For a statement of the conduct of the research in Britain 
and Canada see Appendix I.
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law developed and the policy justifications given by judges in 
developing this area of law. Section II compares American 
legislation on the one hand with British and Canadian laws on the 
other. In section III, attempts at legal reform to deal with the 
increasing incidence of political involvement by British and 
Canadian charities are examined.
Chapter Four
The purpose of this chapter is to survey charities' financial 
sources and to develop a foundation for understanding the diverse 
relationships between charities and the state. In addition, an 
explanation is developed as to why charities, especially those 
operating in the medical research field, have assumed a greater 
responsibility, with the state's assistance, for the provision of 
important services. The chapter divides into two sections. A 
variety of government financial sources available to charities is 
examined followed by a discussion of the various types of non- 
financial government support extended to charities in both Britain 
and Canada.
Chapter five
This chapter is the first of four chapters focusing 
specifically on charities which collect and spend, voluntary 
contributions on medical research. In each of these chapters the 
main object is to gain an understanding of how, and over what 
issues, medical research charities interact with government. To 
provide some context to the case-study, chapter five begins with a
16
short history of the role of medical research in changing public 
health. This is followed by a discussion of the history of 
charities in this policy area, highlighting both their 
organisational features and their varying capacity to raise 
voluntary contributions depending on the disease being 
represented. The chapter concludes by outlining the governmental 
response to funding medical research in each country.
Chapter Six
This chapter seeks to present an understanding of the 
interaction between medical research charities and government 
within the context of theories of public goods. Section I 
outlines the mechanisms in place to facilitate collaboration 
between charity and state so as to avoid duplicating bio-medical 
research. Section II examines examples of charity-government 
collaboration in funding joint research projects. From this an 
assessment is made as to whether medical research charities and 
government view each other as partners or competitors in this 
policy area. Section III describes how the British and Canadian 
governments divide their research budgets among various diseases. 
In response to what charities view as an inequitable distribution 
of public tax revenue among disease areas, evidence is presented 
that charities have begun to lobby government despite legal 
limitations on political activity.
Chapter Seven
Section I of this chapter describes the British government' s
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declining commitment to bio-medical research since 1980 and 
discusses how British medical research charities have successfully 
increased their incomes during the same period. Furthermore, 
arguments are outlined as to why charities are ill-suited to 
assuming a greater responsibility for funding medical research in 
the wake of declining government commitment to this policy field. 
Section II examines the federal government's newly introduced 
formulae for funding Canadian bio-medical research. It is argued 
that with this new arrangement, the Canadian government (like the 
British government) has shifted a portion of its responsibility 
for funding this policy field to charities. In response, medical 
research charities in both countries have lobbied government 
vigorously to spend more on bio-medical research, despite legal 
limitations to their involvement in the political process.
Chapter Eight
While chapters five, six and seven focus on medical-research- 
related issues, chapter eight examines charitable involvement in 
lobbying government on patient services and public-education- 
related issues. In doing so, the chapter divides into three 
sections. The first deals with a number of patient-service issues 
directly related to the Canadian and British pharmaceutical 
industry. Section II examines patient-service issues unrelated to 
the industry which have prompted medical research charities to 
lobby on behalf of disease-suffering volunteers and financial 
contributors. Section III differs from the previous two sections, 
in that it focuses not on lobbies organized around patient
18
services, but rather lobbies organized around preventive medicine. 
Specifically, it examines the role of medical research charities 
in the anti-smoking lobby. Here the skill and sophistication of 
these organisations in pressuring government for legislative 
reform is revealed.
19
Chapter Two
Charity and the Law;__An Historical Review
This chapter has three objectives. First, it provides an 
introduction to a number of institutional actors in each country 
included in this study of charity-state relations. Second, it 
illustrates how charity law has developed in response to 
reconciling the interests of private philanthropy with the 
interests of the state. Finally, it demonstrates how charity law, 
in its present form, is applied when registering and supervising 
charities. In doing so, it is further demonstrated that Canadian 
law is similar to English law. However, there are a number of 
important differences between the two countries regarding the 
institutional structures responsible for registering and 
supervising charities.
While the courts in England and Canada are the final arbiters 
of whether an organisation is charitable. The vast number of 
cases, involving the definition of 'charitable purposes' do not 
reach the courts. Instead, the responsibility for registering and 
supervising charities lie with the Charity Commission and Revenue 
Canada respectively. But how does the law define 'charity'? The 
fact is that 'charity' as a legal concept is not defined. 
Indeed, in both England and Canada there is considerable ambiguity 
attached to the terms 'charity' and 'charitable organisation'. In
20
the context of common law, the issue put before the court is 
normally whether a particular organisation has 'charitable 
purposes'. Therefore, in a strict legal context the question of 
defining the concept of 'charity' is more precisely a question of 
interpreting what 'purposes' are charitable. Throughout the 
process of determining the status of an organisation's 'purposes' 
the administrative bodies in each country, and the courts in the 
final instance, apply four legal tests.
These tests can be summarised as follows: (1) Do the 
purposes of the organisation fall within the classification of 
charitable purposes set forth by Lord Macnaghten in the legal 
case, IRC V. Pemsel (1891)?1 It was in this court decision that 
the Judge Lord Macnaghten, held that all charitable purposes could 
be categorised as for either a) the relief of poverty or b) the 
advancement of education or c) the advancement of religion or d) 
other purposes beneficial to the community. (2) Another test 
applied by both the administrative bodies and the courts, seeks to 
determine whether an organisation's purposes are for the benefit 
of the public. This test, while appearing to be identical to the 
last section of the Macnaghten classification, is actually 
different. It is an additional test to ensure that charities 
provide a benefit of a tangible nature to the public or a 
sufficient section thereof. For example, an organisation would 
not be held charitable if it provided a service of benefit to the
IThe Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax Act
V. Pemsel (1891) A.C. 531 (H.L.)
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community but which was inaccessible to a broad cross-section of 
society. In other words, this second test measures a charity's 
'purposes' to determine whether the accessibility of its services 
are broad enough. In contrast, the last category of Macnaghten's 
classification is a test of the nature of the benefits derived. 
(3) An additional test requires organisations to have purposes 
that are analogous to those listed in the preamble to the Statute 
of Charitable Uses (1601).2 (4) The final test comprises a 
category that examines whether an organisation's objects violate 
public policy. This procedure includes an evaluation of an 
organisation's purposes to determine if a) there is an absense of 
self-help; b) an absence of profit distribution and c) an absence 
of substantial political activity. If organisations possess any 
of the above characteristics, they may be refused registration or 
have their charitable status revoked.
I. The History of Charity Law
This section of the chapter explores the historical 
development of the existing laws applicable to British and 
Canadian charities. By examining each of the four tests, the 
origin and development of charity law is revealed as is its 
influence on the way charities are now organized and operated. 
The major substance of charity law, as it is now applied in both 
countries, was determined largely between the years 1601 and 1891.
2Preambie to the statute__of Charitable Uses Act (1601) 43
Eliz., C.4.
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However, by 1891 Canada had only existed as an independent nation 
for 24 years. Therefore, the following discussion of the history 
and development of charity law must be taken largely to mean a 
history of English charity law.
There are a number of reasons for examining how this body of 
law has evolved into its present form. First, lawyers believe 
that a proper understanding of the present law requires an 
appreciation of the origin and the development of the common law 
treatment of 'charity'. Proceeding in this way reveals several 
important themes. For example, a number of social and political 
influences have played a decisive role in shaping the laws which 
regulate charities. From 1601 up to the present day, there has 
continued the problem of legally reconciling private 
philanthropy's provision of welfare services with the need for 
some provision by the state. Even Hobbes, writing in the 17th
century recognized the need for some form of state provision to 
compensate for the inequities associated with organized
philanthropy. In the Leviathan Hobbes writes:
"And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, 
become unable to be left to the charity of 
private persons; but to be provided for (as 
farforth as the necessities of nature require), 
by the Laws of the Commonwealth. For as it is 
uncharitableness in any man to neglect the 
impotent; so it is in the sovereign of a
Commonwealth, to expose them to the hazard of 
such uncertain charity."
3
3Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. London: I.M. Dent and Sons
Limited, 1970, p. 184.
23
From 1601 to 1853 the struggle between charity and the state 
was more precisely a struggle between the church and state, since 
the former was normally used as the executor of charitable 
bequests. Although secular charities had existed prior to the mid 
19th century their scope of activity, in comparison with church 
charities, had only started to expand greatly during the period of 
the industrial revolution.4 The shift away from using the church 
as the executor of charitable bequests, to the use of private 
trusts, was accompanied by a new instrument of state supervision 
designed to regulate the administration of charitable trusts (the 
Charity Commission). Established in 1853, after decades of 
controversy and complaints of inefficiency among charities, the 
Commission sought to ensure that funds designated for charitable 
purposes were applied honestly and efficiently.5
A. The legal concept of charity
As one legal historian remarked: "The concept of 'charity' 
is an elusive and every changing concept that is virtually 
impossible to define".6 Both Revenue Canada and the Charity
4D. Owen, English__Philanthropy__166Q-196Q Cambridge Mass:
Belknap Press, 1964, pp. 170-71.
5The Brougham Commission was the antecedent of the Charitable 
Trusts Acts (1853), (1855) and (1860) which established for the 
first time a permanent government agency to supervise the 
administration of charitable endowments. By 1860, the Commission 
had three full-time commissioners and one part-time commissioner.
6 G. Jones, History of the Law of Charity. London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 8. The History of the 
development of the concept of charity is traced in detail in W. K. 
Jordan, Philanthropy in England 1480-1660. Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 1964. A much shorter but nonetheless accurate summary can
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Commission have charged that the common law interpretation of 
charity is antiquated. 7 Disputes over the registration of 
charities are referred to the courts, where judges must then 
consult a list of charitable 'purposes' contained in an English 
statute passed in 1601. In order to understand present charity 
law, one must first examine The Statute of Charitable Uses (1601), 
or The Statute of Elizabeth I, as it is sometimes referred to.
Before the late 16th century there was little need to develop 
a concept of charity in English Law. The church, the manor, and 
the guilds undertook most social welfare work. Those individuals 
who desired to make gifts or bequests for charitable purposes 
frequently did so by making them to the church, which in turn 
would administer the funds for the purposes requested by the 
donor. The ecclesiastical courts supervised the administration of 
such funds. However, as medieval institutions like the church 
declined in importance, merchants and the landed gentry began 
assuming a larger role in funding social welfare institutions. 8 
Trusts were the legal instrument by which much of this funding was
be found in M. Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare. 
London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1979, chs. 2, 3; G. W. Keeton 
and L. A. Sheridan, The Modern Law of Charities. Belfast: 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly Inc, 1971; HMSO, Report of the
Committee on— the Law__and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts.London: HMSO, Cmd. 3710, 1952, pp. 15-16; B. Whitaker, The
Foundations■ Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979, Ch. 21.
7British Interview; The Charity Commission, 31 March 1987; 
and Canadian Interview; Revenue Canada, Tax Exempt Division, 29 
January 1987.
8C.E. Crowther, Religious Trusts. Oxford: George Ronald,
1954, pp. 32-33.
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secured. In most cases of benevolent giving in the years leading 
up to the 1601 rtatute, a donor would, normally by will, leave a 
gift to a church, or to some other persons, with instructions that 
it be applied for a charitable purpose. In 1598 the Court of 
Chancery assumed jurisdiction from the ecclesiastical courts in 
enforcing these uses. It was natural that the king, as parens 
patrie. would assume responsibility through the chancellor for 
supervising these funds devoted to the public benefit. As can 
best be determined, it appears that prior to 1601, the court of 
chancery, in deciding whether a use was charitable, simply asked 
whether it was or was not for substantive public benefit.9
The Tudor state became increasingly concerned in the late 
16th century about the escalating problems of poverty and vagrancy 
for two important reasons. First, agrarian reorganisation 
displaced thousands of workers creating large blocks of unemployed 
workers in many regions of the country. Second, with the advent 
of new manufacturing techniques and a greater reliance on 
international trade, the English economy became more buoyant. As 
a result, there occurred cyclical levels of unemployment which, 
during downturns, created a large number of destitute labourers 
and vagrants. Consequently, from 1597 to 1601 the Elizabethan 
Poor Laws were enacted by Parliament. The notable feature of 
these laws was that they systematically placed responsibility for 
the relief of poverty in the hands of local officials. Coinciding
9See G. Spence, Ulfi__Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery. Philadelphia: Tea and Blanchard, 1846, Vol. 1, p. 585.
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with the enactment of the poor laws was a dramatic increase in the 
amount and number of charitable bequests made in aid of the poor 
and dispossessed. Long and complex debates in response to this 
outburst of altruism eventually led to the enactment of the 
Statute of charitable Uses (1601). Most legal historians agree 
that Legislators were attempting to encourage more private 
philanthropy by ensuring donated funds were applied for their 
intended purposes.10
In essence, the Statute established the administrative 
machinery to supervise the application of charitable trusts. For 
example, ad hoc local commissions, appointed by the chancellor, 
were created to investigate allegations made by private 
individuals involving "any breach of trust, falsity, non­
employment, concealment, misgovernment or conversion of trust 
money".11 In carrying out their official duties, the appointed 
local commissioners required a set of guidelines listing the types 
of uses they should investigate if the need arose. Thus, the 
preamble to the statute listed a number of representative 
trusts. 12 However, each of these trusts were only held valid if
10Jones, History of the Law pf Charity, p. 25.
llFor a short description of the social and economic context 
of The Statute of Charitable Uses. (1601) see W. S. Holdsworth, ô 
History of English Law. London: Methuen Co., 1924, Vol. 4, pp. 
387-402.
i2Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses (1601) 43 Eliz.,
C. 4. The Statute was apparently drafted by a committee of people 
including Francis Moore, who shortly thereafter wrote extensively 
about its purpose. See G. Jones, 'Francis Moore's Reading on The 
Statute of Charitable Uses', Cambridge Law Journal. 24 (1967), p. 
224.
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the principal benefit flowed to the 'poor'. The legislation 
provided as follows:
Whereas lands ... goods ... chattels ... and 
money, have been ... given ... by sundry ... well 
disposed persons ... for ...
The relief of aged, impotent and poor people;
The maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and 
mariners;
The maintenance of schools of learning, free 
scholars in universities;
The repair of bridges, ports, havens,causeways, 
churches, sea banks and highways;
The education and preferment of orphans;
The relief, stock or maintenance of houses of 
correction;
The marriage of poor maids;
The supportion, aid and help of young tradesmen, 
handicraftsmen and persons decayed;
The relief of redemption of prisoners or 
captives;
The aid or ease of any poor inhabitants 
concerning payment of fifteens, setting out of 
soldiers and other taxes.
Which lands ... goods, ... chattels ... and 
money, nevertheless have not been employed 
according to the charitable content of the givers 
... by reason of frauds, breaches of trust and 
negligence in those that should ... employ the 
same.
13
The preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses, was neither 
intended to represent a definition of 'charity' nor of charitable 
purpose. Instead it provided an illustration of what should be 
considered a valid charitable purpose. The statute has long since 
been repealed, but no other legislation has been enacted in either 
England or Canada which defines, the concept of 'charity'.
13Preamble to the Statute__of Charitable__Uaea Act (1601) 43Eliz., c. 4.
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Nonetheless, the 1601 preamble is still consulted directly or by 
analogy during cases centering on the validity of a 'purpose'. 
This is done since the document is said to list those purposes 
'illustrative' of what should legally be considered charitable. 
The legal procedure of referring by 'analogy' to previously 
decided cases which themselves are based on cases analogous to a 
purpose listed in the 1601 case is one of the means by which the 
courts presently rule on the issue of charitable status. This 
partially explains why the law of charity has a degree of built-in 
flexibility. What is unusual about this aspect of law is that no 
statute clearly 'defines' the concept of charity. Instead, 
reference continues to be made to a statute enacted almost 400 
years ago, which itself only lists a number of purposes
illustrative of what the law regards as charitable. This has
meant, that the courts have enjoyed the flexibility through their 
own judicial discretion to validate charitable purposes which aim 
to advance the interests of society. At the same time they have 
been able to deny status to organisations which, for example, are 
motivated by the self-interest of their membership. The 1601 
statute in itself represented an attempt by the Tudor state to 
resolve the serious problems of poverty and vagrancy.14 It did 
this by encouraging individuals to assist in the relief of poverty 
through charitable trusts whose activities were controlled by a 
statutory mechanism. In turn, this meant that a portion of the 
administrative burden was taken off local governments who were
14Hold8Worth, A History of English Law, pp. 387-402.
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responsible for enforcing the poor laws.
By most accounts, the legal procedures established in 1601, 
aimed at supervising charities, were successful for the first 30 
or 40 years. However, these procedures were cumbersome and the 
law began to fall into disrepute with the general public. One of 
difficulties concerned the commissions enforcement of charitable 
trusts, since much of this responsibility rested with the general 
public who were expected to provide information (in the name of 
the Attorney-General) to, the Chancery court. However, few such 
actions were ever brought. Thus, for the next one hundred years 
there were very few legal cases which actually affected the types 
of purposes which were legally recognised as being charitable.
However, under the Mortmain__and Charitable Uses Act (1736) the
concept of charity was expanded which theoretically enabled it to 
embrace a new set of organisations. The statute stated that
"gifts of land to already established charities, or for new 
charitable purposes, should be invalidated by the courts unless 
the recipient was a university, college or school entitled 
specifically to exemption".15 Politicians of the day were 
concerned about the church acquiring excessive wealth by way of 
charitable bequests at the expense of the great landowners who 
sought to consolidate and maintain landed estates within their 
families.16 Judges wishing to protect the interest of heirs (and 
clearly most were disposed to do this) were therefore given the
15M. Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare, p. 56.
161bid., p. 36.
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discretion in cases covered by the Act to widen the concept of 
'charity' by bringing gifts within the Act and then striking them 
down. For example, a donation of land to a church for the purpose 
of establishing a hostel for visiting theologians was ruled to be 
a charitable gift but unenforceable under the Mortmain Statute. 
However, by invalidating the gift through this type of judicial 
reasoning, the establishment of 'hostels' became a newly 
recognized charitable purpose. By doing this, legislators, 
without fully realising the impact this would later have, 
broadened the interpretation of a valid charitable purpose by 
allowing the courts to recognise a new set of organisations as 
being charitable. These newly recognised charities were still 
required to have purposes either identical or at least analogous 
to ones listed in the 1601 preamble. By doing this, Chesterman 
remarks that the Mortmain Act distorted the interpretation of the 
1601's concept of 'charitable' since it no longer required a 
purpose to contain a 'public benefit' objective principally aimed 
at benefiting the poor.17 Prior to the Mortmain Act, the courts 
had held that the list of illustrative charitable purposes found 
in the 1601 statute had to also be of some benefit to the poor. 
This meant that during the pre-Mortmain Act period the scope of 
charitable activity was greatly limited. However, with the 
enactment of the Mortmain legislation public benefit was not 
simply equated with benefit to the poor but instead to 'any 
section of the community'. This permitted a much wider variety of
17Ibid., p. 56.
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organisations having purposes held to be analogous to those listed 
in the 1601 statute to be considered charitable. 18 As a result, 
organisations having principal purposes other than for the relief 
of poverty, for example, public school's providing education for 
the sons and daughters of the very wealthy, were held to be valid 
purposes. In essence, the Mortmain legislation is primarily 
responsible for widening the gap between our popular notion of 
charity as being purely altruistic organisations and what is 
actually held to be charitable under common law (this presently 
includes a large number of educational, medical research, and 
animal welfare charities that are completely unrelated to poor 
relief). While the Mortmain Act has provided the legal device for 
expanding the interpretation of a valid charitable trust, for more 
than two centuries this was largely discouraged by the courts 
throughout the 18th and early 19th century. Judges were concerned 
about bequests made for charitable purposes which threatened to 
deprive a testator's family of its 'rightful' due. So long as the 
bequests only involved personal property, family members could be 
protected by giving 'charitable' a narrow meaning and holding 
invalid, on grounds of uncertainty and/or perpetuity, only 'non- 
charitable' bequests. This restrictive approach was adopted by 
the courts in Morice V. Bishop of Durham (1805). 19 In this legal 
case. Lord Chancellor Eldon, the presiding judge, held that the 
trust bequeathed to the Bishop of Durham (the executor) was not
18lbid.. p. 57.
19Morice V. Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves. 522; 32 E. R. 947.
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charitable since the objects of the bequest were uncertain. The 
gift was also invalidated due to the court's sympathy to the 
general anti-clerical movement at the time.20
Aside from the development of the law's interpretation of a 
valid charitable purpose, one feature that has long characterised 
English and Canadian charities is their exemption from a variety 
of taxes. However, very little is presently understood of the 
legal principles or guidelines tax officials have adopted in 
determining tax exemptions. In 1799, the first income tax statute 
was passed in England which provided the exemption of all 
' corporation(s) fraternit (ies) or societ(ies) of persons 
established for charitable purposes only'.21 It appears that 
initially the Commissioners of Inland Revenue adopted the same 
definition of charity that had developed in trust law. However, 
to ensure that this particularly lucrative tax concession was not 
granted to too many organisations, the Commissioners in the 
Treasury lobbied for a much more narrow definition of charity. In
20Jones, History of the Law of Charity, p. 109.
21 Income tax ceased to be applied in 1816 to all corporations 
including charities, but, when, reinstated in 1842, the exemption 
to charities was subsequently reapplied. The fact that income tax 
and the Inland Revenue were not firmly entrenched in Britain's 
commercial culture by the 19th century partly explains why 
supervisory responsibilities went to the Charity Commission as 
opposed to the Inland Revenue. In Canada, when philanthropic 
activity did require government supervision at the beginning of 
the 20th century, income tax was firmly established and thus may 
be a partial explanation as to why responsibility for supervising 
charities went to Revenue Canada as opposed to a separate agency 
modelled after the Charity Commission. Another explanation is 
that Canada did not have old, corrupt, inefficient trusts which 
required modernizing. This was one of the main issues in the 19th 
century debate in England over the need for a Charity Commission.
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1863 the interests of the Inland Revenue were taken up by 
Gladstone, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
Parliamentary debates reveal that Gladstone argued that endowed 
charities engaged in the relief of poverty (which were usually 
older organisations deriving their income from the interest or 
investment of bequeathed money) should not be entitled to 
exemption. He argued that by exempting them from paying income 
tax on their accumulated income, the state and others who did pay 
tax would subsidize these organisations. Moreover, he suggested 
that the financial subsidisation of the charities was not 
accompanied by any form of state control.22 While Gladstone's 
attack did not materialise into legislative reform, it did help 
Inland Revenue officials to defend their new policy to grant the 
coveted tax exempt status only to organisations engaged in the 
'relief of poverty'. Over the next 23 years, this view remained 
unchallenged. However, in 1886 when the Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue refused to grant an exemption to a trust, the precedent
22The following exerpt from his Financial Statements of 1863 
summarises his concerns,
"If we have the right to give public money, we 
have no right to give it in the dark. We are 
bound to give it with discrimination; bound to 
give it with supervision; bound as a 
constitutional Parliament, if the Hospitals are 
to receive a grant, to bring them within some 
degree of control." Quoted in D. Owen, English 
Philanthropy 1660-1960. p. 331.
Furthermore, in his speech in Parliament, Gladstone noted that 
following his argument in his financial statement of 1863 he was 
struck "by the skillful manner in which the charitable army, so to 
call it, has been marshalled". Quoted in Owen, English 
Philanthropy 166Q-196Q, p. 332.
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setting case Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax V. 
Pernsel was launched.23
The judicial decision of this legal case continues to provide 
the Charity Commission and Revenue Canada with lines for deciding 
what organisations should become recognised officially as 
charities. In addition, the courts in both countries continue to 
rely on the Pemsel decision in providing four categories of 
charitable purposes. Because this common law case is so important 
in terms of the history of charity law and has impacted greatly on 
the way charitable organisations are organised and operated, there 
is utility in briefly stating its facts.
In 1813, certain areas of land were transferred to trustees 
to apply the income for the general purpose of establishing and 
administering a number of Protestant Episcopal Churches (commonly 
known as the Moravian Church). The substantive issue put before 
the court was whether the purposes of the trust were charitable 
within the meaning of 'charitable purposes' under the Income Tax 
legislation. The Income Tax Commissioners argued the concept of 
charity, as properly used in the income tax legislation, should be 
restricted to its ordinary meaning; namely the 'relief of 
poverty'. Pemsel on the other hand (who was the Treasurer of the 
Moravian Church) argued that even in the context of tax 
legislation the word 'charity' ought to be given its technical 
meaning; the meaning it had acquired in trust law.
23The commissioners__for Special__Purposes of__the Income Tax
Act V. Pemsel (1891) A. C. 531 (H.L.).
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In long and detailed judgements the House of Lords ruled in
favour of Pemsel. Lord Macnaghten, who wrote the leading majority
opinion, expressed an important reason as to why the court ruled
against the Income Tax Commissioners. Macnaghten felt that the
commissioners had acted improperly in changing their
administrative practice by adopting a too restrictive definition
of charity. He stated that:
With the policy of taxing charities I have 
nothing to do. It might be right, or it may be 
wrong, but speaking for myself, I am not sorry to 
be compelled to give my voice for the respondent.
To my mind it is rather startling to find the 
established practice of so many years suddenly 
set aside by the administrative department of 
their own motion, and after something like an 
assurance given to Parliament that no change 
would be made without the interposition of the 
legislation.
24
Second, and probably the more important aspect of the case 
(other than its holding that charitable purposes have the same 
meaning for tax as they do for trust law) is the four-fold 
classification of charitable purposes developed by Lord 
Macnaghten. In the course of giving his reasons for judgement he 
stated that:
Charity in its legal sense comprises four 
principal divisions: trusts for the relief of 
poverty; trusts for the advancement of religion; 
trusts for the advancement of education and 
trusts for other purposes beneficial to the 
community, not falling under any of the
proceeding heads.
25
24Ibid., p. 591
25Ibid., p. 591
By 1891,the most important legal principles had been firmly 
established in practice which to this day affect the character and 
scope of English and Canadian charity law. For example, the 
purposes listed in the preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 
(1601) are now being referred to directly or by analogy in 
determining the validity of charitable purposes. In addition, the 
Macnaghten classification provided a contemporary interpretation 
of 'charitable purposes' which captures the 'spirit and 
intendment' of the preamble to the 1601 statute.26 It is these 
two legal devices which serve as the basis for determining whether 
or not an organisation is worthy of charitable status. In 
addition, several other important legal tests have developed 
naturally in response to the changing social and political 
conditions under which charities now operate.27
26Particular thanks to John Dewar, School of Law, Univeristy 
of Warwick, for synthesizing the legal importance of a) The
statute of charitable uses (1601), b) The Mortmain__and Charitable
Uses Act (1736), c) Morice V. Bishop of Durham (1805) and d) IRC
V. Pemsel (1891).
27Ba8ically the courts of vitually all Commonwealth countries 
use the same methodology in determining whether a particular 
purpose is charitable. And in Canada the courts will frequently 
cite and rely upon decisions from other Commonwealth countries, 
particularly, of course, decisions of the courts in England. The 
American courts also apply the common law definition of charity 
and their decisions are usually discussed under the same headings 
as decisions from Commonwealth courts. However, American courts 
do not feel as bound as Canadian courts to refer to the categories 
set out in Pemsel's case or to the Statute of Charitable Uses 
(1601). Therefore, American legal decisions are seldom cited by 
Canadian courts. However, the legal principles applied are 
basically the same.
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b . Charity law in England and Canada
In England, and indeed in most Commonwealth countries
including Canada, there are a number of 20th century court 
decisions regarding the definition of a 'charitable purpose'. 
Underlying these decisions are four tests which the courts invoke 
when deciding whether or not a 'purpose' is charitable. This 
section of the chapter reviews each of these four tests, in order 
to illuminate the legal principles underlying the common law 
interpretation of 'charity'. This serves to pinpoint exactly 
which types of organisations qualify for charitable status, and to 
illustrate the wide variety of activities which these 
organisations are now engaged in.
(i) Pemsel's case
In the process of determining charitable status, the courts 
first examine whether an organisation's purposes fall within one 
or more of the categories listed by Lord Macnaghten in Pemsel * s 
case 1891. This means that a trust or organization's purpose must 
be unequivocally for a) the relief of poverty, b) the advancement 
of education, c) the advancement of religion or d) some other 
purposes beneficial to the community. In both countries, the 
courts are compelled to rule that a 'purpose' is not charitable if 
it cannot be categorised according to the options listed in 
Macnaghten's decision.
One question frequently posed -is, why is the categorisation 
significant particularly when the fourth category (purposes 
beneficial to the community) could be taken to embrace the first
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three categories? In resolving this question, legal experts agree 
that if the 'purposes' fall within one of the first three 
categories mentioned in . Pemsel's case, the courts are then 
compelled to rule that the organisation or trust is for a 'public 
benefit'. However, if the 'purposes' fall within the fourth 
category, the applicant organisation must prove that the 'purpose' 
is indeed for a public benefit.
English and Canadian legal experts are of the opinion that 
the categories listed by Macnaghten provide judges with a list of 
conveniences. However, Lord Wilberforce in the precedent setting
case Scottish ..Burial__Reform and__Cremation Society V. Glasgow
Corporation (1968) shed a somewhat different light on the 
Macnaghten classification scheme. As he states:
But three things must be said about it, which its 
author would surely not have denied: first that, 
since it is a classification of conveniences, 
there may well be purposes which do not fit 
neatly into one of the other headings; secondly 
that the words used must not be given the force 
of a statute to be construed; and thirdly, that 
the law of charity is a moving subject which may 
well have evolved since 1891.
28
(ii) Public benefit
The second test that English and Canadian courts apply when 
rendering decisions on charitable status measures the ability of a 
'purpose' to confer a tangible benefit on the public. Most law 
text-books view this second test as ■ having two aspects. First,
28SCQttiah— Burial--Reform__and__Cremation Society V. GlasgowCorporation (1968) A. C. 138.
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some interest must be furthered by the 'purpose'. For example, in
the case of the Scottish Burial__Reform and Cremation Society V.
Glasgow Corporation ( 1968). the court held that based on evidence
showing that public benefits could be derived from cremation, the
society was ruled a charity.29 The basis of that decision rested
on the belief that as a non-profit making society, whose purpose
was to encourage and provide facilities for cremation, a 'social
interest' was indeed being advanced. In another case, Gilmour V.
Coats (1949), 30 a trust for reclusive nuns was invalidated on the
grounds that an insufficient degree of benefit to the public was
being provided. In commenting on this case Maurice remarks:
"There was evidence before the House of Lords and 
the courts below concerning the doctrine of the 
Roman Catholic Church with regard to the benefit 
conferred by the contemplative life, not only on 
those who followed it themselves but also, 
through the efficacy of their intercessory 
prayers, on members of the public, bringing about 
their spiritual improvement, as well as by the 
example afforded by the nuns' lives of self- 
denial in order to attain greater love of God and 
union with him."
31
The second aspect of this test involves an organisation 
illustrating to the court that the 'public' will benefit from its 
proposed ' purpose(s)'. Public in this context is taken to mean 
not simply a small number of persons but rather some substantial
29lbid.
30Gilmour V. Coats (1949) A.C. 495.
31Spencer Maurice, Tudor on Charities. London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 7th edition, 1984, p. 75.
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'cross-section of the community' . It is only then that a purpose 
meets this basic requirement and is considered to be for a public 
benefit hence, charitable. However, the notion of a 'cross- 
section of the community' is loosely defined, and again, only 
serves as a guiding principle for determination of public benefit. 
To reduce the ambiguity of this concept, English and Canadian 
courts have not granted charitable status to trusts or 
organisations if their purposes do not confer benefits to a 
sufficiently large number of persons. Furthermore, they will 
refuse to do so if the benefit is not potentially available to the 
public.32 For example, virtually all activity in aid of the sick
or disabled meets the 'public benefit' test. Charitable status 
has been accorded to trusts and other organisations which 
establish or maintain clinics, hospitals and convalescent homes, 
to provide medical and hospital equipment or to advance medical 
science. However, a number of organisations have failed to pass 
the public benefit test. For example, organisations promoting 
'alternative methods' of healing which have very little degree of 
acceptance by the medical profession, have normally been refused 
charitable status.33
(iii) Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses (16Q1.1 
The third test applied by the courts has caused the most
32This issue is discussed in virtually all the introductory 
law textbooks, but see in particular-P.S. Atiyah, 'Public Benefits 
in charities'. Modern Law Review, 2L (1958), pp. 138-139.
33chesterman, Charities, Trusts and Social Welfare, p. 165.
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difficulty for legal experts. It states that an organisation's 
'purposes' must be analogous to the list of charitable uses 
outlined in the Statute of Charitable Uses (1601). In most cases 
a charitable organisation's purpose(s) will fall within one of the 
four categories listed by Lord Macnaghten in the Pemsel case. 
This is taken to be a sufficient condition for validating 
charitable purposes since the four-fold classification is said to 
capture the 'spirit and intendment' of the 1601 statute. However, 
when there exist some doubts as to the validity of an 
organisation's purposes, that is if they do not fall neatly in one 
of the Macnaghten categories, then reference must be made to the 
Statute of Charitable Uses (1601). This was determined in the 
previously discussed case Morice V. Bishop of Durham (1805). In 
this legal case it was held that the courts should draw an analogy 
between a disputed 'purpose' and purposes listed in the preamble 
of a previous case which in turn had been held to be directly 
analogous to a purpose listed in the preamble. While this may 
seem confusing, an example illustrates best what is meant. In the 
case Scottish Burial Reform (1968), where it was ruled that the 
provision of a crematorium was charitable, the court was persuaded 
by the evidence that the purpose was analogous to the preservation 
of cemetaries, which had been held to be a charitable purpose 
because it was analogous to the upkeep of a churchyard, which had 
been held to be charitable because it was analogous to the repair 
of churches which was mentioned in the preamble. This example 
seems far-fetched since 'analogy drawing' could be extended one
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hundred fold. So, why do the courts continue to do it? It can 
only be assumed that the preamble to the Statute of Charitable 
(1601) was never intended by its framers to be a complete or 
even representative list of charitable uses. Consequently, it is 
presumed that those who drafted the Statute sought to give the 
concept of charity a degree of flexibility to adapt to changing 
social, political and cultural conditions. However, it is 
interesting that this 'flexibility' did not preclude 'purposes' 
once held charitable to become non-charitable under common law. 
For example, some of the purposes listed in the Statute such as 
trusts for the marriages of poor maids or relieving low-paid 
workers from paying taxes, would probably no longer be considered 
charitable themselves. The Act itself, of course, has been long 
since repealed.34 Nevertheless, the process of analogous 
reasoning permits the courts to adopt the concept of charity to 
modern social and political conditions while fulfilling their 
mandatory legal obligation to consult the 1601 statute. In doing 
so, British and Canadian courts have been able to develop the 
concept of charity within the spirit and intendment of the 
Elizabethan preamble. The extent to which the courts come close 
to legislating for new charitable purposes is illustrated by the 
case of animal welfare charities. There is no example in the
Statute__Of__Charitable Uses (1601) that remotely resembles an
animal charity. However, the preamble to the 1601 statute does
340f course, once the courts adopted the preamble in defining 
the meaning of charities, the fact that the statute was repealed 
has been of little consequence.
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contain the maintenance of schools of learning, free schools and 
scholars in universities. From this it was established that the 
advancement of education .including research is a valid charitable 
purpose. In 1857, a trust to fund an institution for studying and 
curing diseases of animals useful to man was held to be 
charitable.35 In 1864, this precedent was followed by holding a 
gift to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals to be 
charitable, and this in turn was followed in numerous other cases 
of animal welfare charities. Picarda explains that the basis in 
England and Canada for considering such trusts charitable today is 
"because they promote morality and check man's innate tendency to 
cruelty and are thus of benefit to the community".36 This type of 
judicial reasoning further explains how we are left with a wide 
gap between popular notions of charity as being concerned with 
purely altruistic concerns and what is actually now held to be 
charitable under common law.
(iv) Absence of self help, profit distribution, and 
substantial political involvement
The fourth and final test that the courts apply concerns a 
number of characteristics of which charities are prevented from 
acquiring. These three characteristics have emerged, over the 
last one hundred years as a reflection of the changes that have 
occurred with regard to the type of services that charities now
35Universitv of London V. Yarrow (1857) 1 De Gand J72.
36Hubert Picarda, The___Law__and__Practice__Relating__toCharities. London: Butterworths, 1977, p. 105.
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provide.37
(a) Self-help organisations
English and Canadian laws are identical in that almost all 
'self-help' organisations have been refused registration as 
charities. In both countries the term self-help is taken to mean 
organisations whose primary objectives are to confer benefits 
(usually financial) upon its membership out of a common fund 
wholly or substantially made up of the member's contributions. As 
Chesterman remarks, such organisations are deemed to lack the 
necessary element of altruism to enable them to qualifty as a 
charity.38 As a result, most trade unions and professional and 
trade associations fall outside the parameters of charity. 
However, certain self-help organisations, particularly in England 
can acquire charitable status by applying to the Registrar of 
Friendly Societies. These bodies acquire the organisational form 
of a self-help group but are actually concerned with the welfare 
of non-members. While the vast majority of friendly societies are 
considered self-help organisations, a small number are not and 
thereby are eligible to apply for charitable status. The dual 
status of 'self-help and charitable' is only conferred on those 
organisations which can illustrate to the courts that their 
purposes are primarily charitable and that any financial rewards 
to the organisation's members, are purely incidental. For
37Chesterman, Charities. Trusts, and Social Welfare, p. 175.
3filbid. . p. 175.
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example, a fund maintained by 250 residents of Brixton to provide 
free home nursing for Brixton children recovering from meningitis 
was granted charitable status since the fund was available to a 
section of the public that did not contribute to the fund. Had 
the fund only been available to the children of paying 
subscribers, the organisation would not have been granted 
charitable status.39
In both England and Canada there are relatively few 
organisations that are both 'self-help' and 'charitable'. This is 
true since self-help organisations, as their label implies, are 
designed to advance the interests of its membership, a feature 
which in many cases is counter-opposed to the underlying principle 
of altruism. However, there are 'hybrid'organisations and the two 
principles of self-help and altruism can legally exist side by 
side. For example, in England in 1985, Alcoholics Anonymous 
introduced a Bill into Parliament so that it could legally refuse 
to accept donations. The charity's members who rely on will-power 
in their battle against alcohol addiction sought the legal power 
to decline cash gifts since they endangered the organisation's 
guiding principle of self-help. The unprecendented move came 
after two legacies of about £10,000 each were made to Alcoholics 
Anonymous which, reluctantly, they were required to accept. This 
unusual case illustrates that charities may have 'purposes' which 
involve both self-help and altruism and which ultimately are
39lbid., P- 177.
46
recognised by the law as being charitable.40
(b) Absence of profit distribution 
In Canada, unlike England of course, there are both federal 
and provincial laws relating to organisations which do not 
distribute profits to their membership. Non-profits, as they are 
popularly referred to, have a number of distinguishing features. 
Although they are permitted through commerical activity to acquire 
profits, they are forbidden from distributing these profits to 
their membership. Non-profit corporations normally acquire their 
initial operating capital from fees paid by subscribing members. 
These organisations are not considered charities since they fail 
to pass the various tests described above.41 The Canadian 
Masonary Contractors Association (CMCA), for example, is a non­
profit organisation whose purposes are to advance the non- 
financial interests of its membership. This is achieved through 
lobbying the federal and provincial governments for legislative 
changes that would be advantageous to their trade. There are a
40The Times. 29 November 1985.
410rganisations wishing to obtain non-profit status register 
as do charities under Part II of the Canada Corporations Act 
(1979) RSC C-32. The major difference between the two types of 
non-profits (charitable non-profits and membership non-profits) 
relates to the way they are treated under tax legislation. For 
example, charitable foundations - those organisations solely 
involved in granting money to charities which do provide services 
- must adhere to strict disbursement requirements. At present 
Canadian foundations must distribute 90 per cent of their income 
acquired either from endowments, inaome acquired from investment 
of these endowments, or from public donations. Like charitable 
non-profits, membership non-profits are not taxed on any profits 
they make from fund raising retail activities, government grants 
or investment income.
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number of reasons why this organization is not considered a 
charity. First, the CMCA's purposes do not fall within any of the 
categories outlined in the Pemsel case. Second, and as discussed 
in the next sub-section, this organisation is actively involved in 
lobbying the government for legislative reform and therefore 
violates the legal principle restricting charities from engaging 
in substantial political activities. Third, the CMCA does not 
provide a tangible public benefit to the 'community' or to a 
considerable cross-section thereof. Finally, the CMCA is 
ineligible for charitable status since its purposes do not fall 
within 'the letter or the spirit and intendment' of the preamble 
to the Statute of Charitable Uses (1601).
While the CMCA is not 'charitable' for the reasons mentioned 
above, Canadian laws do not treat it as being a 'for-profit' 
organisation. Instead, like charities, non-profits such as the 
CMCA enjoy a tax exempt status and are immune from a number of 
regulatory statutes including securities legislation.42 In other 
words, in Canada there are statutory provisions for a separate 
type of organisation that lie somewhere between private 
philanthropy and the business sector. In contrast to Canada, the 
concept of a non-profit organisation has neither popular currency 
nor legal status in England. The closest legal structures found 
in England that approximates the Canadian non-profit is the
42P. Cummings, Proposals___for___a___New__ Not-for-profit
Corporations Law for Canada. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974, 
Vol. 1, p. 4.
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company limited by guarantee.43 However, organisations adopting 
this legal form are not granted the same tax exempt status enjoyed 
by their Canadian counterparts.
In both countries the law not only strictly prohibits 
charities from distributing profits but it legally bars the 
organisation's trustees from receiving remuneration for their 
services. But of course, this does not mean that charities are 
not permitted to have paid employees, Oxfam, England's largest 
charity in terms of income, presently employs 600 people in 
England and 200 employees overseas, and Save the Children Fund 
which has a permanent paid staff of 800 in England and an 
additional 1,400 abroad.44 Sheridan makes the point that legal 
requirements calling for a separation between those at the 
administrative helm of an organisation from those involved in 
'day-to-day' administrative activities, restricts the flow of 
profit, 'in the guise of remuneration', to those in ultimate 
control of a charity. If an organisation is found to contravene 
the non-profit distributing rule, then non-registration or de- 
registration of an organisation's charitable status is normally 
the course of action pursued.45
(c) Political involvement
The common law principle that charities cannot have purposes
43Tom Deans and Alan Ware, 'Charity-State Relations: A 
Conceptual Analysis', Journal of Public Policy. 6 (1986), p. 128.
440bserver Colour Magazine. 20 October 1985, pp. 34-5.
45L. A. Sheridan, Tlifi-Modern Law of-Charities, pp. 61-62.
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which are substantially political is the final test which the 
courts apply when determining whether a trust or organisation is 
charitable. As Chesterman remarks:
... the word political takes on a number of 
different meanings each one of which is taken to 
be a sufficient condition for being a non- 
charitable purpose ... and include purposes (1) 
to further the aims of a recognised party, (2) to 
promote the spread of a general political
doctrine, such as socialism, (3) to persuade the 
public attitude of mind towards some broad social 
question, such as community relations or 
international peace, or (4) to attempt to bring 
about or oppose changes in the law.
46
As with the other tests, there are numerous examples in 
English and Canadian common law history illustrating why charities 
have been denied charitable status on the grounds of 'substantial 
political activity'. For example, in 1898 an English court held 
that a trust's purpose for 'religious and mental improvement', was 
substantially intermingled with furthering Conservative Party 
principles and, thus, was non-charitable. A more recent case
concerning Amnesty International [McGovern__V. Attorney-General
(1981)] involved purposes which included the relief of prisoners 
of conscience and attempts to secure their release. These were 
held to be political, hence non-charitable, since among other 
things the organisation attempted to change the laws of foreign
46Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare, p. 181.
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countries.47
This discussion illuminates just one of the case law examples 
relating to charities and political involvement. A number of 
other complex legal issues relevant to the study of charity-state 
relations are addressed separately in chapter three.
ii. Registration and Supervision of Charities
One dimension of charity-state relations involves the state's 
responsibility for registering new charities and supervising the 
activities of those already in operation. Throughout section I of 
this chapter it was argued that the courts in both England and 
Canada are the final arbiters of whether an organisation's 
purposes are charitable. However, since the vast number of cases 
involving the definition of 'charitable purposes' do not reach the 
courts, the administrative procedures governing the official 
registration of charities are equally important to examine. In 
this section first a brief description of the registration 
procedure which charities must follow is given, and an historical 
account is provided as to why such procedures differ considerably 
in the two countries. After this, evidence is provided to show 
the economic advantages extended to organisations qualifying for
47There are certainly other case law examples concerning 
charities and substantial political involvement. See Animal
Defence and__Anti-vivisection V. I.R.C. (1950) 66 L.T.R. 1091 (Ch.
Div.), where it was decided that, even though the Society's object 
of opposing vivisection might be educational, on the evidence, 
another object of this Society was to obtain the repeal of the 
Cruelty to Animals Act (1876); therefore its purposes were held 
political and hence not charitable.
51
charitable status in England and Canada. Finally, a brief 
description and evaluation is made of the state's ability to 
surpervise charities after they have been registered so as to 
ensure their administration accords with the law.
a . Registration
Registration of new charities in Canada is a two-step 
procedure. In the first instance an organisation must file its 
proposed objects with the Department of Consumer and Corporate 
Affairs and register under Part II of the Canada Corporations Act 
(1970). The advantages of having tax exempt status comes only 
after the second step which involves applying to Revenue Canada 
for a charity tax number. In other words, the responsibility for 
determining charitable status rests with Revenue Canada, not with 
the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. Officials 
within the Tax Exempt Organisation Division of Revenue Canada base 
their decisions to register new charities on the common law 
interpretation of 'charity'. If an organisation's 'purposes' meet 
the common law tests, it then receives a charity tax number, 
automatically, thereby permitting its income to be tax exempt. 
Furthermore, this exemption allows donors to deduct any gift to 
charity from their taxable income.48
48Para. 110(1) of) The Canadian Income Tax Act (1952) r .s .c . 
C148 as amended by 1970-71-72, C. 63, provides that "within 
limits, a taxpayer can deduct contributions to the following 
organisations: (i) registered charities, (ii) registered Canadian
amateur athletic associations, (iii)-housing corporations resident 
in Canada and exempt under this part, by Paragraph 149(1) (i), (iv) 
Canadian municipalities, (v) universities outside Canada 
prescribed to be universities, the student body of which 
ordinarily includes students from Canada to which her Majesty in
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In England, responsibility for registering new charities lies 
with a government department which is separate from the department 
responsible for administering income tax. The Charity Commission 
is a government agency, responsible to the Home Office. It is 
empowered to register new charities and has the jurisdictional 
authority to grant these organisations a number of fiscal 
privileges.49 In deciding whether or not an organisation is a 
charity, the Charity Commissioners carry out a quasi-judicial 
function. During particularly complicated and contentious cases 
involving registration or de-registration, the Charity Commission 
communicates extensively with the Inland Revenue. Thus the 
difference between the two countries is that in Canada a 
government department primarily concerned with collecting taxes 
registers and supervises charities. Revenue Canada executes its 
'registration' and 'supervision' responsibilities in an ancillary 
capacity to its main purpose. In contrast, there exists a much 
clearer separation between the two functions in England: the 
Inland Revenue is responsible for collecting taxes and the Charity 
Commission is responsible for applying charity law.
right of Canada has made a gift during the taxpayer's taxation 
year or the 12 months immediately preceding that taxation year."
49The Charity Commission determines the 'charitable status' 
of all organisations seeking registration. If a decision is made 
to register an applicant organisation, then the Inland Revenue 
takes this as a sufficient condition to exempt the said 
organisation from income tax, capital gains tax, capital transfer 
tax, corporation tax, development land tax, national insurance and 
stamp duty. The charity will also receive at least 50 per cent 
reduction in local authority rate. However, the local authority 
has the discretion to waive some or all of the remaining half.
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In England the procedures which applicant organisations must 
follow to become registered are relatively straightforward. After 
a charity's trustees have submitted an application form, 
accompanied by a copy of the organisation's governing instrument, 
the Commission's staff indicate whether the application succeeds 
or fails. While the application is being processed - and this can 
vary from two months to two years - the trustees may submit 
arguments to the Commissioners in person, in writing or by 
telephone. The cases which are difficult to decide (a small 
minority) must be resolved in consultation with the Inland 
Revenue, a procedure specifically outlined under section 9 of the 
Charities Act (1960).50 However, most applications are granted 
approval mainly because they are drafted in consultation with 
organisations,such as the National Council of Social Services 
(NCSS) which have staff with an expert knowledge of charity law. 
In addition to consulting outside organisations, trustees often 
refer to the Charity Commission's Annual Reports when drafting 
their applications. These reports specify recent changes to the 
guidelines that the Commissioners use when deciding on the 
validity of an applicant's purposes. If an organisation 
formulates an application which is rejected, the organisation's 
trustees are entitled to pursue an informal procedure of internal 
appeal.51 This requires the 'Officers of the Commission' and the
50Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare, p. 115.
51 Internal appeals are referred to in both the Annual Reports 
of the Charity Commissioners and in the Goodman Report, but as 
Chesterman notes the precise procedures are scarcely publicised.
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trustees of the failed application to submit written arguments 
stating their case to the 'Board of the Charity Commission'. If 
the application is again rejected, the applicant(s) can take legal 
action in an effort to force the Charity Commission to register 
them. In both England and Canada, this last procedure is both 
expensive and time-consuming, and therefore seldom used.
In Canada, if the decision is made to grant an organisation 
charitable status, it then becomes eligible to receive a wide 
range of fiscal privileges. At the present time. Revenue Canada 
receives approximately 3,500 applications for registration each 
year which is similar to the number received by the Charity 
Commission. Whereas the Charity Commission has a staff of 450, 
there are only 35 members of the Tax-Exempt Organisation Division 
of Revenue Canada, who review the merits of all applications for 
registration.52 In Canada, the process is conducted relatively 
informally. Information circular No. 80-10 sets out which 
documents a registered charity must file, these include: an
application for registration form, financial statements, governing 
documents and a statement of aims and objectives. 53 Upon receipt 
of these documents a Revenue Officer reviews them; if there are 
any queries the registrants receive assistance from Revenue Canada 
in completing the forms properly. If there are no difficulties 
with the applicant's registration it will be approved in a matter
52Neil Brooks, Charities:____ Hie__Legal Framework- Ottawa:
Policy Coordination Directorate, 1983, p. 227.
53Canada Corporations__Act (1952) R.S.C. C148 as amended by
1970-71-72, c. 63.
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of weeks. However, if the forms are not completed properly, or 
more information is required, it may take up to a year to finalize 
the registration procedure. On average it takes three to four 
months for an organisation to receive charitable status.54
Since Revenue Canada's primary function is to collect taxes, 
it is generally accepted that its ability to oversee the 
registration of charitable organisations, is limited. In fact, in 
the 1977 report by the National Advisory Council on Voluntary 
Action entitled, People in Action, it was recommended that:
The responsibility for registration and 
deregistration of charitable organisations be 
transferred from Revenue Canada which is only 
concerned with the collection of revenue, to the 
Secretary of State, which has somewhat broader 
concerns. The department should be authorised 
and encouraged to take a more flexible view to 
objects and activities which are for the general 
good of the community.
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The most common criticism levelled against Revenue Canada 
concerns its ability to register charities, since such decisions 
are normally legal in nature and thus not adequately addressed by 
a department staffed primarily with accountants. Recent 
suggestions in Canada, advocating a separate agency to register 
and supervise charities, parallel the English example where the 
Charity Commission performs these same functions. For example, 
those supporting the adoption of a similar government department
54Brooks, Charitiesi__The Legal Framework, p - 226.
55National Advisory Council on Voluntary Action, People in
Action. Ottawa: Minister of supply and services, 1978, p. 235.
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in Canada have emphasized that it could be properly staffed, as it 
is in England, with lawyers possessing an expertise in the area of 
charity law. The claim has also been made that a separate agency 
could be given statutory powers that extend and improve the 
state's authority to monitor and regulate the activities of 
charitable organisations. In interviewing a Revenue Canada 
official it was suggested the best model for Canada would be the 
English legislation entitled the Charities Act (1960).56
An important question to resolve is why different 
institutional structures have developed in two countries which 
employ identical legal criteria when determing charitable status. 
The answer to this question is partly entwined in the long and 
complex history of philanthropy in England when compared to the 
relatively youthful history of the charitable movement in Canada.
Beginning in 1601, with the enactment of the Statute of 
Charitable Uses was a provision for the Lord Chancellor to 
authorise the appointment of the Bishop of any diocese and others 
with him to act as commissioners to enquire into the abuses and 
breaches of trust of any property given for such 'charitable and 
godly uses' as were listed in the preamble. The reason the first 
regulatory powers rested with the Bishop reflected the fact that 
most charitable donations were made to the church.57 However, by 
1853 with the mounting fear the church had already acquired far
56Canadian Interview; Revenue Canada, Tax Exempt Organisation 
Division, 29 January 1987.
57Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare, p. 24.
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too much land, and thus was eroding the power of the land owning 
class, legislative reforms were drafted which withdrew the 
regulatory powers away from the church and placed them into the 
hands of a separate statutory agency.58 In addition, by 1853 
there existed not only a growing number of social welfare 
organisations that were completely dissociated from the church, 
but there had been a long-standing concern about the ways in which 
many old charities, including educational charities, were being 
administered. In response to what was essentially viewed as 
corrupt behaviour, the Brougham Commisison in 1816 had begun a 
comprehensive fact-finding investigation into the abuses of 
charitable trusts in England. Over a period of 21 years the 
Commission toured the country and engaged in a thorough and 
painstaking survey of the administration of virtually all
charitable endowments in England and Wales.59 As Owen remarks: 
"The Commission's chairman Lord Brougham never hesitated to press 
such advantages he enjoyed, and he was not reluctant to poke his 
investigating finger into ancient and dignified endowments. It 
was, in his view, unfortunate that London schools so often used 
their resources to board and clothe a small number of pupils 
rather than provide education for a large number."60 The Brougham 
Commission's most important contribution - although one that was 
delayed by bureaucratic squabbles - was establishing the Charity
580wen, English Philanthropy 1660-1960. pp. 197-208.
S9Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare, pp. 63-64.
6OOwen, English Philanthropy 1660-1960, p. 184.
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Commission as a permanent government department designed to 
oversee the administration of private non-church controlled 
charities. As stated above, corrupt activities associated with 
the administration of charitable trusts were, primarily limited to 
older, and larger endowed charitable trusts. In response to an 
increasing number of cases of breach of trust the Brougham 
Commission outlined provisions for chancery suits to be filed by 
the Charity Commission against defaulting trustees. Furthermore, 
the Charity Commission was given powers to correct the
administration of 'old trusts' by assuming the responsibility to 
alter a charity's purposes if they were no longer enforceable.61 
This process is referred to as cy-pres (as near as possible) and 
is a power still enjoyed by the Charity Commission. When taken in 
the context of charity law, the Charity Commission has the power 
to modify a charity's purposes to one similar to the original 
purposes specified by the testator/testrix if they are no longer 
enforceable. Another power granted to the Charity Commission at 
the recommendation of the Brougham Commission was to give them the 
jurisdiction to investigate any suspected abuses in the
administration of all non-church charities by sequesting their 
annual accounts and to remove trustees if such investigations 
revealed abuses of the law.62 Nevertheless, the point must be 
made that since the Charity Commission was precluded from 
sequesting the accounts of church controlled charities - indeed
61Ibid.. p. 193.
62Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare, p. 66.
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where most of the corruption existed - the Charity Commission was 
largely ineffective in supervising their activities. Owen cites 
an example of the types of activities that were taking place in 
mid 19th century England that reinforced the Brougham Commission's 
decision to establish a separate agency to oversee the 
administration of charities. This was the case of Hiron's 
Hospital in 1869:
Here it appeared the Earl of Guilford who owed 
his post as master of St. Cross to his father, 
the Bishop of Winchester, was profiting 
personally by about £1200 annually though 
evidently doing well enough by the inmates and 
keeping the premises in good order. Actually the 
Hospital had had a long and, at times, inglorious 
history of misappropriation of revenue by its 
masters, and the clergy-man was by no means the 
worst offender.
63
At the point in time when the Charity Commission was first 
created, one should bear in mind that Canada was not yet an 
independent country. Indeed, it was not until 14 years later in 
1867 that Upper and Lower Canada, along with several of the 
maritime provinces, united to form the basis of what is now 
Canada.64 While the first Canadian government did adopt a large 
number of institutions and procedures from the British they did 
not, however, create a Charity Commission. There was no need to 
do so. In England, the creation of the Charity Commission was a 
response to the problems associated with private philanthropy
6 3 0 w e n ,  E n g l i s h  P h i l a n t h r o p y  1 6 6 0 - 1 9 6 0 . p .  1 9 6 .
64British North America Act (1867) 30-31 Vic., C. 3.
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which had developed over a period of 250 years since the major 
reform of 1601. However, Canada did not have a long history of 
philanthropy and the abuse of it, thus there was no need to create 
an institution modelled after the Charity Commission. In Canada, 
in 1867, there were no 'old charities' in existence; the problems 
associated with the administration of this type of charity in 
England were irrelevant to Canadian politicians and public 
officials. Furthermore, at the time of Confederation the overall 
amount of organized philanthropy was small in comparison with 
these activités in England.65 Given this, the Revenue Department 
was not overburdened with the administrative responsibility of 
registering and supervising these organisations.
Another explanation for the absence of a Canadian Charity 
Commission relates to the size of each country. In a country as 
large as Canada, it would have been virtually impossible, not to 
mention very costly, to supervise charities centrally as did the 
Charity Commission from its London headquarters. An alternative 
approach of setting up regional Charity Commission offices across 
the country from Nova Scotia to British Columbia would also have 
been expensive. Indeed a Revenue Canada official offered this 
kind of explanation as to why the British model has yet to be 
adopted.
"Canada is 1,000 miles wide and 4,000 miles long 
and yet has only 25 million people. However, 
London alone has 6.8 million in a city that is
65S. Martin, An Essential Grace. Toronto: McClelland and 
Steward, 1985, pp. 8-9.
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20 miles across. It would be ridiculously 
expensive to monitor a charity operating in 
Coquitlam British Columbia from a downtown office 
in Ottawa. In contrast, it is perfectly feasible 
for the Charity Commissioners in London to 
scrutinize the activities of a Canterbury based 
charity.
Instead of creating a separate department the federal 
government has utilized the resources of local and regional 
Revenue offices to monitor the activities of charities. The 
problem with this arrangement is that many offices are under­
resourced in terms of staff possessing legal expertise in the 
area of charity law.
A final explanation as to why different approaches to 
supervising charities has developed in each country (and one more 
difficult to substantiate) concerns two important characteristics 
associated with Canada's historic struggle to become an 
independent nation.67 First, Canada is unique in that it is a 
blend of British and French colonisation.68 At the time of
66Canadian Interview; Revenue Canada, 29 January 1987.
67For a concise and accurate analysis of the events leading 
up to the Confederation see E. A. Forsey, 'Canada: Two Nations or
one?' Canadian— Journal__of__Economicg__and Political science. 28
(1962), pp. 141-168; Ramsey, Cook, Canada__and the French-Canadian
Question. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976; and John Porter,
The Vertical Mosaic. Toronto: Univeristy of Toronto Press, 1965.
68The literature on the relationship between English and 
French cultures and the impact that this relationship has had on 
shaping Canadian politics is very extensive. Perhaps the most 
insightful is Herbert Guidon, 'Two cultures: An essay on
Nationalism, Class and Ethnic Tension in Contemporary Canada', in 
O. KruhlaV., r . Schultz and S. Pobihushchy, The Canadian Political 
Process: A Reader. Toronto: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1970. A 
more historical and Anglo interpretation is presented by Ramsey,
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Confederation (1867) a number of concessions were made to Quebec 
(then Lower Canada and predominantly French) in order to persuade 
it to join Ontario (then Upper Canada and predominantly British) 
and the other maritime provinces including New Brunswick, Nova 
Scotia and Prince Edward Island. One of the most important 
concessions was that Quebec was permitted to retain its civil law 
traditions but more important. Federal politicians from Quebec 
were given the opportunity to evaluate the utility of 
transplanting British rules, procedures and institutions to 
Canada. While House of Commons Debates do not reveal that Quebec 
politicians discussed a motion to create a Charity Commission it 
may be speculated that, if such an idea had been put forth, it 
would likely have been rejected by Quebec politicians. Such 
resistance was displayed when, for example, the federal government 
sought to establish other institutions which threatened to userp 
the church's traditional, social, economic and political control 
of the province.69
A Charity Commission in Canada has yet to emerge as a 
response to the issues and problems associated with private 
institutionalised philanthropy. However, at the present time 
there is growing pressure from the Canadian Council of Better 
Business Bureau (CCBBB) - a peak interest association representing 
Canadian businesses - on the federal government to create a
Cook (ed.), French-Canadian Nationalism:__An Anthology. Toronto:
Macmillan, 1969.
69R. Van Loon and M. Whittington, The Canadian Political 
System. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981, p. 161.
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Charity Commission in Canada.70 In the absence of such a reform 
the CCBBB has implemented its own programme for supervising the 
activities of Canadian charities (this is examined later in this 
chapter).
B .  R e g i s t r a t i o n  a n d  t a x  p r i v i l e d q e s
For most British and Canadian charities, the main advantage 
of charitable status is exemption from direct taxation. Having 
acquired charitable status through registration with the Charity 
Commission or Revenue Canada, charities in their respective 
countries are automatically entitled to a number of tax
privileges. The major difference between the tax treatment of 
British and Canadian charities is that Canadian taxpayers can 
deduct charitable contributions from their gross income before it 
is assessed for federal income tax. The private British donor, on 
the other hand, receives no allowance in respect of charitable 
contributions. Instead the charity to which a person has given 
their contribution may itself reclaim the tax at the basic rate 
paid by the donor if it was made under covenant.
The covenant system appears originally to have arisen as an 
unintended consequence of a provision of the Income Tax Act 
(1803).71 This statute allowed annual income disposed of under 
the conditions of a Deed of Covenant not to be deemed income of 
the donor. Since then, the tax paid and deducted by the payer is
70Canadian Interview; Canadian * Council of Better Business 
Bureaus, 22 December 1986.
7IChesterman, Charities. Trusts and__Social Welfare/ PP- 58-
59, 237.
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deemed to be part of the income of the payee. Substantially the 
same provision, is enacted by Sections 52 and 53 of the Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act (197-0), but only the basic rate of tax and 
not any of the higher rates, may be credited in this way.72 In 
the case of a charity, the logic runs as follows: the donors,
paying a net sum from his fund of taxed income to a charity, is 
assumed to have paid the basic rate of tax, but the charity is 
exempt from the income tax; so the charity may recover the tax at 
the basic rate from the Inland Revenue. When the Conservatives 
formed the government in 1979 the income guaranteed by the 
covenanting system declined when the basic rate of tax was lowered 
from 33 per cent to 30 per cent. This represented a cost to 
charities whose outstanding net deeds of covenant were then 
supplemented by taxes reclaimed at a lower rate than had been in 
effect when they were first written. As discussed in chapter 4 
section II, the British government amended other tax laws in 1985 
- particularly VAT rules - in order to compensate for lost 
'covenanted income'.73
Organisations registered by the Charity Commission are 
eligible for a number of other tax related privileges. For 
example, under the Income and Corporation Taxes Act (1970) section 
360(2), all capital owned by a charity is exempt from Capital 
Gains Tax. This is equally the case in Canada under section 4(b)
72Ibid., p. 237.
73J.M. Schuster, Tax incentives__As__Arts__Policy— in Western
Europe. New Haven, Connecticut: Institution for Social and
Policy Studies, 1985, pp. 16-17.
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of the Income Tax Act (1962). Furthermore, since 1976 Estate Duty 
has been replaced in Britain by the Capital Transfer Tax. The 
three principal exemptions enjoyed by outright gifts to charity 
are: 1) gifts to a total value of £2,000 in any one year; 2) 
gifts made to charity a year or more before the death of the 
donor; or 3) gifts made to charity within the year of death of the 
donor or by his will up to a limit of £100,000. Apart from these 
general exemptions for charitable gifts, the Treasury has power to 
exempt gifts of property which they consider of national interest. 
For example; historic houses, scenic land and even books. Not 
only the gift itself, but an endowment for its upkeep may be 
exempted.74
British charities are also partially exempt from paying rates 
to local authorities. Presently, local authorities are free to 
relieve charities of rates to any extent they deem appropriate to 
a minimum level of 50 per cent. It may be argued that there is an 
inconsistency in a situation where charities are exempt from 
income tax on the rent of properties they let but must pay rates 
on property they occupy. However, rates have been the only form 
of taxation available to a local authority, and since charities 
are not uniformly distributed over the country, the burden of 
relief to charities varies from local authority to local 
authority. The recommendation of the Goodman Committee was that 
the mandatory rate for relief should be raised from 50 per cent to
74Report of the Goodman Committee, Charity Law and Voluntary 
Organisations. London: Bedford Square Press/NCVO, 1976, p. 14.
66
75 per cent, but the burden of mandatory relief should be borne by 
the Central government rather than by local authorities.75 This 
issue may have become irrelevant now with the present government's 
proposal to replace rates with a poll tax.
Further discussion of the tax privileges granted to British 
and Canadian charities is contained in chapter four. The 
important point to note here is that the registration of a charity 
is important for two reasons. First, is the role it plays, in the 
public's perception, in apparently legitimizing an organisation 
and its activities. This 'official recognition' is crucial for 
any organisation dependent on voluntary contributions of money and 
labour. Second, registration of charities in both countries 
extends significant fiscal privileges that are not enjoyed by 
other non-charitable organisations. In many cases, organisations 
unsuccessful in acquiring charitable status have been unable to 
operate without these economic advantages. There are, of course, 
exceptions including Amnesty International and the Anti-
Vivisection League.
C. Supervision of charities
Since charities in both England and Canada enjoy a tax exempt 
status and a number of other fiscal privileges, there is a 
particular concern that they should conduct their activities in 
strict accordance with the law. The public which makes donations, 
charities which obey the law, and governments which provide income
75Ibid-, p. 14.
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to charities, have a vested interest in seeing that organisations 
manage their affairs honestly and efficiently.
(i) Revenue Canada
In the case of Revenue Canada, it appears that the 35 member 
staff in the Tax-Exempt Organisation Division spend very little 
time monitoring the ongoing activities of registered charities. 
As Brooks argues ... 'once a charity is registered, there is 
almost no government oversight ... Revenue Canada simply has not 
been given the resources to monitor the ongoing activités of
charities'.76 Improprieties involving charities are normally 
brought to the attention of Revenue Canada by affected third
parties. If there is substantial evidence to suggest illegalities 
the case is then referred to the Federal Court of Appeal. 
Launching an appeal is an extremely expensive venture and thus 
very seldom done. This is evidenced by the fact that the courts 
did not hear a single appeal brought by Revenue Canada to strip an 
organisation of its charitable status during the period 1973-1983. 
Furthermore, in interviewing a Revenue Canada official it was 
revealed that only 18 charities have been deregistered since 1974. 
The respondent agreed that Revenue Canada does not play an active 
'watch-dog' role over the activities of Canadian charities to 
ensure their administration accord with the law. Department 
officials admit that the legitimacy of Canadian charities is 
determined at the initial stage of registration. After this 
procedure is completed, charities are simply required to file
76Brooks, charities;__The Legal ZamflMorfc, p. 227.
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Annual Information Returns. As one respondent noted; "50,000 
Canadian charities and 3,500 newly registered organisations each 
year are simply entrusted to perform as good corporate 
citizens."77
Government supervision of Canadian charities has been so 
relaxed that a non-governmental interest group has established its 
own programme to monitor charitable activity. In 1985 the 
Canadian Council of Better Business Bureaus (CCBBB) set up its 
Philanthropic Advisory Service. The CCBBB works with local Better 
Business Bureaus (BBB) to assist consumers, encourage self- 
regulation of business, and promote confidence in the private 
enterprise system. Since 1912, the BBB system has monitored 
advertising, mediated business - consumer disputes, corrected 
abuses in the marketplace and provided information to businesses 
and consumers. The CCBBB is supported by membership dues and 
grants from many large corporations and by 17 autonomous BBB's 
across Canada. To maintain its impartiality and independence it 
refuses to accept funds from government agencies or charitable 
organizations. The CCBBB has patterned its programme for 
supervising charities on the Philanthropic Advisory Service in the 
United States. In essence, the CCBBB's Canadian Philanthropic 
Advisory Service has sought to educate donors about charities
77Canadian Interview; Department of Health and Welfare, 30 
January 1987. The poor supervision of Canadian charities is 
compounded by the fact that Revenue Canada's 'Tax Exempt 
Organisation Division' is responsible for applying not simply 
charity law but other complex pieces of tax legislation that are 
applicable to non-charitable, non-profit organisations.
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worthy and unworthy of financial support. While the CCBBB never 
recommends any one charity over another, it does offer information 
to help donors make their own giving decisions. Presently it 
receives 12,000 telephone calls each year from individuals and 
companies who have been solicited by charities for voluntary 
contributions. The programme is especially useful for 
corporations many of which receive hundreds of letters each year 
requesting donations. In the absence of this programme many 
companies would have to incur the cost of hiring a person to 
determine which organisations are reputable. The programme's 
ancillary purpose is to encourage charitable organisations to 
accept the responsibility of self regulation and adhere to ethical
practices outlined 
Solicitations'.
in their 'Standards for Charitable
The CCBBB has 22 standards that are divided into five
categories namely; public accountability. use of funds.
solicitation and information materials, fund raising practices and 
governance. The Philanthropic Advisory Service operates by 
collecting and distributing information on hundreds of charities 
that solicit nationally, or have national or international 
programme services. It routinely asks these organisations for 
information regarding the programmes and fund raising when they 
have been the subject of inquiries. In doing this, the CCBBB 
relies on other Canadian BBB's as well as on 168 American BBB's to 
disseminate its educational materials and to report on 
organisations whose fund raising efforts are local in scope. When
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it receives numerous inquiries about a national charitable
organisation, it evaluates the information in relation to the 
CCBBB's Standard for Charitable Solicitation. When warranted by 
the number of inquiries, CCBBB officials write a report 
summarizing the organisation's current operations. If the 
standards are not met, the charity is included on a list which is 
is published annually. In 1986, 36 Canadian organisations 
appeared on this list including charities like, 'Jesus to the 
Communist World', 'Toronto Spitfire Wheelchair Club', and 'Against 
Drinking and Driving'.78
In the area of medical research, the CCBBB has encountered 
few examples of administrative improprieties. However, Mr. Warren 
Clayson, the Director of CCBBB qualified this by explaining that 
several organizations have misled the public by advertising 
unrealistically small fund raising expenses:
"What we see happening with medical research 
charities is organisations which devote a lot of money to television advertising and fund raising 
- yet classify these expenditures as 'public 
education'. The medical research charities have 
been able to get away with this since they are 
'educating' the public about disease prevention. 
The same holds true of television evangelists- 
for example, it is difficult to measure how much 
'preaching' is related to advancing its 
charitable purposes and how much is related to 
raising voluntary contributions. "
79
78Canadian Interview; Canadian Council of Better Business 
Bureaus, 22 December 1986.
79Ibid.
71
In their own defence, the 18 Canadian medical research 
charities interviewed, all agreed that the CCBBB has tended in the 
past to be slightly overzealous in monitoring their activities. 
In particular, many small charities representing less popular 
diseases argued that the CCBBB was insensitive to the fact that 
more had to be spent on their fund raising in order to establish a 
public profile. As is discussed in chapters five and six, this 
expenditure has been crucial in correcting the imbalance between 
high incidence rates of relatively unknown and horrific diseases 
like ileitis and colitus and the small amount of money 
traditionally raised on their behalf.
The CCBBB has also been interested in determining how a 
charity's fund raising costs relate to voluntary income and 
government grants. For example, if a charity raised all of its 
£15 million annual income from donations and spent only £1.5 
million on fund raising, the CCBBB would classify that ten per 
cent expenditure rate as 'acceptable'. However, if that same 
charity had received £ 12 million of its total income from the 
government, in the form of grants or fees for contracted services, 
the charity would have spent £1.5 million but raised only £3 
million from the public. This costs/donation ratio would be 
deemed unacceptable by the CCBBB. This has not been problematic 
for Canadian medical research charities, though, since they derive 
only a very small proportion of their income from the federal and 
provincial governments.80
80lbid.
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Lastly, CCBBB officials have been concerned about charities 
that do not include their employees salaries under 
'administration' but rather under 'programmes' in their Annual 
Reports. In so doing, the CCBBB claims that charities are able to 
project an unrealistic image of their efficiency and 
resourcefulness. These two qualities are crucial for any charity 
interested in gaining the public's trust and confidence. While 
many of the CCBBB's concerns are important and useful for 
achieving a more responsible charity sector, there are problems 
relating to the programme's usefulness. The major criticism of it 
concerns the reliability of the information the CCBBB collects 
from the charities it is investigating. The CCBBB has no means of 
forcing a charity to 'open up its books' and has no assurances 
that the information it receives is accurate and up to date. 
Unlike Revenue Canada, of course, the CCBBB does not have the 
legal authority to conduct 'blind' or 'random' audits. The only 
power enjoyed by the CCBBB is that charities refusing to supply 
the necessary information are included on their 'Failure to Meet 
Standards List' which is freely available to the public.
(ii) The Charity Commission
As we have noted, the Charity Commission maintains a staff of 
450, many of whom are legally trained solicitors. In comparison 
to Revenue Canada, the Charity Commission exercises slightly 
better oversight of charities, in that its official duties go 
beyond simply registering new organizations. In part, this is due 
to the Charities Act (1960) which is generally agreed to have
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extended the regulatory powers enjoyed by the Commission. For 
example, the Act specifies that the Commission has jurisdiction 
over all charities irrespective of their legal form although some 
organisations are exempt.81 This means that certain companies 
limited by guarantee, unincorporated associations, and certain 
organisations registered under the Friendly Societies Act are 
required to register with the Charity Commission in order to 
acquire a tax exempt status. Second, the 1960 Act gives the 
Commission the authority to 'freeze' a charity's bank account, 
whereupon its assets are vested with the Commissioners. 
Furthermore, the Commissioners are granted the additional power to 
remove individuals in control of a charity if an investigation 
into its affairs reveal that misconduct or mismanagement has taken 
place. This last power, in particular, has broadened the Charity 
Commission's scope of authority and has given it a major advantge 
over its Canadian counterpart in supervising charities. There is,
in fact, no comparable legislation bo the Charities__Act (1960) in
Canada. As a result. Revenue Canada officials have not enjoyed 
the same statutory authority to enforce 'charity law'. Inter alia 
this has meant that Canadian charities continue to operate in a 
climate that is far less restrictive than in England.
The approach of the Charity Commissioners seems to be one of
81Exempt charities are generally accountable to some other 
authority. For example, universities to the University Grant 
Committee and Friendly Societies ‘to the Registrar of Friendly 
Societies. As mentioned in chapter seven section I. B, The 
Medical Research Council in Britain is a charity - but would not 
be recognized as one - and is responsible to the Department of 
Education and Science.
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dealing with complaints about charities as they arise rather than 
exercising any sort of positive policing function. In
interviewing one charity executive, considerable concern was 
expressed regarding a newspaper story alleging some form of 
impropriety by a charity operating in the same service area.82 
The respondent had contacted the Charity Commission and was told 
that it had no special information on the subject, but that it had 
seen the story and were launching an investigation. This is 
typical of the way the Commission usually proceeds. They will 
receive complaints or allegations of improper conduct not only 
from the press but also from private citizens - often from 
disgruntled officers or ex-officers of the charity. In 
interviewing a Charity Commission official it was explained that 
the vast majority of cases were resolved informally by 
correspondence and that only about ten cases a year require more 
formal inquiries. The respondent explained that with an annual 
budget of £ 2.5 million it was impossible to expect the Commission 
to exercise any sort of detailed surveillance over some 130,000 
charities. Moreover, the argument was made that government 
departments providing grants, subsidies and fees should assume a 
greater responsibility for ensuring that public money is not being 
wasted by charities through mismanagement or misconduct. 83
One area of supervision which the Commission might seem to
82British Interview; Brain Research Trust, 2 March 1987. The 
respondent was reacting to allegations of improprieties associated 
with the administration of the Mental Health Foundation.
83British Interview; The Charity Commission, 31 March 1987.
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take a more active role, is scrutinizing a charity's financial 
accounts. However, the resources devoted even to this process are 
modest. All charities (other than exempt organisations) must keep 
proper financial records and submit their annual statement of 
accounts to the Commission.84 These accounts are then made 
available for public inspection. They do not as the law presently 
stands, necessarily have to be professionally audited. However, 
one of the recommendations of the Goodman Committee was that there 
should be a statutory requirement of professional audit for the 
accounts of charities whose income exceeds a certain figure. 
Charities with smaller incomes were recommended to require only an 
independent audit. The Goodman Committee also recommended that 
accounts should be accompanied by a report setting out in 
sufficient terms, the activities of a charity during the past year 
and its intentions for the succeeding year.85 The 1987 Report to 
the Home Secretary and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury (The 
Woodfield Report) further recommended that all local charities 
should be required to send a copy of their accounts to their 
relevant local authority and that all charities should be obliged 
to furnish copies to members of the public on payment of an 
appropriate fee.86 The 1987 Report by the National Audit Office
84Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare. pp. 68, 
292, 298-9.
85Goodman Committee, Charity.____Law and Voluntary
O r g a n is a t io n s ,  p - 113.
86Home Secretary, Efficiency Scrutiny of the Supervision of 
Charities. London: HMSO, 1987, p. 24.
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argued that the statutory and non-statutory requirements for the 
submission of annual charity accounts have been widely ignored by 
large numbers of charities and have not been effectively enforced 
by the Commission. A further problem has been that even when 
accounts are submitted there is no standard format, for example, 
only one third of the accounts submitted are normally 
professionally audited.87
Like Revenue Canada, the Charity Commission does not have the 
staff to review the accounts of every charity each year. Instead, 
they examine the accounts of about six or seven thousand charities 
annually. Therefore, given the number of charities, there is no 
guarantee that the accounts of each organisation will be examined 
more than once every five years. The poor level of submission of 
charity accounts and limited scrutiny have not only undermined 
effective monitoring and control but has posed difficulties for 
the police in carrying cases of suspected fraud and abuse through 
to successful prosecution.88 In comparison. Revenue Canada has 
enjoyed one advantage over the Charity Commission in that its 
files are computerized thus enabling officials to issue 
'cautionary letters' when charities have failed to submit their 
complete financial statements. Computerization has also provided 
Revenue Officials with accurate and up-to-date files for 
litigation proceedings to defend their decisions to deregister
87National Audit Office, Monitoring and Control of Charities 
in England and Wales. London: HMSO, 1987, p. 2.
88National Audit Office, Monitoring and Control of Charities
in England and Wales, p. 2.
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suspect charities.89
In Britain the examination of a charity's accounts involves 
checking on such matters as whether an organisation's funds have 
been expended on charitable purposes and in accordance with its 
articles of association. This is done to ensure that the charity 
is in no danger of insolvency. According to the Goodman Committee 
Report, the examination of the accounts quite frequently is 
followed by recommendations to bring the charity's objects and 
administration up-to-date.90
The Goodman Committee did not believe that these arrangements 
were adequate. They recommended that the Charity Commissioners be 
given the power to grant registration subject to a review of an 
organisation after three years of its operation. Additionally, it 
was argued that every charity should have its accounts examined at 
least once every five years. They also wanted the Charity 
Commission to acquire a staff with sufficient accountancy skills 
to advise whether the system of preparing accounts is adequate to 
give relevant information to the public. Finally, they suggested 
the Commission - with the assistance of a lay-board - should 
periodically review the question of how much detailed information 
should be given to the public about the expenditure of charities 
on their 'objects'.91
89Canadian Interview, Revenue Canada, Tax Exempt Division, 29 
January 1987.
90IbiiL., p. 113.
91Ibid.. p. 114.
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Though the Goodman Committee, in effect, suggested tightening 
up the arrangements for supervising charities accounts they saw 
the Commission's role more as a supportive agency. In doing so, 
they envisioned a greater role for the Charity Commission to 
advise and persuade charities to acknowledge their own
responsibilities to become more accountable to the public. In 
this context, the Goodman Committee's recommendations were not 
proposing a radical change in the Commission's mandate. Instead, 
they were proposing to increase the Commission's resources to 
enable it to discharge its present responsibilities more
effectively. The Woodfield Report supported this proposal by 
recommending that the Charity Commission be given more resources 
to strengthen its advisory services to charities particularly by 
extending its existing range of leaflets dealing with the 
registration and administration of charities.92 
( iii) Charity fraud
In comparison to Canada the British government seems to be 
more conscientious about supervising charities. However, there is 
ample evidence to suggest that both the Charity Commission and 
Revenue Canada, require substantially more legal and accounting 
staff in order to detect abuses of the law. It is arguable that 
such provisions would pay for themselves by recouping lost revenue 
associated with tax fraud. This point is substantiated by the 
1986 investigation into the affairs of the Roman Catholic Church
92Home Secretary, Efficiency Scrutiny of the Supervision of 
Charities, p - 25.
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in England and Wales. After one year of auditing it was 
discovered that hundreds of thousands of pounds had been claimed 
in tax rebates in cases where the donor was not eligible to make a 
covenant. The amount owed to the Inland Revenue from just one 
diocese was estimated to be between £200,000 and £400,000.93 
Furthermore, a small Stoke-on-Trent charity was used to 'launder' 
millions of pounds of money from around the world. Among those 
said to have used the charity to hide large sums of cash was the 
ex-president of the Philippines - Ferdinand Marcos. The Vincent 
Foundation, set up in 1983 to help women in trouble with the law 
received cash from international financera in the form of short 
term loans. The conditions of the deal were that large amounts of 
cash, sometimes exceeding £2 million, were deposited into the 
organisation's bank account and the charity would then claim the 
interest as a charitable donation. After a designated period of 
time the businessmen would ask for the 'principal' back from the 
charity without information being passed to the Inland Revenue.94 
The rising incidence of charity fraud found in Britain led the 
National Audit Office in 1987 to recommend improved communication 
between the Charity Commission and the Metropolitan Police and 
that each should be given more resources to detect frauds. 
Presently, the police pursue individual cases of charity fraud in 
collaboration with the Charity Commission. However, no regular 
liaison or meetings to discuss wider problems related to the
93Guardian, 21 February 1986.
94The Times, 23 March, 1986.
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control of charities has been initiated by either the Charity
Commission or Police Department. Currently, the police are 
involved with charities mainly through their investigation of 
allegations of criminal activity. The Charities Act (1960) makes 
no provision for specific offences involving charities, so police 
prosecutions must be brought under other legislations such as the 
Theft Act (1969). Since charity related fraud cases are not 
separately identified within the available statistics the police 
have no overall understanding of the extent of crime involving 
charity operations or the trustees of charities.95
In Canada in December 1986, the Executive Director of the 
Heart and Stroke Foundation of Ontario was charged with embezeling 
$50,000 (£25,000). He was later found guilty in April 1987 of 
diverting voluntary contributions, earmarked for the charity's 
general revenue account, into his own pocket. The fraud remained 
undetected for several years since the only money misappropriated 
was contributions sent directly to his office. It was eventually 
discovered, though, when an individual who had previously 
contributed $4,000 (£2,000) to the charity later contacted the 
organization's fund raiser to inquire how his money was being 
spent. When the fund raisers could find no record of his 
contribution, an internal investigation was launched. During the 
course of that investigation, the accused tried surreptitiously to 
pay back a portion of the money he had embezzeled. In doing so.
95National Audit office. Monitoring and Control__of Charities
in England and Wales/ p - li.
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he was discovered and subsequently charged.96
In each of the examples of charity fraud described above, the 
interests of the individual donor were clearly exploited. While 
at least in theory the British state can deal with many kinds of 
abuses involving charities [through powers extended by the 
Charities Act (I960)] it is not well suited to protect potential 
donors from fraudulent or incompetent fund raisers.97 As 
Chesterman explains, the Charities Act paralleled the 19th century 
legislation by attempting to focus primarily on charitable trusts, 
rather than on fund raising charities.98 Since Canadian law has 
closely paralleled British common law, government charity 
administrators in the former country have been equally ineffective 
in addressing new and sophisticated fund raising improprieties. 
If Canadian and British charities continue to increase their 
provision of services to compensate for the reduction in like 
government services (see Chapter seven for the case of medical 
research) the need for more effective government supervision of 
charities will become more clearly apparent.
960n 2 December 1986 I scheduled an interview in Toronto with 
the Executive Director of this charity for 22 December. On 19 
December he was arrested by the Toronto Metropolitan Police Force 
and therefore was unavailable for our meeting. As an alternative 
I was re-scheduled to interview his assistant. During our meeting 
and after asking questions regarding the fraud, the respondent 
took to thinking I was a CBC reporter and requested I erase our 
tape recorded conversation. The aformentioned account of this 
incidence is therefore based entirely on my recollection of that 
meeting.
97Alan Ware, Between Profit__and State. Cambridge: Polity
Press, forthcoming manuscript, p. 10.
98chesterman, charities« Trusts and Social Welfare, p - 373.
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‘Chapter Three
Charity Law and Political Involvement
In Chapter two it was argued that indirect public subsidies, 
relating to tax relief are available only to bodies which are 
legally charities. And in order to become a charity, an 
organisation must not engage in political activities. This 
chapter examines what constitutes 'political activities' and 
assesses how this aspect of charity law has influenced charity- 
state relations in Britain and Canada. The discussion here 
provides an important introduction for the comparative study of 
relations between medical research charities and the state in 
Britain and Canada (in chapters five to eight). In these later 
chapters it is shown that despite the law, medical research 
charities have become increasingly political in lobbying 
government for legislative and regulatory reform.
This chapter divides into three sections. The first, 
examines the development in both countries (with occasional 
reference to the United States) of the common law restriction 
placed on charities and their involvement in the political 
process. In a general context, this reveals both the surprisingly 
fragile doctrinal base underlying this legal rule and also the 
social conditions out of which the law developed. This section 
explores the case law on the subject in considerable detail; it is
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not intended to be a full analysis of the law, but instead a 
review of the policy justifications given by the judges in 
developing this area of law. Section II compares, American 
legislation relating to charities and their political involvement 
on the one hand with British and Canadian laws on the other. This 
examination highlights problems in this area of law in each of the 
three countries and illustrates the distinctly different approach 
which American legislators have adopted in dealing with 
politically active charities. Section III begins by examining a 
number of official reports and their recommendations for English 
legal reform. In contrast to Britain, the issue of 'charity and 
politics' has not been the subject of official inquiry in Canada. 
Nonetheless, the Canadian government has introduced much more 
progressive reforms than Britain in this area. In Canada, 
pressure for reform has come not from studying the problems of 
charity and political involvement, but rather as ad hoc responses 
to a series of government controversies from 1978 to 1983.
I. Development of the Common Law Principle Restricting Charities 
From Engaging in Political Activities
The very first English legal case to state that trusts 
established with political objectives were not charitable is 
Bowman V. Secular Society Ltd (1917).1 Lord Parker, who decided 
the case, held the "Law has always refused to recognise political 
objects as charitable ... since trusts for the attainment of these
1Bowman V. Secular Society Ltd. (1917) A. C. 406 (H. L.).
84
objects have always been invalidated.2 This prohibition on 
political activities was later affirmed in a host of other English 
and Canadian legal cases ..3 Some judges have expressed great 
puzzlement at the lack of 'judicial authority' attached to this 
principle, but not one has been inspired to impugn its validity.4 
Not only was there no judicial authority for Lord Parker's 
assertion in Bowman (1917), but previous common law cases had held 
the exact opposite. The only related judicial decisions on which 
the Bowman case was decided were those dealing with 'superstitious 
uses' and 'purposes' ruled to be against state interests. The 
former had been completely overruled by statute by 1846 and the 
latter was confined narrowly to a small number of legal cases. 
During the 15th and 16th century a number of 'superstitious' uses 
or 'purposes' were held both by statute and common law to be non- 
charitable.5 A superstitious use was defined broadly as "one 
which had for its object the propagation of the rites of religion
2ikidj., p. 442.
3See, for example. Re Patriotic Acre Fund (1951) 2 D.L.R.
624, 634 (Sask. C.A.), C.J.S.; National Anti-Vivisection Society
V. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1948) A.C. 31(H.L.).
4The deciding judge commented in 1948 that "it is curious how 
scanty the authority is for the proposition that political objects
are not charitable ..." N a t io n a l__Anti-Vivisection__Society V.
Inland Revenue__Commissioners (1948) A.C. 31, 54 (H.L.). In the
same case Simonds L.J. also reflected on the "paucity of the 
judicial authority on this point ... But the truth and the reason 
of the thing appears to me so clear that I neither expect nor 
require much authority". Ibid.. p. 63.
5See generally, O.D. Sutter, The Law of Charitable Trusts. 
London: Butterworths, 1967, Ch. 2; C.E. Crowther, Religious
Trusts. Oxford: George Ronald, 1954, pp. 31-39.
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not to be tolerated by the law."6 Tudor, the leading commentator 
on charities in the late 19th century, stated that "persons who, 
differ from established religion and are obvious to the law to be 
against superstitious uses, may be divided into three classes: 
Protestant Dissentors, Roman Catholics and Jews. "7 As religious 
tolerance gradually increased superstitious uses were rendered 
valid by statute. The first legislation to validate 'uses' or 
'purposes' relating to the Jewish religion was passed in 1846. 
Since that time, all 'superstitious uses' have been considered 
charitable on the grounds of 'advancement of religion' but must 
also, like other non-religious charities, pass the public benefit 
test.
Since the Bowman decision, all subsequent English and 
Canadian cases holding political objects to be non-charitable rely 
upon it. However, as one commentator suggests, the 1917 case was 
based on 'slim authority'. Only one of five judges giving reasons 
for their ruling addressed the issue. The case cited for the
basis o f  that decision was Ee___Themmines v. P e  Bonneva l (1 8 2 8 ) .8
Lord Parker's task in the Bowman case was to resolve whether 
Bowman's next-of-kin was correct in disputing a bequest made to 
the Secular Society Ltd. The Society's main object was to promote 
the principle that human conduct is based upon natural knowledge, 
and not upon supernatural belief. The Society recommended the
6lbid.. p. 19.
7IfciiL., p. 20.
8De Themmines V . De Bonneval (1828) 5 Russ. 288; 38 E.R. 1035.
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abolition of all support, patronage or favour by the state of any 
particular form or forms of religion, and numerous other
secularising goals, many involving legislative changes.9 Lord 
Parker ruled in favour of the next-of-kin by invalidating the 
bequest on grounds of 'political involvement'. More precisely he 
reasoned this was the law not because such purposes were illegal, 
but in his own words ... "because the court has no means of 
judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be 
for the public benefit, and therefore cannot say that a gift to 
secure change is a charitable gift".10
Throughout the 1920's and 1930's a number of judicial 
decisions in England re-affirmed Lord Parker's ruling holding that 
political purposes were not charitable in law. However, in Canada 
it is interesting to note that the Bowman case was not cited until 
1937. Prior to this, Canadian courts treated the question of 
charities and their political involvement in somewhat different 
terms. In Canada, at the turn of this century, a number of 
political purposes were in fact held to be charitable. For 
example, one organisation sought to promote temperance
legislation and another to promote aid and the protection of 
citizens of the United States of African descent in enjoying their 
civil rights.11 However, in the Canadian case Re Kniaht (1937),
9Bowman V. Secular Society Ltd. (1917) A.C. 406 (H.L.).
1 0 I b i d . .  p .  2 0 .
11See Farewell V. Farewell (1892) 22 O.R. 573 (Ch. Div.) and
Lewis V. Doerle (1898) 25 D. L. R. 713 (Ont. H.C.).
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it was decided that a gift "to the Henry George foundation was 
'political rather than charitable'.12 The organisation was
established for the purpose of promoting the doctrines of the late 
Henry George including his theories and principles respecting the 
single tax.
In both countries, the courts have followed the decision in
Mational__Anti-Vivisection (1948), in deciding that political
activities constitute non-charitable purposes. For example, in 
Canada the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal followed this decision in 
Re Patriotic Acre Fund (1957) and Re Loney (1953).13
English case law examples are more numerous; a review of two 
important legal decisions help to clarify several aspects of this 
law. First, the argument that organisations constituted for 
political purposes cannot be characterised as charitable applies 
whether an organisation's objects expressly refer to political 
purposes or political purposes are implicit in the organisation's 
objects. For example, in McGovern V. Attorney General (1981), Mr. 
Justice Slade refused to grant an application by the trustees of 
the Amnesty International Trust for a declaration that the trust 
be registered under the Charities Act (1960).14 The trust's
12Re Knight (1939) 2 O.L.R. 285, 288 (Ont. S.C.).
13See Re Patriotic Acre Fund (1951) 2 O.L.R. 624, 636 (Sask. 
c• a . ) and Re Co-operative College of Canada (1975) 64 d .l .r . (20)
531 (Sask. C.A.). See also Re Loney (1953) 4 D.L.R. 539 (Man.
Q.B.) where a "gift for the purposes of promoting and propagating 
the doctrines and teaching of socialism was held not charitable".
14McGovern V.__Attorney__General (1981) 3 ALL E.R. 493 (Ch.
Div.).
objects were aimed at "attempting to secure the release of 
prisoners of conscience".15 The courts ruled the trust's purposes 
were furthered by procuring "the reversal of the relevant 
decisions of governments and governmental authorities".16 
Similarly, in Animal Defence and Anti-Vivisection Society V. 
I.R.C. (1950), the Society's objects were stated to "oppose 
vivisection and all experiments on animals calculated to cause 
pain". 17 Mr. Justice Dankwerts rejected the Society's claim by 
arguing that "the matters which are to be done ... must 
necessarily in the end involve an attack on the Cruelty to Animals 
Act (1876) and the promotion or the support of legislation for 
repealing that Act and for suppressing vivisection altogether."18
A second aspect of the law is that charitable organisations 
may influence legislation if their activities are incidental and 
ancillary to their primary charitable objects. For example, in 
National Anti-Vivisection (1948), Lord Simons validated a trust by 
ruling the organisation's political objects were "merely ancillary 
to the attainment of what is ex-hypothesi a good charitable 
object".19 The Charity Commission has applied strict guidelines 
regarding what should properly be considered primary and ancillary
15Ibid.. p. 501.
16Ibi£L., p. 514.
17Animal___D efen ce— and— Anti-Vivisection__society V. I.R.C.
(1950) 66 T.L.R. 1091 (Ch.).
18Ibid*., pp. 1095-96.
19 National__Anti-Viviaection___society V. Inland RevenueCommission (1948) A.C. 31.
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objects at the initial stage of registration. This has been done 
to avoid granting charitable status to organisations which may be 
disposed to confusing their charitable and political objectives. 
Paradoxically, although charitable status is denied to 
straightforward campaigning organisations or pressure groups, it 
is permitted to many bodies which employ political lobbying 
methods as a subsidiary part of their activities. Gladstone 
explains this in saying:
"This does not mean that a charity cannot seek 
changes in the law or in administration or even 
to advance human rights. It can provided that 
end is a charitable purpose and among those 
specified by the charity's trust deed."
20
In this way, certain pressuring and promotional activities are 
allowed, as long as they are not party political. Consequently, 
the law has recognized as charitable. The National Council for 
Civil Liberties, Age Concern, and MIND, all of which have, through 
lobbying and public education, attempted to influence the 
legislative process and government policies. The style of such 
political activities is held to be crucial by both the Charity 
Commission and Revenue Canada.21 For example, reasoned 
memorandums have been acceptable but public demonstrations have 
not been. Charities have all had to proceed carefully with their
2OF. Gladstone, Charity__Las*__and__Social__Justice. London:
Bedford Square Press, 1982, p. 102.
21British Interview; The Charity Commission, 31 March 1987; 
and Canadian Interview; Revenue Canada, Tax Exempt Division, 29 
January 1987.
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political activities. For example, MIND had to answer its critics 
for holding membership in Unemployment Alliance, a lobby group 
aimed at increasing public awareness to the 'evils of
unemployment'. MIND, successfully managed to trace a connection 
between its main concern with mental health and the effects of 
unemployment.22
Until recently, to be registered under the income Tax Act 
(1952), Canadian charities have been strictly prohibited from 
engaging in any form of political activity even if it is only 
ancillary to their main charitable objects.23 This was based on 
the relevant definitions in the Income Tax Act (1970) which 
specified that registered charities must devote "all their 
resources ... to charitable activities".24 However, after a much 
publicized controversy surrounding Revenue Canada's interpretation 
of 'permisable political activities'. Departmental officials in 
1986 drafted new legislation. The new legal rules brought 
Canadian charities in-line with their British counterparts by 
allowing charities to engage in political activities that are 
incidental and ancillary to their main charitable objects. The 
details of this new legislation are dealt with later in Section 
III of this chapter.
English and Canadian courts have adopted four guidelines in
22m. Brenton, The— Voluntary__Sector in British socialServices. London: Longman, 1985, p. 98.
23See A.B. Drache, 'Political Activities: A Charitable
Dilemma', The Philanthropist. 8(1980), pp. 10-11.
24See The Canadian Income Tax Act (1970) para. 194. 1 (l)(b).
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distinguishing primary charitable objects from those that are 
political and ancillary. As outlined in chapter two Section I.C; 
charities are held to be political, hence non-charitable, if their 
main activities include: (1) attempting to bring about, or 
oppose, changes in the law; (2) furthering the aims of political 
parties and promoting political doctrines; (3) affecting foreign 
relations; and (4) propagandising, including attempts to persuade 
the public to adopt a particular attitude towards some broad 
social question.25 Each of these categories is examined below.
a . Promoting or opposing changes in the law
An organisation will not be considered charitable if one or 
more of its purposes includes promoting changes in the law. This 
policy guideline finds its origin in the case National Anti- 
Vivisection Society V. I.R.C. (1948). The central issue in the 
case was whether the Society was eligible to claim an exemption 
from income tax on the grounds that it was a charitable 
organisation. However, the Society's main object was held to be 
for the complete abolition of vivisection through its campaign to 
repeal the Cruelty to Animals Act (1876) and its substitution by
25See generally, a series of articles by L.A. Sheridan:
'Charity V. Politics', Anglo-American__Law Review. 2 (1973), p.
130; L.A. Sheridan, 'The Political Muddle - A Charitable View?', 
Modern Law Review. 19 (1956), p. 341; L.A. Sheridan, 'The Charpol 
Family Quiz', The Philanthropist. 5 (1977), p. 80; L.A. Sheridan, 
'Charitable Causes, Political Causes and Involvement', The 
Philanthropist. 8 (1980), p. 30. See also Chesterman, Charities. 
Trusts and Social Welfare. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1979, pp. 181-88; B. Nightingale, Charities. London: Allen Lane, 
1974, Ch. 2; D.W.M. Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada. Toronto: 
Corswell, 1974 pp. 494-94.
new legislation. A majority in the House of Lords held the trust 
was non-charitable on two grounds. First, the organisation was 
not for the benefit of the community or a sufficient section 
thereof as stated in the fourth category outlined by Lord 
Macnaghten in Pemsel * s case. Second, the Anti-Vivisection 
Society's purposes were viewed as being for an alteration in the 
law; they were therefore considered 'political' hence non- 
charitable.
The reasoning developed in relation to this legal rule is 
straightforward. Judges have argued they have no reasonable means 
of asserting whether or not a change in the law, influenced by a 
charity will confer a substantial public benefit to the community.
However, this type of judicial reasoning has been strongly 
criticized by a number of British and Canadian legal commentators. 
Alternatively, they have endorsed the approach adopted by American 
judges. In that country, judges are at liberty to recommend 
changes in the law. In fact, as Ritchie states, "there are few 
people better qualified than judges to assess whether a change in 
the law would be for the public benefit."26 In the U.S., the 
relevant question is not whether a particular legislative outcome 
is in itself for the public good, but instead whether having all 
viewpoints presented on legislative issues is a public benefit. 
As Gravells candidly remarks:
"There seems no reason why judges should be
26L. Ritchie, 'Charities and Political Activity', The 
Philanthropist, 6 (1978), p. 63.
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unable to determine whether the advocacy of 
change, in particular laws, is for public 
benefit. It may be possible to decide it is, 
even if there remain doubts about the rights and 
wrongs of the. change itself. In a free 
democracy, the promotion of controversial views 
may well be for the public benefit."
27
British and Canadian Judges have refused to accept this 
responsibility and have continued to hold purposes involving 
direct and indirect changes in the law as 'non-charitable '. For 
example, in 1972, a British student union (itself a charity) 
wished to subscribe to a campaign against the government's policy 
on free milk supplies to school children. The object of the 
campaign was admittedly according to its own literature, 
political, and an injunction was granted against the student 
union's officers prohibiting them from applying union funds to 
this purpose.28
b . Supporting political parties...and promoting politicaldoctrine
English and Canadian courts have held that if it promotes the 
interests of a particular political party a trust's purpose is 
political, hence non-charitable. For example, in 1929 a gift "to 
the British Primrose League of the Conservative Cause to be used 
as a habitation in connection with the league or in a manner which
27N.P. Gravells, 'Public Purpose Trusts', Modern Law Review. 
40 (1971), p. 397.
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would benefit the cause of a political party"29 was invalidated. 
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Vaisey in Re Hopkinson (1949) struck down 
a gift on trust "for the. advancement of adult education with 
particular reference to the following purpose, ... the education 
of men and women of all classes (on the lines of the Labour 
Party's memorandum ...) to a higher conception of social, 
political and economic ideas and values ..."30 The memorandum 
cited by the testator was aimed at furthering the ends of 
socialism and encouraging the solution of contemporary problems by 
the application of socialist principles. The object of the gift 
was not to influence the content of a particular piece of 
legislation but rather to advance the fortunes of one political 
party and its policies. Similarly, in Bonar Law Memorial Trust V. 
I.R.C. (1933), a trust to establish a college run by members of 
the Conservative Party sought to be exempt from income tax. They 
argued that students were admitted without reference to their 
political leanings. Some lectures were given on Conservative 
Party organisation and, during the holidays the building was used 
to give courses restricted to Conservative Members of Parliament. 
Mr. Justice Finlay held that a trust for the furtherance of a 
particular political party could not be ruled a charitable trust. 
On the facts, the Bonar Law Memorial Trust was held to be closely
29Re Jones (1929) 45 T.L.R. 259 (Ch. Div.).
30As stated in the dictum in Re Hopkinson (1949) 1 ALL E.R. 
352 (Ch. Div.).
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aligned to the Conservative Party and therefore invalid.31 In the
Canadian case. Re. Loney (1953), a trust "for the purposes of 
promoting and propagating, the doctrines of teaching socialism"32 
was held to be non-charitable on similar grounds.
As previously noted, if an organisation is able to 
demonstrate to the courts that political activities are ancillary 
to its main charitable object, then charitable status will be 
conferred. For example, in Re. Scowcroft (1898), a bequest of a 
building known as the Conservative Club and Village Reading-Room 
... to be maintained for the furtherance of Conservative 
principles and religious and mental improvement was ruled valid: 
In the Judges own words it was argued:
"The furtherance of religious and mental 
improvement is ... an essential portion of the 
gift. It is therefore, a gift in one form or 
another for religious and mental improvement, no 
doubt in combination with the advancement of 
Conservative principles ..."
33
To make the same point, in the case Re Arthur McDouqall Fund 
(1957), a trust was held charitable even though it was established 
by a political society devoted to advancing the concept of 
proportional representation. The decision was even upheld under
31 Sonar Law Memorial Trust V.__i.R.c. (1933) 49 t .l .r . 220(K.B.).
32As stated in the dictum in Re Loney (1953) 4 D.L.R. 539.
33Re Scowcroft (1898) 2 Ch. 641-2 (Ch. Div.). The decision 
handed down in this case is credited with laying the legal 
foundation on which the Bowman (1917) case was later decided.
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an appeal since the organisation's purpose was viewed as advancing 
education in the area of political science.34 The basic lines of 
reasoning adopted by the courts in the above decisions, are as 
follows. Judges argue they cannot validate gifts from charities 
to political parties or recognise organisations as being 
charitable if they advance only one political doctrine. As the 
final arbiter, they have no way of determing whether disputed 
'objects' are for a public benefit. To proceed otherwise, judges 
have feared "encroaching on the functions of the legislature and 
prejudicing their own reputation for political impartiality."35
C. Affecting foreign relations
Judges have invoked the principle that charities seeking to 
affect relations are deemed to be political, and hence (because of 
Bowman) non-charitable. For example, in Re. Strakosch (1949), the 
courts ruled a gift invalid for any purpose which in their opinion 
is designed to strengthen the bonds of unity between the Union of 
South Africa and Britain. The decision was reached despite the 
plaintiffs plea that the gift would help to appease strained 
racial feelings between the Dutch and English speaking communities 
in South Africa.36 In a similar case, an organisation aimed at 
promoting a closer and more sympathetic understanding between 
English and Swedish people was held non-charitable under English
34Re Arthur McDougall Fund (1957) 1 W.L.R. 81 (Ch. Div.).
35As stated by Mr. Justice Slade in McGovern V. Attorney 
General (1981) 3 ALL E.R. 493.
36Re Strakosch (1949) Ch. 529 (C.A.).
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common law.37 Furthermore, Oxfam has encountered legal problems 
for publishing its own 'politically tainted' literature. 
Commenting on Oxfam's efforts to resolve the problems of poverty 
in Nicaragua, Roger Scruton argued in The Times on 8 April, 1986 
that the literature distributed by this charity asked for 'public 
support of the Marxist government of Nicaragua'.38
The most publicised legal case in which a charity was ruled 
to have affected foreign relations, involved Amnesty International 
(1981). The objects of this organisation included, "attempting to 
secure the release of prisoners of conscience and procuring the 
abolition of torture and inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment"39 and were ruled non-charitable on these grounds. In 
arriving at his conclusion, Mr. Justice Slade asserted that the 
organisation's main purpose was to alter another country's laws 
both directly and indirectly. His decision was based on two 
assumptions. First, Slade argued that even in the case of a 
proposed change in domestic law, "the court has no adequate means 
of judging whether a proposed change in the law of a foreign 
country would or would not be for the public benefit. "40 Second, 
he assumed that by holding the trust to be charitable, relations
37See Analo-Swedish Society V. I.R.C. (1931) 147 T.L.R. 295. 
It was held that the organisation was not charitable because it 
was essentially a trust to promote an attitude of mind concerning 
a view of one nation by another.
38The Times. 8 April 1986.
39McGovern V. Attorney General (1981) 3 ALL E.R. 493.
40lbid*., p. 507.
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between Britain and other foreign countries, might be strained. 
In other words, Mr. Justice Slade decided this case by taking into 
consideration public polioy issues. In advancing this argument in 
his dictum the following was stated.
"Before ascribing charitable status to an English 
trust of which a main object was to secure the 
alteration of a foreign law, the court would ... 
be bound to consider the consequences for this 
country as a matter of public policy. In a 
number of such cases there would be a substantial 
prima facie risk that such a trust, if enforced, 
could prejudice the relations of this country 
with the foreign country concerned."
41
Because the Attorney-General in both England and Canada 
administer charitable trusts when executor(s) are incapable of 
carrying out their responsibilities, there is concern a greater 
relaxation of this restriction would damage state relations with 
other countries. Most legal commentators suggest this would not 
be the implication since it is difficult to imagine a foreign 
country viewing the Attorney-General ' s administration of a charity 
as representing a state endorsement of its purposes. In America, 
however, charities have been permitted to advance purposes which 
affect foreign relations. The most obvious example is charities 
aimed at promoting peace by disarmament, as well as those aimed at 
promoting peace by preparedness for war.42 Obviously, these 
organisations often set their objective to alter domestic laws and
41Ibid.. p. 507.
42Gladstone, Charity Law and Social Justice, p. 105.
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the laws in foreign countries. However, their fundamental 
'purpose', to guarantee international peace, also involves 
influencing existing relationships between nations. Nevertheless, 
American legislation openly recognises these overtly political 
activités as 'open territory' for charity. The most striking 
demonstrations of the potentially political nature of American 
charities (in the context of affecting foreign relations) were 
revealed between 1952 and 1967. During that time, a large number 
of grant making foundations secretly received funds from the 
Central Intelligence Agency on the basis that, in turn, they would 
make grants to 'approved' charities operating mostly in the sphere 
of education and culture within developing countries. American 
cultural aid, although dispensed by 'neutral' organisations of a 
philanthropic nature, was thus significantly tinged with political 
doctrines favouring 'freedom' under American-style capitalism. In 
the context of 'charity law', what matters is not that the U.S. 
was thus distributing its own political propaganda, but that 
charities were the medium for this.43
D. Disseminating propaganda and attempting to change social
attitudes
Organisations attempting to persuade people to adopt 
particular attitudes have been held non-charitable on two broad 
grounds.44 First, the courts have ruled them 'non-educational' as
43M. Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare, p. 356.
44The acceptance of the two general principles embodied in 
the law is beyond dispute. Curiously, the article on 'charities' 
in the most recent edition of Halbury's laws of England appears to
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defined in the Pernsel case, if all sides are not presented. 
Second, they are normally ruled to provide no public benefit since 
they are political (that is to say the courts have no way of 
deciding whether they will benefit the public). While this last 
line of reasoning has been discussed in sub-sections A, B, and C, 
the first requires more elaboration.
In the context of charity law, propaganda, as opposed to 
education, has been defined as presenting only one side of an 
issue or presenting unsubstantiated opinions. The legal case Re. 
Bushnell (1975), involved a trust "for the advancement and 
propagation of the teaching of socialised medicine".45 A testator 
who died in 1941 bequeathed his residuary estate on trust to 
publish books and other literature, promote lectures and establish 
an institute, all for the purpose of spreading knowledge about 
'the socialized application of medicine to public and personal 
health and well-being'. However, the main purpose was held by the 
court to be for 'illustrating that the full advantage of 
socialized medicine can only be enjoyed in a socialist state'. 
Mr. Justice Goulding held the trust non-charitable on the ground,
be outdated. Indeed, it is a replication of the law as stated in 
the very first edition of Halsbury. See T. Holden, Halsbury's 
Laws of England. London: Butterworths, 1974, vol. 5, para. 543, 
where it is stated that "the promulgation of particular doctrines 
or principles not subversive of morality of otherwise pernicious, 
and not in furtherance of the principles of a particular political 
party, nor involving pressure on the legislature to acheive a 
political object in changing the law of the land, may be 
charitable". This accurate statement of the law in 1908, is 
outdated today.
45Re Bushnell (1975) 1 W.L.R. 1596, 1605 (Ch. Div.).
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inter alia, that the socialist element in the trust gave it a 
substantial political flavour. The judge further concluded the 
trust could not be supported as an educational trust and therefore 
was not considered charitable under common law. He remarked: 
"the testator never for a moment, as I need his language, desired 
to educate the public so that they could choose for themselves, 
starting with neutral information, to support or oppose what he 
called 'socialised medicine'.46 The test of 'neutral information' 
as a criterion of education may seem stringent: this is
particularly true in the U.S. For example, the American Senator, 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, threatened U.S. foundations with 
deregistration if they were not "even handed in the political 
consequences of (their) activities, seeking neither to advance nor 
impede any cause except that of understanding and competence".47 
However, British legal historians have not been convinced that the 
judge in the Bushnell case wished to extend the law this far. 
Rather, it has been argued his judgement was more analogous to an 
earlier American Treasury regulation stating an organisation was 
not educational if "formed to disseminate controversial 
propaganda".48 The judge in the case further stated, "I think he 
(the testator) was trying to promote his own theory by education,
46lbid.. p. 1605.
47John Simon, 'Foundations and Public Controversy: An
Affirmative View' in Fritz Heimann, The__Future__of Foundations.
New York: Prentice Hall, 1973, p. 71.
48j . Filer, Giving in__America;__Toward a Stronger Voluntary
Sector. Washington D.C.: University of Chicago Press, 1975,
Volume 4, p. 1054.
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if you will propaganda, but I do not attach importance to that 
word."49
Many British and Canadian charities have sought to advance a 
variety of causes, but this has not impeded their charitable 
status so long as the promotion of legislation is merely ancillary 
to their charitable purpose. There are at least three problems 
for the courts in deciding whether a charity's purposes are 
educational (hence charitable) or propaganda (hence non- 
charitable).
First, the most significant problem involves distinguishing 
between educational material and propaganda. Regardless of how 
they are defined, the difference between the two terms only become 
apparent when taken in their literal contexts. Some argue that 
all education is infected with the biases of the educator. Even 
if bias is not apparent from the material presented, it is from 
the material that was not presented but might have been. The only 
real differences between these two scenarios is not what 
information they provide the reader with, but the form in which it 
is presented. Thus, for example, one commentator has noted, 
"advancement of inter-social harmony can be described as education 
of different racial groups about each other's way of life, and 
propagation of right or left-wing doctrines may be charitable if 
it can be described as education in political science".50
Second, even assuming there is a difference between
49Re Bushnell (1975) 1 W.L.R. 1605 (Ch. Div.).
50Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare/ p. 159.
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propaganda and educational material, the judgments about this 
involve subjective considerations so that it provides a basis for 
the censorship of ideas, . or at least differential state support 
for some ideas. The fact that distinguishing between 'education' 
and 'propaganda' leaves vast room for the reflection of a judge's 
or administrator's political biases is widely recognised. For 
example, a member of the U.K. House of Commons Expenditure 
Committee made the following comment about the judge deciding the 
Be Bushnell case.
"... he was probably a Tory himself. Most of 
the judges are, in fact, right-wing reactionaries 
and, therefore, whatever one might have to say on 
the impartiality of the judges, it is not always 
the case in a case like this where there might be 
a political context which might be at variance 
with the views of the judge."
51
Even if this allegation is unfounded, it does reveal the potential 
conflict of interest of involving judges in essentially political 
questions.
Third, when organisations disseminate propoganda it can not 
be clear to judges whether its against the public's interest. For 
example, even though a person is being presented with only one 
view, they are nonetheless being educated. Having heard all views 
from different organisations, it is arguable that individuals are 
able to form their own judgement. One legal expert has argued "if
51Minutes of Evidence taken before the House of Commons 
Expenditure Committee, 12 May, 1975, p. 312, as cited in 
Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare, p. 161.
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one reason that the advancement of education is for the public 
benefit is that it enables people to make educated judgements, 
then allowing them to hear from the strongest advocates of each 
side of an issue is arguably the best means'*.52
There are few case law examples of charities actively 
involved in disseminating propaganda and attempting to change 
social attitudes. Nevertheless, cases involving the question of 
'charities and propaganda' have demonstrated the court's eagerness 
to disallow these types of charities to exist. Judges have argued 
if charities were permitted to promote propaganda and receive 
immunity from income tax, the public might be misled into 
believing such views were supported and endorsed by the state.53
II. American Law Versus English and Canadian Law
Aside from several minor differences, English and Canadian 
law have treated the issue of charities and political involvement 
in virtually identical terms. However, in the United States, 
different guidelines in this area of law have been developed and 
given statutory force. In each of the three countries the issue 
of charities and politics has only recently become a pervasive 
problem, for two important reasons. First, charitable 
organisations, whether involved in third world relief or medical 
research, recognise government-sponsored action is often more
52lhi£L., pp. 313-320.
53See IRC V. Yorkshire Agricultural Society (1927) 1 K.B. 611.
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effective in resolving problems than is philanthropy on its own. 54 
As a result, many charities have attempted to achieve their 
objectives by affecting government legislation. Second, because 
charitable status automatically entitles organisations to a host 
of fiscal privileges, an increasing number of groups with mainly 
political objectives have sought to operate in some limited ways 
under the banner of charity. It has been shown that since 1917 
English and Canadian law have limited the amount of political 
activity which charities may involve themselves, but this is not 
the case in the United States. From 1919 to 1969 American law 
closely paralleled English and Canadian law over the question of 
charities and political activities. The United States Treasury in 
1919 issued a regulation providing that "associations formed to 
disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda are not 
educational within the meaning of the statute”.55 This judicial 
line of reasoning remained intact until a number of widely- 
reported cases brought by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
against certain tax-exempt organisations resulted in strident
54However, Third World relief charities are conscious of the 
fact that they are often able to implement and administer 
programmes and achieve certain goals that government agencies are 
unable to because of their 'private status'. Charities that have 
accepted large government grants have frequently encountered 
problems in the 'field' since their 'private non-governmental' 
status has been perceived by the host government/people to be 
politically tinged. See generally, Peter Burnell, Third World 
Charities in Britain and Official Funding. University of Warwick: 
Politics Department Working-paper No. 46, 1987.
55S. Clark, 'The Limitation on Political Activities: A 
discordant note in the Law of Charities', Virginia Law Review. 
46(1960), p. 446.
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demands in the late 1960s for law reform. The most publicised 
cases involved the Sierra Club - an environmentalist group - and a 
number of public interest .law firms.56 In these cases, legal 
experts argued that the courts had no means of determining when an 
organisation's activities had become substantially political. 
This, in turn, lead to serious charges against the IRS of 
selective and random enforcement practices. The urgency for
legislative reform increased after a number of challenges were 
initiated to test the Revenue Code's constitutionality. The 
central issue related to restrictions on the deductability of 
donations to charities involved in lobbying for legislative 
reforms. These constitutional challenges included impermissible 
vagueness, denial of equal protection and restriction on free 
speech.57 The problem of distinguishing political from charitable 
purposes in the U.S. is complicated by the First Amendment's 
guarantee of freedom of religion and particularly 'the free 
exercise thereof'. The Free Exercise clause has been held to 
justify political activity when the church in question regards the 
legislation as religious: an example is the promotion of
Temperance58 or Sunday Observance Legislation.59 Both of these
56R. l . Hoibert, Tax Laws and Political Access; The Bias of
Pluralism Revisited. Beverly Hills: Sage Publication, 1978, p.
31-49 as cited in n . Brooks, charities;____The__Legal framework«
Ottawa: Policy Coordination Directorate, 1983, p. 158.
57For a summary of the various legislative proposals made 
between 1969 and 1974 and a reprinting of the major bills 
presented to Congress, see Filer, Giving in America: Toward a
Stronger Voluntary Sector# p- 917.
58Girard Trust Co. V. Commissioner (194l) ill f 2d 108.
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have been held to be political objectives in England and Canada. 
Conversely it has been argued that American tax treatment 
favouring religious organisations undermines the principle of 
neutrality implicit in the First Amendment's proscription of 
governmental interference with religion. It was suggested by the 
Filer Commission that this principle of neutrality may require 
that in this respect religious organisations should be treated in 
the same way as other American charities; "that is, with no 
substantial advantage or disadvantage applied to religious 
organisations merely because they are religious".60 Under English 
and Canadian laws, charities established for the advancement of 
religion receive no special advantage or disadvantage with regard 
to political activity.
By the late 1960s, the taxation and regulation of American 
charities came under close scrutiny from several congressional 
committees. One aspect of this investigation related to the 
political activities of private foundations. One concern was that 
private foundations had become too financially supportive of 
political activists aligned with particular parties and even 
political candidates. Congressional committees also concluded 
that some of these political activities were aimed at furthering 
the self-interest of individual charities and their major donors.
59Lords Day Alliance of Pennsylvania V. United States (1946) 
65 F Sapp 62. The Lord's Day Observance Society is a charity in 
England because it was established in the 19th century prior to 
the Bowman decision in 1917.
60Filer, Commission__on Private Philanthropy and Public Need.
p. 961.
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In response new legislation - the Tax Reform Act (1969) - was 
enacted containing precisely defined rules prohibiting private 
foundations from engaging .in political activities. However, the 
prohibition, was subject to three important exceptions which 
permitted grant-giving foundations to (1) make available the 
results of non-partisan analysis, study or research; (2) to 
furnish technical advice or assistance in response to requests by 
governmental bodies and (3) to attempt to influence legislation 
concerning the existence of the private foundation, its powers and 
duties, its tax exempt status, or the deduction of contributions 
to it.61
Legislation relevant to charities which actually deliver 
services are more complex than those applied to private 
foundations. Nevertheless, the statutory framework can be simply 
explained in the following way. Certain organisations in the 
United States, often referred to as 'section 501(c)(3)'
organisations, are entitled to have their income exempt from tax 
and also to receive tax deductable charitable contributions. 
These 'section 501(c)(3)' organisations include corporations 
"organised and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational 
purposes."62 However, the 1969 legislation outlines three 
principal forms of activities which would lead an organisation to
61See the United States, Tax Reform Act (1969), especially 
section 4945.
62United States, Internal Revenue Code (1979) reg. 1. 501(c)(3).
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be classified as a 'social welfare group' and therefore non­
char itable. These include: (1) attempting to influence 
legislation, (2) participating in political campaigns on behalf 
or in opposition to any candidate for public office, and (3) 
having a 'primary objective' that may be attained by legislation 
or defeat of proposed legislation.63 The legal rules applicable 
to social welfare groups are covered under section 501(c)(4) of 
the Internal Revenue Code.
American courts have encountered the same difficulty as their 
British and Canadian counterparts in determining what constitutes 
a 'primary objective'. In general the American regulations go 
into much more detail as to the precise form of activity that is 
allowable. For example, specific guidelines are in place which 
determine the extent and condititons under which charities may 
circulate the voting records of Congressmen. The English and 
Canadian tendency on the other hand, is to make a more general 
assessment as to whether political activity is a primary or 
ancillary purpose. Thus, English and Canadian charities appear to 
be more free than their American counterparts in proposing new 
legislation or making representations to government officials and 
Members of Parliament about legislation that affects their 
charitable purposes. This is conditional on such activities 
remaining ancillary to their charitable purposes. Conversely, the 
American regulations define 'political' more closely in terms of
63Filer, Commission on Private Philanthropy and— Public Need, 
p. 950.
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interference with the legislative process, including elections.
As in the U.S. it has become increasingly difficult for the 
Charity Commission, and Revenue Canada to consistently draw an 
accurate line between politics and philanthropy. The task has 
been made more difficult by the increasing number of overtly 
political organisations seeking the fiscal priviledges attached to 
charitable status. As a result, in each of the three countries 
many charities with both political and charitable purposes have 
feared deregistration. In reducing this anxiety many 
organisations have divided themselves into two distinct parts; the 
main body to advance their charitable objectives and the 
subsidiary organisation to advance their political objectives. In 
the United States the 'social welfare group' structure is most 
often adopted as the subsidiary organisation for lobbying 
government. While classified as non-charitable and ineligible to 
receive tax deductable contributions, they may receive tax exempt 
status. In Britain and Canada, many organisations have also 
separated their political and charitable activities by creating 
subsidiary organisations. However, in contrast to the social 
welfare group in the U.S., British and Canadian subsidiaries are 
ineligible to receive comparable tax exemptions.
An example of a British organisation with specifically 
political purposes is the Disablement Income Group, (DIG). Its 
objectives include:
"securing the provision for all disabled people 
of a national disability income including an 
allowance for the extra expense of disablement;
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to cooperate with other bodies working in the 
field; for the improvement of the economic and 
social position of disabled people and the 
chronic sick; to promote research into the
economic and social problems of disablement."
64
However, in this case a close alliance of political and charitable 
purposes is achieved by establishing two bodies. One is a non- 
party, non-charitable pressure group concerned with legislative 
reform. The other is a registered charity concerned with the 
collection and dissemination of information about the economic and 
social problems of disabled people. Clearly, research and the 
collection of information about social and economic problems are 
charitable purposes at law. Even though the organisation may 
serve an object that is not charitable - political pressure for a 
statutory disablement income - its own charitable status is not 
affected. Two other publicised British examples of this practice 
include Amnesty International (political) with its subsidiary. 
Prisoners of Conscience Fund (charitable), and Christian Aid 
(charitable) with its subsidiary. Defence and Aid Fund 
(political).65 While this strategy has reduced the chances of a 
charity being deregistered for unlawful political activities, 
there are other practical disadvantages such as keeping separate 
accouunts and maintaining separate payrolls.66 In the area of
64Disablement Income Group, Annual Report. 1985. London: p.
65Chesterman, Charities, Trusta and Social Welfare, pp. 360-361.
66lbid.. p. 361.
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medical research, none of the British and Canadian respondents 
acknowledge their organisation had adopted this strategy.
m «  Charities and Political Involvement;__issues Raised inBritish and Canadian Public Debates.
This section examines issues raised during public debates in 
Britain and Canada relating to charities and their political 
involvement. In looking at Britain, two official reports are 
examined: the Charity Commission's Annual Reports published by
the Home Office, and the House of Commons Expenditure Committee's 
Tenth Report entitled: The Charity Commissioners and their
Accountability«_1974-75. Also examined is the Report published by
the National Council of Social Service
(1976). In contrast to Britain the issue of charities and
political involvement has not been the focus of official inquiry 
in Canada. For example, the issue was not addressed in the 1966
Carter Report on taxation nor was it dealt with in the 1975
Department of Finance Green Paper on charities. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to examine the issue from a different perspective by 
reviewing a recent controversy involving Revenue Canada. In 1978, 
Revenue officials introduced new guidelines regarding the 
restriction of charities from political involvement. The issue of 
charities and politics has arisen in different contexts in the two 
countries, nevertheless a review and discussion of these public 
debates illustrates the diversity of opinions concerning this 
aspect of charity law.
113
A. Charity Commissioners' Annual Reports
In consideration of the growing number of complaints 
regarding political activities, the Charity Commissioners' 1969 
Annual Report listed two classes of 'political' activities which 
they believed could be justified as being proper for charities. 
First they stated that if government officials or Members of 
Parliament asked a charity for information or evidence, it would 
be proper for that charity to be able to respond to such requests. 
The Commissioners suggested extending the principle further by 
regarding the government as implicitly inviting comments when they 
set forth their proposals in Green and White Papers.67 From this 
position they went one step further by stating: "When a
parliamentary bill has been published, a charity will be justified 
in supplying relevant information to a Member of either House and 
such arguments to be used in debate as it believes will assist the 
furtherance of its purposes. "68 In recommending this, the 
Commission drew a fine distinction between initiating political 
action (an illegal activity) and participating in policy debates 
in a restrained manner (a permissable political activity). 
However, the Commission qualified this by listing its second class 
of permissable political activities, cases where a charity might
67A Green Paper is a consultative document in which the 
government sets forth for discussion proposals that do not 
necessarily represent their own policy. The Government takes a 
greater degree of responsibility for proposals set forth in a 
White Paper.
68HMSO, Report Qf the__Charity Commissioners.__1969. London:
HMSO, 1970, para. 16.
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be justified in initiating political activities:
"It is unobjectionable for a charity to present 
to a government .department .a reasoned memorandum 
advocating changes in the law provided that in 
doing so the charity is acting in furtherance of 
its purposes. On the other hand, a charity can 
only spend its funds on the promotion of public 
general legislation if in doing so it is 
exercising a power that is merely ancillary to 
its charitable purposes. But here again
difficulty arises in defining the boundary 
between what is merely ancillary and what amounts 
to adopting a new purpose itself. A charity 
would be well advised to seek advice either from 
legal advisors or from us before undertaking any 
such activities."
69
The Charity Commissioners returned to the issue of political 
involvement in their 1976 annual report. The Commission stated 
that during the previous year it had a number of complaints 
regarding charities involved in the area of family planning, 
abortion and anti-smoking. For example, the Commission was asked 
by a number of non-charitable anti-abortion lobbying groups to 
deregister the Family Planning Association (F.P.A.). This charity 
was accused of failing to give proper information and instruction 
concerning the need for, and value of sexual restraint and because 
it was engaged in lobbying for legislative changes.70 The Charity 
Commissioners argued that organisations like F.P.A., The British 
Pregnancy Advisory Service and the Pregnancy Advisory Service, all 
of which are registered charities, were not, on the evidence
69Ibid.. para. 16.
70HMSO, Report of the Charity Commissioners.__1976■ Londons
HMSO, 1977, para. 98.
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accumulated, in league with pro-abortionist lobbying groups. This 
case highlights the strategy adopted by some non-charitable 
organisations holding certain beliefs to strip charities 
advocating contrary beliefs of their tax exempt status. This 
would remove an organisation's fiscal privileges and place it on a 
more equal financial footing with non-charitable organisations 
advocating opposite points of view.
Similarly, the Charity Commission stated in its 1978 annual 
report that, during that year, they reviewed the activities of 
three international relief charities concerning alleged political 
involvement. War on Want, Oxfam and Christian Aid Division were 
all required to meet officials from the Charity Commission to 
explain their behaviour.71 This was done prior to the Commission 
deciding on whether legal action should be initiated. The Charity 
Commission concluded that the Christian Aid Division had 
previously made grants to the World Council of Churches' 
Commission on Churches' Participation in Development. The objects 
of this organisation were aimed at "enhancing political action, 
mobilising public opinion and effecting structural change within 
societies in an attempt to tackle those causes of poverty which 
lie in the economic, social and political structures of 
communities".72 The Charity Commissioners reacted by advising the 
charity's trustees that such activities were not within the
71HMSO, Report of the Charity Commissioners. 1978. London: 
HMSO, 1979, paras. 22-23.
72Ibid.. para. 27.
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parameters of the original set of 'objects' agreed upon at 
registration. As a result, future grants made to the World 
Council of Churches were required to be given for objects 
exclusively charitable in law.73 While the Charity Commission has 
had the authority to pursue a much more aggressive approach in 
dealing with these organisations, normally only a written warning 
is issued. This approach has been favoured for two reasons. 
First, for the Charity Commission to proceed directly to 
litigation in every instance of detected breaches of the political 
bar rule would be costly and time consuming.74 According to one 
respondent, the Commission's limited resources have primarily been 
allocated to programmes responsible for detecting other illegal 
activities such as tax fraud. However, this directly contradicts 
the recent conclusions reached by the National Audit Office in its 
1987 report.75 Second, the Charity Commission has preferred to 
view itself as an information and co-ordinating agency genuinely 
dedicated to assisting charities rather than functioning as a 
strict government watch-dog agency.76
The Charity Commission's annual reports reveal a partial 
response to charity demands to 'clarify' the law regarding the 
types of political activities considered permissible. The
73Ibid.. para. 27.
74British Interview, The Charity Commission, 31 March 1987.
75National Audit Office, Monitoring and Control of Charities 
in England and Wales. London: HMSO, 1987, pp. 3-4.
76lbid.. pp. 3-4.
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prevailing misconception is that the Charity Commission has the 
jurisdictional authority to draft new legal guidelines. As the 
Charity Commissioners themselves point out, their responsibility 
is merely to interpret the guidelines as formulated by the courts. 
Attempts to redefine the law in the direction of increasing the 
limitations placed on a charity's political activities, would be 
met with considerable opposition.77 A similar situation developed 
in Canada when Revenue Canada officials issued an information 
circular in 1978 in an attempt to clarify the legal interpretation 
of similar guidelines. While the Commission has advocated law 
reform in this area it has yet to provide its own set of 
recommendations. Given its limited resources and hence limited 
success in applying this aspect of charity law, most Commissioners 
have favoured a greater liberalisation in the types of political 
activities considered acceptable.78
B. The House of Commons Expenditure Committee's Tenth Report.
1 9 7 4 - 7 5 .
The second report to examine the issue of charity and 
political involvement was the House of Commons Expenditure 
Committee's, Tenth Report: The Charity Commissioners and Their
Accountability. 1974-75. Most commentators agree this study was 
the first to put forward substantive recommendations aimed at 
resolving the problem. During its hearings, the Commission
accumulated considerable evidence from a wide body of interested
77Ibid.. pp. 3-4.
78lbid.. pp. 4-5.
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organisations. For example, the Charity Law Reform Committee 
demanded in its submission to the Expenditure Committee that 
legislation barring charities from- political involvement be 
overturned. Furthermore, they argued the expansion of the welfare 
state had forced charities to alter their role from one of 
pioneering to one of supplementing statutory welfare services.
"In the past and particularly in the 19th 
century, charities were at the forefront of 
social change. They pioneered subsidised
housing, prison visits, care of the handicapped. 
Labour exchanges, adult education and many other 
services now too often taken for granted. In 
those days, the only possible method of 
ameliorating conditions was by approaching the 
general public for support. The government took 
little interest in social legislation, and 
charities played a major role in radical, 
pioneering work."
79
When the welfare state began to assume much of the work 
previously performed by charities, it was widely believed the 
latter would 'fade away'. However, it became apparent there were, 
and continue to exist, major gaps in the welfare state. In 
response, many charities began to provide services similar to 
those provided for by the state. The Charity Law Reform Committee 
further stated in its submission that this has created two 
problems for charities in relation to their restriction from 
political activities. First, organisations providing services 
supplementary or complementary to state-provided services have
79See, House of Commons Expenditure Committee, Volume of 
Minutes of Evidence and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1975, pp. 349- 
350.
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naturally criticized and commented on the quantity and quality of 
government welfare programmes. Second, many charities, for 
example those relieving the poor, felt their contributions have 
contributed to delaying public policy to solve the more 
fundamental causes of poverty.80 In response, the Charity Law 
Reform Committee suggested "the sensible solution, consistent with 
the tradtitional pioneering role of charities, seems to be for 
them to investigate and define needs, to undertake small-scale 
pilot schemes, and to press the community and the government, as 
its agent, to accept their responsibilities and extend welfare 
services ".81 As the members of the Expenditure Committee 
themselves recognised, "the ban on politics simply makes this 
approach impractible."82 Despite the law, many charities have 
followed the Charity Law Reform Committe's recommendations. This 
is true of the Child Poverty Action Group, a charity whose purpose 
is to promote action for the relief (directly or indirectly) of 
poverty among children and families with children. In the broad 
sense of the term, this charity would seem to be politically 
active although not specifically partisan. In this case the 
organisation's primary focus is a 'deserving cause', the relief of 
poverty among children, which it pursues irrespective of whether
80Ibid.. pp. 361-362. 
81Ibid.. p. 358.
82Ibid.. p. 358.
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the relief emanates from the public or private sector.83
The Expenditure Committee was strongly influenced by the 
evidence submitted by the Charity Law Reform Committee. In their 
recommendations, the Expenditure Committee, like the Charity 
Commission in its Annual Reports, accepted that the existing 
restrictions on political activities were impractical and 
outdated. As a result, the Expenditure Committee further 
recommended that the area of permissible political involvement be 
expanded and given statutory force. This, the Committee argued, 
would relieve part of the apprehension charities experience when 
becoming politically involved, and invigorate the public policy 
process in allowing them to openly comment on government
programmes. The Expenditure Committee's Report also recognised 
the severe financial limitations placed on the Charity Commission 
and sympathized with their inability to supervise both the 
financial and political activities of 130,000 registered
charities. In combination with the broad-guidelines relevant to 
the political bar rule, which the Charity Commission has been 
required to enforce, this aspect of Charity law was concluded to 
be largely 'unenforceable'.84
c .  Goodman R e p o r t ,  1978
The Third report to address the problem of 'political
83Brenton, The Voluntary Sector in British Social Services, 
p. 98.
84House of Commons Expenditure Committee Volume of Evidence 
and Appendices. pp. 360-362.
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involvement', was the Goodman Report (1978) sponsored by the 
National Council of Social Services. The Committee devoted 
chapter IV of its report entirely to 'political activity'. After 
long and complex explanations outlining how and why charities are 
allowed to engage in political activities ancillary to their main 
objects, the Committee summarised its conclusions. First, it 
rejected the notion that fiscal privileges accorded to charities 
should be extended to organisations having political objectives as 
recognised by law. Furthermore, it was not pursuaded by evidence 
submitted by a number of charities that broadening the definition 
of a 'charitable purpose' would invigorate political life by 
involving more participants in the policy process. In one 
submission, a charity maintained it would merely continue bo 
bandage the wounds of society instead of actually preventing the 
injuries if the restrictions were not lifted.85 While the 
Committee rejected the extension of fiscal privileges to charities 
with political purposes, it did not accept the proposition that 
charities should be divorced from political activity altogether. 
In fact, the Goodman Report states the importance of striking a 
balance between, advocating or promoting the continuance or change 
in the law or government policy, and supporting (directly or 
indirectly), a political party or individual standing for 
election.86 The Committee reaffirmed that only charities engaged
85Goodman Committee, Charity Law and Voluntary Organisations. 
London: Bedford Square Press/NCVO, 1976, ch. IV. para 103(c).
86Ibid.. para. 104.
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in political activity ancillary to their legally recognised 
purposes should be considered permissible. Second, the Committee 
stressed it was not desirable -for politically motivated 
organisations to camouflage themselves as charities. However, 
they recognized that in financial terms organisations having 
purposes undeniably political in nature are often 'better-off' by 
passing themselves off as charities. As a result, they strongly 
recommended that greater resources be given to the Charity 
Commission to detect this type of activity.87
In response to the increasing number of organisations that 
have split themselves into two divisions - one charitable, one 
political - the Goodman Committee argued this would undermine the 
charity movement's credibility. They claimed this strategy had 
effectively allowed charities to insulate their charitable 
activities from 'political taint'. While charitable donations 
given to organisations are required by law to be spent on their 
charitable purpose(s), the Committee recognized that many
charities use funds to finance the political wings of their 
organisation. This activity is generally not discouraged for two 
reasons. First, the Charity Commission has not had the resources 
to audit effectively the financial transactions of all registered 
charities. Second, where this strategy has been adopted and where 
control is interlocking, the use of such funds has been extremely 
difficult to trace.88 As a result, the Committee's main
87Ibid.. para. 104(c).
88Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare, p. 165.
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recommendation was for stricter legal guidelines to discourage 
organisations with both a charitable and political wing from 
confusing the two. In other wordsr a greater separation rather 
than unification under a 'charitable banner' was recommended.89
The Committee's recommendations are best understood in the 
context of its view of charity's role in society. As Lord Goodman 
explained; "charity has a moral connotation which itself attracts 
support and some are concerned that the notion of a charity being 
permitted to become involved in political activity may detract 
from the special status accorded in the minds of many to 
charities. ”90 This was particularly the belief of the 19th 
Century philanthropist who saw his role essentially as that of 
using his own resources to alleviate distress or provide some 
other social benefit. Particularly with the growth of statutory 
services in the post-war period, there has been as the Charity 
Commission expressed it:
" ... an increasing desire of charities for 
involvement in the causes with which their work 
is connected. Many organisations now feel that 
it is not sufficient simply to alleviate distress 
arising from particular social conditions or even 
go further and collect and disseminate 
information about the problems they encounter. 
They feel compelled also to draw attention as 
forcibly as possible to the needs which they 
think are not being met, to rouse the conscience 
of the public, to demand action and to press for 
effective official provision to be made to meet
89Goodman Committee, Charity Law and Voluntary Organisations, 
para. 105.
90Ibid.. para. 105.
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those needs.
Thus the activities charities now pursue represent a 
continuum from social research to outright political lobbying. The 
problem is where on this continuum the law should draw the line if 
the distinction between charity and politics is to be preserved. 
The attitude of both British and Canadian charities is
understandable. Their resources are limited - in many cases
manifestly inadequate to deal with the magnitude of the problems 
they encounter. As discussed in chapters five and six, British 
and Canadian medical research charities have lobbied their 
respective governments to spend increasing amounts on researching 
their specific 'disease area'. Rather than using their resources 
to 'tinker at the edges of a problem', medical research charities 
in both countries have used part of their voluntary income to 
initiate, or augment, government programmes capable of making a 
more sizeable impact. The potential achievements of the state, 
with its enormous financial resources, are far greater than any 
charity is able to accomplish on its own. When for example the
Labour government decided in 1969 to cut back £20 million on 
foreign aid, this involved more money than Oxfam, one of Britain's 
richest charities, had raised for expenditure on foreign aid since 
its inception in 1942.92
91
91h m s o, Report of the__Charity Commissioners.__L2£2. London:HMSO, 1970, para. 8.
92Chesterman, Charities, Truata and Social Welfare, p - 85.
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D. Summary
Despite each of the recommendations for legal reforms put 
forward by the Charity Commission, the House of Commons 
Expenditure Committee and the Goodman Committee, legislative 
amendments regarding charities and their political involvement 
have yet to be enacted. As a result, British charities continue 
to operate with a great deal of uncertainty when participating in 
the policy process. Each of the three studies reviewed above did 
not advocate a complete nullification of the law barring charities 
from politics. Instead, each demanded clearer guidelines be 
legislated in order for charities to determine what constitutes 
for example, 'ancillary political purposes'. The urgency for such 
legal reforms in Britain were evidenced in each study by the 
increasing number of overtly political organisations attempting to 
pass themselves off as charities to qualify for privledged tax 
treatment.
E. Canada;__1978-1983
Although the issue of 'charity and politics' has not been the 
subject of official inquiry in Canada, the Canadian government has 
introduced much more progressive reforms in comparison to its 
British counterpart. In Canada, pressure for legal reform has 
come in response to a series of government controversies lasting 
from 1978 to 1983. The first controversy involved a new 
interpretation by Revenue Canada of the 'political bar rule' which 
sparked considerable debate among politicians, public officials.
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charity administrators and the general public. The issues 
emerging throughout the duration of that controversy, revealed a 
number of competing legal viewpoints. -
In February 1978, Revenue Canada officials, at the behest of 
their Minister Monique Begin, published a draft Information 
Circular listing what it considered to be the legal parameters 
regarding the political activities of charities.93 The document's 
basic thrust was that "an object is normally said to be 
'political' if its ultimate intention is to influence the policy 
making process ... of any level of government."94 Furthermore, it 
considered an activity political if it was designed to embarrass 
or otherwise induce a government to take a stand, change a policy, 
or enact legislation for a purpose particular to the organisation 
carrying on the activity.95 The circular then went on to
distinguish between non-political and political activities. (1)
The following were defined as non-political:
- Presenting briefs with recommendations, to appropriate 
government bodies, whether or not they were solicited, 
provided they were not part of a campaign to influence
93'Revenue Canada, Registered Charities: Political Objects
and Activities.' Information_Circular 78-83. Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1978. The Information Circular is also reproduced in
A.B. Drache, Canadian Tax__Treatment of__Charities and Charitable
Donations• Toronto: Richard De Boo, 1980, p. 171; and in A.B. 
Drache, 'Political Activities: A Charitable Dilemma', The
Philanthropist. 8 (1980), pp. 10-11.
94Revenue Canada 'Registered Charities - Ancillary and 
Incidental Political Activities,' Information Circular 87-1. 
Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1987, para. 4(a).
95Ibid.. para. 5.
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legislation.
- Making representations to appropriate elected 
representatives or government officials.
- Publishing an impartial and objective magazine.
- Holding conferences in which all sides of a public question 
are presented.
(2) The following activities were defined as political, and thus 
prohibited:
- Lobbying, whether conducted directly or indirectly.
- Public demonstrations, which are intended to apply pressure 
upon a government.
- Writing form letters to solicit members of the public to 
write letters of protest to their elected representatives.
- Supporting a political party.
- Writing letters to editors of newspapers which air 
political views or attempt to sway public opinion on a 
political issue.
96
The circular's publication provoked firm condemnation from 
opposition members in the House of Commons, newspaper editors, 
and, from charities, in particular, from a number of large 
religious organisations. Before examining the concerns expressed 
throughout the duration of this controversy it is useful to review 
the events leading up to the circular's release. In early 1976, a 
religious organisation with charitable status, known as Christian
96lbid.. para. 6.
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Prisoners Release International (CPRI), had planned a protest 
march on the Russian Embassy in Ottawa. When reapplying for 
charitable status that same year -CPRI was threatened with 
deregistration on the grounds that it repeatedly failed to file 
required financial reports. However, Revenue Canada also informed 
CPRI that its participation in the march would constitute 
'political activity' and would therefore be refused registration 
as a charity under the Income Tax Act. The matter was publicised 
when debated in the House on May 10, 14 and 14 June 1976. 
Throughout these debates the government was repeatedly questioned 
as to whether the Department of External Affairs had placed 
pressure on Revenue Canada to deregister CPRI, and whether the 
department had written statements clarifying what was considered 
legitimate political activities.97 While this incident drew 
Revenue Canada's attention to the immediate need for a clearer 
statement of the law, the information circular was not formulated 
until the summer of 1977. In the House of Commons on 1 May 1978 
the Revenue Minister stated she had requested her own departmental 
officials to draft the document. This was done in response to 
requests by a women's association who, in applying for charitable 
status, wished guidance on what constituted prohibited political 
activities.98
97H.C. Debs. (Canada), 30th Parliament, 3rd Session Vol 13, 
Col 13328, 13517 and H.C. Debs. (Canada), 30th Parliament, 3rd 
Session Vol 14, Col 14457.
98H.C. Debs. (Canada), 30th Parliament, 3rd Session Vol 5, 
Col 5001, 5118, and 5188.
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The information circular was published in February 1978, but 
was not raised in the House of Commons for several months. 
However, on 1 May t^e Liberal . government was questioned 
extensively about the document and was accused of deliberately 
attempting to intimidate charitable organisations by prohibiting 
them from engaging in political activities. The tenor of the 
questions raised in the House were as follows.
"In view of the fact that the Mennonite Central 
Committee has already responded by having 
interviews with officers of National Revenue, 
trying to define what the government is getting 
at in this regard, and that the government agreed 
that the Mennonite Central Committee can raise 
questions in respect of capital punishment, the 
purchase of fighter aircraft or a change in milk 
policy but cannot get involved in one of the 
church coalitions having to do with the upcoming 
disarmament assembly at the United Nations, will 
the Prime Minister indicate whether this action 
of intimidation in the circulation of last 
February is a direct attempt to remove the 
legitimate political rights of thousands of 
voluntary organisations in this country."
99
The government's strategy was to argue the information 
circular was not government policy but rather an attempt to 
publicize to charities what the common law rules stated.100 Once 
understood that the document 'stated the law' and did not 
represent a shift in government policy, many of the subsequent 
questions and comments voiced in the House became critical of the
99H.C. Debs. (Canada), 30th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol 5, 
Col 5002.
100H.C. Debs. (Canada), 30th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol 5, 
Col 5056.
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policy underlying the law. As Conservative MP Flora MacDonald 
stated on 3 May 1978:
"How can these charitable organisations, most of 
which are attempting to ameliorate the plight of 
certain underpriviledged groups of people, be 
made to flourish when all of the avenues of 
affecting change are being closed to them, if 
they are not allowed to lobby, to hold public 
demonstrations or to conduct letter-writing 
campaigns to elected representatives, how can 
they make the government aware of their concerns? 
How can they get their point across if effective 
methods of doing so are considered to be what 
this government terms political and, as it says, 
"a threat to their status as charitable 
organisations"? We are not talking about 
partisan political efforts here at all. What the 
government says in its circular is that it sees 
any involvement in the political process, even 
that of recommending legislation on an issue of 
national concern, as a questionable and perhaps 
even subversive activity by these groups."
101
Two days after the matter arose in the House of Commons, 
Senators Godfrey and Forsey not only criticised, in the Senate, 
the policy behind the circular and the language used, but also 
Senator Gray, who, they claimed, had drafted the document. 102 On 
4 May, Senator Gray answered his critics by announcing the 
circular's withdrawal so that it could be reviewed and reworded in 
order to avoid future ambiguity.103 On 17 May before the House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs,
101H.C. Debs. (Canada), 30th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol 5, 
Col 5116.
102S. Debs. (Canada), 1978, Vol 2, Col 7728.
. Debs. (Canada), 1978, Vol 2,103S Col 744 and 755.
Senator Gray further noted, that in revising the circular, "I hope 
to hear the views of some charitable organisations to make sure 
that our message, when next it goes to them, will not cause the 
unfortunate reaction that we have been experiencing.M104
Although the circular was withdrawn, the matter continued to 
arise during 'question period' in the House of Commons. 
Opposition members were concerned with the rules that would be 
applied once the circular had been withdrawn. In response, 
Liberal government members explained the circular merely 
represented Revenue Canada's interpretation of law as formulated 
by the courts. Therefore its publication and subsequent 
withdrawal were stated to have no effect on the law's 
substance.105
The interesting aspect of this controversy is that the press 
and many charities completely misunderstood the circular's status 
as issued by Revenue Canada. Both seemed irritated that civil 
servants at Revenue Canada were permitted to promulgate rules 
relating to charities' political activities. Others, particularly 
opposition Members of Parliament, felt the document represented a 
change in government policy. This view was a combination of the 
issue being legally complicated, and potentially damaging to the 
Liberal government. The opposing Conservative and New Democratic
104Proceedings of House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, Issue NO. 35. Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1978, p. 35-6. See also H.C. Debs. (Canada), 
30th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol 5, Col 5119.
105See, H.C. Debs. (Canada), 30th Parliament, 3rd Session, 
Vol 5, Col 5188-89.
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Parties felt the latter would be accomplished if ^ publicly 
demonstrated the government was formulating policy restrictive to 
all Canadian charities. In other words, the opposition attempted 
to seize the opportunity to embarass the government. In 
retrospect. Revenue Canada was merely attempting to provide 
charitable organisations with their interpretation of the law as 
decided by the courts. Critics failed to recognize that Revenue 
Canada, similar to the Charity Commission, had no authority to 
make new laws. Instead, the Department's information circular 
merely attempted to deduce the current law from existing common 
law cases. Revenue Canada officials accepted the possibility that 
their interpretation of permissible political activity might be 
overuled by the courts. Nonetheless, the Department was obliged 
to respond to requests from charities for more specific legal 
guidelines.
The issue disappeared from June 1978, until December of that 
year. On 11 December, it surfaced in the House of Commons during 
debate on the proposed Canada Non-Profit Corporations Act. Again 
the opposition members of the House attempted to inculcate a 
'crisis atmosphere' by suggesting the government had been 
negligent in discharging their responsibilities to public 
officials. In doing so, they further accused Revenue Canada of 
'intimidating' charities. The following extract from House of 
Commons debates captures the opposition's strategy:
"First, it (the information circular) was based 
on a couple of court cases that were certainly 
not recent and which showed very little relevance
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to the present situation. The interpretation 
that was put on these cases went, from my point 
of view, way beyond what those particular cases 
in effect decided. I thought it entered very 
much into the situation of departmental 
officials, if not ministers, beginning to 
intimidate or, to some degree, limit the freedom 
of action of charitable organisations of this 
country."
106
Conservative opposition members of the House, attempted to promote 
themselves as the protectors and advocates of Canadian charities. 
The following statement by H. Monroe in the House of Commons on 11 
December 1978, best illustrates this point.
"I find that sort of circular issued to 
organisations which are fulfilling a very 
important role in our society an abomination. 
They are fulfilling a role that no government in 
any democratic country will ever be able to 
fulfil or should fulfil. These channels should 
be open to our citizens to express themselves, 
and to influence legislation and legislators." 107
When the issue 
media, particularly 
newspapers, strongly
had first arisen in the Spring of 1978 the 
editorialists of several large Canadian 
criticised the Liberal government for their
106H.C. Debs. (Canada), 30th Parliament, 4th Session, Vol 2, 
Col 2013.
107H.C. Debs. (Canada), 30th Parliament, 4th Session, Vol 2, 
Col 2013. In noting that the law stated in the circular was still 
being enforced, Miss Flora MacDonald recounted the situation of 
the Brampton Woman's Centre. In the Spring of 1978 in order to 
become registered under the Income Tax Act, they apparently were 
required to sign a statement that they would take no part in 
political activities; this they refused to do and were therefore 
denied charitable status.
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poor judgement in discerning the interests of Canadian 
charities.108 In a widely reported Canadian Press story senior
executives of several large charities had been interviewed and 
asked to comment on the government's 'information circular'. On 
16 April 1978, the following conversations were reported. First, 
the editor of the United Church Observer, revealed that "his 
magazine and many church leaders, had repeatedly breached Revenue 
Canada's strict guidelines for charitable activities."109 For 
example, it was suggested that demonstrations by church members 
against the Vietnam war violated Revenue Canada guidelines but 
were never enforced since they were foolish and unenforceable. In 
the same article, Ms. Dudley of the Migraine Foundation, explained 
she never hesitated to encourage the public to write letters to 
politicians, urging legislative reform. As she stated, "I'd be 
willing to make a guess that 50 per cent of the legislation passed 
in this country has been at the urging of some group. If you ever 
just sat and waited for the government to propose legislation, 
nothing would happen.”110
Most newspaper articles included criticisms of Revenue 
Canada's allegedly arbitrarily enforced legal standards. This
108The debates in the House of Commons concerning the 
information circular were widely reported by the Press. See, for 
example, 'Opposition charges church 'intimidation'', Montreal 
2 May 1978; 'Political rule aimed at scaring churches, Tory 
MPs suggest'. Globe and Mail. 2 May 1978; and 'P.M. suspends 
policy of gagging charities', Toronto Star. 2 May 1978.
109See, 'out of politics Ottawa tells charity', Toronto Star. 
16 April 1978.
H O lbid. . p. 8.
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point was made by comparing organisations that had qualified as 
registered charities, with those that had not. The Ottawa Citizen 
on 16 April 1978 reported on an Ontario-based charity registered 
by Revenue Canada, and it compared it to a similar organisation 
denied registration on grounds that its purposes were partly 
political. After comparing copies of * application materials' 
submitted to Revenue Canada, including their 'stated purposes' or 
'objects', the Ottawa Citizen argued the two organisations were 
virtually identical in their degree of political involvement. 
Consequently, the paper argued that Revenue Canada officials were 
guilty of abusing their quasi-judicial authority in applying this 
rule.Ill The apparent lack of uniformity in Revenue Canada's 
decisions on granting or refusing charitable status highlights the 
point that, like its British counterpart, it does not have the 
resources to systematically screen an organisation's proposed 
objects or purposes when first applying for registration.
Given that the circular's publication did not represent a 
major shift in government policy and that the document was drafted 
in response to requests from charities, it is surprising the press 
adopted the position it did on the issue. Both the Toronto Star 
and Globe and Mail vehemently attacked the circular in their 
editorials. On 18 April 1978, the Toronto Star in an editorial 
entitled "Ottawa shouldn't muzzle charities" urged:
"The Trudeau government is off base in its effort
to muzzle voluntary organisations that campaign
lllSee, 'Bureaucrats', Ottawa Citizen. 27 April 1978.
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for a better deal for the physically handicapped, 
native peoples, needy citizens and other groups.
An amendment to the Income Tax Act, clearly 
defining a charity and its activities in terms of 
what it does today - and that certainly goes far 
beyond distributing food baskets to the poor and 
includes advocating change in public policy - is 
in order.
Meanwhile, let's put those guidelines where they 
belong - in the paper shredder."
112
The Toronto Star further reported that Canadian charities had 
acquired and consolidated public support by holding public 
meetings, by writing to politicians of all parties, by appearing 
on broadcast shows and by conducting advertising campaigns. They 
argued that charities should consider these activities a 'right' 
not a privilege. In their view the right to urge governments to 
change policies was fundamental in a democracy and should not be 
denied to citizens whether acting as individuals or in 
association.113
For three years the issue of charities and political 
involvement seemed to either disappear or to have been resolved.
112See, 'Ottawa shouldn't muzzle charities', Toronto Star. 18 
April 1978.
113See in particular, 'Let charities speak out freely', 
Toronto Star. 29 April 1978; and 'Ottawa sees the light over 
charity rights', Toronto Star. 4 May 1978. This article is 
especially interesting in that it offers a popular and 
contemporary view of the changing role that charities play in 
social welfare. "A definition pertinent to today must surely 
recognise that the role of a voluntary association goes beyond 
distributing food baskets to the poor and includes efforts to 
change public policy, to alleviate poverty, help the handicapped 
or achieve other social reforms".
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However, in 1981 Revenue Canada attempted to deregister one 
charity and refuse another tax exempt status. Both decisions were 
based on the assumption that each organisation was actively 
engaged in political activities. One case involved Renaissance 
International, an Ontario-based evangelical organisation. On 23 
November 1980, Revenue Canada notified the charity's trustees that 
deregistration was to take effect immediately. This decision was 
reached on evidence illustrating that the charity had purchased 
two full-page advertisements in a local newspaper urging voters to 
elect a 'moral majority' in the federal election. Moreover, the 
advertisement expressed their criticism of pro-homosexual 
candidates in the Toronto civic race. In appealing this decision 
the court heard that Renaissance groups across the country were 
self-proclaimed right-wing fundamentalists who frequently prepared 
and publicised moral report cards on candidates during election 
campaigns. 114 Despite this evidence, the case was dismissed from 
the Federal Court of Appeal on 17 November 1982. Apparently, 
Revenue Canada had violated principles of natural justice by 
failing to meet with Renaissance International prior to issuing 
the revocation order.115 It is remarkable that the issue of 
'political activities' was not even addressed.
The second case arose in February 1980, when Revenue Canada
114See, 'Tax row back to court', Toronto Star. 3 May 1981; 
'Charity status given moral campaigners opposed by women,' 
Winnipeg Free Press. 24 September 1981.
115See, Larry Rowbottom, 'Renaissance International', The 
Philanthropist/ 11(1983), p. 53.
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refused to register the Manitoba Foundation for Canadian Studies
as a charity under the Income Tax Act. The Foundation's main 
object was to publish - Canadian Dimension. a left-of-centre 
economic magazine. However, in a letter drafted by Revenue 
officials, the organisation's publication was accused of drifting 
into the realm of political activity by promoting only one strand 
of political ideology. In other words, the magazine was 
considered political propaganda. As the letter read:
"On the basis of the material contained in the 
Canadian Dimension magazine, it would appear that 
its main goal is not to educate the reader in the 
sense of training the mind in matters of 
political science but to promote a particular 
ideology. Accordingly, the purpose of the
magazine does not come within the meaning of 
education in the charitable sense."
116
In responding to Revenue Canada's decision, the Manitoba 
Foundation for Canadian Studies launched an appeal in the Federal 
Court but later terminated litigation for financial reasons. 
While each case did not alter the substance of charity law, both 
helped to thrust the issue back into the public domain. For 
example, several national charities offered to help defray the 
costs of hiring legal counsel and were prepared to petition to 
intervene in one or both of these cases. However, the offer to
116The letter sent from Mrs Betty Wardle, chief official of 
the charitable and non-profit organisation section in Revenue 
Canada to the lawyers for the Manitoba Foundation for Canadian 
Studies is reproduced as an appendix to K. Smith, 'Political 
Activity and Charitable Organisations', The Philanthropist. 
11(1983), p. 16.
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petition was later withdrawn since it was impossible to estimate 
the cost of litigation for each case.117 Furthermore, both legal 
battles caught the attention of the media and again sparked public 
debate concerning changes in the law. For example The Toronto 
Star editorialised:
"The law should be ¿unended to recognize the 20th 
century role of a charity so that it can collect 
contributions from individual Canadians without 
constantly having to worry whether the tax man is 
going to revoke its status and disallow 
deductions for the donations.
It is, of course, necessary to draw a line 
between political and charitable activities. But 
the line should be drawn at partisan political 
activities, designed to further the interests of 
a particular political party or individual, while 
leaving the churches and voluntary organisations 
free to attempt to change and influence public 
policy for the public good."
118
Discussion in the press and House of Commons over these cases 
was not as great or as strident as in the 1978 controversy. When 
commentators were confronted with actual cases, they were more 
aware of the need for some limitation on charities' political 
activities. Furthermore, by 1980 the press, and even opposition 
Members of Parliament, seemed to realize the issue of charities 
and politics was more legally complex than they first believed.
Most informed observers later agreed the information circular
117See, 'Charities fight for right to lobby'. Financial Post. 
16 May 1981.
118See, 'Define role of charities', Toronto Star. 8 February
1981.
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did not represent a shift in government policy but rather an 
attempt to clarify existing guidelines as defined in common 
law.119
F. Charity law reform in Canada
In response to public debates sparked by the 'information 
circular'. Revenue Canada undertook consultations with 
representatives of major Canadian charities. All participants in 
the consultations agreed that charities should not be permitted by 
the Income Tax Act to be involved in partisan politics (for 
example, actively supporting or opposing candidates for public 
office) but that the Act should be amended to permit registered 
charities to be engaged to a certain degree in non-partisan 
political activity. The proposals for amendments were reviewed by 
the members of the consultative group, were announced by the 
Minister of Finance in the May 1985 Budget, and were passed into 
law on 13 February 1986.120
The new legislation states that an organisation seeking 
charitable status which engages in political activities which lie 
beyond those ancillary and incidental to its charitable purposes 
is ineligible for registration. Politically active organisations 
qualify for registration only if they intend to carry out 
ancillary and incidental political activities in order to further
119Canadian Interview; Revenue Canada, Tax Exempt Division, 
29 January 1987.
120'Registered Charities - Ancillary and Incidental Political 
Activities,' Information Circular 87-1. p. 1.
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their charitable purposes and charitable activities. Charities 
wishing to sponsor political activities which go beyond the limits 
permitted by the Income Tax Act, may set up a separate tax-exempt 
organisation or trust to pursue those activities which would 
otherwise interfere with a charity's status under the Act. 
However, under the new legislation charities could not fund such 
separate organisations or otherwise make their resources available 
to them.121
In order to understand the new limitations imposed on 
Canadian charities in this respect, it is useful, to categorize 
potential activities into three separate categories; they are as 
follows:
(i) charitable activities not subject to any limitations;
(ii) prohibited activities; and
(iii) political activities allowed within Expenditure limits.
(i) Charitable activities not subject to any limitations
The new legislation states that activities charitable at law 
are not subject to any limitation under the Income Tax Act. This 
remains true even if the activity has some political element or 
flavour to it, provided the activity is fundamentally charitable. 
Whether an activity is fundamentally charitable or political 
depends on the facts of each situation. In other words, it is a 
matter of degree that must be judged by the courts or Revenue
121Ibid.. p. 2.
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However,Canada on a case by case basis. 122 er, as a general 
guideline, activities of a political nature can be one of the 
means employed by charity .to further _a charitable end but cannot 
predominate the organisation's efforts or become an end unto 
themselves. For example, a charity whose purpose is to protect 
wildlife and the environment might, in conjunction with its 
research, conservation, and public education programmes, ask 
people to press for stricter legislative standards for industrial 
waste disposal. The political activity of pressing for 
legislative change is 'ancillary and incidental' in this case, 
because it is directed towards the organisation's charitable 
purpose of protecting the environment and is subordinate to the 
education and other charitable programmes of the organisation.123 
Therefore it would be allowed subject to the established 
expenditure limitations. By contrast, an organisation formed 
solely, for example, to press for the adoption of a flat tax 
system or some other purpose that could only be achieved through 
legislative reform, would have a political not a charitable 
purpose. This is true even though it might engage in research and 
public information programmes to support lobbying efforts.124 As 
illustrated in chapter seven section II, the 'ancillary and 
incidental' clause has made it possible for Canadian medical 
research charities to lobby government to increase its financial
122Ibid.. p. 2.
1231l2i£L., p. 8.
124Ibid.. p. 8.
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commitment to basic scientific investigations.
Although activities designed to persuade government to adopt 
a particular viewpoint can. be considered political. Revenue Canada 
views the following items to be charitable activities. These 
apply only so long as the devotion of resources to such activities 
are reasonable in the circumstances (for example, when intended to 
inform and educate by providing information and views designed 
primarily to allow full and reasoned consideration of an issue 
rather than to influence public opinion or to generate 
controversy). These items include:
" - oral and written representations to the
relevant elected representatives or public 
servant to present the charity's views or to 
provide factual information,
- oral and written presentations or briefs
containing factual information and
recommendations to the relevant government
bodies, commissions or committees, and
- the provision of information and the 
expression of non-partisan views to the media.”
125
All resources used directly in preparing or substantiating the 
representations or presentations described above are now treated 
as resources devoted to charitable activities.
(ii) Prohibited activities
Under the new legislation, Canadian charities may not oppose 
or endorse a named candidate, party, or politician. The charity's
125ibid. . p.3
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resources may not be devoted directly to such activities, or 
devoted indirectly through provision of resources to a third party 
engaged in partisan political activities. Furthermore, the courts 
now view purposes that can only be achieved by legislative reform 
as political and not charitable in nature. Consequently, an 
organisation formed to achieve a particular legislative or other 
policy purpose, whether it be disarmament, tougher or looser 
abortion laws, the abolition or reinstatement of capital 
punishment, or the like will be ineligible for registration. 
Another organisation whose purpose is to amend a zoning by-law or 
to increase restrictions on broadcasting is considered to operate 
for a political purpose.126
(iii) Political activities allowed within expenditure 
limits
The new legislation designates activities that cannot 
themselves be considered charitable activities but are subordinate 
to be bona fide charitable purposes. These activities may be 
considered political and are permitted within designated 
expenditure limits. Examples of activities that would normally 
fall within this category are:
" - Publications, conferences, workshops and
other forms of communication which are produced, 
published, presented or distributed by a charity 
primarily in order to sway public opinion of 
political issues and matters of public policy;
- advertisements in newspapers, magazines or on 
television or radio to the extent that they are
126lbid.. p. 9.
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designed to attract interest in, or gain support 
for a charity's position on political issues and 
matters of public policy;
- public meetings or lawful demonstrations that 
are organized to publicize and gain support for a 
charity's point of view on matters of public 
policy and political issues; and
- mail campaigns - a request by a charity to 
its members or the public to forward letters or 
other written communications to the media and 
government expressing support for the charity's 
views on political issues of public policy."
127
The legislation provides two tests which are used to control a 
charity's expenditures on the political activities described 
above. The first test is based on a calculation using the total 
amount of revenue for which the charity issued tax receipts in its 
previous fiscal period. In short, a charity that meets its 
disbursement quota (by spending at least 80 per cent of its 
receipted donations of the previous year on charitable activity) 
and in doing so spends no more than ten per cent on permitted 
political activities, would be operating within the new rules. 
The second test is operational in nature. The provisions
permitting political activities require that where a charitable 
organisation engages in political activities, substantially all of 
its resources must be devoted to its charitable activities. 
Substantially all in this context means 90 per cent or more of a 
charity's financial, physical and human resources may be devoted 
to its charitable programmes and activities over a programme
127Xbi£L., pp. 9-10.
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cycle.128 The regulation of Canadian charities under the Income 
Tax Act is based on a self-assessment system. Therefore, the 
charities themselves are required to., apply the two expenditure 
tests each year in order to ensure compliance with the 
requirements. It should also be noted that the tests are 
independent since they are calculated on two different bases- 
receipted amounts versus resources.129
In conclusion, this 1986 legislation provided Canadian 
charities with a set of precisely defined guidelines regarding the 
parameters of permissable political activities. In doing so, 
Canadian laws did not depart from British common law in 're­
defining' the concept of 'charity' or 'political involvement'. 
Instead, the new legislation merely set down specific limitations 
regarding the amount of resources Canadian charities could devote 
to political activities. In Britain, the tendency of politicians, 
public officials and other interested parties has been to study 
the problem of charity and politics but not to move swiftly in 
drafting new statutory guidelines. In Canada, the reforms were a 
manifestation of public debate and concern over controversial 
applications and enforcement of rules restricting charities from 
participating in the political arena.
128Ibid.. p. 8. 
129lbid*., p. 5.
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Chapter Four
Sources .of Charity-Income
Thus far the phrase charity-state relations has been used in 
a general context. This has been appropriate in our discussion of 
how government policies have affected the registration and 
supervision of charities (chapter 2) and how it limits their 
political activities (chapter 3). However, in examining how 
charities interact with the state it is necessary to recognize 
this relationship varies depending on the policy area under 
discussion. British and Canadian charities, depending on their 
area of activity, have been subjected to very different government 
policies. Thus, in reality there are many different kinds of 
charity-state relations that are worth exploring. A common 
feature of most of these relationships is that government has, in 
one way or another, relied in recent years increasingly on 
charities to provide services furthering government policy.
In response to a failing welfare state, the British and 
Canadian governments have increasingly relied on charities to 
provide important social services. This suggests that charity- 
state relations have changed dramatically since the 19th century 
when charities not only resisted state encroachment into many 
areas of social welfare, but devoted much of their resources 
towards encouraging state withdrawal from areas where tax revenues
148
were already being applied. This represents a major departure 
from the competition between charity and state to acquire from the 
other more responsibility -for the delivery of social services. It 
is interesting that, some charities, for example those involved in 
medical research, have voiced strong opposition to government cut­
backs. Their claim is that charities presently do not have the 
resources to provide services at comparable levels of quantity and 
quality. In Britain, the Association of Medical Research 
Charities (AMRC) has actively lobbied the government to increase 
its commitment to basic medical research. This is in stark 
contrast to the traditional belief of most 19th century charities, 
as typified by the Charity Organisation Society, that they, were 
better equipped than government to provide these essential 
services. The present approach by charity is compatible with the 
post 1945 consensus that government has been better able to 
provide services in certain policy areas. However, the 
interesting point is that it is government which now takes the 
view that more should be done by charity.
To test the hypothesis that the state has been active in 
promoting a charitable reformation in both countries, we examine 
not only direct government aid but also what is described as 
'indirect' government aid. This second form of assistance 
involves recent government policies aimed at creating a tax 
environment that seeks to increase the amount of personal and 
corporate donations made to charities. With indirect aid, 
government officials are unable to directly influence a charity's
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activities. Government control may not appear to be a problem in 
areas like medical research where government policy and the policy 
of the medical research charities is thought to be the same: to 
find a cure for a particular disease. However, since medical 
research charities also fund public education campaigns and 
patient service programmes there are examples where the aims of 
charity and those of government clash. For example, British and 
Canadian medical research charities have devoted an increasing 
amount of their resources to reducing the incidence of particular 
diseases and this has included lobbying for legislative changes. 
Smoking is an obvious example: cancer research charities have 
demanded that the government increase taxes on tobacco products 
and ban smoking in public establishments and, in Canada, on 
domestic airline flights (see chapter eight, section III). For 
the small number of medical research charities in receipt of 
direct government aid the possibility exists for government to 
provide funds which are in turn used to lobby itself. Governments 
may wish to stop this through imposing conditions on grant usage. 
Consequently, even in the case of medical research, the state and 
charity may not have totally compatible aims.
The chapter divides into three sections that are, in turn, 
divided further into a number of different sub-sections. We begin 
with an examination of the variety of non-government sources of 
finance available to charities and identify the advantages and 
disadvantages of each. A major theme developed is that there are 
several draw-backs for charities that remain financially
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independent from the state which tend to be over-shadowed by the 
more obvious disadvantages attached to direct government funding. 
Section II examines the variety of government financial sources 
available to charities. Here an initial distinction is made 
between direct and indirect government aid. In doing so, a 
challenge is made to the view that the recent revival of charities 
in both countries has been fostered principally by the extension 
of government grants and contracts. Instead, it is argued that 
recent tax legislation has indirectly had an equally important 
effect in stimulating charitable activity in both countries.
In discussing direct government assistance we examine the 
various funding structures of the two governments and the policy 
areas in which they operate. It is argued that neither the 
British nor the Canadian government has a coherent and all- 
encompassing policy for funding charities; instead this is a 
departmental responsibility that is often run on an ad-hoc basis 
and includes only short-term planning. The discussion then shifts 
to an examination of the various funding arrangements utilized by 
individual departments and an assessment is made of the effects of 
each on the operation of recipient charities. Finally section III 
of the chapter identifies the various types of non-financial 
government support extended to charities in both Britain and 
Canada.
The purpose of this chapter is to survey charities' financial 
sources and to develop a foundation for understanding the diverse 
relationships between medical research charities and the state.
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Additionally, an explanation is developed as to why charities, 
including those operating in the medical research field, have 
assumed a greater responsibility with the state's assistance for 
the provision of important services.
A full examination of the role of charity in the context of 
the welfare state could be made only by relying on a wide variety 
of sources, ranging from official government reports and 
statistics to parliamentary debates and the information provided 
by charities themselves in their annual reports. However, the 
information provided by these sources has many limitations in that 
it reflects the form in which it was collected and the purposes 
for which it was collected as well as the difficulties encountered 
in gathering the data. Consequently, much of the data relating to 
charities that can be compiled is expressed in terms of what is 
accessable and measurable such as the number of paid individuals 
employed by charities or their annual incomes. The focus of this 
chapter is on the sources of charity finance, the amount of 
government grants, trends in subsidy policies and a host of other 
related issues which concern the state's financial relationship 
with charities. However, a note of caution must be sounded 
concerning the reliability of the data presented when discussing 
these themes given the fact that much of it is produced by 
interested parties -including government departments, politicians 
and charities. Inevitably,some of this data reflect a desire to 
plead a case, formulate an argument or create a certain climate of 
opinion in order to advance particular interests.
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I. Non-Government Sources of Finance Available to Charities
English and Canadian charities presently derive their income 
from a wide variety of non-government sources including:
-self-generated investment income
-corporate donations
-grants from charitable trust (foundations)
-retail income,
-individual voluntary donations
Understanding both the advantages and disadvantages of these 
different sources of income help to put into perspective 
government financing of charities. It also contributes to our 
understanding the problems encountered by privately-funded 
charities which, because of government cut-backs to statutory
agencies providing like services, have had to assume a greater
responsibility for their provision. In both countries the 
literature tends to emphasize the disadvantages associated with 
direct financial aid to charities - which usually involve
discussions of government control and the threat that this poses 
to a charity's independence. However, the weakness of most of 
these studies centres on their failure to examine the problems 
inherent with other non-government sources of finance.
Additionally, they fail to provide an explanation as to why 
charities and government have been eager to utilize each others 
resources.
a . Investment income;
Among the larger British and Canadian charities, investment
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income has become an increasingly important: source of finance. 
Although there are few studies explaining this trend, it is likely 
related to a conscious effort by charities to generate their own 
reliable source of income instead of depending on fluctuating 
private donations from outside sources. In the case of some 
charities there is often no choice but to retain capital, notably 
where a bequest is stipulated as not being available for current 
expenditure. A recent survey in Britain suggests that charitable 
grant-giving trusts (otherwise known as foundations) which do not 
actually provide services, tend to generate a high proportion of 
income from their own investments.1 Since there is a general 
trend towards retaining funds for investment, rather than 
expending them upon charitable purposes, charities have developed 
into 'institutions for the retention and accumulation of capital' 
(see chapter five, section IV. A). A fact often not realized is 
that:
Charities do not immediately spend every pound that they receive by way of income, for along 
with private investors and a wide range of 
investment institutions, such as insurance 
companies, banks, unit trusts and investment 
trusts, it constitutes an important source of 
investment finance within the economies of both 
countries.
2
Charity investments constitutes an increasingly important
ICharities Aid Foundation, Report on Foundation Activity, 
abridge: CAF, 1976, p. 3.
2M. Chesterman, Charities Trusts and Social Welfare. London: 
denfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 95.
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source of investment finance within the country's economy. This 
is evident from data produced by the Diamond Commission, which 
suggests that the proportion of ordinary shares quoted in U.K. 
companies held by British charities rose from 2.6 per cent in 1963 
to 4.4 per cent in 1973.3 More recent data illustrate that among 
all British charities investment income has increased each 
consecutive year from 1983 to 1986 but that in proportion to other 
sources of charity income it has remained constant - see Table 
4.1. In the specific area of medical research. Table 4.24 
illustrates that the total amount of investment income of the 14 
British medical research charities appearing in the Charities Aid 
Foundation's list of the 'top 200 grant-seeking charities' between 
1982 and 1986 increased by £ 5,206,000. Among these organisations, 
investment income as a proportion of their total voluntary income 
fluctuated considerably between 1982 and 1986 but in each year, 
except 1983, remained considerably below comparable sector-wide 
figures.
One of the most obvious advantages enjoyed by charities which
3HMSO, Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and 
Wealth, Report No. 2. London: HMSO, 1974, p. 17. The Report 
also indicated that this increase in share ownership by charities 
is partly atributable to the widening of trustee investment powers 
affected by The Trustee Investmenta Act (1961).
4The data presented in Table 4.2, 4.5, 4.7 and 4.10 was 
derived from the following sources: Charities Aid Foundation, 
Charity Statistics 1982/1983. Tonbridge: CAF, 1983, pp. 54-55; 
Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Statistics 1983/1984. 
Tonbridge: CAF, 1984, pp. 74-75; Charities Aid Foundation, 
Charity Statistic«. 1984/85. Tonbridge: CAF, 1985, pp. 104-105; 
Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Statistics 1985/86. Tonbridge: 
CAF, 1986, pp. 184-185; Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends 
1986/87. Tonbridge: CAF, 1987, pp. 102-103.
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Table 4.1
Investment Income aa a Proportion of 
Total Charity Income In Britain;__1983-1986
1983 1984 1985 1986
Total Amount of 
of Investment 
Income by 
British Charities 
(¿000)
79,284 88,940 106,380 119,627
Investment 
Income as a 
Proportion of 
Total Charity 
Income
21% 21% 21% 20%
Source : Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends. 1986/87. 
Tonbridge: CAP, 1987, p. 116.
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rely heavily on investment income is the freedom to expend their 
profits as they see fit, provided they are for 'charitable 
purposes'. The major draw-back is that of the risk of losing 
invested capital - especially in the stock market. However, 
critics of charities which are heavily dependent on investment 
income often fail to appreciate that other sources of income are 
even less secure. For example, a major economic depression would 
greatly affect private and corporate donations as well as 
government's ability to give grants. While the value of 
charitable investments in the stock market would also surely 
depreciate in these circumstances and most charitable 
organisations would not be bankrupted: they have portfolio 
investments in safe securities, guaranteed annuities, bonds, gold 
and real estate. However, despite the relative security of 
investment income, the donating public often demand their 
contributions be put to 'use' immediately as opposed to being 
invested in term-deposits or stock portfolios as a means of 
generating future income.
B. Corporate donations
According to a study published in 1971, donations from 
British companies represented a more significant source of charity 
income than they did at the beginning of the century.5 In both
5B. Shenfield, Company Boards. London: Longman, 1971, 
Chapter 4. Shenfield's data was derived from entries made in 
published company accounts in accordance with S. 19 of the 
Companies Act (1967). Like most data collected on corporate 
donations, the term is taken to include contributions made by 
companies from pre-tax profits and from employees contributing to
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Britain and Canada, companies were also found to be making other 
direct non-charitable contributions to pension schemes, sick pay, 
redundency payments and the like. Contributions to charitable 
organisations were viewed as representing another, less direct, 
contribution to social welfare, but one upon which certain 
charities had become increasingly reliant. However, while 
corporate donations have been important for some charities, a 
study conducted in the mid 1970's concluded they were not as 
significant as other sources of income generated by retail 
activity and government grants and contracts.6 In fact, the 
success of these other sources of income during that period 
attributed to a tapering off of corporate support to charities. 
This is indicated by data showing that an average of 0.47 per cent 
of gross trading profits donated to charities by corporations in 
1965 declined in 1974 and 1975 to 0.26 per cent.7 However, by the 
1980's this decline in corporate support abated and as illustrated 
in Table 4.3 corporate support actually increased each year from 
1983 to 1986. What is extraordinary about this data is that 
despite a decrease in the number of 'donating' U.K. employees 
between 1985 and 1986 by 61,938, total corporate donations as a 
proportion of total voluntary income actually increased during
company sponsored charity schemes.
6P. Falush, 'Trends in the Finance of British Charities', 
National Westminister Bank Quarterly Review. 2 (1977), p. 32.
7Ibid.. p. 34. The study by Shenfield reveals that there has 
been a tendency for medium sized British companies to donate a 
higher proportion of their profits than the smaller or even larger 
companies.
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ïsLblc 4 .3
ÇQCPQCate ContelbutIona to all British Charities: 
1 9 8 2 -1 9 8 6 .
1983 1984 1985 1986
Total 
Corporate 
Donations (i)
34,394,145 43,049,688 46,029,539 57,978,481
Number of 
UK Employees
3,495,340 3,802,976 3,904,117 3,842,179
Donations per 
Employee (JL)
9.84 11.32 11.79 15.09
Corporate 
Donations as 
a Proportion 
of Total 
Voluntary 
Income
3.7% 4.3% 3.7% 4.45%
Source : Data taken from charltlea Aid Foundation, nurlt» 
Trenda. 1966/87. Tonbridge: CAF, 19.7, p. 66.
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that same period.
Company donations have traditionally been heavily biased 
towards higher education and there has been an understandable 
inclination to support schemes from which the company or its 
employees will derive benefits.8 A sample survey of donations by 
62 British companies in 1960 found that 62 per cent of the total 
amount given went to education and 20 per cent to social welfare. 
The rest was split between health - 6.4 per cent - and religious 
charities - 4.4 per cent. The figure of 62 per cent for gifts to 
education was made up of 26 per cent for company related 
educational schemes and 36 per cent for other educational 
purposes.9 The same study illustrates how corporate donation 
policies have traditionally been oriented towards themselves and 
how heavily dependent recipient charities can be on these funds. 
For example, in the area of medical research, expenditures by the 
pharmaceutical industry on all types of charitable activity have 
increased dramatically since the early 1970's but their 
contributions to medical charities for research have risen even 
faster. As Falush remarks, "in addition to increasing its total 
charitable contributions by six per cent from 1961-62, the 
pharmaceutical industry increased its financial support for 
medical research by 18 per cent during the same period. "10 
However, in interviews with 44 British and Canadian charities (18
8Shenfield, Company Boards, pp. 110-118.
9lbifL., pp. 115-118.
lOFalush, Trends in the Finance of British Charities'. p. 34.
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Canadian and 26 British) 40 respondents believed the particular 
disease they represented influenced the level of corporate support 
they received from the_ pharmaceutical industry. The four 
charities disputing this correlation (three British and one 
Canadian) disagreed with the assumption that pharmaceutical 
companies support research into disease areas where incidence 
rates are high and where the potential market for new medicines is 
the greatest. Chapter eight, section I, argues that medical 
research charities which have been willing to support 
pharmaceutical lobbies for greater patent protection for new 
medicines, shorter drug development periods and lower drug prices, 
have been financially rewarded by this industry. Furthermore, 
British and Canadian respondents generally commented that 
corporations other than pharmaceuticals tend to skew their 
financial support to medical research charities that fund research 
into 'popular diseases' such as cancer and heart.11 If indeed 
this is true the 'firm' can be seen to be basing its 'giving 
decisions' on similar criteria as those traditionally adopted by 
individuals which as discussed in chapter five section III. B, 
ignore important factors such as the incidence rate of a 
particular disease.
The major draw-back to corporate donations is like that of 
individual voluntary donations in that charities having little 
popular appeal, either because they are controversial or cater to
llln particular this view was expressed in British Interview, 
Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great Britain, 19 February 1987.
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very specialized interests, do not easily commend themselves to 
industrial support. For example, a charity in the non-medical 
research field such as the 'National Council for the Unmarried 
Mother and Her Child' whose work has seriously been hampered for 
lack of funds, received less than £1,000 from companies in 1967 
(representing only 1.5 per cent of its annual income). Thirty-six 
companies made contributions but these tended to be token 
contributions of only £25 to£ 50.12
C. Grants from charitable trusts (foundations\
Another source of income for charities is grant-giving 
trusts, or foundations as the larger ones are sometimes called. 
The largest British ones include Wellcome, Nuffield, Leverhulme 
and Cadbury, and in Canada, Devonian, Massey and Carnegie.13 In 
most instances, they were founded by, and received their capital 
from, either individuals whose wealth was derived from industry or 
commerce or companies bearing the name of an individual. Instead 
of dispensing social welfare on their own behalf, or doing so by 
means of direct gifts to active grant-seeking charities, 
companies, transfer their philanthropic contributions to grant- 
making trusts which, in turn, make donations to grant-seeking 
charities. The assets of the top 200 foundations have grown over
12Chesterman, Charities. Trusts and Social Welfare, p. 96.
130ne of the best sources on the topic of grant-giving 
charities or foundations is B. Whitaker, The Foundations. London: 
Eyre Methuen, 1974. The book primarily examines foundations in 
the United States but has some reference to British and Canadian 
charities as well.
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the past ten years due in part to the revaluing of their property 
and premises. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the constant 
(inflation adjusted) value of trust holdings showed little or no 
growth during the period 1979-82. The proportion of assets paid 
out by British foundations declined from 22.8 per cent in 1979 to 
9.2 per cent in 1986 - see Figure 4.2. However, since 1982 the 
assets of British foundations have grown sharply from £429 million 
to £1.412 billion in 1986 (constant terms). Finally as Figure 4.3 
illustrates, grants made by the top 200 foundations since 1977 
have grown in constant terms (inflation adjusted) from £91 million 
to £125 million in 1986.14
In both Britain and Canada, smaller grant-making trusts 
expend funds in ways that often reflect the current wishes -of the 
founder or its trustees.15 Charities whose activities do not mesh 
with such 'wishes' are again vulnerable to fluctuating levels of 
public support depending on the popularity of their cause at any 
given time. The wealthier foundations which distribute the 
largest 'gifts' are commonly concerned with specific areas of 
charitable activity. In Britain, for example, the Gulbenkian 
Foundation takes a particular interest in the arts, as does the
14Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends.__1986/87.
Tonbridge: CAF, 1987, pp. 70-71.
15Charities Aid Foundation, Report on Foundation Activity. 
Chapter 5. According to the Charity Commission as many as 10 per 
cent of newly-registered charities are personal grant-making 
trusts of this nature. See, HMSO, Report of the Charity 
Commissioners. 1986. London: HMSO, 1987, para. 43.
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Figure 4.1
Value of Assets of British Foundations in Real 
Terms»
«£ million
* Constant figures are calculated by using Retail 
Price Index of September 1977 as a base.
Source. Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends. 
1986/87. Tonbridgei CAF, 1987, P.70.
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Figure k .2
Proportion of Grants to Assets of Top 200. 
Foundations in Britain.
Source. Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends, 
1986/87. Tonbridge« CAF, P770.
1 6 6
Figure 4.3
Grants Made by British Foundations in Real 
and Current Terms.
£000
Source. Charities Aid Foundation.Charity Trends. 
1986/87. Tonbridge 1 CAP. 1 9 8 7. P.71
* Constant figures are calculated by using Retail 
Price Index of September 1977 as a base.
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Massey Foundation in Canada.16 Likewise, in the area of medical 
research some of the largest foundations are wholly committed to 
one particular disease, of-ten heart disease and cancer. This 
raises the problem that most low profile diseases, such as spina 
bifida and hydrocephalus, are not generously funded by the large 
foundations.17 This situation, like corporate and individual 
donations, leaves many charities constantly scrambling to raise 
funds to finance existing programmes. The ability of many 
charities to engage in long-term planning and to expand their 
research programmes is limited.
d . Retail income
Little at all has been documented about the commerical 
activities of charities. This is partly because in Britain and 
Canada the borderline between commercial activity and other fund 
raising activities has been unclear. Nonetheless, a distinction 
can be drawn on the basis of a charity charging a fee for a 
service which is an integral part of what it exists for, as 
opposed to charging a fee for a service or good in order to raise
16Grant-making trusts are almost invariably charities within 
the legal definition. A well known exception, however, which 
makes many large grants in England is the Gulbenkian Foundation. 
It is not a charity under English law because it was established 
in Portugal.
17Until recently, several of the less popular diseases which 
charities have been unable to raise donations for, have 
been partly financed by the medical research councils in each 
country. However, since 1980 the budgets of these councils have 
declined in real terms. As we shall see in chapter seven section 
I. A, this has shifted a larger burden of the responsibility to 
charities for conducting medical research into these less popular 
diseases.
money. Britain's National Trust is a good example: the Trust's 
sale of jams and Christmas cards is undoubtedly commercial retail 
activity. However, it is .less clear whether their charge on 'non­
members' to visit their historic buildings is part of their 
'charitable activity' or simply another means of raising money. 
It is not disputed that British charities, in particular many 
large ones, have increasingly relied on retail activities to 
generate income. Charities, like Oxfam, Save the Children's Fund, 
War or Want and a host of other charities have opened clothing 
stores, held charity auctions and developed extensive mail order 
gift services. Charities have defended these retail activities by 
arguing that it reduces the inherent risks associated with 
flunctuating levels of voluntary donations. The data listed in 
Table 4.4 illustrates that among all British charities, retail 
income has increased by £6,570,000 from 1983 to 1986 but that in 
proportion to other sources of charity income it has remained 
constant. In the specific area of medical research. Table 4.5 
illustrates that the total amount of retail income of the 14 
British medical research charities appearing in the Charities Aid 
Foundation's list of the 'top 200 grant-seeking charities' between 
1982 and 1986 increased by £1,318,000. Among these organisations, 
retail income as a proportion of their total voluntary income 
fluctuated considerably between 1982 and 1986 but remained 
considerably below comparable sector-wide figures.
One of the best examples of a clear distinction between 
genuinely commercial activity and what are in effect solicitations
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Tatole-.1^ 1
Retail Income of British Charities as a 
Proportion of Total Voluntary Income: 1982-1986
1983 1984 1985 1986
Retail Income 
(¿000)
27,402 30,226 44,558 33,972
Retail Income 
as a Proportion 
of Total
Voluntary Income
7% 7% 8% 6%
Source: Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends 1986/87.
Tonbridge: CAP, 1987, p. 116.
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for donations involves the sale of charity Christmas cards. In 
Britain, this is done through a non-charitable trading company 
called the Charity Christmas Card Council (CCCC). Charity 
Christmas Cards are a comparatively new form of retail fund 
raising in that they were distributed by individual charities in 
one form or another only on a small scale during the 1920's and 
1930's. It was not until 1949 when Unicef produced a famous card 
that this form of fund raising became more widely embraced by a 
wide range of charities. During the 1960's a number of large 
charities recognized that it was not cost-efficient for each 
organisation to individually design, produce and market their own 
Christmas cards. As a result, in 1966 with the assistance of the 
National Council for Voluntary Organisations, the CCCC was fbrmed. 
The CCCC is now comprised of 84 national and international 
charities which pay an annual membership fee. In doing so, 
charities are able to select a number of Christmas card designs 
from the CCCC's catalogue and have their names printed on the 
back. The cards are then distributed in three ways. First, they 
are sold in commercial stores owned and operated by the CCCC (see 
Appendix III for total sales figures for 1985). Second, they are 
sold in normal retail stores (including charity shops) and lastly 
they are sold through the post with the aid of a brochure. One of 
the initial stumbling blocks for the CCCC was that member 
charities were fearful of turning donors into traders. Prior to 
the introduction of Christmas cards an individual would donate £20 
knowing that the entire amount would find its way to charity.
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However, by introducing Christmas cards, charities feared the 
total amount of donations would decrease if individuals believed 
that of say a £20 giftt £10 was going to the card manufacturer. 
In an interview with the CCCC's Executive Director the following 
explanation was offered:
"We originally feared that charity Christinas 
cards would turn donors into 'traders' and in 
doing so the level of donations would decline. 
However, as it turned out this was not the case; 
in fact the opposite was true in that charity 
Christmas cards carried the charities name on it. 
This has been proven through extensive marketing 
research to be an excellent source of 
advertising. In addition, people began to send 
charity Christmas cards in order to demonstrate 
that they were doing their charitable bit."
18
A complex issue for charities engaged in retail activities 
involves their relationship with for-profit companies selling 
comparable goods and services. The tax advantage that the law 
confers on charities and its effects on the nature of competition 
between charities and commercial organisations is a subject 
outside the main focus of this chapter. However, from the sketchy 
information now available it can be postulated that commercial 
activities are reducing a charity's risk of fluctuating voluntary 
donations and producing relatively constant incomes generated by 
retail markets. 19
18British Interview; Charity Christmas Card Council, 12 march
1987.
19The success of charities' commercial activities is 
evidenced by the fact that the Cancer Research Campaign earned 
£143,934 net profit from its Christmas cards sales which
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e . individual voluntary donations
A charity whose income is derived substantially from 
voluntary, non-government sources is ideally thought to enjoy a 
good deal of self-governance and freedom from external 
interference. In reality, the situation is far more complex than 
this. For instance, the very need for a charity to raise 
voluntary donations can often limit its time and resources to 
pursue the main object for which the organisation was established. 
As illustrated in chapter five section IV. A, this has been a 
problem encountered by medical research charities representing 
'unpopular diseases'. In many cases, a charity's preoccupation 
with fund raising has often meant that other important decisions 
like selecting eminent scientists to dispense research funds to 
scientific investigators has been neglected. Additionally, 
charities which are wholly dependent on voluntary donations, are 
often left vulnerable to the sporadic bursts of public benevolence 
towards other causes.20 This problem tends to be overcome by the
represented .08 per cent of its total income, an increase of .01 
per cent over the previous year. Figure taken from Cancer 
Research Campaign, Annual Report. 1985. London: 1986, p. 19.
20The Ethiopian Famine of 1984-1985 was a cause taken up by 
many charities and celebrities working on their behalf. The vast 
sums of money raised through efforts such as LIVE AID, according 
to some analysts, served to re-direct charitable donations that 
would have gone to the other causes. However, this claim has been 
disputed by those who have argued that Band Aid clearly topped a 
new market for donations. The Charities Aid Foundation conducted 
a household survey which produced data showing that this 'new 
market' comprised two major groups; younger individuals (below 18 
years) and non-professional socioeconomic groups. See, Charities 
Aid Foundation, Charity Statistics. 1985/86. Tonbridge: CAF, 
1986, p. 130.
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large well-endowed charities like the RSPCA and RNLI which can 
afford to employ professional fundraisers. These professional 
agencies use increasingly sophisticated techniques such as 
telethons to collect large amounts of voluntary donations over a 
short period of time. However, when small charities representing 
less popular causes hire professional fundraisers a major 'capital 
investment' is being made. Often this can carry with it the risk 
of failure, if there is a surge of public altruism towards a 
different, and seemingly more immediate cause. Furthermore, the 
competition between charities representing different 'causes' 
makes the reliance on voluntary donations even more unpopular 
among a donating public faced with inflation and high 
unemployment. In Britain, as opposed to Canada, charities are not 
only faced with competition among themselves for public donations, 
but sometimes with government agencies that also enjoy the 
statutory privilege to solicit individuals for such funds. For 
example:
When the Health Service Act, 1980 gave health 
authorities the power to raise voluntary funds 
there was much concern among voluntary agencies 
in the health and welfare field, lest the 
National Health Service (NHS) appeals cream off 
funds usually available for other more routine 
causes.
21
At the time, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations 
(NCVO) argued that this placed charities in direct competition
21M. Brenton. The Voluntary Sector in British Social
Services. London: Longman, 1985, p. 66.
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Jwith the NHS for the public's money, of which there was and 
continues to be an obvious limitation. The NCVO further argued 
that they were badly disadvantaged since the NHS had public funds 
provided to them for the start-up cost of their own fund raising 
efforts.22 However, in interviews with British medical research 
charities, not one respondent identified statutory fund raising as 
a source of 'charitable' competition. In interviewing a Medical 
Research Council official, it was commented that if the Council 
was forced to survive on voluntary donations instead of government 
grants, it would perform poorly alongside charity as people would 
hesitate to support something that resembles a quango.23
The major draw-back for charities that rely on individual 
voluntary donations, as already mentioned in the discussion of 
corporate and trust donations, is that appeals for charitable 
giving rely on the public's sympathy for a particular cause; 
sympathies that are notably volatile and sentimental. This again, 
is an argument that is much less convincing when applied to older 
well established charities that have a broad base of financial 
support. Nonetheless, charities in support of children have much 
more appeal than those for the elderly or the mentally ill; 
respectable causes such as blindness acquires more public support 
than do socially rejected groups like the single homeless and drug
22Guardian. 18 February 1981.
23British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
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addicts.24 In the area of medical research, a high profile 
disease such as herpes may, in fact, be over funded one year only 
to be left virtually bankrupt the next when public attention is 
turned to a higher profile disease such as Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) (see Chapter six section III. B).
f . Trends in voluntary giving
During the 1970's, public attitudes towards the financing of 
charities in Britain and Canada was supportive of voluntary 
sources of income rather than increased government funding of 
charities. Financial independence from the state was seen as 
crucial to a dynamic charity. However, in both countries the
administrators of charities responded by pointing out that there 
were no substantial reservoirs of charitable resources waiting to 
be 'tapped'. As a consequence, and as one British respondent 
lamented:
"the donating public has grown weary of 
charitable appeal after charitable appeal. There 
is a fine line between agressive fund raising, 
where we can play on someones 'duty' to give, and 
outright bribery. Normally the latter scenario 
does not prevail, however, its frequency will no 
doubt increase as the need for non-governmental
24As noted in chapter four, animal welfare charities have 
been much more successful in raising voluntary donations than 
other charities involved for example in helping drug addicts or 
those assisting the aged. In 1980-1981, the People's Dispensery 
for Sick Animals received almost as much income from voluntary 
giving as did the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Children (NSPCC); and the Donkey Sanctuary, ranking in the top 
200 British charities, received more income from voluntary sources 
than St. Christopher's Hospice for the Terminally 111. From, 
Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Statistics. 1980/81. Tonbridge: 
CAF, 1981, p. 60.
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sources of income increases. "
Statistical evidence in Canada indicates that during the 
1970's and early 1980's there was a general decline in personal 
donations made to charities. In Canada, the best source of 
national data is derived from the statistical summary of all 
personal income tax returns published annually by Revenue Canada 
and the decennial survey habits of Canadians published
occassionally by Statistics Canada. Because these studies are
tabulated and published for a wide range of purposes, both studies 
have major defects as sources of data for rigorous analysis of 
personal donations and the underlying factors that motivate people 
to give. The statistical summary of personal income tax prdduces 
a particularly problematic data base for several reasons. First, 
it does not take account of donations of amounts less than $100 
(£50) which do not qualify as tax exemptions according to the 
rules administered by Revenue Canada. Consequently, the data 
relating to total donations are grossly deflated since they fail 
to account for the many small cash donations made for example at 
garage sales, church bazaars and community' car washes. Second, 
the statistical summary of personal taxation produces only raw 
data on the total amount of revenue donated, and in doing so fails 
to breakdown the figures into 'donations per region', 'donations 
per age group and gender' and other potentially useful categories 
for social scientists.
25British Interview; March 1987.
25
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Despite these statistical shortcomings, one researcher has 
nonetheless concluded that in Canada, from 1946 to 1981, personal 
donations to charities _declined in real per capital terms.26 
However, as Martin himself remarked, "the evidence supporting that 
conclusion was reasonably convincing but I could offer very little 
to explain why."27 The study shows that the decline in donations 
was not significant during the Second World War or up until the 
mid 1950's when welfare services began to expand. Instead, the 
trend indicating a major decline in public support for charities 
became statistically significant in the late 1960's, as education, 
health care and culture became areas where state spending 
increased. This trend continued to accelerate throughout the 
1970's leaving many charities with no other option but to ’wind­
up' their operations.28 Table 4.6 illustrates this same point by 
comparing on a yearly basis the amount of donations per family (in 
real terms) to the percentage of donations per family income.29
Another means of indicating whether voluntary donations by 
indviduals have increased or decreased in Canada is to examine the 
number (and proportion) of Canadians claiming deductions for 
charitable donations on their income tax' returns. In 1961, the 
first year that donations over $100 (£50) were tabulated, some 1.5
26S. Martin, An Essential Grace. Toronto: McClelland and 
Steward, 1985, p. 68.
27Ibid.. p. 68.
28lbid.. pp. 41-46.
29S. Martin, An Essential Grace, p. 141.
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Table 4.6
Donations to Charities bv Canadian Foundations
Year Donations
Dollars
per Family 
Pounds
Donations/Family 
Income
Percentage
1937 49.11 24.55 0.012
1947 65.96 32.98 0.012
1957 86.01 43.01 0.013
1969 85.83 42.91 0.010
1978 75.67 37.83 0.007
Source : S. Martin, An Essential Grace. Toronto: 
McClelland and Steward, 1985, p. 68.
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million Canadians made claims for tax exemptions - 25 per cent of 
all taxpayers. By 1970, the number of claiments had dropped to 
1.1 million - 12 per cent .of the total. In 1979, the number rose 
to 1.4 million - still 100,000 fewer but this still represented 
only nine per cent of all Canadians filing tax returns.30
In Britain, Falush's study in 1977 noted a general decline in 
personal donations made to charities. Like the Canadian cases, 
fewer households were making donations to charity and those who 
did, were not doing so at a level commensurate to the rise in 
their disposable income.31 In light of these results, the 
Wolfenden Committee (1978) was led to conclude that the failure of 
private giving to keep pace with inflation was so striking that 
there was an obvious need for charities to increase their reliance 
on statutory funding. It further warned that without such aid, 
some charities would have no other alternative but to discontinue 
their services.32 While fewer people were giving to charity 
during the early and mid 1970's. Figure 4.4 illustrates that the 
total amount of personal donations (not adjusted to inflation) has 
increased in every year since 1977. The more interesting point is 
that in relation to personal donations the aggregate level of all 
sources of income of British charities has increased more 
dramatically from 1977 to 1987. The 'levelling-off' of personal
30Ibid.. p. 143.
3iFalush, Trends in the Finance o f  British Charities, p p - 32-44.
32Wolfenden Committee, The Future of Voluntary Organisations. 
London: Croom Helm, 1978, p. 166.
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F igu re 4 .4
Comparison of Components of Income,of British Charities
1 9 ?? - i98<r:
¿million
Source. Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends. 1986/87. 
Tonbridge» CAF, 1987. P.8 9 .
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donations from 1980-1982 was symptomatic of the economic recession 
that unfolded during that period. Between 1983 and 1985 the 
parallel upward trend of both personal donations and total charity 
income continued. However, data for 1986/87 indicates a 
'levelling-off* in personal donations, while total income has 
continued to rise. Obviously, the sustained increase in total 
charity income in the face of levelling personal donations can be 
attributed to the strong performance of other fund raising 
techniques that have generated increasing amounts of income - for 
example from government sources. In the specific area of medical 
research. Table 4.7 illustrates that the total amount of personal 
donations of the 14 British medical research charities appearing 
in the Charities Aid Foundation's list of the 'top 200 grant­
seeking charities', between 1982 and 1986 increased by
£46,068,000. For these organisations, personal donations as a 
proportion of their total income fluctuated between 1982 and 1986 
but averaged 67 per cent over this period - approximately 11 per 
cent higher than comparable 'sector-wide' figures.
Most studies examining the decline in voluntary donations (in 
real terms) in both countries during the early and mid 1970's list 
the rise of the welfare state as the most important contributing 
factor. It is argued by laissez-faire Libertarians like Friedman 
that individual donors felt less pressed to contribute out of 
their own pockets since the state had already assumed the major 
responsibility for social welfare and had increased the rates of
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personal taxation in order to be able to do so.33 However, this 
theory has been disputed by Obler who argues that in many domains 
of philanthropy, state assistance has not deterred private giving 
since the people who work for charity realize that private 
philanthropy can supplement rather than compete with state aid. 
As Obler himself remarked:
“The Libertarian position that state aid 
automatically precludes private giving is 
inaccurate. It is also naive. The Libertarians 
incorrectly assume that concern for others' 
welfare is the sole reason why people do charity 
work... many people become involved in charities 
not because they sympathize with the 
disadvantaged but also because they enjoy such 
fund raising activities as coffee mornings and 
strawberry lunches."
34
It is easily understood how the Libertarians' argument might 
explain a sudden drop in charitable giving in Britain and Canada 
in the late 1940's and into the late 1950's. However, it is less 
clear why the decline continued after the welfare state was more 
or less in place. For example, there have been many areas of 
activity since 1945 that have not been covered by the state - like 
recreational activities for the disabled - to which people could 
have given more generously. Alternatively, there may be a 
'generational' type argument that people born into a welfare state 
are somehow less generous. However, testing this hypothesis with
33Milton Friedman, Capitalism___and__Freedom. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 190.
34Jeffrey Obler, 'Private Giving in the Welfare State', 
British Journal of Political Science. 11(81), pp. 17-18.
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empirical data - most notably in a comparative context - is 
extremely difficult. Another possible explanation for the decline 
in charitable giving since 1945- is related to increasing 
secularization in both Britain and Canada. What inspired people 
to donate their money during the 19th and early 20th centuries was 
a culture that viewed charitable giving as part of moral and 
religious duty. The decline of religious observance and religious 
practice since the 1950's has meant that these sorts of sentiments 
have declined correspondingly. In other words, there would have 
been a decline in giving anyway whether or not the welfare state 
had come into being.
At the time that voluntary donations were declining, one 
should also bear in mind that signs of a faltering welfare state 
began to emerge in both Britain and Canada. Precipitated by 
economic recessions at the beginning of the 1980's, it was not 
surprising that both the British and Canadian governments 
responded by cutting-back services provided for, or funded by, 
statutory agencies. An immediate result was that charities began 
to share an increasing burden of the responsibility for service 
provision in many areas such as medical research.35 Perhaps in 
recognition of this trend, and possibly for other reasons, the 
British and Canadian governments reacted similarly by increasing 
their amount of financial assistance extended to charities. As we 
shall see now in Section II, this assistance has taken two forms.
35The Association of Medical Research Charities, Medical 
Research Today. London: AMRC, 1986, pp. 4-7.
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ii. Government Financial Support to Charities
In Britain and Canada the financial interaction between 
charities and the state occurs in two distinct ways. When 
governments mention their interaction with charities they are 
normally referring to their financial aid to these organisations. 
However, there is an important distinction to be made between 
'direct' and 'indirect' financial assistance. 'Direct financial 
aid' consists of grants and payments to charities for services out 
of the Treasury reserves in each country. 'Indirect financial 
assistance' consists of any legislative or executive act which 
stimulates the flow of money from private donors to charities by 
designing tax or other concessions for citizens, corporations or 
other private institutions. In effect, this type of state 
intervention gives individuals and institutions incentives to 
increase their assistance to charities whether in the form of time 
or in the form of direct financial contributions. Indirect aid 
may also take the form of legislative or executive acts which 
create tax concessions for charities which seek to lower their 
operating costs. This includes rate reliefs, preferential postal 
rates, and a number of other tax benefits.
There is one, fundamental, difference between direct and 
indirect government assistance that is worth explicating. In the 
case of direct financial aid, government itself decides whether to 
provide grants or some other payments to a particular charity or 
charitable cause in general. With indirect government financial
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assistance, the decision whether to actually support philanthropic 
action rests with citizens, corporations and other private 
institutions depending oa their generosity, their social concern, 
their wealth, and a host of other factors. The actions of 
government merely develop a more or less, favourable climate for 
this support. Again it is important to distinguish between two 
different kinds of 'direct aid' : grants and fee payments (often 
called fee-for-services or contractual aid). Unlike instances of 
grants, it is less clear that a government's intention is to 
'encourage' or support charitable activities when fees are paid to 
charitable organisations for the delivery of services to 
government. For example, local authorities often pay charities 
operating residential care facilities and hospitals for bed space. 
In the past, these charities have been critical of local 
government for being 'stingy' - for not reimbursing them at a fair 
rate when inflationary costs have been incurred. 36 In such cases 
it is difficult to view government fee payments as 'support or 
assistance'. While an extensive system of fee payments may make a 
charity financially dependent on government, this does not mean 
that the government's intention was to 'assist' them or promote 
their charitable activities. In such cases the government is 
able to save money by using charities as intermediary 
organisations as opposed to provding the service directly 
themselves. Nevertheless, some instances of payment for services
36B. Nightingale, Charities. London: Allen Lane, 1973, pp. 
72-74.
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clearly do constitute state support for charities.
This section provides evidence that in both countries, 
indirect financial assistance is more important than is perhaps 
commonly perceived. An effort is made here to provide a more 
complete picture of how charities are financially supported both 
directly and indirectly by government and some of the inherent 
implications attached to each form of assistance. Of course the 
area of activity in which charities are operating largely 
determines how they will be financed by government. For example, 
in the case of medical research we see in chapter seven section I 
and II, that the governments of both countries have cut back their 
direct funding to their own research agencies - The British and 
Canadian Medical Research Councils. At the same time, both 
governments have indirectly increased their financial commitment 
to medical research charities by encouraging individuals through a 
number of tax reforms to donate more money to these organisations. 
In this peculiar way, both the British and Canadian governments 
have redefined their financial commitment to medical research, and 
in doing so have increasingly relied on charities to provide this 
service.
a . indirect government financial assistance
In the attempt to reverse the decline in the level of 
voluntary donations in the 1960's and 1970's the governments of 
both Britain and Canada have taken steps to alter tax legislation 
in order to encourage people to make larger charitable donations 
more frequently. However, the tax policies in both England and
189
Canada that achieve this end are very different in the two 
countries.
In Britain, individuals are not able to deduct from their 
taxable income donations to a charity. Instead, charities, derive 
a large proportion of their income by way of covenants - by 
reclaiming the tax on the income paid by an individual donor. For 
charities, therefore, consistently high tax rates would, be 
preferred. In Canada, where the covenant system is not in place, 
lower levels of taxation generate more income for charities, since 
individuals have more disposable income from which to make 
charitable donations. In the remainder of this section we examine 
tax policies in relation to charities in more detail: we begin
with Canada.
B. Canada
Canadian charity administrators have long realized the 
financial advantages that flow from government policies which 
encourage individuals to make charitable donations. Successive 
governments have been reticent to adopt sweeping changes to tax 
policies that would encourage people to donate more, since changes 
in the tax conditions for charitable giving involve trade-offs 
between what the government stands to lose in tax revenue and what 
charities stand to gain.37
The only scientific study of charitable giving in Canada is
37A good review of the trade-off between increased indirect 
financing of charities and lost government revenue is found in R.
Bird and b . Bucovetsky, Canadian__lax___Reform__and— Private
Philanthropy. Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1976.
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Samual Martin's 1975 work entitled; Financing Humanistic Services. 
In it he concludes that as income rises, charitable donations 
increase in absolute terms, though not proportionately to the rise 
in income. In addition, tax incentives to individuals to donate 
more heavily to private charities do not necessarily produce 
increases in donations to those charities equal to the decrease in 
government revenue. Stated differently, taxpayers might keep some 
of the money saved on taxes for themselves depending on the tax 
scheme being used.38 Two of the most popular schemes currently 
being lobbied for are discussed below; namely a tax credit system 
and a matching government grant system.
(i) Tax credit system
An overall tax credit system would involve a deduction from 
an individual's tax rather than a deduction when computing income 
to which the appropriate rate of tax is applied. Under such a 
formula, everyone's cost in making a charitable donation would 
ostensibly be identical because the same amounts of credit would
38S. Martin, Financing__Humanistic___Services. Toronto:
McClelland and Steward, 1975, p. 140. It should be emphasized 
that the empirical data on which Martin bases his observations are 
not without flaw. His taxation data for example, only list those 
donations claimed as deductions for income tax purposes. Because 
tax laws concerning the deductability of charitable donations have 
changed periodically since the end of the Second World War, the 
annual series is discontinuous. Annual comprehensive data for all 
donations made and claimed by Canadians are complete for 1946 
through 1956. No donation statistics were reported for the years 
1957 through 1960. Since 1961, the data only represents donations 
claimed by taxpayers provided the amount exceeded $100 (£50) per
taxpayer. Since an optional standard claim of $100 (£50) was 
introduced in 1957, no listing has since been required for 
donation claims of less than $100 (£50) per taxpayer.
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be made available to anyone despite their income. However, in 
fact, a tax credit system provides more real income to the low- 
income taxpayer.39 Both the Carter Commission on Taxation in 
Canada and the Filer Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public 
Needs in the United States, revealed that a tax credit system 
intended to stimulate philanthropy provides greater inducement to 
lower and middle income taxpayers than it does to higher income 
taxpayers.40 Their assumption was that if total giving remained 
constant - that is, if the lower and middle income earners 
increased their giving proportionately to the decline in giving by 
higher income earners - the result would be to increase support to 
the religious community and decrease support to cultural, 
educational and medical research charities. The former tends to 
be supported by those earning lower income; the latter by those 
with higher incomes. Martin corroborates this conclusion in his
39The number of studies on the feasibility of Canadian tax 
credits is voluminous. The best account as it relates to 
charitable giving is, W. Thrisk, 'Giving Credit where Credit is 
Due: The Choice Between Credits and Deductions Under the 
Individual Income Tax Act in Canada', Canadian Tax Journal. 
28(1980), pp. 32-42.
40See generally Department of Finance, 'The Tax Treatment of 
Charities', Discussion Paper 40-1. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 
1975; Senate of Canada, Report of the Standing Senate Committee of 
National Finance on Information Canada. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 
1974, (The Carter Commission); and J. Filer, Giving in America: 
Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector. Washington, D.C.: University 
of Chicago Press, 1975, Vol. 8. Given the commission's auspices 
and membership, its principal focus, quite understandably was on 
the impact of the U.S. tax system upon the private sector- 
specifically whether the existing tax system should be modified. 
Implicit in the commission's objectives was that any modifications 
in future tax legislation would be more favourable than the 
restrictive measures embodied in the 1969 Tax Reform Act.
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1976 study and in his most recent work entitled; An Essential 
Grace (1985), arguing that charities heavily dependent on the 
wealthy would face much harder times.41
(ii) Matching government-grants system 
Under this scheme, the government would have to match, in 
whole or in part, all charitable donations made to registered 
charities and pay them lump sums at regular intervals. The 
positive feature of this system from the viewpoint of both the 
government and certain charities, is that it can be adjusted 
easily by changing the ratio of government grants to other 
incomes. Taxpayers would, in effect, be directing government 
money to their favourite charity.42
The major drawback to the matching-grants system is that 
large support would clearly go to 'high-profile' successful 
charities, whereas little or no support would go to less visible 
causes, no matter how worthy. In effect, the less popular 
charities that often need increased support the most would likely 
find themselves further disadvantaged in comparison to the high 
profile charities because they have smaller incomes to begin with. 
The argument simply stated is that this system would not assist 
charities pursuing 'unpopular' but socially important causes, such
4lMartin, An Essential Grace, pp. 136-137.
42The matching-grant formula has also been used widely in 
Federal financing of the provinces. They are normally given with 
'conditions'; for example, the Federal government may try to place 
quality and administrative controls on a provincial programme 
being funded.
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as half-way homes for battered wives or research into horrific 
afflictions like inflammatory bowel disease. Additionally, 
support would be given to more wealthy charities such as those 
involved in cancer and heart research which are already estimated 
by some to have more resources than they can spend responsibly. 43
C. Britain
In Britain, a tax credit scheme has not been pursued by 
charities interested in tax law reforms. Instead their attention 
has been focused on other areas of tax legislation such as the 
covenanting scheme. Value Added Tax (VAT), and to a lesser extent, 
the matching grant scheme. All reforms in these areas are aimed 
at bringing about more indirect government assistance to 
charities.
The financial importance attached to major reforms of the tax 
laws governing charities can be gleaned from an overview of the 
gradual reforms in tax legislation that have already been made in 
Britain. As Schuster remarks:
"When the Conservative Party returned to power in 
Britain in 1979, its fiscal policies were 
designed to deemphasize the income tax and to
43See Carl Bakal, Charity USA. New York: Times Books, 1979, 
p. 401. Bakal points out that in the United States the American 
Cancer Society raises about 80 per cent more money for lung cancer 
research than that the American Diabetes Association even though 
the latter disease is twice as widespread as cancer. The problem 
that arises for cancer research charities is that often they haye 
more money than qualified researchers, therefore, the money is 
often expended on their infra-structure. The fear of a matching- 
grant formula is that charities involved in popular diseases such 
as cancer will become even more overfunded at the expense of these 
less popular diseases.
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further exploit other sources of taxation, 
particularly the Value Added Tax (VAT). The 
Finance Act (1980) was a watershed for British 
charities because, in translating these Tory 
policies into law, it included several provisions 
that have had a direct financial .impact on 
charities.”
44
For example, the Finance Act (1980) provided for 'higher relief' 
on covenanted contributions, an additional tax incentive for 
donors who pay more than the basic rate of tax.45 The 1980 Act 
also lowered the required minimum length for a charitable deed of 
covenant from seven years to four years. While this reform was 
strongly endorsed by British charities at the time, available data 
indicates that it has done little to influence individuals to 
donate more by way of covenants.46 In 1982, the Conservative 
government liberalized some of the existing tax exemptions in its 
Finance Act that included a fiscal package claimed at the time to 
be worth an extra £30 million. It was anticipated that most of 
this money would be generated from an increase in the upper limit 
of money that could be donated by way of covenant.47 Again, the 
data that is now available indicate that this was a far too
44J. Mark Schuster, 'Tax Incentives As Arts Policy in Western 
Europe', PQNPO Working Paper No. 90. New Haven, Connecticut: 
Institution for Social and Policy Studies, 1985, p. 14.
45Michael Norton, Co venant a ;__ A Practical Guide ..ta— the Tax
Advantages of Giving. London: Directory of Social Change, 1983, 
p. 34.
46Charities Aid Foundation,• Charity Trends. 1986/87. 
Tonbridge: CAF, 1987, p. 116.
47Brenton, Voluntary Sector in British Social Services, p. 75.
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optimistic calculation.
In its 1986 budget, the Conservative government continued 
with its commitment to extend more indirect financial assistance 
to charities. After the March budget was announced, the Institute 
of Charity Fund Raising Managers Trust, predicted that donations 
to charities would double as a result of tax concessions to 
encourage employees and individuals to support charities. The tax 
reforms were essentially a two-part relief package. First, it 
offered a series of concessions for companies and individuals, and 
second, it provided more relief for welfare and medical research 
charities from VAT.
The government proposed that it would abolish altogether the 
upper limits of £10,000 on covenants for individuals who wished to 
donate money over a four year period. At the same time, the 
government allowed companies to make single donations instead of 
having to covenant money over a number of years. Under the new 
legislation they were able to give up to three per cent of their 
annual dividends to charity and receive tax relief at the basic 
rate. Additionally, the government allowed any person on a 
company pay-roll to donate up to £100 a year with full tax relief 
to charity. Under this new programme, an employer would approach 
a charity to launch a scheme to give a maximum of £100 a year. 
The employer would then deduct the payment through PAYE. 
Deductions would then be made like pension arrangements, with the 
employee receiving tax relief. The concessions at the time of 
their announcement were valued at £60 million a year to charities
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which would double donations.48
The VAT concession made in the 1986 budget meant that 
charities would no longer pay for display advertising in 
newspapers and magazines, the provision of distress alarms and 
lifts for the handicapped, or the use of minibuses and cars to 
transport the disabled. This last concession was calculated by 
the VAT Reform Group as having a net worth of £12 million a year 
to charities.49
(i) importance of indirect government financial assistance
in Britain .and Canada
No study has yet calculated the value of all the 
indirect government subsidies to charities in either country. 
However, in Britain one estimate, which included stamp duty, 
capital transfer tax and the covenant form of tax credits, but 
excluded other kinds of tax or rate relief, concluded the amount 
saved by charities equalled more than £200 million in 1980-1981.50 
A more recent study suggests that this figure has doubled to an 
¿unmount of £400 million in 1986.51 In Canada, one comparable 
study indicates that the federal government alone extends close to 
$395 million (£197.5 million) to charities by exempting them from
48'Doubling of donations forecast to follow tax concessions,' 
Guardian. 19 March 1986.
49Ibid.
50Brenton, Voluntary Sector in British Social Services, p. 75.
SICharities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends. 1986/87. p. 37.
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paying tax on their accumulated annual income.52 This figure is 
estimated to represent approximately 10 per cent of total charity 
income. In contrast, and as illustrated in Table 4.8, voluntary 
donations made up 44 per cent of all Canadian charity revenue in 
1983, with government grants following at 23 per cent, the 
proceeds from the sale of goods and services made up 22 per cent 
and investment income comprised 11 per cent. However, among non­
religious Canadian charities government grants were the most 
important revenue source, comprising 40 per cent of total revenues 
and donations fell to approximately 20 per cent whereas income 
from investments remained constant.53 In comparison to Canada, 
voluntary donations made up 54 per cent of all British charity 
revenue in 1983 with government grants following (similar to the 
Canadian pattern) at 26 per cent, followed by investment income 
at 13 per cent. However, in contrast to Canada, among non­
religious British charities, personal donations as opposed to 
government grants remained the most important revenue source 
comprising 50 per cent of total revenue. Government grants 
increased moderately by three per cent whereas income from fees 
and investments remained constant.
A further, and closely related point is that charities are in 
effect increasing their income by not having to pay taxes on the 
donations they collect. This, of course, represents a net loss to
52D. Ross, Some Financial and__Economic__Dimensions__of
Registered Charities and Voluntary__Activity in__Canada• Ottawa s
Social Economic Research, 1983, pp. 2-3.
53Ibid.. p. 1.
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the government through lost tax revenue. Gilbert and Specht 
describe this type of indirect subsidy as money that has escaped 
from the public treasury and which can be seen as a policy 
instrument used by governments to confer their blessing on certain 
types of activity and to deny it to others.54 Moreover, and as in 
our examination of medical research charities (chapter seven 
sections I and II), the governments of both countries have cut 
back the amount of direct funding to agencies while at the same 
time have increasingly relied on charities for research 
discoveries by indirectly increasing their income through various 
tax reform measures.
D. Direct government financial assistance
In both Britain and Canada, government grants to charities 
are given mostly on a selective basis to those organisations 
operating in a department's jurisdiction. Many departments have 
financial links with charities and it is frequently the case that 
charities combine grants from a number of departments to finance 
different aspects of their work if such work overlaps the sphere 
of interest of more than one department. For example, several 
smaller British medical research charities receive grants from the 
Medical Research Council (which is responsible to the Secretary of 
State for Education and Science) for experimental purposes, and 
from the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) which 
provides finance for patient service related projects; for
54M. Gilbert and H. Specht, Dimensions of Social Welfare 
Policy. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974, p. 147.
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example, the provision of home nurses for terminally-ill cancer 
patients.55 Generally, the policy towards such subsidies is that 
they should go first to charities which engage in activities 
'supplementary' to a department's own area of concern. As noted 
in the Wolfenden Report:
Where departments have certain statutory 
responsibilities which must be met from the total 
amount of money available to them, only limited 
funds are left over for help to voluntary 
organisations which are not simply acting on an 
agency basis to fulfill statutory duties.
56
The data in Table 4.9 illustrate that among all British charities 
income from government sources has increased by £79,995,000 from 
1983 to 1986 and that in proportion to other sources of charity 
income has increased from 17 per cent to 22 per cent. In the 
specific area of medical research Table 4.10 illustrates that the 
total amount of income from government sources (including central 
government grants and fees and local government fees) of the 14 
British medical research charities listed in the 'top 200 grant­
seeking charities', between 1982 and 1986 increased by £6,566,000. 
However, this figure is greatly skewed by the disproportionately 
large government grant flowing to one charity - the Spastics 
Society. In an interview with the Executive Director of this 
charity, it was learned that the entire amount of government
55Marie Curie Memorial Foundation, Annual Report. 1984-1985. 
p. 33.
56Wolfenden Committee, The Future of Voluntary Organisations, 
p. 215.
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Table -1.-2-
Government Contribution to Total Charity Income
In Britain 1983-19^
1983 1984 1985 1986
Total Amount 
of Government 
Funds givento 
British Charities 
(£000)
148,499 175,372 194,621 228,494
Government Funds 
as a Proportion 
of Total Charity 
Income
17% 18.5% 20% 22%
Source: Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends. 1986/87.
Tonbridge: CAF, 1987 p. 116.
Note: Data on government funds includes fees and grants made
by central and local governments.
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support is directed towards 'patient services' as opposed to 
medical research. In removing the Spastics Society from the 
aggregate totals it is cle_ar that government is not an important 
source of funding for medical research charities. For example, in 
1986 not only did 10 of the remaining 13 charities not receive any 
government financial support but this source as a proportion of 
their total income dropped considerably from 16 per cent to a mere 
1.7 per cent when the Spastics Society is excluded. In relation to 
the general policy that government limits its financial support to 
charities providing complementary services, the question arises 
whether there is any difference between charities and statutory 
agencies and whether the former has merely developed into a quasi- 
statutory agency. The argument frequently advanced is that 
charities deriving a large proportion of their income from 
government sources correspondingly deliver services on behalf of 
the statutory sector, as a glorified sub-contractor.57
A major difference between the financing arrangements between 
charities and the state in Britain and Canada relates to the 
existence of a special source of government money for charities in 
Britain namely, the Voluntary Service Unit (VSU).
The unit was established under the Conservative Government in 
1973 and has acted as a focal point in government for relations 
with charities. A similar but much smaller co-ordinating unit had 
previously existed in the Cabinet Office under the Labour
57See, Brenton, Voluntary Sector in British__Social Services/
p. 39.
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Government of 1964-1970, but had neither the resources nor 
expertise within its staff to co-ordinate effectively government 
involvement with charities. The VSU was originally designed to 
perform four roles: to act as a link between charities and 
government departments; to act as a focal point through a system 
of departmental liaison officers for departmental interests 
relating to charities; to stimulate the use of volunteers and 
encourage cooperation and coordination among charitable 
organisations; and to act as a financer of last resort in 
Whitehall.58 As is shown in chapter six section I, the VSU has 
not played a role in liaising between medical research charities 
and the Medical Research Council. Consequently, the potential for 
duplicated research has become an increasingly difficult problem 
for charities, government, the scientific community and the more 
prudent members of the donating public. In relation to its last 
function, the VSU has been largely responsible for funding 
charities whose activities are embraced by policies of more than 
one department or are not the direct responsibility of any one 
department. According to Brenton's estimations:
The VSU's grants to voluntary organisations in 
1980-1981 amounted to just over £2 3/4 million.
This total included grants of £500,000 or more to 
such agencies as Community Projects Foundation, 
Community Service Volunteers, and the Volunteer 
Centre and smaller grants to bodies like Gamblers 
Anonymous, the National Playing Fields
58wolfenden committee. The Future .of Voluntary Organisations, p. 213.
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Association and Task Force.
As mentioned above, there is no comparable institution in 
Canada to that of the VSU. In the 1977 federal government report. 
People in Action, a major recommendation was that a central agency 
should be established to provide a wide range of grant-related 
information for charities. Additionally, it was argued that the 
Canadian government was inefficient, since departments had no 
central source of information regarding which charities had 
previously received public money and where in government it had 
emanated. Most of the Canadian charities surveyed for the report 
perceived government funding as largely uncoordinated and lacking 
an over arching policy to steer decision makers towards properly 
selecting worthy candidates for funding. In light of these 
problems, many charities have regarded direct financial aid from 
the federal government as a mixed blessing. While unquestionably 
most charities need government money, often acquiring it has been 
so onerous that charity administrators have debated whether it is 
a worthwhile exercise.60
While there continues to be no overarching government policy 
relating to the funding of charities, (despite efforts by the VSU) 
government departments in both countries nonetheless have their
59Brenton, Voluntary Sector in British Social Services, p. 71.
60Report of the National Advisory Council on Voluntary 
Action, People in Action. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1977, pp.
161-168.
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own unique set of priorities for extending financial assistance to 
them and for monitoring the activities of recipient organisations. 
Each also has a distinct mandate and can set up programmes subject 
to Treasury and Cabinet approval to provide grants and contracts 
for needed services in light of those mandates. Once a programme 
has been created, its operation is determined by the departmental 
setting, the internal operations of the government, its past 
relationship with charities, the attitude of particular ministers, 
the political climate for its activities and a host of other 
factors. There is, in short, little uniformity of policy within 
the governments of both countries regarding the funding of 
charities. 61
The legal provisions under which the governments in both 
Britain and Canada are empowered to give financial assistance to 
charities are too numerous to list in their entirity. However, 
even if all statutory powers were given it would not present a 
full picture of the full range of funding; at least in so far as 
the central and federal governments are concerned. This is 
because:
The existence of specific statutory powers does 
not necessarily mean the grants will be made and 
conversely, the lack of statutory powers does not 
mean the grants cannot be made; but if the
61The two best sources relating to government funding 
structures in Britain and Canada are Brenton, Voluntary Sector in 
British Social Services, chapter 4; 0. Leat, G. Smoka and J.
Unell, Voluntary and Statutory Collaboration:____Rhetoric or
Reality?. London: Bedford Square Press/NCVO, 1981, Chapter 2, 
and the Report of the National Advisory Council on Voluntary 
Action, People in Action, chapters 9-11.
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assistance is substantial and continuing it is 
expected that covering legislation would be 
obtained.
62
An example of a statutory provision under which a central 
government department in Britain is empowered to make grants to 
charities is the Education Act 1944, S. 100, (1) (b): it states:
The Department of Education and Science may 
provide by regulation for grants to be paid 
towards expenses incurred in the provision of 
educational services or for the purposes of 
educational research. Regulations have been 
passed to enable grants to be made to special 
schools for training disabled persons, institutes 
for teacher training, adult education institutes 
and until recently, direct grant schools.
63
There are plenty of British and Canadian examples of the 
governments' offering of grants to charities covering all major 
fields of social welfare provision including education, relief of 
poverty, care for children, elderly people, health and even 
housing. Additionally, there are broad and flexible powers not 
expressly linked to recognized categories of social welfare. In 
Britain, these include the power under the urban aid scheme to 
support charities attempting to alleviate 'special social needs'
62Memorandum submitted to the Wolfenden Committee by the Home 
Office Voluntary Services Unit. Published in Wolfenden Report, 
The Future of Voluntary Organisations, p. 219.
63Attached to the Home Office Voluntary Services Unit 
memorandum was a list of statutory provisions under which central 
government departments are empowered to make grants to charities. 
See Wolfenden Committee, The Future of Voluntary Organisations, p.
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in urban areas, and in Canada the power of the federal government 
to finance charities involved in promoting bilingualism and 
biculturalism.
To gain some perspective on the importance of these statutory 
provisions some data indicating the actual amounts of capital 
given to charities are listed below. Large sums of money, for 
example, have been dispensed to charities in Britain out of 
central government coffers under the job creation programme (£31.2 
million between October 1975 and March 1977) and to charitable 
associations chiefly via the Housing Corporation (some £6 milliion 
in 1975-1976). Besides these amounts, £1.9 million was paid to 
charities under the Urban Aid programme in 1976-1977 and £4.5 
million paid out in the same period by VSU in its role as a 
stimulator of charitable activity.64 Likewise, the Canadian 
Opportunities for Youth programmes (COY), administered by the 
Secretary of State, sought to alleviate the high employment rate 
among Canadian youth by providing opportunities for worthwhile 
community work during the summer months. Much of the £190 million 
budget for the programme went to local charities whose 
responsibility was to provide students with summer jobs. The 
employment created under this programme sought to develop
technical and trade skills and to complete projects that 
benefitted local communities.65
64These data are drawn from the Wolfenden Committee, The 
Future of Voluntary Organisations. Appendix 6 B.
65N. Carter, Trends in— Voluntary Support for Non-Government Social Service Agentieg. Ottawa: CCSD, 1974, pp. 53-S5.
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The extreme diversity of both the Canadian and British 
governments' policies and programmes renders it difficult to 
acquire information comparing grants made by different departments 
or even different programmes within the same department. For 
example, it is difficult to acquire general information relating 
to available grants, grants' criteria, the procedures for dealing 
with grants, rules for reporting by grant recipients and the 
evaluation of grant recipients and their programmes. The lack of 
any central source of information in both Britain and Canada, on 
grants to charities, presents a serious obstacle to anyone 
investigating this area.
E. Government funding policies
There are many examples where governments have relied on 
charities to deliver certain kinds of services instead of relying 
on their own agencies. Some have argued that this symbolizes 
government's belief in a pluralistic supply of services. Others 
claim that governments have relied on charities to deliver new 
programmes or services because establishing new departmental 
agencies for this purpose has proved expensive. Lastly, some 
writers have argued that governments use charities because their 
labour is cheaper.66 This is partly true since charities use 
volunteers and their employees are normally paid less than public 
sector employees performing comparable tasks.
At the partisan level in both countries, the policy aspects
66See, S. Martin, An Essential Grace, pp. 108-9.
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of government-funded charities vary between departments; 
nevertheless some general patterns may be identified. The summary 
supplied to the Wolfenden Committee by the VSU divided government 
support into three categories:
These are where it is considered that voluntary 
provision is preferable to a statutory service; 
where the voluntary organisations can provide an 
alternative to existing statutory provision, 
providing an element of choice for users of the 
service concerned; or where a statutory service 
can be supplemented or are extended by voluntary 
means.
67
The breakdown in government support in Canada is virtually 
identical to Britain. However, one Canadian study stresses the 
importance of the first category; namely where charity provision 
is preferable to that of the state. This is the case since 
government assistance is often extended to charities to promote 
activity in areas that would otherwise be politically embarrassing 
to government. Such has been the case of government's financial 
support for the Women's Shelter, which provides temporary homes 
for distressed pregnant women as well as offering information 
concerning the availability of therapeutic abortions. Since the 
issue of abortion is a highly politicized issue, the government 
has favoured the use of charities as an intermediary body to
67Wolfenden Committee, The Future of Voluntary Organisations. 
Appendix 4.
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deliver this service.68
Given the general policy of the government in each country 
towards charities, they would, for example, support an 
organisation where a need was relatively small and specialized or 
where a case for statutory provision has previously failed. 
Alternatively, for specific groups like drug addicts, alcoholics 
or the single-homeless, the authoritarian image of a state agency 
is often deemed not appropriate. Some kinds of services lack 
popular appeal so that, on the one hand, statutory provision is 
not viewed as legitimate, and on the other, alternative voluntary 
provision has difficulty gaining financial support. Consequently, 
a publicly funded charity has been a happy compromise.69
The typical departmental response in both countries to a 
charity seeking financial aid since funding began has been 
described as being 'reactive' and 'arbitrary'. The reason being 
that the previous austerity measures imposed on government 
expenditures have prevented individual departments from tailoring 
a comprehensive grants policy aimed at charities in general.70 
According to Martin, the imposition of expenditure controls on 
every Canadian department, save the Ministry of Defence, has 
contributed to a grants policy popularly described as being 'ad-
68M. Zald, 'Organisations as Politics: An Analysis of
Community Organisation Agencies', Journal of Education for Social 
Work. 2(1966), p. 31.
69Brenton, Voluntary___Organisations___in___British socialServices. p. 73.
70S. Martin, An Essential Grace, p. 202.
213
hoc' and 'systematically unfair' for three decades.71 The 
economic constraints have also had an effect on the duration of 
grants. In Britain, government subsidies are normally given for 
one year, whereupon they are re-negotiated.72 In Canada, one 
report averages the normal contract to last approximately two 
years, however, this figure fluctuates considerably given the type 
of government assistance under discussion.73
There are two important but largely ignored facts concerning 
these developments that are worth noting. First, the difficulties 
faced by charities in renewing their grants may not necessarily 
rest on government's evaluation of the service being financed, but 
instead upon the vicissitude of public expenditure policies. 
Second, the popular belief that governmental sources of income 
facilitate charities to conduct long-term financial planning is 
challenged by the fact that government grants are not necessarily 
renewed automatically on a yearly basis.
Government policies relating to the conditions under which 
funds are customarily granted and the extent of their control over 
the activities of charities in receipt of funds is also remarkably 
similar in both countries. Both the VSU report in 1978 and the 
Canadian study conducted by the National Advisory Council on
71Ibid.. p. 203.
720ne exception is the DHSS which announced a change of 
policy in 1984, setting grants on a two to three year basis, to 
give greater stability to charities. Brenton, Voluntary 
Organisations in British Social Services, pp. 63-64.
73National Advisory Council on Voluntary Action, People in 
Action, p. 167.
214
Voluntary Action in 1977, agreed that the primary determinant for 
government funding of charities must be that the organisation work 
to a policy which is in accordance with that of the departments 
involved.74 The formal conditions which attach to grants differ 
depending on their amount and the proportion they represent of a 
charity's gross income. For example, government policy in both 
countries demands that charities in receipt of relatively small 
grants must reciprocate by providing public officials with some 
form of annual report and audited accounts. For charities whose 
grants are large, or which constitute a substantial proportion of 
their total income, the designated status of 'controlled fringe 
body' applies, and the organisations become subject to 
governmental location policy and to public sector norms regarding 
conditions of service and levels of pay.75 As Brenton points out:
The number of charities that fall into this 
category are relatively few, instead most are 
open to less direct forms of government control 
and accountability for their expenditures of 
public funds.
76
The tension between the need for charities to maintain their 
autonomy and the constraints government finance can impose is a
74Home Office, Voluntary Service Unit, The Government and The 
Voluntary Sector; A Consultative Document. London: HMSO, 1977, 
p. 107. See, National Advisory Council on Voluntary Action, 
People in Action, p p - 162-163.
75Brenton, Voluntary___Organisations___in___British SocialServices. p. 74.
76lbifiL., p. 74.
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theme widely discussed in the existing literature. The purpose 
here, however, has been to summarize both the British and Canadian 
government's policies and _general attitudes towards the funding of 
charities.
f . Types of direct government financial assistance
Three main types of direct government funding are discussed 
below: namely, project grants, sustaining grants and fee-for-
services. Also discussed are other schemes for funding charities 
and types of funding relationships each providing both government 
and charities with a unique blend of opportunities and problems. 
It should be noted at the onset of our discussion that the three 
funding arrangements are identical in Britain and Canada, although 
instead of using the term fee-for-service, British charities in 
receipt of this kind of government assistance are said to be 
receiving 'contractual aid'.
(i) Project grants
Project Grants are payments provided to charities to carry 
out a specific activity, programme or a series of activities and 
programmes. In Canada, these grants may be given to provincial 
governments, private institutions as well as to charities. 
Likewise, in Britain this type of government assistance may be 
given to local governments, city councils as well as to a range of 
organisations including trade associations, mutual or self-help 
groups and charities. For example, the Canada Council has 
provided funds to a children's museum in London, Ontario, so that
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it could develop further displays for exhibits and programmes.77 
In Britain, the Department of Health and Social Security has given 
financial aid to charities like 'Welcome House' that provides 
homes to children who are without adequate parental supervision 
and that have been in trouble with the law.78
In both countries, the government usually sets up broad 
programmes under which the projects of individual charities will 
be funded. This initiative for developing specific projects 
utilizing the funds under the government programmes rests with the 
individual charities, though a department often can and does take 
the initiative. The department running the grants programme then 
assesses whether specific projects are complimentary to the 
objectives of the programme and its own interest and mandate.79
In both countries, new grant programmes have been initiated, 
particularly job creation schemes which have created a variety of 
new relationships between government and charities. For example, 
in Britain one of the earliest programmes, and one entirely 
designed for charities, was the Community Industry Scheme, set up 
as a temporary measure in 1972 under the direction of the National 
Association of Youth Clubs. The programme provided aid to "help 
socially and personally disadvantaged young people prepare for
77R. Sim, Government__Grants__to_Voluntary Organisations.
Toronto: Canadian Association for Adult Education, 1970, pp. 16-
17.
78W.B. Jones, Charity__and___Teenage__Delinquents. London:
Voluntary Action Supplement, 21 June, 1984, p. 4.
79Sim, Government Grants to Voluntary Organisations, p. 14.
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permanent employment by providing them with practical work or 
community benefit".80 Financed by the Department of Employment, 
the programme provided job opportunities for thousands of youths 
who worked on community projects and workshops as well as in 
social service institutions. In Canada, the Student Community 
Service Programme administered by the Department of Secretary of 
State is an excellent example of a programme which gave project 
grants exclusively to charities to provide an opportunity during 
the summer for young persons to carry out activities which the 
employment charities themselves lacked the resources to perform.81 
The programme was also subjected to yearly scrutiny to determine 
whether it was still meeting the needs of both charities and those 
of the students. When conducting this annual assessment, the 
government considered that, in order to accomplish something 
worthwhile in a single summer, it was necessary to impose on 
charities a host of management and administrative procedures. 
Because such arrangements can be unnecessarily burdensome to 
charities, the question has been raised about the value of this 
type of funding. The initial negative reaction to the use of 
project grants in the context of job creation took two forms. 
First, the programmes were seen by non-charitable organisations as 
being disruptive to community priorities since they by-passed 
established agencies already providing similar services. Second,
80Manpower Services Commission, Annual Report 1980-81. 
London: 1981, pp. 3-9.
81Carter, Trends— in__Voluntary__Support__for Non-GovernmentSocial Service Agencies, pp. 54-55.
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government officials themselves were uncertain as to whether the 
charities which received the grants would be able to account 
properly for their expenditures. The response, at the time of 
these concerns, was to set up constituency advisory boards 
composed of local citizens nominated by the area Member of 
Parliament and appointed by the minister in many federal ridings 
to select and oversee projects. In a few ridings the local M.P. 
made the selections and administered these projects himself.82 D. 
Blake has made the controversial argument that, because of this 
last arrangement, political considerations frequently affected the 
selection of projects and the groups who were assigned to 
administer them.83
(ii) Sustaining grants
Sustaining grants are payments by government into the general 
core budget of a charity. In other words, the grants are designed 
to do what their name implies; they sustain a charitable 
organisation. In both countries, the evidence suggests that these 
payments have not resulted in the direct involvement of the 
funding department in determining how the money should be spent. 
In providing this direct financial assistance, government 
officials first assess whether a potential charity will provide a 
sufficient contribution to the overall national interest. Thus in 
comparison to project grants, the government's focus shifts from
82Ibid.. p. 53.
83D. Blake, 'LIP and Partisanship: An Analysis of the Local 
Initiatives Program', Canadian Public Policy. 2(1976), pp. 17-32.
219
supporting a specific activity or project to funding a charity's 
entire range of activities.84
In Canada, in the last few years the Welfare Grants Section 
of the Department of National Health and Welfare has developed, a 
Sustaining Grants policy for charities registered at the federal 
level. The policy was designed generally to assist five areas of 
charitable activity that are complementary to departmental 
interests. First, the department supplements charities engaged in 
citizens' action within a specific area of need; such groups 
include the Canadian Rehabilitation Council for the Disabled and 
the Canadian Association for the Mentally Retarded. Second, the 
department supports charities with limited resources as a means of 
equalizing their provision of services in each region of the 
country. Such groups include the National Anti-Poverty
Organisation and The Canadian Council on Children and Youth. As 
discussed in more detail in chapter five, 20 Canadian medical 
research charities presently receive this type of government 
support. Third, the department supports charities dedicated to 
training and developing social welfare manpower, such as the 
Canadian Association of Schools of Social Work. Fourth, it 
supports Canadian affiliates of international social welfare 
groups. The fifth type of activity supported by this department 
is unique in that it is also available to non-charitable non-
84For example, in Canada, the Department of National Health 
and Welfare, through the use of sustaining grants has supported 
the overall activities of the Canadian Rehabilitation Council for 
the Disabled and the Canadian Association for the Mentally Retarded
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profit organisations having professional qualifications; such 
groups include the Canadian Association of Legal Aid Workers and 
the Canadian Institute_ of Chartered Accountants. These 
organisations provide feedback on government proposals and make 
suggestions relating to social policy in general. Charities have 
limited participation in this particular area of activity since 
legal rules restrict them from openly participating in the policy 
formation process.85
An important aspect of this type of direct funding is worth 
mentioning. The Department of Health and Welfare argued publicly 
that in order for a charity to meet community needs effectively, 
it should assess its own internal operations thoroughly and 
evaluate - either independently or with government assistance- 
the relevance of its goals and objectives. In the case of 
sustaining grants, as opposed to project grants, the overriding 
concern was not necessarily that the goals of the charity should 
always converge with departmental objectives but rather that the 
charity itself become aware of how to improve the services it has 
offered. In short, it appears that the department's intention was 
that Sustaining Grants be utilized by individual citizens be 
directed into socially useful projects.86
85National Voluntary Health Agencies Committee, 'The Role of
the National Voluntary Health Agencies', Discussion__Paper to
Delegates attending the Second National__Voluntary— Meeting-
Ottawa: NVHAC, April 1979, pp. 5-6.
86Sim, Government Grants to Voluntary.Organisations, pp. 25-28.
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G. Fee-For-Service or Contractual Aid
As previously stated, the Canadian term 'fee-for-service' and 
the British term 'contractual aid' have the same meaning. They 
are simply payments given to an organisation in direct exchange 
for goods or services required by government.
When the government enters into such arrangements with a 
charity it is to some degree recognizing and capitalizing upon the 
special expertise of that particular charity. Contractual aid is 
therefore, normally initiated by the government and involves the 
payment of an agreed upon fee for services rendered. The 
government's focus is upon ensuring that the service is adequately 
provided; the nature of the charity providing the service is 
secondary. Contractual aid, like project grants, support specific 
activities instead of a charity's general programme of action. 
The types of activities often supported by this type of government 
funding include, among others, research, education, community 
development and cultural programmes.87
The debate continues as to whether contractual aid should be 
viewed as support by the central and federal governments for 
charitable activity or the reverse. On the one hand under such 
contracts, charities accumulate income but on the other hand 
government receives a precisely defined service for the money 
expended. If charities did not provide the services, they would 
have to be delivered by for-profit corporations or by government
87J. Cutt, 'Accountability, Efficiency and the "bottom line"
in Non-Profit organisations', Canadian__Public Administration. 25
(1982), pp. 311-331.
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itself, possibly at greater expense and at an uncomparable level 
of quality.
Charities in both countries often use this last argument in 
pleading with government to amend tax legislations in order to 
create a more opportunistic financial environment for themselves. 
Furthermore, in the sense that charities receive capital, and with 
it recognition of the value of the service they provide, they 
eventually do receive some 'non-financial' gains from contractual 
aid. As the 1977 Canadian government report on charities stated:
The learning of business methods, the hiring of 
administrative personnel and the adoption of its 
structures to a bureaucratic system can also 
strengthen the independence of a charitable 
organisation by improving its efficiency.
88
H. Other funding relationships: centralized funding and 
matching-grant formulae
(i) Centralized funding
One of the unique features of the state system of financing 
charities in Britain is that there exists a central government 
agency - the VSU - which is responsible for co-ordination and 
funding. In Canada, the absence of a similar agency was
identified in the 1977 government report People in Action, as a 
major weakness and potential drawback to a healthy and dynamic 
charitable non-profit sector.89 There were several problems and
88National Advisory Council on Voluntary Action, People in 
Action, p. 193.
89National Advisory Council on Voluntary Action, People in 
Action, p. 192.
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concerns that charities felt could be eliminated by a centralized 
funding agency comparable to the VSU. Many charity administrators 
were suspicious of political bias concerning the selection of 
grant recipients. Other charities expressed concern that the 
'closeness' or 'directness' of the present funding relationship 
between themselves and government departments meant that it was 
too easy for the funding agency to force its objectives on 
charities. Still, others complained that the scattering of 
funding throughout the Federal government meant that there were 
too many different sets of granting criteria for grants.90
However, the recommendation of People in Action for 
centralized funding departed from the British model in that it 
proposed all federal money to charities be funded through this new 
agency, whereas the VSU has always extended grants to charities 
only as a last resort to those unable to secure funding elsewhere.
In Canada, evidence was submitted to the National Advisory 
Council on Voluntary Action when drafting its report, stating why 
a centralized funding scheme was impracticable and virtually 
impossible to implement. These recommendations were likely acted 
upon given that no agency described above has emerged at the 
federal or provincial level of government in the eight years that 
have passed since the report was published. Perhaps one of the 
most persuasive recommendations was that a central funding agency 
would have to possess final say over the dispensing of grants and 
contracts to charities. However, this authority has long been a
90lbiiL., p. 193.
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vital component of many deparmental programmes and, therefore, it 
would be likely that a new agency would meet serious resistance 
from departments on this _ issue. A parallel can be drawn between 
the likely future of this agency and a similar agency that failed 
to provide inter-departmental co-operation; Information Canada. 
The latter was set up to collect and cross-index information 
regarding, among other things, governmental expenditures, but soon 
after failed to do so because of its inability to secure the full 
support and co-operation of government departments. Government 
departments saw Information Canada as an encroachment into their 
own activities in the information field.91
(ii) Matching-grant formulae
Over the last ten years in Canada, and only recently in 
Britain, charities have called on government to be more innovative 
in their funding policies towards charities. One scheme strongly 
advocated by 'certain charities' is a matching-grants formulae. 
As previously stated, this scheme operates by government providing 
money to a charity in some proportion to the money they collect 
from private donors. For example, the government might give a 
charity one pound for every pound collected from private donors. 
But these proportions could be varied. In fact, the argument has 
been made that the proportion of government grants to private 
donations - the matching-grants formulae - should be varied in
91 See Senate of Canada, Report of the Standing Senate 
Committee on National Finance on Information Canada, pp. 7-16 and 
pp. 21-45.
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accordance with the needs of a specific charity receiving the 
grant.92
A Canadian study conducted by H. Cooperstock assessed the 
reactions of charities to a matching-grant formulae as a new means 
of government support. Fifty-seven per cent of Cooperstock's 
respondents said they opposed any overall matching formulae which 
might be imposed on them by government. The respondents pointed 
out that the matching-grants system could work against many types 
of charitable activities. For example, the arts, anti-poverty 
organisations as well as senior-citizen groups argue that they 
would be poorly served by this type of granting system. 
Conversely, it should be noted that 43 per cent of Cooper stock' s 
respondents favoured matching grants on the grounds that it would 
"improve the autonomy and initiative of volunteers and provide 
assurance that the community really supported a project".93
h i . NQnrZinancial Government Support to Charities
Charity-state relations in Britain and Canada are diverse 
most notably when one considers the broad picture and not just 
financial matters. In this section of the chapter, we focus on 
the main categories of 'non-financial' support given by the state 
to charities. These include 'general support', the 'bestowal of
92National Advisory Council on Voluntary Action, People in 
Action, p. 193.
93H. Cooperstock. Relations Between Local Voluntary
Organisations and__Federal__Government— Departments— and Agencies.
Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1976, pp. 3-18.
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recognition' and the 'release of information' .
A. General support
The most obvious form of non-financial assistance is 'aid-in­
kind'. This includes access to government facilities, premises, 
resources, efforts to improve the responsiveness of government 
personnel to charitable activities and various types of non- 
financial support services.94
At the present time in Britain and Canada, the provision of 
aid-in-kind is extended by governments without clear guidelines. 
Instead, their provision now depends upon the goodwill of 
governmental personnel at all levels and on the ingenuity of 
charities in seeking-out this assistance. In Britain, and perhaps 
more so in Canada because of its vast geographical size, national 
charities have lobbied government to provide support to overcome 
the high costs of communication and travel. Specifically, the 
governments have been requested to offer their own communication 
facilities such as WATS telephone lines and telex to charities 
free of charge or at a reduced charge.
In the area of transportation, demands have been made for 
government to ensure that the economies of charter and excursion 
flights on government owned airlines - such as Air Canada - be 
made available to members of charities attending their annual 
conventions and meetings. Another proposal has been for the 
government to set up a system of grants which could be used in
94N. Carter, Volunteers: The Untapped Potential. Ottawa:
The Canadian Council on Social Development, 1975, pp. 46-52.
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reimbursing members of charities for part of the transportation 
costs incurred when travelling to such meetings.95
Most charities depe_nd extensively on the circulation of 
printed materials to their membership because, unlike government 
and business, charities cannot afford expensive phone-calls. Thus 
in order to maintain adequate and efficient communications with 
their members, charities have had to resort to the post - this has 
been a particularly severe problem in Canada because of the long­
standing inefficiency of Canada's postal system. The effects of 
continually rising postal rates in both countries, charities 
claim, have had a serious financial impact. As a result, repeated 
demands on the government of each country have been made to create 
specially reduced postal rates for the information materials and 
publications of charities.96
B. Recognition
The granting by government of a charitable registration 
number, the disbursement of a grant and the provision of 
facilities or services are not just sought by charities as a means 
of support. They are also appreciated as a symbol of recognition 
by the government of the worth and credibility of charitable 
organisations. There are other special measures which charities 
in both countries seem to agree the government could take as a
95Ibid.. pp. 61-66.
96Sim, Government__Grants to Voluntary Organisations, pp. 15-
17. Canadian and British charities have cause to be optimistic 
since American charities do enjoy preferential postal rates.
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means of bestowing recognition on charities. One is for the 
government to make a greater effort to publicize the value of 
charitable activity. One such scheme that has been proven 
successful in Canada has been to send leaflets promoting 
charitable activities along with cheques emanating from the 
Department of National Health and Welfare. The existing 'cheque- 
insert' programme has reached close to 5 million people monthly 
across Canada who receive government assistance through Family 
Allowance, Old Age Security or the Canada Pension Plan.97 As best 
can be determined, no comparable scheme has or does exist in 
Britain.
Other forms of recognition by government of charitable
involvement includes the bestowal of the Order of Canada for
voluntary achievements and in Britain the distinction of honours- 
from MBEs upwards. Additionally, the issuing of special stamps 
commemorating achievements, as well as public mention of 
charitable activities by politicians and senior civil servants are 
looked upon favourably by charities. One form of recognition of 
charitable activity that has been proven successful in Canada is 
the Life-Style Award programme administered by the Department of 
National Health and Welfare. This award honours volunteers who 
contribute outstandingly to the creation of healthy life-styles in 
their communities. Local branches of national charities, 
municipal governments and local citizens all share in the
971bid^.f pp. 30-31.
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responsibility of recognition.98
c. information
Another important source of ~non-f inancial support from 
government for charitable activities involves the preparation and 
circulation of government information. The belief of many British 
and Canadian charities is that governments have traditionally been 
unwilling to provide 'information' at their disposal. The defence 
of government policy has been that information potentially 
valuable to charities has been held back for reasons of national 
security, defence and especially to protect the infringement on 
the privacy of individuals.
One Canadian study has estimated that a considerable amount 
of information falling outside the above categories has remained 
secret because it has become customary to classify most government 
information. In fact, it has been estimated that over 80 per cent 
of Canadian government documents are classified.99 As a result, 
many charities have found it difficult to obtain information 
relating to government investigators of charities where 
embezzlement or other accounting irregularities have been alleged 
to have occurred. This is a particular concern of foundations 
which do not wish to disburse grants to grant-seeking charities 
that have been involved in administrative improprieties.
98National Advisory Council on Voluntary Action, People in 
Action, p. 264.
99T. Riley, 'Access: Lifting the Veil of Secrecy', The
Canadian Review, 4(1977), pp. 18-29.
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Another related problem for charities concerns the collection 
and organisation of information on government programmes. The 
relative autonomy of government departments has meant that 
information has been scattered between different departments and 
different programmes within single departments. Charitable 
activity has historically been such a minor governmental concern 
that there is no centre located in any department for the 
collection and dissemination of grant information to assist 
charities. As the Canadian government report; People in Action 
concluded:
The council discovered that there were no uniform 
reporting procedures or commonly accepted 
definitions of granting activities for charitable 
activities for use in obtaining such hard data. 
In addition, the Treasury Board did not act on a 
Cabinet directive to produce an annual report on 
Federal support to charities and little has been 
done to resolve this problem.
100
Charity administrators in both countries complain that they 
need more accurate and up-to-date information regarding government 
programmes and policies which affect them. This information can 
often be quite general; for example, charities may demand to know 
where they can best go for assistance given their own programmes 
and objectives. At other times, their information needs may be 
quite specific. For example, many charities often have detailed 
questions requiring equally detailed answers - such as, the
lOONational Advisory Council on Voluntary Action, People in Action f p. 271.
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precise criteria required for charitable registration. One 
recommendation put forward by the National Advisory Council on 
Voluntary Action was that the Federal government directs every 
department and agency with programmes of assistance for charities 
to allocate sufficient resources and personnel for the preparation 
and annual updating of directories identifying these 
programmes.101 The Canadian government's response to this 
recommendation has been that departmental resources are better 
applied by distributing grants to charities instead of spending a 
portion of that money on their publication.
IV. Conclusion
In Britain and Canada, we now know that charities derive 
their income from a wide variety of government and non-government 
sources. For charities that are financially independent from the 
state there are problems of fluctuating levels of public 
benevolence which make long-term planning difficult. However, 
these charities nonetheless enjoy the freedom and independence to 
expand their resources as they see fit. Government financed 
charities normally tend to enjoy the benefits of large and more 
secure incomes; possibly however at the expense of government 
influence on their administration.
With our knowledge that the state welfare system has begun to 
falter we are able to make some sense as to why both the British 
and Canadian governments have increasingly relied on charities to
lOllbid*, p. 272.
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deliver important social services. The manner in which 
governments have done so can be classified in two distinct ways. 
First, they have directly .financed them through the extension of 
project grants, sustaining grants and service .contracts. 
Government's selection of which charities should receive direct 
financial assistance and the type of aid depends largely on a 
charity's area of activity and whether its existing programmes 
coincide with government policy. Second, governments have also 
indirectly increased their financial commitment to charities by 
ammending tax legislation to encourage individuals and 
corporations to make larger donations. Where charities have been 
successful in raising voluntary donations because of these recent 
tax amendments, as in the case of medical research, governments 
have in turn cut back their own financial commitment to these 
areas of activity.
By examining some of the problems encountered by charities 
dependent on non-government financial sources such as voluntary 
donations, corporate donations, retail income, trust grants and 
self-generated income, we are able to discuss in the following 
chapter, how effectively they are able to function as surrogate 
institutitons to statutory agencies. In this next chapter we 
focus on charities involved in medical research. By doing so we 
are able to examine the nature of government's reliance on 
charities, some of the advantages and disadvantages of this 
arrangement and the likelihood of it being applied to other policy 
areas.
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History of Charitable and Government Support
for Medical Research
This chapter is the first of four chapters focusing 
specifically on charities which collect, and spend, voluntary 
contributions on medical research. The object here is to gain an 
understanding of how and over which issues, medical research 
charities interact with government and where possible, more 
general conclusions are made about charity-state relations.
British and Canadian medical research charities have become 
increasingly active in lobbying their respective governments on a 
host of issues, ranging from government cutbacks to the British 
Medical Research Council (B)MRC to government legislation 
affecting the Canadian tobacco industry. As an introduction to 
this discussion, it is first necessary to offer a short history of 
the role of medical research in changing public health. While the 
history of scientific investigation into the cause and cure of 
disease dates back many centuries, the organized response to 
funding medical research in both countries is less than a century 
old. Indeed, medical research charities as a community of 
charitable organisations are one of the most contemporary types of 
philanthropic bodies when compared to those dating back to 
Elizabethan times established for the 'relief of poverty'. Most
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medical research charities were established during the 1960's and 
1970's and registered under the second category of the Macnaghten 
classification as 'educational charities'.
After placing medical charities in their proper historical 
context, section II describes the impetus behind the establishment 
of the first medical research charities at the turn of the 
century. Explanations are offered as to their enormous popularity 
60 and 70 years later - as witnessed by the large number of new 
charities established and their success in attracting voluntary 
contributions. From this, we focus specifically on the internal 
dynamics that have shaped the way in which these charities 
organize and operate themselves. Here, close examination is made 
of the organisational features which have made charities 
representing certain diseases more successful than others. 
Indeed, arguments are formulated suggesting that the nature of the 
disease represented by a charity is a significant factor in 
determining its fund raising capabilities. In both countries, 
this provides useful background information for understanding why 
there are disparities between the incident rates of certain 
diseases and the availability of both government and charitable 
funds for their research. Appreciating this disparity lends 
understanding to why British and Canadian charities have lobbied 
their respective governments to increase research funds 
specifically earmarked for the disease they represent. These two 
issues are discussed in greater detail in chapter six. In 
addition to charities as a potential source of funding for bio-
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medical researchers the role of government as an alternative 
source is discussed below.
I. Role of Medical Research in Public Health
It is scarcely contentious to claim that modern medical 
practice developed during the last two centuries and that during 
this period life expectancy increased (in the Western World) at a 
rate not witnessed before. The reliable identification of disease 
began in the 19th century, as did the first accurate understanding 
of disease processes. The ancient physicians had always blamed 
the development of disease on the defective mixing of the humours 
in the body but in 1761 an Italian, Giovanni Battista Morgagni
published a book entitled Qn__the__Seats__and__Causes of Diseases
based on a greater number of post mortems in which he showed 
convincingly that different diseases involve different organs. 
Forty years later the Frenchman, Marie Francois Xavier Bichat, 
showed that organs are made up of many different kinds of tissue 
and that different tissues are responsible for different disease 
processes.1
In 1833 a German, Johannes Muller, published the first volume
O f  his Handbook Of__Human Physiology which led the move away from
philosophical medicine towards a more scientific approach. The 
final and perhaps most important step in the creation of the basis 
of modern medical thought was taken in 1855 by another German,
IF. H. Fielding, An Introduction to the History of Medicine. 
Philadelphia: Saunders, 1969, pp. 21-24.
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Rudolf Virchow, who used microscopes to study cells and who
introduced the idea of cellular pathology. His book called 
Cellular Pathology as based upon Physiological and Pathological 
History was published in 1858 and many historians believed that it 
marked the beginning of modern medicine.2
The fight against infection was also fought with great 
enthusiasm in the 19th century. Jan Ignaz Semmelweis, an 
assistant in the Obstetrics Unit in Vienna, believed that puerpal 
fever, an infection which affects women who have just given birth, 
was caused by a 'poison' of some sort from dead bodies. He was 
scorned, and his theories were rejected at first, but later in the 
same century he was proved right. Robert Koch discovered the 
tubercle bacilalus in 1882 and in 1883 found the organism which 
causes cholera. Meanwhile, in the 1860's Pasteur developed his 
theory of the cause of infectious diseases, and it was in 1865 
that Joseph Lister, the British surgeon, developed the antisepsis 
principle which helped save patients on the operating table. 
Before Lister, surgeons used to wear their oldest and dirtiest 
clothes in the operating theatre and their instruments were rarely 
if ever rinsed.3
The basis of modern anaesthesia was also developed in the 
19th century. Horace Wells, an American dentist, introduced the 
use of nitrous oxide (laughing gas) in 1844; another American W. 
T. Morton, first used ether in 1846, and a Scottish doctor. Sir
2Ibid.. p. 37
3Ibid.. p. 37
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Jeunes Young Simpson, introduced chloroform as a general anesthetic 
in 1847. He complained that ' ... the man who lies on the
operating table in one of -our hospitals runs a greater risk of 
dying than did the British soldier on the Battlefield of 
Waterloo'.4
The compound microscope, which enabled Virchow to study cells 
and Pasteur to study micro-organisms associated with different 
diseases, was developed during the 19th century. In 1895, at the 
end of this scientifically progressive period, Roentgen discovered 
x-rays and made the greatest single contribution to diagnostic 
medicine. Like a good many of the inventions later to prove so 
vital to doctors, the x-ray machine was developed by someone who 
had no interest at all in medical practice or medical research.5
Undeniably, then, the 19th century saw the introduction of 
many ideas and techniques which are so crucial to the modern 
medical practitioner. Through the efforts of researchers, medical 
men had learned a great deal about the function and structure of 
the human body. Never before had a single century seen a greater 
increase in the amount of medical knowledge made available. 
Science commentators like, Wilson and Rosenburg have even debated
4P. Williams, The Peaks of Medical History. New York: 
Hoeber, 1959, p. 61. For earlier studies see, E. Long, A History 
of Pathology. Baltimore: Williams and Williams, 1928; and M. 
Neuburger, History of Medicine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1925.
5Fielding, An Introduction to the History of Medicine, p. 26.
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whether a similar 'information explosion' will ever occur again.6
During that same century when Virchow, Pasteur and Koch were 
making their great discoveries, the expectation of life improved 
significantly. A baby born two centuries ago would on average 
live only to the age of 25. By the end of the 19th century, 
however, the newborn baby had a far better chance of reaching his 
'biblically allotted three score years and ten (70 years old)'. 
In 1901, the one-year-old male would stand an average chance of 
living to the age of 55; the 45 year old could expect another 23 
years of life. During no other century had life expectation 
improved so dramatically.
However, in retrospect there is considerable debate over 
whether these improvements reflect the contributions made by 
medical researchers or by better public health standards ushered 
in during the late 19th century. Coleman argues that the decline 
in infant mortality and the increase in life expentancy was a 
direct result of an increase in the supply of good nutritious 
food, an increase in the supply of pure water and the improvement 
in the quality of available housing. Cholera, for example, one of 
the biggest 'killers' of the 19th century, was brought under 
control by hygenic measures 10 to 20 years before Koch discovered 
the existence of the cholera vibrio. Furthermore, writers, 
including Coleman argue that the decline in the incidence of 
tuberculosis was due not to the discovery of the 'tubercle
6T. Wilson and L. Rosenburg, Historical Conflicts in Medical 
Practice. London: Bateman, 1964, p. 16.
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bacillus' but to improved nutritional standards.7 According to 
McKeown and Lowe,
" ... it seems right to conclude that in
descending order of importance the main 
influences responsible for the decline in
mortality - our best index of improved health- 
since deaths were first registered in 1838 have 
been: a rising standard of living, hygenic
measures and specific preventative and curative 
medicine."8
Interestingly, a World Health Organisation (WHO) publication 
entitled Life Expectancy in the Year 2000 adds stable government, 
progress in road building and better education to the above list.9
From the middle of the 19 th century, improvements in 
available food, in the quality of water supplies, in sanitation, 
in living accommodation and other environmental factors were 
largely responsible for typhoid, scarlet fever, dysentry and 
infective diarrheas being brought under some sort of control. 
These diseases had been important 'killers' and their 
environmental control led to a decline in mortality rates. Some 
writers, like Coleman, argue that the many technically important 
discoveries of the 19th century were of far more importance to the 
academic than to the busy practitioner struggling with the
7Vernon Coleman, Paper Doctors: A Critical Assessment of
Medical Research. London: Temple Smith, 1975, pp. 10-11.
8T. McKeown and C.F. Lowe, An Introduction to Social
Medicine. London: Okpol Press, 1981, pp. 42-43.
9World Health Organisation, Life Expectancy in the Year 2000. 
London: WHO Publications, 1979, p. 4.
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practical problems of how to treat disease. Vaccination against 
smallpox was one of the very few medical measures to have any real 
effect in the 19th century and the disease was of relatively small 
importance in statistical terms. For example, in 1878 only 1.2 
per cent of the total number of people admitted to British 
hospitals were diagnosed with smallpox.10
During the 20th century medical intervention did play a much 
greater part in the improvement of life expectancy. By far the 
greatest contribution to medical care came from the researchers 
developing drugs. At the end of the 19th century the 
pharmaceutical industry was still in its infancy (the first asprin 
tablet was made in 1899) but during the next three to four decades 
great advances (many of them accidental) were made in the 
development of drugs. The discovery of the hormone insulin by 
Banting, Best and Murphy at the University of Toronto in 1922 
brought about a revolution in the treatment of diabetes. The 
development of potent diuretics and drugs to control hypertension 
meant that patients with cardiovascular disorders could be 
treated. In 1914, Wenchebach discovered the usefulness of 
quindine for patients suffering from arrthymias of the heart. In 
addition there were, of course, tremendous advances in the 
development of the sulphonamides, the penicillins and so on meant 
that those infectious diseases which still remained were no longer
lOColeman, Paper Doctors; A Critical Analysis of Medical 
Research, pp. 11-12.
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the threat that they had been. 11
The resultant more effective treatment of infectious diseases 
helped to ensure that life expectancy- rose from 50 years at the 
beginning of the century to about 70 years today. As indicated by 
Figure 5.1 there were over 70 deaths per 100,000 from tuberculosis 
in England and Wales in 1930 but only about three per 100,000 in 
1970. There were over 6,000 deaths from whooping cough in 1925 
but only 15 in 1970. More than 5,000 people died from measles in 
1925 but by 1970 the annual mortality rate had dropped below 50. 
The mortality from gastro-intestinal infections dropped by 80 per 
cent in the United Kingdom from 1930 to 1975 and the number of 
deaths from chest infections dropped by 70 per cent during the 
same period.12
Interestingly, the improvement in life expectancy which we 
have enjoyed in this century has been largely due to the dramatic 
decrease in the number of children dying. In 1900 about 150 
children in every thousand born in England and Wales died within 
one year. By 1950 this had declined to 30 per thousand. Adults, 
however, have benefited far less from the pharmaceutical
revolution. If we consider their life expectancy, we find that it 
has hardly changed in the last three-quarters of a century. The 
45-year-old male could expect another 23 years in 1901 and only 25 
years in 1980. While the improvement in standards of nutrition
11Ibid.. p. 11.
120ffice of Health Economics, 'Medicine and the Quality of 
Life', OHE Briefing. No. 19. London: OHE, 1982. p. 7.
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F igu re  5.1
Mortality Rate From Tuberculosis in England 
and Wales 1900-1980.
Annual Deaths per 
100,000 population
Sources Office of Health Economics, Medicines 
and the Quality of Life. Londons OHE,
2U3
and in living standards greatly affected the life expectancy of 
the middle-aged man in the second half of the 19th century, the 
first half of this century saw comparable improvements in the 
survival rates of infants but not of adults.13
While great strides in the field of basic bio-chemistry were 
being made by the pharmaceutical industry during the first half of 
this century far less was directly accomplished by government and 
charity financed researchers during the same period. In 1919, 
under a provision of the Ministry of Health Act the British 
government established the Medical Research Council [(B)MRC]. The 
first provision of a comparable state mechanism for funding 
Canadian medical research was established in 1936 as the National 
Research Council later to be known also as the Medical Research 
Council [(C)MRC]. Table 5.1 lists the level of government funding 
of both the (B)MRC and (C)MRC from the time of their 
establishments to 1986. The Medical Research Councils in both 
countries gave government officials a greater say as to what type 
of research they wanted conducted. In addition to this, funds for 
medical research also became available for the first time from 
private charity but were limited exclusively to the area of 
cancer. This was primarily a response to economic arguments as to 
the need to preserve an able-bodied workforce and to maintain 
healthy armies to defend the country during periods of war. The 
first organisation to collect voluntary donations specifically to
13Coleman, Paper Doctors; A Critical Assessment of Medical 
Research, pp. 12-13.
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Table. 5.1
Level, of Government Funding of the British and Canadian 
Medical Research Councils« 1926-1996
Year British - Medical Research 
Council (a )
Canadian - Medical Research 
Council (¿)
1926 135,000 _1931 139,000 -
1936 195,000 26,500*1941 195,000 27,0001946 415,000 90,0001951 1,626,500 110,0001956 2,680,000 500,0001961 5,884,000 1,103,0001966 11,831,000 6,504,0001971 23,469,000 11,300,0001976 37,357,000 23,000,0001981 101,523,568 40,000,000
1986 122,310,000 80,000,000
♦Note: From 1936 to 1960 the Canadian federal government
chanelled Its *grants-in-aid' to medical research 
through the National Research Council (NRC). As 
discussed In Chapter five section V. C, this changed In 
1960 when the Medical Research Council - which from 1936 
had operated as a 'division' of the NRC - became fully 
autonomous.
Source: British and Canadian data complied from the Annual
Reports of the Medical Research Councils In Britain and 
Canada for the years listed above.
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fund research into the 'cause, cure and prevention of disease' 
was founded in 1902 in Britain (The Imperial Cancer Research Fund) 
and in Canada in 1934 (The National-Cancer Institute of Canada). 
The rapid increase in the number of medical research charities in 
other disease areas did not begin until after the Second World 
War.
From the beginning, charity (and government) financed 
research has been executed in university science departments. 
After the First World War the specialization of certain fields of 
medicine and medical research was a natural consequence of the 
broadening field of scientific knowledge. At that time, it became 
increasingly obvious to scientific investigators that no one 
person could adequately or efficiently cover the entire field of 
medical knowledge as had previously been the case. As a result, a 
number of disciplines and sub-disciplines such as bio-chemistry, 
physiology and neurology were defined. Furthermore, advances in 
science necessitated larger, and better equipped, laboratories. 
No longer was it feasible for researchers to work in the basement 
of their homes, or in ill-equipped laboratories. Therefore, 
universities were the obvious forum for scientific investigations 
to proceed on a much larger scale, and the creation of new 
university science departments was a natural outgrowth of this 
increasing sophistication in medical research.
Despite the increasing funds made available to Canadian and 
British medical researchers, improvements in life expectations up 
to the end of World War II were again arguably due to better
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living conditions, better techniques of preventive medicine, 
improved surgical techniques and greater availability of drug 
therapy. Consequently, there are many who now believe that, with 
the important exceptions of drugs for the treatment of infectious 
diseases like syphilis, tuberculosis, pheumonia, and poliomylitis, 
medical research had surprisingly little effect on life 
expectancy. In other words, improvements in human health in the 
late 19th and 20th centuries was largely due to changes in 
environment and modification of human behaviour.
While the evidence presented by writers such as Coleman 
indicate that the pharmaceutical industry contributed the most to 
improved public health conditions up to the end of World War II, 
it is curious why public support for medical research charities 
increased dramatically shortly thereafter. In answering this 
question and in addressing more general themes concerning the 
interaction between charity and state we begin our comparative 
case study of British and Canadian medical research charities.
II. Biatorv of Charitable Involvement in Medical Research
Most British and Canadian medical research charities, 
(excluding those involved in cancer) are only 20 to 30 years old. 
The list of medical research charities and the dates of their 
establishment given below (see Table 5.2) indicates that British 
and Canadian organisations representing comparable diseases were 
created at virtually the same time; in seven instances Britain 
took the lead, in two cases medical research charities 
representing the same disease were established in the two
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Table 5,2
Patea at  Establishment of Biltlsh and Canadian 
ttadlcal Research Charities
BRITAIN CANADA
1) Arthritis and Rheumatism 1) The Arthritis Society
Council - 1936 - 1948
2) British Diabetic Association 2) Canadian Diabetes- 1934 Association - 1952
3) British Digestive Foundation 3) Canadian Foundation for- 1971 Ileltus and Colitis - 1974
4) British Heart Foundation 4) Canadian Heart
- 1961 Foundation - 1961
5) Cancer Research Campaign 5) Canadian Cancer Society
- 1923 -1934
6) Chest, Heart and Stroke 6) Heart and Stroke
Association - 1960 Foundation of Ontario
- 1955
7) Cystic Fibrosis Research 7) Canadian Cystic Fibrosis
Trust - 1964 Foundation - 1964
8) Foundation for Age Research 8) Canadian geriatrics
- 1976 Research Society -1973
9) Foundation for the Study of 9) Canadian Foundation forInfant Deaths - 1971 the Study of Infant Deaths
- 1973
10) Imperial Cancer Research 10) Canadian Cancer Society
Fund - 1902 - 1934
11) Hental Health Foundation 11) Canadian Mental Health- 1972 Association - 1950
12) Migraine Trust - 1965 12) Migraine Foundation - 1975
13) Multiple Sclerosis Society 13) Multiple Sclerosis Society- L953 of Canada - 1948
14) Muscular Dystrophy Group of 14) Muscular Dystrophy
Great Britain - 1961 Association of Canada
- 1954
15) National Kidney Research 15) Kidney Foundation ofFund - 1967 Canada - 196416) Spastic Society - 1952 16) Ontario Federation for
the Cerebral Polsy - 1947
Source : The list Is derived from Interviews with British and 
Canadian medical research charities where identical organisations 
exist in both countries. The closeness in dates of establishment 
of "like" British and Canadian charities after 1950 is partially 
attributable to the formation of international associations 
representing specific diseases - their aim being to create new 
charities in other countries. In many disease areas,
associations were formed first by British and American charities 
and successfully assisted in establishing, charities in places 
like Canada, and a number of other European countries.
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countries in the same years, and in seven instances, medical 
research charities appeared first in Canada. It is interesting to 
note that after 1950, the-average period of delay in establishing 
a new charity in the one country after it had been established in 
the other was only five years.
The growth in the number of medical research charities in 
both countries during the late 1950's, 1960's and early 1970's can 
be attributed to the tremendous advances made by science in 
identifying new diseases. Certain afflictions such as cystic 
fibrosis and muscular dystrophy were identified by medical 
researchers only after the Second World War. While other diseases 
such as cancer, diabetes, and arthritis were identified by 
scientists in the early part of the century, the economic 
vicissitude imposed by two world wars and the Great Depression of 
the 1930's precluded a greater response by an altruistic public to 
these afflictions. Furthermore, the financial resources made 
available to medical researchers at that time were usually for 
solving more 'dreaded' diseases like tuberculosis, polio and 
cancer. The economic prosperity associated with the era after 
1945 generated enormous faith and optimism in science to rid 
people of all diseases. With the introduction of television and 
the development of a more educated and affluent middle class, 
people became better informed about many of the less popular 
diseases. In response, charities were established with a view to 
raising money for research into their cause, cure and prevention. 
British and Canadian medical research charities created in the mid
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1970's were also symptomatic of a society disenchanted with the 
welfare state, for it was acknowledged that the state through its 
own apparatus [(B)MRC and (C)MRC] could not solve all the problems 
posed by disease. Not only did the increasing number of diseases 
identified by scientists place a burden on the resources of the 
Medical Research Councils in each country, but the type of 
research which the public demanded was different from that which 
the Medical Research Councils were prepared to fund. As is 
discussed in greater detail in chapter six, section I, the 
research bias of the Medical Research Councils in Britain and 
Canada is, and has been historically to support basic, non­
disease-related research. To the British and Canadian public of 
the 1960's and 1970's, charities offered an alternative and 
complementary approach to government sponsored research by funding 
more 'applied-disease-related investigations'. The post war 
increase in the number of medical research charities can be 
attributed to the increasing willingness of people to support this 
type of charitable cause. The public and volunteers working for 
these charities wholeheartedly believed that if only enough money 
was raised, a cure would be found very shortly. In the late 
1980's volunteers and the donating public appear to be better 
educated and more realistic about how science progresses, since 
they have 20 to 30 years of largely 'non-discovery' to reflect 
upon. While during the 1950's and 1960's the 'man in the street' 
was deluded, by previous successes in the field of tuberculosis 
and poliomylitis and pneumonia, that same man has developed more
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realistic expectations as to the ability of science to generate 
miracle cures and wonder drugs. This view is affirmed by the 
sparse number of medical research charities created after the mid 
1970's despite the discovery of many diseases which have been 
identified by researchers since that time; for example ... 
Kleinfelter syndrome, cerebellar disease and certain new strains 
of encephalitis. Clearly, the absence of a charitable response in 
many of these new disease areas is due to the relatively small 
number of people affected. In addition, the risk of mass epidemic 
has normally been low. However, where newly identified diseases, 
like AIDS have shown their potential to become a growing public 
health problem, a charitable response has been displayed (in 
Britain the Terrence Higgins Trust and in Canada The Canadian AIDS 
Foundation).
It was stated earlier that British and Canadian cancer 
research charities have a much longer history in comparison to 
charities representing other types of maladies. When the (B)MRC 
was founded in 1919, cancer was the one field of medical research 
for which there was already, by the standards of those days, ample 
financial provision. This was the result of voluntary 
contributions from the public towards a cause that had always made 
a strong appeal to the charitably minded since the beginning of 
this century. The Imperial Cancer Research Fund (ICRF), 
established in 1902 was the principal body engaged in raising 
funds, primarily for the maintenance of a scientific staff in
251
laboratories in London. 14 The ICRF is the only British and 
Canadian charity that funds and administers its own 'in-house' 
laboratories; all subsequent medical -research charities in both 
countries distribute their funds to university or hospital based 
researchers.
At the turn of the century, cancer research was also richly 
endowed in the United States and in countries of continental 
Europe. In Canada, it took a full 32 years after the creation of 
the ICRF to establish a comparable cancer research charity. By 
this time, Canada had begun to severe its colonial ties with 
Britain by signing the Balfour Declaration in 1926 and was 
becoming much more economically integrated with the U.S.15 The 
shifting influence on Canadian affairs from Britain to the United 
States manifested itself in the financial assistance which the 
latter gave in helping to establish the Canadian Cancer Society in 
1934. A study of funding sources of Canadian researchers 
conducted much later in 1949 showed that all sources contributed 
.75 million dollars of which .1 million emanated from the United 
States. In the early years charitable trusts, such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation, were particularly supportive of Canadian
14A. L. Thomson, Half a Century of Medical Research. London: 
HMSO, 1975, p. 10.
ISThis agreement allowed the Government of Canada to exercise 
its own independence in foreign and domestic policy matters 
without having to first consult London. The impetus behind this 
document was Canada's disgruntlement over Britain's treatment of 
the Dominion during the First World War, whereby all key decisions 
were made in London without consultation with Canadian Officials.
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bio-medical research.16
In 1923, another cancer research charity was established as 
the British Empire Canoer Campaign (now the Cancer Research 
Campaign). Its programme differed from that of the ICRF in that 
all monies collected from the public were, and continued to be, 
allocated to outside researchers. Criticism of the multiplicity 
of appeals has always plagued cancer charities in Britain. In 
addition to the two previously mentioned cancer charities in 
Britain, there are four other, smaller, ones: the Tenovus Cancer 
Fund, Marie Curie Memorial Foundation, Yorkshire Cancer Research 
Campaign and the Institute of Cancer Research. In Canada, the 
only charitable source of funds for cancer research is the 
National Cancer Institute of Canada which is the legally 
associated research arm of the Canadian Cancer Society. The 
presence of more than one charity in a particular field of 
research has been problematic from a fund raising perspective (see 
section III of this chapter), as well as from a scientific 
perspective because of possible wasteful duplication of research.
At this point, it is useful to make a distinction between two 
different legal forms adopted by medical research charities 
operating in Britain and Canada. On the one hand, there are those 
charities which collect money directly from the public and spend 
it on medical research, patient services or public and 
professional education campaigns. On the other hand, in both
16Medical Research Council, Newsletter. Ottawa: Queen's 
Printer, 1985, p. 3.
253
countries, there are charities such as the Wellcome Trust and 
Leverhulme Foundation which derive all their income from 
endowments and which tend to support one programme at the 
exclusion of others.
In the field of British medical research donative charities 
are clearly more prominent than foundations: of the AMRC's 35 
members, only four can be classified as endowed medical research 
charities. However, the term 'foundation' is only loosely defined 
in a strict legal sense, the result has been that you get 
charities which are not endowed using the word Foundation in their 
title; for example, the British Heart Foundation and the 
Foundation for Age Research, both of which solicit the public for 
funds. Like foundations, the Medical Research Councils in Britain 
and Canada are not susceptible to the same sorts of constraints 
placed on the more traditional, unendowed, medical research 
charities. First, because a foundation's aims and objectives are 
normally defined by a testator in a will, the trustees may have 
little flexibility in shifting emphasis from patient services to 
research, this makes internal division over expenditure priorities 
superfluous. Second, foundations have traditionally been 
insulated from criticism by the scientific community over the 
quality of research they have supported. This is true for two 
reasons; first, trusts do not have to account to the public for 
their donations and therefore are in a position to fund very 
'basic' or ' f undamental' research that may have no clear 
connection to any specific disease. The scientific community has
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traditionally preferred this type of research over the more 
'applied' disease-oriented research. Second, trusts have the 
flexibility to fund inter-disciplinary research that may cut 
across two or three different disease areas, something unendowed 
charities have been reticent to do for fear of alienating 
volunteers and confusing the donating public.
A distinct pattern in the creation and development of British 
and Canadian medical research charities is that most were founded 
by individuals suffering from the diseases for which the 
organisations were set up to represent. Consequently, many 
medical research charities had a dual purpose to help those 
suffering from a disease and to help fund research into its cause, 
cure and treatment. Additionally, some charities which represent 
diseases like cancer where a 'cause' is known (such as smoking in 
the case of cancer), a third objective has been to develop public 
and professional education campaigns. The annual reports of 44 
medical research charities interviewed (18 Canadian and 26 
British) shows that 14 Canadian and 25 British charities were 
established by sufferers, or their friends and families; the 
impetus for the creation of the remaining five charities came from 
the scientific community.
Medical research charities that adopt a 'three-pronged' 
programme encounter both advantages and disadvantages over 
charities pursuing just one programme, whether it be research, 
education or patient services. On the one hand, comprehensive 
medical research charities have a broad base of support since they
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are 'doing something for everybody'; they are helping people in 
the future, by funding research and prevention through education, 
and they are helping people today by funding patient services. On 
the other hand, this type of charity encounters two problems; 
first, it must spread its resources thinly between each programme 
and, second, it must arrive at a formula for doing so which 
appeases the volunteers, who traditionally support patient 
services, and the donating public which normally responds more 
when its money is earmarked for research. The Medical Research 
Councils in both countries fund only research; in Britain patient 
services are a responsibility of the Department of Health and 
Social Security (DHSS) and in Canada that of the Department of 
Health and Welfare (DHW).
Another observable pattern which emerged from the interviews 
was that the larger and more sophisticated a medical research 
charity becomes, and hence the more money it raises, the more it 
spends on research and the less it spends on patient services or 
public and professional education. As the budgets of medical 
research charities increased, particularly during the affluent 
1960's and early 1970's, the greater the need became to replace 
volunteers (who were normally disease sufferers) with paid staff 
(non-disease sufferers). These professional administrators were 
swayed less by emotion, and they tended to be more eager to 
support research rather than caring for those already afflicted. 
Most charity executives interviewed admitted that their own 
organisation had experienced 'growing pains' and that a tension
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between volunteers and paid staff remains a constant irritant. 
The tenor of this complaint can be gleaned from the following 
statement offered by one paid staff member of a medium-sized 
Canadian medical research charity.
"I feel I really don't fit in as a paid staff 
member because I am not suffering from (disease 
x), especially since they run the operation. Our 
entire executive are sufferers and are so 
involved with their emotional problems that they 
have no sense of business. When our volunteers 
and executives get together at our annual meeting 
they are so involved with their condition that 
their main concern is expressing ideas relating 
to their physical condition instead of discussing 
business. They do not understand private sector 
concepts, like profits, cost-benefit budgeting 
and zero-based budgeting. Furthermore, while I 
would like to see more spent on research it is 
understandable that they skew their budgets in 
favor of patient services since a disease like 
the one we represent is passed on genetically to 
their sons and daughters."
17
Transforming a medical research charity's emphasis from 
patient services to research has been difficult for some
organisations since the articles of association of several of them 
require that a certain proportion of board members must be actual 
sufferers. In cases where research has gained more prominence 
over patient services the shift has often been precipitated by a 
gradual education of the volunteers of the necessity to invest in 
research for the benefit of future generations. For many
charities, increasing annual incomes has made it relatively easy 
for charity executives to appease their volunteers, by sustaining
17Canadian Interview; December 1986.
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the level of patient services while increasing expenditure on 
medical research. However, even when most volunteers are disease 
sufferers, or their relatives, there are pressures to give 
priority to research.
For charities representing less popular diseases (often
called 'orphan' diseases) where there is an absense of government
commitment to research, volunteers have been apt to embrace the
philosophy 'if we don't fund research into disease x nobody will'.
Thus there has been a natural inclination of medical research
charities over the years to place a greater premium on research as
opposed to patient services despite some opposition from
volunteers. As one respondent explained;
"If the state has one hundred units of money to 
spend how much do you think it will give to a 
disease like muscular dystrophy which affects 
20,000 people in comparison to what it would 
spend on cancer which affects millions? If the 
state was the sole provider of research funds it 
is clear that many less popular diseases would 
not be funded at all."
18
This tendency for organisations to support research over patient 
services is illustrated in Figure 5.2. First, the total income of 
medical research charities (indicated on the graph as AMRC 1) has 
increased dramatically from £82 million in 1979 to £137 million in 
1981 representing a 67 per cent increase over a five year period. 
However, breaking this figure down into the total charitable 
expenditure, specifically on medical research (indicated on the
18British Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great 
Britain, 19 February 1987.
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F igu re  5.2
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AMRC-1 = Total income of AMRC member Charities 
AMRC-2 = Total expenditure on research by AMRC 
member charities
The difference between AMRC-1 and AMRC-2 represents 
the total expenditure on patient services and public 
education by AMRC charities
AMRC-1 figures represent total income after 
administrative costs of AMRC member charities are 
subtracted
Comparable statistics are not available for Canadian 
medical research charities since there is no national 
association similar to the AMRC. However, interviews 
with executives of Canadian research charities revealed 
a similar pattern.
sources Association of Medical Research Charities,
Handbook for 1985/86. Londoni The Development 
Trust for the Young Disabled, 1986, P.4.
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graph as AMRC 2) it is revealed that this amount jumped from £37 
million in 1979 to £115 million in 1984 representing a 210 per 
cent increase. In other words, while the incomes of British 
medical research charities have been rising steadily, far more has 
been spent on research as opposed to other programmes such as 
patient services and education.19
Converting charities into research-support agencies has 
produced some problems. For charities in both countries which 
have increased their commitment to research, the criticism has 
often been made that there is not a proper scientific infra­
structure to review research grant applications made by 
university-based scientists. The result of this has been a lack 
of consistency and lower quality of research in comparison with 
bio-medical research supported by the Medical Research Councils in 
each country. One British respondent pointed out that a charity 
he knew of had recently appointed to their grants-review committee 
a past Director of the British Steel Corporation who had no 
previous medical training.20 However, it is necessary to point 
out that in Britain, attempts to standardize and improve decision­
making procedures relating to grants by medical research charities 
have been made through seminars. These have been held in 
conjunction with the (B)MRC where most charities have been 
encouraged to adopt the formers' grant-making procedures. The
19Association of Medical Research Charities, Annual Report.
1984. London: AMRC, 1984, p. 3.
20British Interview; February 1984.
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seminars have been organized by the Association of Medical 
Research Charities (AMRC) - the interest association representing 
35 British medical research charities. In Canada, where no 
comparable association exists, the improvement of a charity's 
grant-review committee has been left to the individual 
organisations.
A further problem with charities making a transition from 
patient services to research is the tension between administrators 
and their scientific advisors. In both countries, top-flight 
scientists are seconded from universities to work for a charity on 
a part-time basis which involves reviewing grant applications 
between one and four times a year, depending on the size of the 
charity. Normally, these scientists are supervised by a permanent 
scientific advisor whose main job is to coordinate their research 
with that supported by other medical research charities and the 
Medical Research Council, as well as to communicate the results of 
this research to the charity's executives and volunteers. 
However, in Britain, where a peculiarly large number of executive 
directors are ex-servicemen, scientists have found it difficult 
convincing them to pursue certain lines of research. The 
resulting tension between the scientific advisors and senior 
administrative staff can be appreciated from the following 
comments made by one scientist:
"The real problem with the charities is that the 
people in control are retired military types who 
are great fund raisers but know very little about 
science. They bring their military way of 
thinking to these medical research charities and
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are convinced that you can find the cure for a 
disease by throwing money at it. I often hear 
them say ... 'We've got to attack this problem 
with both barrels'. As a scientist I would let 
our Executive Director fly me to America any day 
of the week but'when it comes to medical research 
his judgement I respect not".
21
h i . structure of Medical Research Charities
Generalizing about the way in which medical research 
charities are organized in Britain and Canada is difficult for a 
number of reasons. First, the annual incomes of these
organisations differ dramatically; in Britain of the AMRC's 35 
members, the largest is the ICRF with £24.7 million, the smallest 
is the Back Pain Association with £121,789.22 Comparable figures 
from Canada indicate a similar disparity between the largest 
medical research charity - the Canadian Cancer Society with $3.5 
million (£17.5 million) and the Canadian Foundation for the Study 
of Infant Deaths the smallest charity with $102,000 (£51,000).23 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the distribution of British and Canadian 
charities expenditure on medical research. The difference in 
income between the two largest British and Canadian charities can 
be partly attributed to the population levels of each country. In 
Britain there are 31 million more donors.
21British Interview; February, 1984.
22Association of Medical Research Charities, Annual Report. 
1981/82. London: National Fund for Research into Crippling
Diseases, 1982, pp. 12 and 40.
23lncome Tax Returns of Canadian Charities for the year 1982. 
Supplied by Revenue Canada upon request.
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In light of this income disparity between small and large 
charities, many organisations have only a local presence in London 
or, in the case of Canada, a presence in Toronto or Montreal. 
However, of the 18 Canadian medical research charities interviewed 
13 had established branches througout the country whereas all 26 
British charities interviewed had representation in virtually 
every region of the country. However, in both countries, a 
national presence was facilitated through a three-tier structure 
that included local branches, regional offices (in the case of 
Canada known as provincial offices) and national offices. Given 
that most medical research charities were created by people 
actually suffering from the disease, many were established first 
at the local level. As the fund raising capacity of these 
branches increased, and as public awareness of the diseases they 
were representing grew, it was natural that many more local 
branches were created. As the number of branches increased and as 
research gained prominence over patient services, it became 
necessary to create regional offices to coordinate local fund 
raising campaigns and a national office to disperse systematically 
funds for research. Without a national office, local branches 
raising and distributing grants for research ran a greater risk of 
funding lower quality work, since each branch would not have the 
resources to second first-rate scientists to review grant 
applications. They also ran the risk of duplicating research 
funded by other branches, since communication among them would be 
poor. Thus, for British and Canadian medical research charities
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whose main emphasis has been on research, the role of the national 
office has been to collect money raised by the local branches and 
to assemble a committee of experts to distribute funds to 
scientists.
It is interesting to note that some charities, like the 
British Spastics Society, which devote only a small proportion of 
their income to research, funds flow in the opposite direction - 
from the national office down to the local level (see explanation 
provided of Table 4.10). Sir John Cox - the Executive Director of 
this charity explained that there is a better understanding at the 
local level of how money can best be spent on those already 
suffering from cerebral palsy.24 However, the obvious question is 
why have predominately patient service oriented medical research 
charities adopted a 'national office' structure at all when 
presumably this would detract from local appeals? The same 
respondent answered this by explaining that a national office does 
perform several useful functions including helping to establish 
new local offices and negotiating government grants for individual 
branches from the central and local governments.25 Again, many 
national offices have lobbied government for legislative reforms 
on issues related to patient service (see chapter eight). 
Furthermore, since a national office of a predominantly patient 
service oriented charity disperses its funds to the local level, 
national fund raising appeals have not posed a threat to the
25Ibid.
24British Interview; Spastics Society, 23 February 1987.
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autonomy of individual branches.
Canadian and British respondents were asked what advantages 
and disadvantages there were in adopting a three-tier structure. 
In both countries, there was a clear consensus that this type of 
structure greatly enhanced a charity's fund raising capabilities 
by giving them representation at the grassroots level. Most money 
is collected at the local level through sponsored walks, coffee 
mornings, garage sales and a host of other fund raising events. 
Surprisingly, though, a number of disadvantages were identified 
with this type of organisational structure. For example; the 
executive directors of several British and Canadian charities 
remarked that they had received criticism from the local and 
regional wings of their organisations when national direct-mail 
fund raising campaigns were launched. In several cases, the 
national offices were asked to discontinue these campagins on the 
grounds that they were detracting from local appeals. In both 
countries, this type of complaint is symptomatic of strong 
affiliations that people have with the region in which they live. 
For example, Canadians tend to see themselves first as Maritimers, 
or as Quebeckers or as Westerners. With this type of mentality, 
it is difficult for national organisations to forge a consensus 
out of all the regional interests. The national wing of a 
Canadian medical research charity must position itself within the 
hierarchy of its member bodies, as its role is often defined in 
terms of dismantling the consolidated power of one region and 
sharing it with others. The tension between jealously guarded
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local organisations and the national organisation reflects the 
same federal-provincial tensions which have been characteristic of 
Canada's political system since Confederation. Similarly, in 
Britain, a number of respondents spoke of a 'tartan curtain' and 
the difficulties encountered in administering a national fund 
raising effort that embraced Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. 
In both countries, problems have manifested themselves when 
national organisations have collected money from local branches 
and have been perceived to have distributed them
disproportionately to researchers in those regions which 'house' a 
greater proportion of the scientific talent and research 
facilities. In Britain, these facilities are located in London, 
Oxford, Cambridge and several other large urban centres in the 
south. The thriving scientific communities in Canada are located 
almost entirely in Toronto and Montreal, to the exclusion of eight 
other eastern and western provinces. Despite the obvious point 
that, say, a cure for cancer found in London would benefit equally 
a person living in Wales or Scotland, strong pressure is 
nonetheless exerted on charities to fund research in all regions 
where money has been raised. As the following statement implies, 
at least one charity has succumbed to this pressure, and it would 
run the risk of being criticized if in the future it continued to 
fund research in a less prosperous region of the country should 
the quality of such investigations prove sub-standard.
"I think the (charity) would be reluctant to move
away from a situation where there was no research
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being funded within the University of Hales and 
its various colleges. This is not a problem now 
because there is some very good research being 
done there. However, if this last point were not 
true there would be a requirement to keep some 
research going. It is important for fund 
raisiers in places like Wales and Northern 
Ireland to see that some of their money is going 
back locally." ^
Funds are also redirected back to the regions by charities to 
discourage the public from making donations instead to their local 
hospitals, which often administer their own research funds. 
Several of the larger British cancer research charities have been 
vocal in their criticism of the quality and cost-effectiveness of 
research funded in this way, since research projects tend not to 
be screened by peer review. The British Heart Foundation has had 
the added problem of getting local branches to raise money for 
research, since collecting funds for medical equipment, like 
defibulators earmarked for a local hospital, has often been more 
popular. Other charities, like the Cancer Research Campaign 
(CRC), have avoided this problem by stripping local branches of 
their autonomy by making them remit their total annual proceeds to 
the national office and by enforcing strict regulations on the 
amount they are allowed to keep for their own fund raising 
activities. This arrangement has effectively limited the amount 
of pressure that local branches can place on national offices to 
fund research on a regional basis. Volunteers unhappy with this 
arrangement have had no legal recourse and consequently have
26British Interview; Cancer Research Campaign; 11 March 1987.
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normally resorted to withdrawing their services. However, for the 
large cancer and heart research charities, the number of 
volunteers lost as a result of such disputes has not had a great 
impact on their overall operations.
While many medical research charities support research in 
certain localities to appease fund raisers, it is interesting that 
the Medical Research Councils in both countries also have the same 
policy but for very different reasons. Since the (B)MRC and 
(C)MRC derive their income from their respective Treasury each are 
tied to government policies aimed at reducing regional 
disparities. Consequently, in Britain the (B)MRC maintains units 
in universities located in every region (see Appendix III). When 
the (B)MRC failed to maintain one of its research units in the 
north west, during the Council's 1984 budget cutbacks, strong 
criticism by the media, succeeded in re-establishing this research 
centre. However, spokesmen from the Research Councils in each 
country emphasized that; "in determining what research should be 
funded, the question of quality of research has always dominated 
over the issue of where it should be conducted."27 In Canada, 
proof of this statement lies in the fact that of the (C)MRC's 1986 
budget totalling $161 million (£80.5 million) all of which is 
spent on grants to university based researchers $80 million (£40 
million) of that went to the University of Toronto where the
27British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987; 
and Canadian Interview; Medical Research Council, 28 January 1987.
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country's best scientists are employed.28 Having said this, it is 
nonetheless true that the (C)MRC's mandate is to provide funding 
for research in all of the 16 universities with medical schools. 
This policy is based on the premise that a good medical training 
involves research experience. In response to regional interests 
during the 1950's and 1960's, the federal government established 
a number of smaller universities through a series of transfer 
payments to the provinces. This allowed people to be educated 
within their own region instead of travelling to the older, more 
established, universities which are located in the larger urban 
centres like Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa and Vancouver.
However, the problem with medical research, in which every 
country it is conducted is that the very best researchers 
gravitate towards the more established schools where salaries are 
higher, research facilities better and prestige more attainable. 
Since the early 1960 's the (C)MRC has tried to counter this by 
offering 'development grants' to the smaller schools like Lakehead 
University located in Thunder Bay. In some isolated cases, (C)MRC 
officials admitted that this has been successful in luring 'top- 
notch' researchers away from the larger schools. One Canadian 
scientist was critical of this type of (C)MRC grant on the grounds 
that it tended to destroy 'centres of excellence'.
"If a researcher investigating heart murmurs 
working in a Dalhousie university laboratory 
leaves his collegues and takes up a post in 
Saskatchewan it is impossible for economic
28Canadian Interview; Medical Research Council, 28 January 1987.
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reasons to collaborate closely with him. Indeed, 
it would be easier to collaborate with him if he 
moved to Britain since he'd be closer."
29
The (B)MRC has been able to side-step this criticism, since, 
unlike the (C)MRC, the (B)MRC not only provides grants to 
university researchers but also maintains its own laboratories and 
research units housed in university science departments. As a 
result, the (B)MRC has the ability to shift entire teams of top­
flight scientists to less prosperous regions of the country.
While the British and Canadian governments have both 
attempted to utilize their Medical Research Councils to help 
narrow the regional disparities in their respective countries, the 
Canadian government has gone one step further by offering grants 
to medical research charities enticing them to adopt a national 
profile. This is in sharp contrast to British medical research 
charities which are left to their own devices to establish a 
presence in all regions.
Through its Department of Health and Welfare the federal 
government initiated a programme in 1960 called 'Sustaining Grants 
for Voluntary Health Organisations'. The main thrust of the 
programme has been to encourage medical research charities to 
adopt a truly national perspective by establishing local branches 
and provincial offices in every region of the country. To 
alleviate regional disparities, the sustaining grants were
29Canadian Interview; McMaster University Medical School, 19
January 1987.
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designed to allow medical research charities to 'free-up' some of 
their administrative budgets to create new local branches or get 
the services in 'have not' provinces like Newfoundland up to 
levels available in prosperous provinces like Ontario and Quebec. 
The maximum value of these grants can only equal 50 per cent of 
the medical research charity's administrative costs - up to a 
maximum of $125,000 (£62,500). However, in the past, several 
newly established medical research charities have received grants 
equalling 70 per cent of the administrative costs, after it was 
decided they were providing essential services. This was 
justified on the basis that the value of the grant would be 
reduced to 50 per cent and ultimately to 20 per cent when the 
charity had established its own fund raising base.30
In 1982, the budget for this programme received a large 
increase, from $400,000 (£200,000) to $3 million (£1.5 million). 
This rapid expansion was indicative of the government's 
recognition that medical research charities were providing a 
service that would otherwise have to be offered by government 
itself. At present, 20 medical research charities receive this 
grant, including charities that have overlapping aims and 
objectives such as the Canadian Alzheimer's Society and the 
Huntington's Society which both fund research into the 
neurological sciences.31 Of the 13 national charities interviewed
30Canadian Interview; Department of Health and Welfare, 30 
January 1987.
31Ibid.
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10 were in receipt of this grant and those that were not, were 
asked why. Three explanations were offered; first, large 
charities such as the Canadian Cancer Society and Canadian Heart 
Foundation had already developed a national presence and were 
therefore ineligible for the grant. Second, the charities 
commented that deriving income from government took an 'edge-off' 
their appeal to the public for voluntary donations. The extent to 
which charities publicize their financial independence from 
government further illustrates their belief that government money 
tarnishes an organisation's 'saleability' to the public. Third, 
the charities were reluctant to accept this government grant on 
the grounds that Health and Welfare demanded too much in the way 
of control and accountability. Surprise on-site visits were made 
by departmental officials and extensive annual reporting were 
required. In terms of control, the Department of Health and 
Welfare has refused in the past to renew grants when charities 
have failed to demonstrate 'suitable progress'; this may involve a 
charity failing to create new local branches, fund national 
conferences or fund a national information magazine. As one 
executive director pointed out;
"These are all very expensive ways of showing 
progress - sometimes more expensive than the 
dollar value of the government grant itself. For 
a $100,000 (£500,000) grant we may find ourselves 
developing new research programmes that cost us 
$250,000 (£125,000) simply to appease Health and 
Welfare officials in Ottawa. While we appreciate 
the availability of these funds the fact remains 
that government officials can indirectly 
determine our expenditure priorities through
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enforcing strict grant guidelines."
The Canadian Government is active in influencing the national 
affairs of medical research charities through another programme- 
the 'Promotion of Official Languages Programme' - administered by 
the Secretary of State. This government grant scheme which helps 
to defray the cost of translating a charity's literature into 
English or French, had its origin in the 'official languages 
policy' formulated by the Liberal government in the early 1970's. 
The only organisations qualifying for this assistance are 
registered charities with a national agenda, which operate in 
either of the two official languages and want to provide services 
to the public (normally fund raising campaigns) in both English 
and French. As an added condition, recipient charities must have 
a bilingualism clause as part of their articles of association. 
This protects against the possibility of a new administration 
taking over a charity and abandoning a bilingual policy thereby 
wasting previously invested government money.
After completing interviews with Canadian medical research 
charities the data revealed that of 13 national organsations 
interviewed eight held grants in tandem from the Department of 
Health and Welfare and the Secretary of State. Throughout the 
interviews, an effort was made to ascertain the degree of co­
ordination between these two government departments; that is, 
whether a charity in receipt of one government grant was in a
32
32Canadian Interview; January 1987.
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favourable position to receive funds from another. Officials from 
both departments acknowledged that each programme operated 
independently from the .other, but. that it was natural for 
officials dispersing grants to be biased towards supporting 
charities that had already received the financial 'blessing' of 
another government department. Departmental spokesmen from each 
agency also admitted that historically there had been little 
contact between the two, despite the fact that the raison d'etre 
of both programmes has been to encourage the growth and 
development of nationally focused charities. However, it was 
added that during 1986, a movement in the direction of more inter­
departmental coordination had been spawned through the creation of 
a committee designed to liaise between the Programme Directors of 
each department.33
When comparing British and Canadian medical research 
charities it is important to argue that, while the level of 
government subsidies to Canadian charities is much higher, they 
must be viewed in terms of the problems they seek to address- 
namely, the presence of two cultures, as well as the economic 
disparities between each of the ten provinces. Given these two 
features, the economic costs incurred by Canadian charities 
seeking a national presence are clearly greater than their British 
couterparts. In other words, the higher level of federal 
government support to Canadian medical research charities in
33Canadian Interview; Department of Health and Welfare, 30 
January 1987, and Canadian Interview; Secretary of State, 29 
January 1987.
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comparison to the complete absence of comparable support offered 
by the British government must be understood in the context of 
Canada's distinct culture and geographic size.
IV. Fund Raising Capabilities of British and Canadian
Medical Research Charities
The amount of money that individual medical research 
charities are able to collect from the general public depends on a 
number of different factors. For example, whether the disease is 
contagious, affects children, or is confused with other diseases. 
Appreciating how British and Canadian charities market themselves 
to the public sheds some light on why there is a disparity between 
the incident rates of specific diseases and the amount of money 
both charities and government commit for research purposes. 
Furthermore, by examining the reasons for this disparity, we can 
understand why British and Canadian medical research charities 
lobby their respective governments to increase research
expenditures into the specific disease they represent. The 
examination of how medical research charities raise funds is 
divided into two sections. The first section considers a 
charity's organisational features, while the second takes account 
of the advantages and disadvantages of the 'nature' of the disease 
being represented.
a. Organisational features
As discussed earlier, charities adopting a three-tier 
structure are more successful in raising funds since they have 
representation at the local, regional and national levels.
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Furthermore, the more success a national office has in creating 
local branches the more money it is likely to raise. Finally, a 
charity's income is normally directly proportional to its number 
of volunteers; for example the Canadian Cancer Society with 
130,000 registered volunteers has a far greater fund raising 
capacity than the Parkinson Foundation which has only 1,000.34
When comparing the fund raising efforts of British and 
Canadian medical research charities it is clear that each enjoys 
both advantages and disadvantages in relation to the other. For 
example, in Britain medical research charities, indeed all 
charities, are restricted from advertising on television.35 In 
Canada, not only is this permitted but often advertising companies 
and television networks will donate their services free of charge 
as a 'corporate gesture of goodwill'. In 1985, the Canadian 
Mental Health Foundation increased its income by 22 per cent after 
launching a six week television advertising campaign. Because the 
cost of producing the commercial and showing it on television were 
largely covered by corporate sponsors, the Foundation claims it 
spent only three cents to raise one dollar.36
34Figures taken from, Canadian Cancer Society, Annual Report.
1985. Toronto: 1986 and Parkinson Foundation of Canada, Annual 
Report, 1985. Toronto: 1986.
35Both the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) and the National 
Council For Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) have lobbied for this 
law to be relaxed. Both organisations are optimistic that by 1989 
the Central Government will consider lifting a partial ban on 
charity television advertising.
36Canadian Interview; Canadian Mental Health Association, 18 December 1986.
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The main advantage that British medical research charities 
enjoy over their Canadian counterparts is the absence of any legal 
restriction on the amount of money that can be expended on 
administration. In Canada, charities are permitted to spend a 
maximum of 10 per cent of their annual income on 'administration'. 
Clearly, this gives smaller British charities the flexibility to 
spend more money on advertising, particularly during the early 
years of their existence when it is critical to develop a public 
profile. Even larger, more established, British medical research 
charities can benefit from having annual capital expenditures in 
excess of 10 per cent. For example, they are able to finance 
large projects like the purchase of a new administrative building 
independently of a bank or a building society. In Canada, a 
charity wishing to purchase a comparable facility would have to do 
so by taking on a long-term mortgage whereby a maximum of 10 per 
cent of its total annual income could be directed at paying this 
mortgage off. This is a disadvantage to those Canadian charities 
which have the resources to fund large projects in a given year, 
because instead they must pay interest on a loan in order to 
comply with charity law. The rationale for this law is that it 
deters charities from spending large proportions of their income 
on non-charitable purposes such as administration.
One fear expressed by a number of British medical research 
charities concerns permissible television advertising. 
Organisations might spend exorbitant amounts in order to stay 
competitive with other charities vying for the donations, and
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could do so because there is no ceiling on administrative costs 
they may incur. However, the counter-argument offered by one 
British charity executive was that expenditures on items like 
advertising are closely monitored by volunteers, the media, 
consumer interest groups and by the donating public.37
Throughout interviews conducted in Britain, several 
respondents suggested that there was a far more serious fund 
raising problem. This involved medical research charities that did 
not spend a large proportion of their income on charitable 
purposes, but rather invested money in the stock market and in 
term deposits to generate future income. Volunteers and the 
donating public have always objected - sometimes by withholding 
further services or donations - when money has been directed into 
savings accounts instead of being expended immediately on 
charitable purposes.38 This has not been an issue in Canada since 
Income Tax laws require charities to disperse 90 per cent of their 
annual receipted income on their charitable purposes. This last
37British Interview; National Fund for Research into 
Crippling Diseases, 4 March 1987.
38ln interviewing a spokesman from the Cancer Research 
Campaign (CRC) it was explained that in 1980 the charity had been 
the target of a media campaign on the issue of abuses of publicly 
donated funds. The main criticism levelled at the CRC was not 
that it was in efficient or wasteful but that it was not 
immediately applying the money it had collected to address the 
'so-called' urgent problems associated with cancer. One of the 
main promises appearing in the CRC's fund raising literature was 
that 'money would be spent to ensure that cancer patients would 
benefit from the fruits of research as speedily as possible.' 
When it was publicized that this was not the case, the number of 
people willing to donate their voluntary services to the CRC 
decreased. British Interview; Cancer Research Campaign, 11 March 
1987.
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regulation, is aimed at ensuring that Canadian charities spend 
donated funds 'immediately' on the charitable projects for which 
the public is often prompted to support on the understanding that 
a particular 'need' is current. The most frequent complaint made 
by Canadian charity executives is that this rule makes long-term 
budgeting and financial stability problematic.39
In reviewing the Charities Aid Foundation's 1984/85 Annual 
Report it is clear that the above criticism is not simply directed 
at British medical research charities. For example, in the area 
of third world relief. Bob Geldof's Band Aid Trust which spent 
only one-third of the £69 million raised in 1985, has deliberately 
held back money to fund longer term development. This has been 
justified on the grounds that the aim was not only to relieve the 
current famine but to prevent future ones. Save the Children's 
Fund has given similar reasons for the fact it spent only 61 per 
cent of the £42 million it raised in 1985.40
Beyond the area of medical research and third world relief, 
the NSPCC spent only 57 per cent of its £21 million income. 
Though its income rose £7 million between 1984 and 1985, spending 
went up by only £500,000. The National Trust's income exceeded 
its spending in 1984 by £14 million , the Salvation Army's by £13 
million. Doctor Barnardo's by £6.3 million and the Royal National 
Lifeboat Institution by £6 million. Table 5.3 provides a rank
39Canadian Interview; January 1987.
40Charities Aid Foundation Charity Statistics. 1984/85. 
Tonbridge: CAF, 1985, pp. 104-109.
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Table 5.3
Expenditure Record of the Lowest-Spending 
British Charities listed In the ‘Charities Aid 
Eflimdatlon'a Top .2QQ Char it lea'
CHARITY 1985 INCOME (in) % OF INCOME 
SAVED OR 
INVESTED
Band Aid Trust 69.0 66%
National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children
21.2 43%
Save the Children 42.7 39%
Salvation Army 43.3 30%
Imperial Cancer Research Fund 32.4 26%
Royal National Life Boat 
Institution
25.8 24%
Dr. Barnardo's 42.8 23%
National Trust 70.2 20%
Royal National Institute for 
the Blind 23.1 20%
Source: Charities Aid Foundation Charity Statistics. 1984 / B 5 . 
Tonbridge: CAF, 1985, pp. 104-109.
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ordering of the lowest spending British Charities in 1985.41
B. 'Marketing' disease
Organisational features are just one dimension in 
understanding the fund raising success of charities. In the 
context of medical research charities, another important dimension 
is the 'nature' of the disease being represented. In many cases 
more money is raised by charities on behalf of 'socially popular' 
diseases where incidence rates are lower than for 'socially 
unpopular' diseases where, conversely, incidence rates are high. 
The argument is made in the following chapter that the level of 
government support for research is determined in a broadly similar 
way. Thus popular diseases such as 'cancer' and 'heart' receive 
more funding when compared with more prevelent, yet less popular 
and horrific diseases, like schizophrenia or bowel disease. 
Additionally, it is because of this disparity that medical
research charities have increased their lobbying activities to
encourage more government-sponsored research into the disease 
areas they represent. Some of the arguments developed by 
political economists might shed some light on why people make
voluntary contributions. For example, Becker suggests that the 
act of giving may be only apparent charitable activity motivated 
by a desire to avoid the scorn of others or to receive social 
acclaim. 42 Similar suggestions have been made by Johnson and
41lbid.
42G. Becker, 'A Theory of Social Interactions', Journal of 
Political Economy. 82(1974), pp. 1063-4..
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Olson, yet neither can explain why some kinds of charitable 
activities attract voluntary contributions more easily than 
others.43 It is the purpose of this section to explain why for 
example, the cancer research charities are able to raise twice the 
amount that heart research charities can, despite the fact that 
far more people die of chest, heart and stroke diseases than do 
from cancer.
Charities representing diseases where the 'cause' is known, 
such as certain types of cancer, are able to launch public 
education campaigns which not only provide a valuable service but 
are also a tremendous fund raising tool. For charities 
representing diseases where the cause is unknown and public 
education campaigns are unable to be organized, the level of 
public understanding of the diseases is diminished. As a result, 
charities representing diseases like multiple sclerosis, muscular 
dystrophy and cystic fibrosis are commonly confused with each 
other. To increase their fund raising capabilities these types of 
charity have made their first priority that of assisting the 
public in differentiating between what are incorrectly viewed as 
closely related maladies. But knowing what causes a disease, and 
being able to educate the public about how it can be prevented, 
has its own limitations as demonstrated by the early response to 
the AIDS problem. With AIDS, its 'causes' and 'prevention' were
43D. Johnson, 'Some Fundamental Economics of the Charity 
Market', in T.R. Ireland and D. Johnson (eds). The Economics of 
Charity. Blacksburg, Va: Centre for the Study of Public Choice, 
1970, pp. 68-72 and M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971, chapter 2.
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known yet because the disease was originally thought to be 
confined to homosexual men the level of charitable support for 
research into AIDS was limited. . It was only after further 
epidemological studies44 revealed that heterosexuals, 
haemophiliacs and drug users were susceptible to the virus that 
charitable giving to organisations like the Terrence Higgins Trust 
in Britain garnered stronger public support. Indeed, the British 
and Canadian governments' protracted delay in responding with 
funds for AIDS research indicates that governments are influenced 
by similar factors.
The 'class of people' affected by a disease can pose serious 
problems for fund raisers, as in the case of AIDS. It is also 
true that this factor can be used to a charity's advantage, as is 
evident in the extensive use of children as a fund raising tool by 
British and Canadian medical research charities. The British 
Heart Foundation, which actually supports coronary research for 
those aged 35 and over, nonetheless used a picture of a baby on 
the cover of its 1985-1986 Annual Report. However, charities 
collecting money for research into cot-death do not advertize the 
suffering of the child in their fund raising campaigns. An 
interesting explanation for this was offered.
44Epidemology is defined as "the science which investigates 
the cause and control of epidemic diseases". Through empirical 
methods epidemiologists factor into their study of diseases many 
different variables in order to determine its cause and spread. 
For example, with AIDS, the sexual orientation, diet, region, 
occupation and social habits (such as drug addiction) of those 
already infected, helped scientists to better understand the 
'cause' and 'prevention' of this virus.
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"With cot-death a child will die suddenly in 
his/her sleep; it is seldom that any will recover 
... therefore all that is left is a grieving 
family. Where .many cancer and heart patients 
live for a protracted period of time and are 
often cured, multiple layers of people 
surrounding those patients are affected including 
friends and family. However, cot-death strikes 
quickly and invariably kills every time, so where 
the cancer and heart charities can sell the 
'suffering' we are left selling 'death' or the 
grief of stricken parents - something we have 
adamently rejected. Instead, we have raised far 
more money by launching positive campaigns."
45
The standard advertising formula adopted by most Canadian and 
British medical research charities, particularly in the daily 
newspapers, is to demonstrate first the scope of the problem, by 
providing figures on the number of people suffering from the 
disease. This is done to impress in people's minds the 
seriousness of the problem. During interviews it was suggested by 
respondents that the advice given to medical research charities by 
marketing agencies is to frame their disease as a 'public health 
problem'. Charities benefiting most from this strategy are those 
representing diseases that are 'contagious', those that inevitably 
result in death, and those that involve long periods of suffering 
and diseases with incident rates which are already high or are 
increasing. It is these factors, individually or in combination, 
which determine a charity's success in 'shocking' the public to
45Canadian Interview; Canadian Foundation for the Study of
Infant Deaths, 8 January 1987.
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respond with their pocket-books. But 'scaring' the public into 
believing that they could be the next to contract, say, kidney 
disease or cystic fibrosis is only one part of their message. 
Equally important is the idea that the disease is not 
insurmountable, and that with money donated for research the 
disease can be conquered. Hence, there are slogans that 'cancer 
can be beaten' and 'where there's a will there's a way'. Despite 
this marketing strategy, there are diseases that still encounter 
difficulties attracting public support. A disease such as mental 
health, which affects many more people than cancer, and which 
involves longer periods of suffering (often leading to death), 
nonetheless encounters problems raising voluntary contributions 
for research. Despite the large number of sufferers, inflammatory 
bowel disease, and other gastroentological diseases have similar 
debilitating affects are viewed as being so horrific and 
unappealing to discuss that public financial support is limited.
One hypothesis to explain this is that people associate 
themselves with a disease when making a contribution in aid of 
research. This argument is better understood by looking at the 
fund raising history of the cancer research charities. It has 
only recently become evident that people are able to speak 
publicly of having cancer without embarrassment. In other words, 
cancer has been promoted to a 'legitimate disease'; it has been 
demystified through vigorous education campaigns with the result 
that people are not afraid to contribute to this cause. The 
success of the cancer charities has been in striking the right
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balance between fear and hope in the minds of the public. Medical 
research charities like the one representing bowel disease have 
not progressed this far, .since the public is uniformed of how the 
disease is caused and the possibility of finding a cure. As one 
respondent noted:
"It will probably take a famous movie star to 
come forward and talk publicly about their bowel 
disease or schizophrenia before the public feels 
comfortable with these causes. After all it 
worked with Patricia Neil with stroke, Rita 
Hayward with alzheimer's, and most recently Rock 
Hudson with AIDS”.
46
Again, diseases like leprosy affect millions of people yet 
because it is perceived correctly to be confined to people living 
in developing countries its appeal to the British and Canadian 
public is diminished. The diabetes research charities encounter 
special problems: people incorrectly believe that insulin
represents the 'cure' for diabetes, rather than a means of 
containing the disease, and that money donated for research is 
therefore wasted. While diabetics must suffer through daily 
injections of insulin - often developing other medical 
complications because of this - charities in both countries are 
unable to market this suffering since thousands of diabetics live 
long, and relatively normal, lives and object to 'shock 
advertising'. One in five blind people in Britain became blind as 
a result of diabetes, but the public is unaware of this since the
46Canadian Interview; Alzheimer Society of Canada, 10
February 1987.
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British Diabetic Association and Canadian Diabeties Association 
refrain from publicizing this as part of their fund raising 
campaign. In the words o£ the Executive Director of the British 
Diabetic Association;
"Of our 110,000 volunteers, the vast majority are 
diabetics who repeatedly insist that our 
advertising campaigns should avoid shocking those 
afflicted, particularly children suffering from 
juvenile diabetes."
47
These charities are less successful in producing the 'trauma' 
that makes people frightened of contracting diabetes, and hence 
they are less successful in raising voluntary donations. The 
'genetic' nature of diabetes has meant that the British and 
Canadian diabetes research charities have developed into self-help 
groups for family (and the extended family) with a single mission 
—  to save the lives of their children.
Another factor to consider when assessing a medical research 
charity's fund raising potential, is whether or not other 
charities are funding research in the same disease area. The 
multiplicity of appeals by British cancer research charities has 
confused the donating public. Proof of this lies in the number of 
vague bequests made in wills for 'cancer research' which end up 
tying the six cancer research charities in litigation over the 
titlement of these funds. While there are several Canadian 
charities with slightly overlapping research objectives, such as
47British Interview; British Diabetic Association, 2 March
1987.
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the Canadian Geriatrics Research Society and the Canadian 
Institute of Gerontology, all nonetheless have very different 
research foci. In Britain, the problem of competition among 
charities representing the same disease is slightly greater. 
Apart from cancer there is another disease area where there are 
several charities with overlapping aims; there are two 
organisations that collect funds for heart disease research: the 
British Heart Foundation and the Chest, Heart and Stroke 
Association. In interviews, the executive director from each of 
these organisations made the point that having two charities 
funding identical research, does tend to limit the fund raising 
capacity of both charities.48
In 1961 the British Heart Foundation was formed as an off­
shoot from what was then the Chest and Heart Association. After 
15 years of direct competition between the two charities in the 
area of 'mainstream heart research' the Chest and Heart 
Association decided to redirect its focus by funding stroke 
research. To make a clearer distinction between itself and the 
British Heart Foundation it was re-named the Chest, Heart and 
Stroke Association. While this move has limited the possibility 
for the duplication of research, it has done little to lessen the 
confusion in the minds of those wishing to donate money for heart 
research, since both charities retain the word 'heart' in their 
title. Correcting the public's perception of duplicated research
48British Interview; Chest, Heart and Stroke Association, 20 
February 1987; and British Interview; British Heart Foundation, 3 
March 1987.
289
has been a priority of both organisations - as the Research 
Director of the British Heart Foundation stated:
"We must advertise the special qualities of the 
British Heart Foundation; this is critical since 
the public are getting wiser and more prudent 
with their donations; they simply do not want to 
give to a cause where duplication of research is 
a possibility."
49
Both charities admitted that careful coordination of national 
fund raising campaigns was absolutely essential to avoid further 
confusing the public. As a result, the Chest, Heart and Stroke 
Association avoids sponsoring fund raising events during the 
British Heart Foundation's London to Brighton annual bike ride 
which normally raises £500,000. While direct competition between 
charities is limited to the disease areas of cancer and heart, the 
following chapter illustrates the need for cooperation and 
coordination, between all medical research organisations and the 
Medical Research Councils in each country.
v. History of Government Involvement in Medical 
Research
Presently, the British and Canadian governments' direct 
involvement in medical research is executed entirely through the 
Medical Research Councils in each country. The (B)MRC and (C)MRC 
are charged by their respective governments with the promotion of 
research aimed at advancing knowledge in the bio-medical field. 
They also advise the government departments on matters requiring
49British Interview; British Heart Foundation, 3 March 1987.
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special investigation. Furthermore, their members are appointed 
in a manner that largely ensures their status as an independent 
scientific body, but members are nonetheless susceptible to some 
political influences in special disease-related research
programmes such as that involving AIDS. A review of their origin, 
development, financing and present structure facilitates an
examination of charity-state interaction in the area of medical 
research.
a . Madical Research Council in Britain [(B)MRC1
It was not until the 20th century in Britain that, following 
the 1911 National Insurance Act, the Medical Research Committee 
(1913-1920) was created. As immediate antecedent of the (B)MRC, 
the formation of the Committee was the single most significant 
step in the formation of the structure supporting a modern 
research community.50 After the First World War the Ministry of 
Health Act (1919) provided the basis for the formation of both the 
(B)MRC and the new Ministry of Health. A central facet of the 
relationship between the two was the Haldane - Addison principle 
that scientific research should be free of immediate ministerial 
direction (a provision at the start ensured by the fact the (B)MRC 
operated under the aegis of a Committee of the Privy Council).51 
In 1965 this arrangement was changed in that responsibility 
for the funding of the (B)MRC was placed in the hands of the
Sinaia*, P- 6.
50D. Taylor, Health Research in England. London: Office of
Health Economics, 1980, p. 6.
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Secretary of State for Education and Science. But the (B)MRC has 
never been controlled by the Ministry/Department of Health. The 
two bodies have retained distinct roles defined in a mutually 
acceptable concordat. Appendix IV shows the first version of this 
agreement, privately drawn up in 1924 between Sir Walter Fletcher 
and Sir George Newman. However, the agreement was not made public 
until 1928.
To many commentators, the achievements of the (B)MRC appear 
to justify fully the independence it was given initially and has 
retained. This confidence is reflected in the fact that it served 
as the model for the formation of other research management 
agencies: the Agricultural Research Council (ARC), the Science 
and the Engineering Research Council (SERC, formally the SRC), the 
Natural Environmental Research Council (NERC), and the Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC, formally SSRC). The Research 
Council's total proportional U.K. spending in 1979-80, including 
funds from all sources is given in Figure 5.4. The purpose of the 
(B)MRC has been to promote the balanced development of medical and 
related biological research in Britain. It is advised by a 
Neurological and Mental Health Board, a Cell Biology and Disorders 
Board, a Physiological Systems and Disorders Board and a Tropical 
Medicines Research Board. The (B)MRC's grant-in-aid from the 
government for the year 1983-84 was £113.5 million out of a total 
allocation to the Research Councils of £500 million. It is the 
recipient of the second largest sum; the highest grant in aid
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Figure «Î.4
The Research Councils* Total Proportional UK 
Spending in 1979-1980
Source« Office of Health Economics, Medicines 
and the Quality of Life. London« OHE, 
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going to the SERC.52
The financial allocations for research recommended by the 
boards of the (B)MRC are _of three types. First, the Council
awards project or programme grants to non-council employees, 
almost exclusively university employees, in response to 
applications submitted to it. This accounts for 36 per cent of 
the expenditures in support of research. Second, the (B)MRC
employs full-time staff to work in (B)MRC units located within a 
university campus. This accounts for a further 30 per cent of the 
(B)MRC's research expenditure. Finally, the (B)MRC supports work 
undertaken by its own full-time employees in its own institutes 
and units located outside the universities. These include the 
Institute for Medical Research at Mill Hill, the Clinical Research 
Centre, Northwick Park Hospital and several other smaller 
establishments. Together they consume some 34 per cent of the 
Council's research expenditure.53 Prior to 1960, the (B)MRC made 
the decision to establish its own research centres since the 
existing facilities for university-based scientific research were 
inadequate. However, when university facilities were improved and 
expanded in the 1960's, the need for separately controlled and 
financed (B)MRC facilities decreased. In comparison to Britain, 
the (C)MRC does not have its own 'in-house' research facilities. 
Consequently, all Canadian government support for bio-medical
52A. Buller, 'The Organisation of Medical Research', Xhs 
Royal Society of Arts Journal. 133(1985) pp. 186-192.
53British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
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research funded through the (C)MRC is conducted in universities. 
In light of the (B)MRC having its own in-house laboratories it 
enjoys a number of advantages over its Canadian counterpart. 
First, scientists working in these laboratories can devote all of 
their time and energy into high quality research since they have 
no teaching responsibilities. Second, the (B)MRC utilizes its own 
laboratories to support outstanding individual researchers to free 
them from other commitments. Such appointments are often designed 
to offset the emigration of top-flight scientists to countries 
like the U.S. where salaries and laboratory conditions are better. 
The problem with 'brain drain' in the field of medical research is 
discussed in chapter seven section I. Third, research conducted 
in a (B)MRC laboratory is more 'directed' than that funded in 
universities or hospitals. Indeed, the (B)MRC can exert greater 
control over a scientist's research programme if that person is 
employed directly in one of its three research establishments. As 
outlined in chapter six section III. A, this has given the (B)MRC 
a tremendous advantage over the (C)MRC in responding to the AIDS 
crisis.54
In interviews, officials at the (C)MRC offered an explanation 
for the absence of in-house facilities. It was argued that the 
(C)MRC's history has prevented it from emulating the British 
model, since the (C)MRC has been enormously successful from a cost 
perspective in providing university researchers with various types 
of grants. As one (C)MRC respondent stated;
54Ibid.
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"If we started opening our own laboratories, as 
they have in Britain, then we would have to bear 
the cost of laboratories, technicians, equipment, 
researchers and _an entire administrative staff to 
manage these in-house facilities —  this is 
simply not realistic given the present political 
climate which would like to see the private 
sector assume more responsibility for medical 
research."
55
The reason why a similar structure to the (B)MRC was not 
adopted by the (C)MRC is symptomatic of Canada's federal system. 
Because Health and Education are provincial responsibilities, the 
federal government [through the (C)MRC] must utilize provincial 
institutions like universities and hospitals in its funding of 
medical research. If the federal government had adopted the 
British model entirely, by making provisions for (C)MRC 
laboratories, it would have been viewed as encroaching into the 
provinces responsibility for 'health'. Canada's federal system 
has also affected the 'type' of medical research which the federal 
government is able to support through the (C)MRC. In Britain, a 
very small proportion of the total work conducted in (B)MRC 
laboratories is 'applied research' such as the work done in their 
Common Cold Unit which has the potential to yield immediate 
results affecting the health of British citizens. In Canada, the 
(C)MRC is precluded from funding 'applied research'; instead, it 
must limit itself to funding very 'basic or fundamental' bio­
medical investigations. For example, the (C)MRC supports
55Canadian Interview; Medical Research Council, 28 January 1987
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scientists conducting basic research in the neurosciences and 
those examining protein structure and function. This 'basic or 
fumdamental' research does, not encroach into the provincial domain 
of 'health care', since any discovery would not immediately affect 
the health of people living in the province. While the Canadian 
federal system gives the provinces considerable responsibility for 
applied research, very little is actually funded by the ten 
governments. Instead, this type of bio-medical research has been 
funded primarily by the medical research charities.
Understanding the British government's present commitment to 
scientific research in universities via the (B)MRC, necessitates 
an explanation of the 'dual support system'. This system is not 
unique to medical research; it is the primary means by which all 
academic research is undertaken in Britain. The two components of 
the dual support system are the universities and the research 
councils; both operate in the public sector.
All universities now obtain their primary funding from 
government. The government department accountable for this 
expenditure is the Department of Education and Science. However, 
money does not pass directly from the department to individual 
universities. There is an intermediate agency, the University 
Grants Committee (UGC). The terms of reference of the UGC, 
established in 1919, are:
"to inquire into the financial needs of 
university education in Great Britain; to advise 
the government as to the application of any 
grants made by Parliament towards meeting them; 
to collect, examine and make available
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information relating to university education 
throughout the United Kingdom; and to assist in 
consultation with the universities and other 
bodies concerned, that preparation and execution 
of such plans_ for the development of the 
universities as'may from time to time be required
in order to ensure that they are fully adequate 
to national needs."
56
As the terms of reference imply, the UGC advises the 
Secretary of State for Education and Science, on the financial 
needs of the universities. It also has the responsibility for 
dividing the budget provided by government and notifying the 
individual universities of their allocations.
The chairman and members of the UGC's main committee are 
academics, the Chariman being on secondment. The Secretariat is 
provided by the civil service. To assist it in its work, the UGC 
has a number of sub-committees, one of which is the medical sub­
committee. Whilst the UGC has the responsibility for allocating 
funds to each university, it does not indicate how those funds are 
to be used. Each university has a degree of autonomy in the use 
of its 'grant-in-aid' yet is required to make annual returns 
outlining how the grant has been spent. In the year 1982-83 the 
UGC divided £1,250 million amongst all universities in the U.K. 
The 19 universities having medical schools spent £130 million on 
their clinical and preclinical departments where the vast majority 
of university-based medical research is conducted. Of this
56Buller, The Organisation of Medical Research, p. 189. 
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amount, 70 per cent represents the cost of staff salaries. The 
remaining 30 per cent is available for the recurrent teaching and 
research costs during the year.57
A basic tenet of the dual support system is that the 
universities should, by means of the grant in aid, provide 'well- 
found' laboratories - that is, the physical plant, including 
modern equipment and consumables, support staff, (both technical 
and secretarial, and academic staff with time available to permit 
them to undertake research). The second arm of the dual support 
system is the group of five research councils. Like the others, 
the (B)MRC receives its income, from the Department of Education 
and Science. Again, rather like the UGC in the case of 
universities, there is a buffer between the government department 
and the (B)MRC. This is the Advisory Board for the Research 
Councils (ABRC). According to the DHSS' Chief Scientist from
1977-81 the ABRC was established in 1972 with the following terms 
of reference.
"A) To advise the Secretary of State of its 
responsibilities for civil science with 
particular reference to the research 
council system.
B) To advise the Secretary of State on the 
allocation of the science budget among 
the research councils.
57Association of Medical Research Charities, Annual Report 
1£M, p. 5.
299
C) To promote close liaison between councils 
and the users of their research."
58
The ABRC determines the distribution of the science budget 
between the research councils. Each research council is 
accountable to the ABRC for the use to which it put its money, 
though it has considerable autonomy in determining expenditure 
priorities. This system contrasts with Canada in that the three 
councils in that country all report directly to the federal 
Parliament without passing through an intermediary agency. The 
distribution of funds among all the Canadian research councils is 
left to Cabinet to decide. This decision is ultimately influenced 
by advice received from the Treasury Board and other government 
departments where scientific research overlaps with departmental 
mandates.
In Britain, the Department of Education and Science, and 
succeeding Secretaries of State, have always paid lip-service to 
the maintenance of the dual support system for medical research. 
During the early stages of the reduction in UGC funding to 
universities (1980), it was stated that this reduction would be 
counter-balanced by continuing growth in the sum made available to 
the ABRC and hence the research councils. However, that growth 
has not continued. Since 1983 the (B)MRC has faced a serious 
financial situation(see Figure 7.4). Due to an insufficient
58British Interview; Chief Scientist (1977-1981), Department 
of Health and Social Security, 24 February 1987.
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increase in the grants-in-aid, the effective spending power of the 
Council was reduced by £2 million in 1983 from what would have 
been required for level funding. The (B)MRC has been forced to 
place stringent financial constraints on its own institutes and 
units; its support for medical research in the universities has 
also declined substantially. It is apparent that with a decrease 
in real terms of the grants in aid to the universities and the 
(B) MRC, the support for medical research provided by the dual 
support system is under great strain. Indeed, when interviewed 
the (B)MRC spokesman stated that it can no longer fund some of the 
applications submitted to it, even though these have been scored 
'alpha' by referees and grant committees.59 Consequently, medical 
researchers have turned to alternative sources of funding such as 
medical research charities to sustain existing research 
programmes. This shift in support of medical research from the 
public to the private sector has inspired medical research 
charities to become more vocal in criticizing government cutbacks 
to the dual support system. In chapter seven section I. A and B, 
we examine the increasing lobbying activities of British medical 
research charities on this issue.
B. Department of Health and Social Security (DHSSi
There is presently only one major source of public sector 
funding for medical research in Britain, however this has not 
always been the case. For many years a small sum of money has
59British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
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been available annually to the Chief Medical Officer at the DHSS 
(formally known as the Ministry of Health) to be used for research 
at his discretion. However, this money has always been too small 
for Departmental officials to organize a major research effort 
around their own interests. In an effort to change this. Lord 
Rothschild as head of the Central Policy Review Staff (the 'Think 
Tank'), urged the government in 1971 to adopt a customer- 
contractor relationship with the research councils for its R & D 
programmes. Lord Rothschild's report recommended the transfer of 
money from the civil science vote to the budgets of government 
departments so that the recipients would become more able to 
influence the work done by the research councils. Among 
scientists, its publication evoked considerable debate concerning 
the utility of the 'customer-contractor' principle.60 The (B)MRC, 
in particular, stated that the method was inappropriate for the 
prosecution of bio-medical research. The DHSS, unconvinced by 
this argument, enumerated a list of topics (prepared in 1972) 
including arthritis, rheumatism, hearing, heart disease and 
stroke, mental health and low back pain in which they had been 
unable to obtain an adequate research effort, as perceived by 
themselves, from the (B)MRC. In July 1972 a government White 
Paper was published.61 It reaffirmed the government's intention 
of extending the customer-contractor approach to all its applied
60British Interview; Blonde Mclndoe Centre for Medical 
Research - Research Scientist, 26 February 1987.
61HMS0, Framework for__Government__Research__and Development.
Londons HMSO, Cmnd 5046, 1972. pp. 2-5.
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research and development. The White Paper described the 
intentions of the DHSS to set up a Chief Scientist's Organisation 
and indicated that, after a transition period, the DHSS would 
acquire control of approximately 25 per cent of the (B)MRC's 
previous income from the science vote.62 Rothschild's proposals 
were first put into practice in 1974 but were dismantled in 1981. 
For a variety of reasons the DHSS never became an effective 
customer, certainly not in the bio-medical field. In an interview 
with the government's Chief Scientist (1978 - 1981) an explanation 
was offered as to why the Rothschild agreement failed.
"It was apparent to all that this arrangement 
just simply was not working - because there was 
nobody in the DHSS who could tell the (B)MRC 
sensibly what it wanted done. Stated differently 
the (B)MRC knew its job better than did DHSS. 
When I was Chief Scientist I had the embarrassing 
job of forwarding research request from DHSS to 
the (B)MRC of the kind which included statements 
like 'we would like a cure for schizophrenia'- 
but who at that time didn't want a cure ... it 
was ridiculous since these requests didn't help 
the (B)MRC at all. It soon became evident that 
money had to be transferred back from the DHSS to 
the Department of Education and Science - it had 
to go from one government department to another, 
it being done on the understanding that the DES 
would put this money into the civil science 
budget, and that having being given to the ABRC 
it should be rescheduled back to the (B)MRC from 
whence it came."
63
In Canada, the parallel government department to the DHSS-
62lbid.. p. 6.
63British Interview; Chief Scientist (1977-1981), Department 
of Health and Social Security, 24 February 1987.
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the Department of Health and Welfare (DHW) - has never 
experimented with anything comparable to the Rothschild's 
customer-contractor principle. By returning to the pre-Rothschild 
arrangement in 1981 whereby the (B)MRC was free to set its own 
research priorities, the British government's organisation of 
medical research became virtually identical to Canada's. The only 
two major differences now are that the (B)MRC is responsible to 
the Department of Education and Science through a buffer body (the 
ABRC), whereas in Canada the (C)MRC is directly accountable to the 
Department of Health and Welfare. In addition, there is a lack of 
uniformity between the two countries in the government departments 
overseeing the Medical Research Council in each country. In 
Canada, there is no federal government department for 'education' 
since this remains a provincial responsibility.
c. Canadian-Medical Research Council [{C1MRC1
The history of the (C)MRC is similar to that of the (B)MRC. 
Indeed, in interviewing a (C)MRC official the idea was supported 
that the (C)MRC was modelled closely on its British counterpart; 
the similarity of names was no accident. Its formation in 1960 
was a culmination of a series of events dating back to 1921. In 
that year, the major discovery of insulin in a Canadian laboratory 
opened up research possibilities in virtually every field of bio­
medical research. In 1925, the National Research Council (NRC) 
established a special joint committee with the Department of 
Agriculture, which had been spending large sums annually on bovine 
tuberculosis, to study, both the relation of this to Human
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tuberculosis and also the means by which they might be mastered. 
For many years funds were provided for trials of a vaccine 
undertaken in several Canadian research centres. The next major 
step towards federal support for Canadian medical research was not 
taken until 1936. General A.G.L. McNaughton, president of the 
NRC, supported by the Canadian Medical Association and the Royal 
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, established an 
Associate Committee on Medical Research (ACMR) with the NRC. This 
committee was chaired by a leading British scientist of the day- 
Sir Frederick Banting; its Secretary was Dr. Chester B. Stewart, 
and it had a meager budget of $53,000 (£26,500) that was 
distributed mostly for research grants.64
The 'adolesence' of medical research in Canada ended abruptly 
with the outbreak of World War II. The newly formed ACMR had to 
suspend the federal programmes then being planned for medical 
research in the universities. Furthermore, the ACMR divided 
itself into several sub-committees, each devoted to solving 
specific medical problems confronting the various branches of the 
Armed Forces. As in most other Western countries during this 
period there followed a great surge of activity in the field of 
medical research.65
As was the case in Britain, the need for war-related research 
forced the Canadian government to rely upon university professors 
to conduct investigations into new areas of medical research-
64Medical Research Council, Newsletter, p. 5.
65Ibid-. p. 6.
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most notably, areas that addressed injuries suffered in modern 
warfare.
"University professors made up most of the 
various committees and directed the researchers; 
they were assisted by collègues who had joined 
the services and were seconded to investigative 
work. University laboratories and their
personnel were used for most investigations. 
This focus on research in the universities was 
continued after the war. In both countries, 
peace brought freedom to the universities to 
resume more basic and fundamental research 
activity. Much new equipment had been installed 
for war researchers, technical personnel had been 
trained in its use; young medical graduates who 
had been in the services clamoured for graduate 
training; there remained only a need for 
increased financial support."
66
In 1948, the Department of National Health and Welfare 
instituted a system of health grants, part of which could, with 
provincial approval, be used for the promotion of university 
research in specific areas such as child and maternal health, 
mental health, and cancer. In that same year the Defence Research 
Board was established and through its medical section, the 
government began to increase the amount of federal funds chanelled 
to the universities in support of medical research that was 
related to defence problems. Two years later, the Department of 
Veterans' Affairs established a programme for the support of 
special areas of medical research to be carried out in its own 
hospitals across the country, and often under the direction of 
investigators who at the same time held university appointments.
66Ibid.. p. 6.
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As mentioned in section II, the growing public interest in 
the advancement of medicine at that time was reflected in the 
establishment of a number of medical research charities. 
Substantial sums raised from public campaigns by societies 
concerned with cancer, heart disease, arthritis and rheumatism 
were devotd to research in these special areas. While these 
charities, both large and small, made an important contribution in 
providing funds for service and research, they also made another 
type of contribution, which was just as important as the financial 
one. They stimulated public interest in research which brought 
many to a realization of its value in achieving a better standard 
of health for Canadians. 67
The definitive steps towards the formation of an autonomous 
(C)MRC were taken in 1957. Dr. D.H. Copp writes.
"The Association of Canadian Medical Colleges 
sent to the newly elected Prime Minister, the 
Right Honorable John Diefenbaker the following 
resolution; that the Association of Canadian 
Medical Colleges, representing, through their 
deans, the twelve Medical schools of Canada, 
finds that federal support for medical research 
is alarmingly inadequate to support those 
investigations which are now in hand, and those 
which, in the public interest, should be 
undertaken, and asks the Prime Minister to
increase the funds available to the Medical 
Division of the National Research Council in his 
first budget, by at least $500,000 (£250,000)."
68
67Canadian Interview; Medical Research Council, 28 January 1987.
68Medical Research Council, Annual Report. 1969. Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1970, p. 3.
307
According to the (C)MRC's 1969 Annual Report, this letter was 
followed by direct representation to Cabinet by a delegation from 
the ACMR. The response was prompt; the budget of the Division of 
Medical Research was increased by $628,000 (£314,000) to
$1,523,000 (£761,500) in 1958, and the Honourable Gordon
Churchill, in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee of the 
Privy Council on Scientific and Industrial Research, set up a 
special committee in February 1958.69 After consulting experts at 
the (B)MRC, which at that time had already been in existence for 
39 years, a report was submitted that included the following 
recommendations:
"A) That a Medical Research Council be 
established under terms similar to those of 
the National Research Council.
B) That the budget of the Medical Research 
Council be $4 million [£2 million].
C) That funds be made available for the 
construction of urgently needed research 
buildings and facilities in the medical 
schools of Canada and affiliated 
institutions."
70
On 4 July 1960, the (C)MRC was established as an autonomous 
subsidiary of the NRC with a budget of $2,206,000 (£1,103,000). 
At the end of the 1960's the (C)MRC became a crown corporation. 
During the early summer of 1968, the federal government announced 
its decision that the (C)MRC should report to Parliament through
69Ibid.. p. 3 
70Ibid.. p. 4
308
the Minister of National Health and Welfare. Royal assent was 
received on 28 March 1969, bringing an end to the NRC's 32 year 
period of support and guidance.
At this point both Britain and Canada paralleled each other 
in terms of the structures in place for funding medical research. 
Both governments had established their own medical research 
funding agencies that functioned at arms-length from elected and 
non-elected officials. The (B)MRC and the (C)MRC provided 
governments with structures to facilitate state involvement in the 
search for knowledge leading to the eradication of various 
diseases. In each country, this came in response to public 
pressure on elected officials to actively participate in this area 
of science. Similarly, while governments responded to public 
pressure and provided more research funding, the public also began 
to support medical research voluntarily through charities. We now 
turn our attention in chapter six to the interaction between 
charity and state in the area of medical research. In doing so, 
we focus on several issues: how charity and government co­
ordinate their research efforts and how charities attempt to 
influence the state's research priorities.
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Chapter Six
Relations Between Medical Research Charities and the state: 
Co-ordination and Collaboration
This chapter seeks to understand the nature of interaction 
between medical research charities and government within the 
context of public goods theory. Section I describes the limited 
degree of collaboration between charity and state in their effort 
to avoid duplicating bio-medical research.1 Interviews with 
charity and government officials reveal that no formal co­
ordinating mechanisms exist but instead ad hoc procedures whereby 
only limited technical information is traded. Section II provides 
examples of successful charity-government collaboration in funding 
joint research projects. This contrast makes it difficult to 
assess whether medical research charities and government view each 
other as partners or competitors in this policy area. Section III 
describes how the British and Canadian governments divide their 
research budgets among the various diseases. Like their
charitable counterparts, it is clear that the governments are 
susceptible to public and interest group pressures (including
IThe limited extent of collaboration applies to all disease 
areas in Britain and Canada with the exception of cancer research 
in Britain. In this case, there is a special agency known as the 
United Kingdom Co-ordinating Committee on Cancer Research (UKCCCR) 
whose membership includes the (B)MRC and the six British cancer 
research charities.
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charities) to fund 'popular diseases'. Consequently, it is 
natural for governments too to also ignore funding unpopular but 
prevalent diseases. In response to this imbalance, most British 
and Canadian medical research charities have begun to lobby 
government despite legal limitations on the political activity- 
limitations which we discussed in chapter three. Consequently, 
the public policy role played by medical research charities in 
influencing government research priorities is a central theme of 
this chapter.
I. Charity-State Co-ordination of Medical Research
Section I of this chapter reviews the impetus behind charity- 
state co-operation (or lack of co-operation) at the state and 
international level in the context of public goods theory. It 
does so by examining the factors that motivate British and 
Canadian medical research charities and the government funded 
Medical Research Councils in each country to co-operate and co­
ordinate their research programmes to avoid wasteful duplication.
To begin with a basic understanding of public goods theory we 
turn to Mancur Olson's notable contributions to this strand of 
political economy literature. Olson tells us that the most 
important type of organisation is the 'nation-state' and that 
patriotism is probably an individual's strongest non-economic 
motive for supporting it. Many nations draw additional strength 
and unity from ideology, such as democracy or communism, as well 
as from common religion, language or cultural inheritance.
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However, the state is also important economically in that it 
provides its citizens law and order which is a prerequisite of all 
civilized economic activity. Despite-the force of patriotism, the 
appeal of the national ideology, the bond of a common culture, and 
the indispensibility of the system of law and order, no major 
state in modern history has been able to support itself through 
voluntary dues or contributions.2 As Olson explains:
"Philanthropic contributions are not even a 
significant source of revenue for most countries.
Taxes, compulsory payments by definition, are 
needed. Indeed, as the old saying indicates, 
their necessity is as certain as death itself."
3
The reason the state is unable to survive on voluntary 
contributions, and instead must rely on taxation, relates to its 
provision of fundamental services that must be available to 
everyone if they are to be available to anyone. The most obvious 
examples are national defence, police protection and the system of 
law and order which benefit everyone in a nation. For example, it 
would be infeasible to deny the protection provided by the
military. the police. and the courts to those who did not
contribute voluntarily to pay their share of the costs-
consequently taxation is necessary. The common or collective 
benefits provided by governments are usually called 'public goods'
2Mancur Olson Jr., The— Logic of__Collective Action;__EnfclicGoode__and__the Theory of Groups. Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1965, p. 13.
3Ifcidj., p. 13.
312
by economists and can be defined as any good such that, if any 
person X; in a group XI X2 ..., Xn consumes it, it cannot be 
witheld from the others iiv that group.-4 In other words, those who 
do not purchase or pay for any of the public or collective good 
cannot be excluded or kept from sharing in the consumption of the 
good, as they can where non-collective goods are concerned.
Just as the state supplies public goods so do many 
charities.5 However, the application of conventional economic 
theories of public goods are woefully inadequate in providing 
explanation as to why this is true of charities. The problem is 
that many charities are principally engaged in the provision of
40n the definition and importance of public goods, see John 
G. Head, 'public Goods and Public Policy', Public Finance. 
17(1962), pp. 197-210; Richard Musgrave, The Theory of Public 
Finance. New Yorks McGraw-Hill, 1959; Paul A. Samuelson, 'The 
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', 'Diagramatic Exposition of a 
Theory of Public Expenditure', and 'Aspects of Public Expenditure 
Theories', Review— of Economics and Statistics. 36(1958), pp. 332- 
338. For somewhat different opinions about the usefulness of the 
concept of public goods, see Julius Margolis, 'A Comment on the
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', Review__Of__Economics and
Statistics, 36(1955), pp. 347-349; and Gerhard Colm, 'Theory of
Public Expenditures', Annals of the American__Academy of Political
and Social__Science. 33(1936), pp. 1-11. For a more contemporary
analysis see Roger Benjamin, The Limits__of Politics: Collective
Goods and— Political Change in Postindustrial Societies. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980, chapter 2; Edward H. Clarke, 
Demand Revelation and the Provision of Public Goods. Cambridge 
Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1980, pp. 45-50; and
Thomas Wilson and Dorothy J. Wilson, The Political Economy of the 
Welfare State. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982, pp. 4-8.
5Not all charities supply public goods: the 'public good'
component of a soup kitchen is rather small. Some charities 
therefore are supplying goods for individuals which others have 
paid for out of 'altruism'. Other charities (like medical 
research charities) are suppliers of public goods. Finally, 
because of the legal peculiarities in the development of charity 
law (discussed in chapter two section I. A) some charities such as 
public schools provide private goods to those who pay for them.
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public goods, to an extent that is inconsistent with the public 
good literature since theorists have no means of accounting for 
the voluntary input of labour and money to produce such goods. 
This is a critical problem since the standard theory of public 
goods is adopted in most economic discussions of the proper role 
of the state in providing goods and services. These theories 
advance the notion that public goods will not be supplied in 
economically efficient amounts unless individuals are compelled to 
contribute towards the cost of supplying them. Naturally, it is 
because of this line of argument that most political economists 
argue that public goods should be provided by the state as opposed 
to by charities.6 In many cases it is reasonable enough for a 
political economist to ignore the possibility of private- 
charitable provision of public goods by simply viewing them as 
anomolies. The problem arises when we seek to understand the 
nature of charity-state relations in an area like medical research 
where both participants are supplying a 'like' public good- 
namely scientific research. Consequently, we are unable to 
analyse properly what might motivate charities and government to 
co-operate and co-ordinate their activities in an effort to supply 
the public good most efficiently (that is by avoiding wasted 
resources on duplication).
6Robert Sugden, 'Voluntary Organisations and the Welfare 
State', in Julian LeGrand and Ray Robinson, Privatisation and the 
Welfare State. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984, p. 71.
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A. Medical research as a public good
In adopting Olson's definition of a 'public good' we see that 
both charitable and governmental provision of medical research is 
a classic example of a pure form of such goods from which many 
people simultaneously benefit in direct and indirect ways. For 
example, Jenner's discovery of the small-pox virus leading to the 
development of a vaccine has benefited not only those who 
contributed but equally those who did not. In addition, there is 
no 'crowding-out' effect in that the 'consumption' of small-pox 
medicine by one person does not exclude others from benefiting 
from this technology. Like other public goods, medical research 
can be contrasted with private goods. The supply of public goods 
cannot be restricted to those who pay for them. For example, 
cleaning up polluted air is a public good since you cannot 
restrict the clean air to those who have paid for it just as you 
cannot restrict it to those who are actually responsible for the 
polluting. One important feature of medical research as a public 
good, in contrast to many public goods, is that there are no 
special or geographic constraints. For example, if the British 
government funded the establishment and maintenance of a park in 
London users of that good would obviously be required to be 
located (if only temporarily as tourists) in that city. However, 
in the case of medical research, the results of scientific 
investigations are usually published in journals and thereby 
freely available to scientists and individuals of other foreign 
countries. Indeed, medical research charities are required by
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their charitable status as 'educational' organisations to make 
their discoveries publicly available to everyone in order to be of 
'benefit to the community', [one -of the important features of 
charity law discussed in Chapter two section I. B. (ii) J. As a 
result, there is an incentive for the governments of other 
countries to act as 'free riders' by utilizing the benefits that 
flow from medical research without leveying taxes to finance their 
own contribution to improved public health.7 Given the free-rider 
dilemma why do governments and charities continue to supply this 
public good? Interviews with (B)MRC and (C)MRC officials revealed 
three reasons. First, governments fund medical research out of 
partisan political interests in response to public pressure 
(governments publicly perceived to be 'caring' have normally 
improved their electoral fortunes). Second, governments 
frequently hold the view that other countries may not be doing a 
good job in researching a particular health problem and, 
therefore, the opportunity to 'free ride' does not occur. Lastly, 
there is often great prestige, in the form of Nobel prizes and 
like honours, that flow to governments who have supported research
7There is no necessity that a public good to one group in a 
society is necessarily in the interest of the society as a whole. 
Just as a tariff could be a public good to the industry that 
sought it, so the removal of the tariff could be a public good to 
those who consumed the industry's product. This is equally true 
when the public-good concept is applied only to governments; for a 
military expenditure, or a tariff, or an immigration restriction 
that is a public good to one country could be a 'public bad' to 
another country, and harmful to the rest of the world.
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yielding major discoveries. 8 Medical research charities have 
garnered public support for the provision of the public goods they 
supply for different reasons. First, there is the obvious 
explanation that some individuals are altruistic and are concerned 
with supporting public goods, even goods which 'spill-over' 
national boundaries. Second, some individuals are not impeded by 
the free-rider issue since their motivation for giving to research 
is grounded in the superstition that if they 'give to a disease' 
they might somehow be immunized from contracting it. Other 
reasons for giving that ignore the free-rider problem are 
synthesized by Ware and include:
"... laziness (the failure to stop a bank's 
standing order for a charity in which the donor 
has long since lost interest); convenience (it is 
sometimes easier to give donations than to argue 
with the person soliciting funds); social 
conformity (a desire not to be in the minority 
that is not wearing a charity flag); peer group 
pressure (social ostracism because of a failure 
to support a particular cause); social esteem (at 
Jewish charitable functions in the U.S. the donor 
often has to announce how much he is prepared to 
pledge, a device which helps to increase 
contributions); informal tit-for-tat ("you 
contribute to my fund raising drive and I'll 
contribute to yours later"), [and] habit ("I've 
always given to this cause...")
9
To get to the more central issue of what motivates, or fails 
to motivate charities, to co-operate with other foreign and
8Briti8h Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987, 
and Canadian Interview; Medical Research Council, 28 January 1987.
9Alan Ware, Between Profit and State. Cambridge: Polity
Press, forthcoming manuscript. Chapter 4, p. 14.
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domestic charities and with governments to avoid duplicating 
research we must explain why the state provides this public good 
alongside charitable provision. The orthodox theory of public 
goods demonstrates that charitable activities will be 
undersupplied if individuals are free to choose how much they 
contribute towards them. It is argued that economic efficiency 
can only be achieved if the free-rider problem is solved through 
coercion.10 This argument is often used to justify the provision 
of welfare services by the state. It has been used to justify 
both income support schemes11 and public provision of certain
welfare services, particularly health care.12 This line of 
argument can also easily be extended to explain governments' 
commitments to medical research despite the increasing numbers of 
medical research charities established in Britain and Canada after 
1960. The problem with this theory of public goods is that it 
does nothing to illuminate the special relationship between 
charity and the state once both are actively involved in supplying 
like goods and services. An alternative theory that resolves this
lOIndividuals might consent to their being co-erced as part 
of a kind of social contract but what they consent to is 
nonetheless coercion.
11M. Friedman, Free to Choose. London: Seeker and Warburg, 
1962, pp. 109-101, and H.M. Hochman and J.D. Rodgers, 'Pareto- 
optimal redistribution', American Review. 59(1969), pp. 542-7.
12See, K.J. Arrow, 'Uncertainty and the Welfare Economies of
Medical Care', American__Economic__Review, 53(1963), pp. 941-73;
C.M. Lindsay, 'Medical Care and the Economies of Sharing', 
Economica. 36(1969), pp. 531-7; and A.J. Culyer, Need and the 
National Health Service. London: Martin Robertson, 1976, chapter 
3.
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problem starts from the idea that individuals derive some kind of 
private benefit when they contribute to charities; since non­
contributors are excluded from these benefits, the free-rider 
problem is eliminated. The 'private benefits' theory rests on the 
notion that individuals who contribute to charities receive direct 
benefits in return, the value of which does not depend on any 
private or social morality and from which non-contributors are 
excluded.13 In the more general context of public goods, Olson 
has argued that many pressure groups and trade unions work on this 
principle: they supply public and private goods as joint 
products, and the private goods - which are supplied only to paid- 
up members - are sufficient to induce individuals to join. For 
example, trade unions and professional associations often provide 
specialized information to their members and organize social 
functions.14 It can be argued that the same principle explains 
how medical research charities - especially those with patient 
services programmes - operate. Historically, British and Canadian 
medical research charities were founded by disease sufferers and 
have subsequently come to rely on them for voluntary inputs of 
both labour and money. In return, these disease sufferers have 
not only contributed to the provision of medical research (a pure 
public good) but have also received private benefits. These
13Robert Sugden, Voluntary Organisations and the Welfare 
State, p. 71.
14Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action. 
Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971, chapter 
3.
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benefits have come in the form of specialized medical information 
relating to their disease conditions, the opportunity to 
interchange with other disease sufferers (self-help benefits) and 
benefits accruing from charitable organisations lobbying 
government on their behalf for disability payments, mobility 
allowances and the like. The logic of this theory is that a 
charity supplying a public good has two components. One component 
works essentially like a private firm, providing some excludable 
service (information, social functions, personal advocacy) in 
return for contributions of money and labour. The profits of this 
firm are then used to finance the other component of the 
organisation, which supplies some public good - medical research.
While the private benefits theory sheds light on why disease 
sufferers establish and support charities it also explains the 
role of volunteers in seeking to protect their interests. In the 
context of medical research, it helps to explain why disease 
sufferers and their families, who are often volunteers or 
financial contributors, pressure charity administrators to avoid 
wasting funds on duplicating research. Duplication can occur in 
two ways: there is duplication involving domestic and foreign
charities, and then there is duplication involving charity and 
government.
B. Co-operation and co-ordination of charity supported 
Research
The need for co-operation and co-ordination in the field of 
medical research is especially important given the nature of those
320
who are actually involved in developing this public good. As one 
scientist explained:
"Scientists are a fiercely competitive lot 
possessing enormous egos. Consequently, there is 
little co-operation within the international 
scientific community and certainly not among 
scientists from the same country doing identical 
work. There is an ongoing race to cross the 
finish-line first ... for example, for a 
scientist to be able to put his/her name behind 
new disease, drug, or innovative surgical 
technique."
15
A glaring example of wasteful duplication stemming from a lack of 
co-operation among charity-funded scientists involved fierce 
competition between France and the United States in identifying 
the AIDS virus. Even after its discovery, there continued a long 
battle between researchers in both countries over the naming of 
the virus. This international rivalry involved Professor Gallo 
from the U.S. and Professor Luc Montagnier at the Institut Pasteur 
in Paris. As early as 1979, Gallo discovered that a virus 
claiming the lives of homosexual men was related to a family of 
viruses called HTLV(l) and HTLV(2). When Professor Montagnier 
discovered the AIDS virus in March 1983 - a full year before the 
Americans - the French called it Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus 
(LAV) because they had isolated it from a gland (Lymph node) of a 
young male homosexual. After long and bitter public, and private, 
debate between the rival investigators, it was agreed to make
15Canadian Interview; McMaster University, Medical School, 
Department of Pathology, 19 January 1987.
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HTLV(3)/LAV the technical designation for AIDS. 16 In retrospect, 
scientific commentators have concluded that the Gallo-Montagnier 
race mitigated against. discovering the virus rather than 
accelerating the process. Moreover, it is agreed that, in 
clamouring for more funding, fame, patent rights and possibly a 
Nobel prize, not only delayed the discovery of the virus, but also 
a lack of international co-operation, delayed the formulation of a 
public education campaign, which in turn might have saved 
thousands of lives. 17
While AIDS exemplifies the potential for international 
competition, there are instances where remarkable co-operation has 
been displayed. In the case of muscular dystrophy, three
16Graham Hancock and Enver Carim, AIDS; the Deadly Epidemic. 
London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1986, pp. 30-31.
17Ibid.. pp. 30-39. Duplicated research should not be 
confused with research that verifies other scientific results. A 
recent case highlighting the need for verification involved the 
muscular dystrophy research charities in Britain, Canada and the 
United States. In 1982, a British researcher claimed publicly 
that a 'compound' he had discovered was effective in curing those 
afflicted with muscular dystrophy. He did this for several years 
despite strong opposition mounted by the international scientific 
community. As a result of his claims - which marshalled strong 
support among optimistic parents of muscular dystrophy sufferers- 
the issue had to be resolved at an emergency international 
conference held in New York City. Of the 39 participating 
scientists in attendance, 38 rejected his evidence based on the 
results of their own independent studies. When reflecting on this 
unfortunate event, the British and Canadian muscular dystrophy 
research charities agreed that; 'the results should have been 
duplicated immediately so as to avoid the disgraceful waste of 
time and money spent on the New York rendezvous. Moreover, it 
would have spared those suffering from the disease and their 
families, from the enormous let down they later experienced', from 
Canadian Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Association of Canada, 5 
December 1986; and British Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Group of 
Great Britain, 19 February 1987.
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researchers, (Dr. K. Davis from England, Dr. B. Walton from Canada 
and Dr. P. Loucunkle from the U.S.) exchanged blood samples and 
information over a three year period in their search for isolating 
the muscular dystrophy gene. Though the American team discovered 
the gene in 1984, credit was also accorded to the British and 
Canadian scientists:
"My counterpart at the U.S. Muscular Dystrophy 
Association contacted me three days prior to the 
press conference they staged to announce their 
discovery. He reassured me that they would be 
very generous in their literature about the help 
they received from this charity and the one in 
Canada."
18
Global co-operation between different medical research 
charities (and the scientists they fund) is largely aided by 
international associations representing specific disease areas. 
These include the International Diabetes Foundation, the 
International Cancer Research Society, the International Society 
and Federation of Cardiology. These organisations arrange and 
finance conferences attended by leading scientists from a variety 
of research fields. In doing so, they attempt to foster greater 
collaboration among scientists from different countries and to 
encourage a multi-disciplinary research approach. According to 
one charity executive; "The financing of these meetings has been 
supplemented by pharmaceutical companies who aim to keep their
18British Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great
Britain, 19 February 1987.
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finger on the pulse of scientific progress" . 19 The multinational 
Interfalf drug company from West Germany has long been a financial 
supporter of international conferences dealing with 
gastroentological diseases and is a leading manufacturer of 
synthetic drugs for these afflictions. According to one
respondent, "These conferences are a useful means for the 
pharmaceutical companies to do some of their major networking". 20 
The suspicion might arise that a Canadian researcher flown to 
Venice for a two week, all-expense-paid, conference, would feel 
some allegiance to the sponsoring company if he discovered a 
compound worthy of further drug development. One pharmaceutical 
spokesman argued, though, that scientists are not legally bound by 
contract to turn any of their major discoveries over to the 
sponsoring company. However, it was added that this is what most 
scientists would likely do since the company would certainly be a 
leader in that particular research field.21
After completing interviews with 44 different British and 
Canadian medical research charities, it became evident that some 
organisations are more concerned about the issue of duplication 
than others. For example, there are charities like the British 
Diabetic Association that have reduced the probability of 
international duplication by holding memberships in several
19Canadian Interview; National Cancer Institute of Canada, 28 
November 1986.
20Canadian Interview; Canadian Foundation for Ileitis and 
Colitis, 12 January 1987.
21Canadian Interview; Connaught Laboratories, 11 February 1987.
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associations, including the United States Juvenile Diabetes 
Association, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the European 
Association de Societee pur Diabetes-(EASD) and the International 
Diabetes Federation. Conversely, there are charities like the 
Parkinson Foundation of Canada, that are less concerned about 
duplication and appear to be isolationists even though there are 
five different American organisations collecting voluntary 
donations for Parkinson's research as well as two international 
co-ordinating agencies. In Britain, the Chest, Heart and Stroke 
Association (CSHA) acknowledged the potential for duplicated 
stroke research programmes since an international co-ordinating 
agency does not exist for this disease. Although the CHSA has 
heard of other stroke research charities operating in Canada and 
the U.S., no effort has been made to contact them to establish an 
association. As the Executive Director of the CHSA freely 
admitted:
"In the area of stroke research, there is no 
means of co-ordinating research conducted in 
other countries - so the potential for wasted 
resources is enormous. This is sad given that I 
know of the American Stroke Association located 
in Denver, Colorado as well as the Ontario Heart 
and Stroke Association in Toronto.”
22
The question remains why an international association for 
stroke research has not been formed, given that other charities 
have responded to pressures from volunteers to avoid duplication.
22British Interview; Chest, Heart and Stroke Association, 20February 1987.
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One possible explanation might be that creating an association is 
beyond the financial means of a charity like the CHSA. It is 
conceivable that the establishment and maintenance of an 
international co-ordinating body could be a function of the income 
levels of its member charities. However, in examining the 
membership of existing international associations, this appears 
not to be the case. For example, the CHSA's 1985 income of 
£939,110 is more than double that of the Asthma Research Council, 
an active member of the International Asthma Federation.23 
Similarly, the Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust in Britain, which 
has an income level comparable to that of the CHSA, holds dual 
membership with WHO and with the International Cystic Fibrosis 
Association (ICFA). Appendix V lists the ICFA's points of contact 
with researchers around the world.
An alternative explanation of why the CHSA has isolated 
itself from the international research community involves the 
sparse distribution of their research funds to cover stroke and 
coronary heart research as well as a host of other chest ailments. 
The reason for doing this can be understood in the context of the 
rather peculiar history of this charity. The CHSA, which began as 
the National Association for the Prevention of Tuberculosis 
(NAPT), switched its research focus to heart disease when 
Tuberculosis mortality rates declined sharply after World War II. 
From a scientific viewpoint, it is not entirely clear how NAPT was
23Chest, Heart and Stroke Association, Annual Report.1985? 
and Asthma Research Council, Annual Report. 1985.
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able to make a connection between tuberculosis research and heart 
research. Indeed, it can be argued that during the 1950's the 
NAPT was a charity in search of a disease. As was discussed in 
chapter five section IV. B, the newly established Chest and Heart 
Association decided in 1976 to further extend its activities by 
tacking-on 'stroke' to its title. Consequently, the CHSA's remit 
now embraces all chest, heart and stroke related illnesses. As 
one scientist commented, "the number of diseases falling within 
the CHSA's ambit is almost limitless; it is not surprising that 
their scope of international contact is non-existent. It would 
cost them a fortune to hold memberships with associations in order 
to represent all the diseases embraced by their remit".24
In considering charity's role in the international co­
operation and co-ordination of bio-medical research, special 
reference must be made to the Ciba Foundation. This British 
charity is the only organisation in the two countries whose 
specific purpose is to promote international dialogue between bio­
medical researchers. The Ciba Foundation - established by the 
Swiss pharmaceutical company, Ciba Geigy - was registered by the 
Charity Commission in 1947 as an educational charity. The 
Foundation operates independently from other charities or 
corporations in London and is internationally known for the 
symposia it organizes at its premises in London. The Ciba 
Foundation makes contributions towards research by holding eight
24British Interview; Imperial Cancer Research Fund, 19
February 1987.
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international symposia each year. The proceedings of these 
meetings are then edited by the Foundation's staff and published 
as hard back books. As Dr. David Evered, the Foundation's 
Executive Director, explained:
"Scientists are competitive and their work is 
often fuelled by it. I an convinced that this is 
not inherently bad. Although duplication
stemming from this competition is vital for the 
verification of results, there is often 
unintentional duplication resulting from limited 
communication networks. The aim of the Ciba 
Foundation is to resolve this problem by bringing 
researchers from around the world together under 
one roof and in doing so, to break down the 
barriers created by scientists by virtue of their 
selected areas of expertise."
25
C. Co-operation and.co-ordination of charity and government
sponsored research
The 'private benefits' argument to explain why charities co­
operate internationally with other charities does not seem to be 
applicable to charity-state co-operation and co-ordination of 
research. Here, the degree of co-operation to avoid wasteful 
duplication does not appear to hinge on volunteers seeking to 
protect their own interests by pressing charity administrators to 
apply research funds efficiently. Instead, motivation for co­
ordination at the state level seems to reflect the relative size 
of a charity's research commitment to a particular disease area 
vis-a-vis that of the government. In Britain and Canada, the 
problem of duplication is precipitated by multiple sources of
25British Interview; Ciba Foundation, 27 February 1987.
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funds available to scientists, regardless of their research focus. 
For example, there are the research councils which fund research 
into a wide range of disease areas and which overlap with research 
supported by one (or more) charities.26 However, in the peculiar 
case of British cancer charities an effort in co-ordinating 
research has been demonstrated.
In 1974, the British government, in collaboration with the 
six cancer research charities, established the United Kingdom Co­
ordinating Committee on Cancer Research (UKCCCR). Membership of 
the UKCCCR now includes the (B)MRC, the Cancer Research Campaign, 
the Imperial Cancer Research Fund, the Tenovous Cancer Fund, the 
Institute of Cancer Research, the Leukemia Research Fund and the 
Marie Curie Memorial Foundation. The aim of this 'umbrella' 
organisation is to disseminate scientific information among its 
members in order to eliminate duplication. The committee's 
executive meets twice a year, attended by the directors of the 
member charities, senior (B)MRC officials and observers from the 
DHSS. A permanent Secretary, housed at the (B)MRC's headquarters 
in London, is responsible for routine administrative matters 
including the collection of information relating to who receives 
funding for cancer research, how much is granted, what problems
26Pharmaceutical companies represent a third source of funds 
for bio-medical researchers. However, most of their research 
differs from that funded by charity and government. Drug company 
research is more commercially-oriented, towards developing new 
synthetic compounds to treat disease, rather than investigating 
the cause and cure of disease. The role of the British and 
Canadian pharmaceutical industries in shaping charity-state 
relations in each country is examined in chapter eight.
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the project seeks to address, and where the investigations are 
conducted. The UKCCCR has also been used by its members to lobby 
government on medical-related issues -such as increasing taxes on 
cigarettes as well as banning 'skullbandits' - a new type of oral 
tobacco.27
In contrast to cancer research in Britain, attempts to 
control duplication in all other disease areas in the two 
countries is left to more informal and ad-hoc mechanisms. British 
and Canadian charity executives were asked what procedures were in 
place to ensure that duplication of research into their particular 
disease was avoided. Fourteen of 18 Canadian respondents 
explained they were aware of what the (C)MRC was funding in their 
disease area since their reviewers performed a similar task for 
the (C)MRC (referred to as a cross-appointment). Likewise, of the 
26 British charities interviewed, 24 described a similar 
arrangement in Britain. With the exception of one respondent, the 
cross-appointment system was deemed a sufficient mechanism for 
deterring unnecessary duplication. The following statement by the 
Executive Director of the Heart and Stroke Foundation of Ontario 
typifies the attitudes of most British and Canadian charities 
towards this arrangement:
27As a member of the UKCCCR and as an agency deriving 98 per 
cent of its income from government, the (B)MRC encountered 
'political difficulties' when it was later learned that a factory 
built to manufacture skullbandits in Scotland had received a large 
government grant. The (B)MRC was therefore trapped in the 
confusion between the government's health policy and regional 
economic development policy.
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"To say that we check with the (C)MRC every year 
over every grant we make would be a fallacy. But 
the people who are grant reviewers for our 
organisation are likely to be reviewers for the 
(C)MRC or a part of that network. They would 
have a pretty good feel for what research has 
been done and what needs doing."
28
The vast majority of British and Canadian charities have not 
made 'cross-appointments' with the (B)MRC/(C)MRC a formal policy. 
Instead, as one respondent commented; "There might be some 
crossing over but it would almost be accidental". 29 There is an 
important explanation as to why charities have avoided making it a 
firm policy to use (B)MRC/(C)MRC scientists to review their grant 
applications. First, 'territorial protection' of their disease 
area, means that charities are reluctant to give any of their 
responsibilities away to the (B)MRC/(C)MRC, even to help avoid 
duplication. Charities have historically relied entirely on their 
own in-house expertise for reviewing grants, involving complex 
bureaucratic and administrative structures. By hiving-off all of 
their own peer-review responsibilities to (B)MRC/(C)MRC 
scientists, it is argued that the autonomy of these charities 
might be threatened.
In contrast, there are a small minority of charities like the 
Canadian Cancer Society and British Heart Foundation that require 
either (B)MRC/(C)MRC officials to participate in their granting
28Canadian Interview; Heart and Stroke Foundation of Ontario, 
11 December 1986.
29Canadian Interview; Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada, 3 
December 1986.
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process or that there be a formal exchange of technical 
information between them. This may lead to the design of a 
charity's research programme around -government interests rather 
than an integration of the two programmes. This distinction may 
seem inconsequential but is nonetheless an important consideration 
for charities whose fund raising success depends on being seen by 
the public as independent from government. In recognizing this, 
the (B)MRC commented: "When we have our scientists sitting on a 
charity's scientific review board, we understand the need to avoid 
stepping on their toes".30
Understanding what motivates British and Canadian charities 
to co-operate and co-ordinate their activities with government to 
avoid duplication involves distinguishing between at least three 
different funding policies adopted by charities. First, there are 
a few smaller charities, like the Canadian Alzheimer's Association 
(CAA), that limit themselves to providing supplementary grants to 
researchers whose main support comes from the (C)MRC. With this 
arrangement, the charity will liaise closely with government 
officials as a means of determining the appropriate funding level. 
These types of charities freely acknowledge the (C)MRC/(B)MRC as 
the leading funding agency hence communication and co-ordination 
of research is not problematic normally.
Second, there are a few charities like the Multiple Sclerosis 
Society of Canada and the British Heart Foundation, that refuse to 
support scientists receiving (B)MRC/(C)MRC funding. In the words
30British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
332
of one respondent; "if a scientist receives funding from the 
government, we ask them to choose between us and them; we simply 
refuse to adopt a 'dual funding policy'".31 These charities do 
not recognize the (B)MRC/(C)MRC as a senior partner in funding 
bio-medical research but rather covet this role themselves. Here, 
the likelihood of duplication is greatest, owing to poor 
communication and co-operation between the two. In their own 
defence of this policy, one Canadian charity spokesman claimed:
"there is no formal mechanism to protect against 
duplication or over-funding but there are a 
number of surreptitious ways of knowing what the 
(C)MRC is up to. We prefer this arrangement
because it gives us greater flexibility in
determining what projects we want funded".
32
A criticism of this approach is that charities may fund some lower 
quality research since good investigators, who are made to choose 
between charity and government, will normally opt for the latter, 
presumably more prestigious, option. As one scientist remarked; 
"if a charity gave me an ultimatum, there is no doubt that I would 
choose the (C)MRC even if the awards were commensurate in value 
and tenure".33
Third, the vast majority of charities, including the British
3¡.Canadian Interview; Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada, 3 
December 1986.
32Canadian Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Association, 5 
December 1986.
33Canadian Interview; McMaster University Medical School,
Department of Pathology, 19 January 1987.
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Diabetic Association and the Canadian Geriatrics Research Society, 
have a funding policy which is a compromise between the two 
approaches already described. These-charities fund investigators 
who are both independent of and yet closely associated with the 
(B)MRC/(C)MRC. These charities normally like to carve-out a 
scientific reputation of their own but this does not preclude them 
from collaborating with government on 'alpha' research projects 
worthy of dual support.34 Most respondents did not view a trade­
off between their collaboration with government and any loss of 
freedom or flexibility in determining their own research 
priorities.
D. The role of the Association of Medical Research Charities
(AMRO in eliminating duplication
In Britain, duplicated research is partly avoided through the 
role played by the Association of Medical Research Charities. 
Founded in 1972, the (AMRC) operated for many years as a loosely 
structured unincorporated organisation. During this time, 
discussion among the member charities centred on issues of mutual 
concern relating to the administration of their organisations. In 
1981 this changed when the AMRC began to realize the total 
contributions of its 35 member charities towards research was 
approaching the amount spent by government via the (B)MRC. 
Consequently, in 1982, the AMRC initiated plans to reconstitute 
itself, apply for charitable status and create a permanent
34Canadian Interview; McMaster University Medical School,
Department of Pathology, 19 January 1987.
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secretariat; a process that has lasted five years. It was 
believed this would give British medical research charities a 
forum with which to lobby government on issues of collective 
concern for example, government cutbacks to the (B)MRC and to the 
number of senior registrars employed in DHSS hospitals (these 
issues are examined in chapter six section I). The newly 
constituted AMRC is expected to operate as an 'information house' 
by collecting and disseminating information on research projects 
supported by member charities. Additionally, it is anticipated 
that the association will help to set standards of practice in 
grant assessment and performance evaluation. With regard to the 
first objective, the AMRC has already made considerable progress 
by implementing new granting policies aimed at correcting problems 
of nepotism that have plagued many smaller charities. In doing 
so, charities like the Arthritis and Rheumatism Council in Britain 
have created their own 'research policy committee' which ensures 
that their grants' review committee is distanced from the 
community of researchers who apply for support. With smaller 
charities representing less popular diseases, there are 
comparatively few scientists investigating in these disease areas. 
Consequently, as one respondent remarked; "it is frequently the 
case with small charities to have the monkeys guarding the 
bananas".35 In instances like this, the AMRC's policy has been to 
encourage charities to second eminent scientists from different.
35British Interview; Association of Medical Research 
Charities, 4 March 1987.
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but closely related, disease areas. For example, the Multiple 
Sclerosis Society's recently-appointed grants' review chariman is 
a leading expert on Parkinson's disease.
The newly constituted AMRC will also encourage members to use 
the association as a forum to arrange collaborative research 
ventures. Anne Luther, the AMRC's Secretary, explained that the 
association will eventually develop very flexible sub-groups, made 
up of charities with overlapping research programmes. For 
example, one sub-group representing neuro-muscular diseases might 
embrace the Spastics Society, the Muscular Dystrophy Group of 
Great Britain and the National Fund for Research into Crippling 
Diseases. Since the AMRC was registered by the Charity Commission 
during the final preparation of this thesis, it is difficult to 
assess its performance in fostering greater co-operation among 
member charities. For the same reason, the AMRC's interaction 
with the (B)MRC over the issue of duplication is also difficult to 
assess. However, when asked how the (B)MRC had received the news 
of the AMRC's intention of re-constituting itself, Luther 
explained:
"We haven't had a formal response from the 
(B)MRC. To be quite honest I think our new 
presence will be a little bit daunting for them. 
In terms of eliminating duplicated research, I am 
positive the (B)MRC will welcome us with open 
arms. However, on other issues, where the AMRC 
intends to make strong representations to 
government, the (B)MRC may feel that we are going 
to be usurping some of their traditional advisory
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powers."
In Canada, where there is no comparable association, the 
problem of duplication will continue to plague both government and 
charities. In the light of this, Canadian respondents were asked 
why a national association has not been created and what 
possibilities exist for the establishment of one in the future. 
In addressing the first part of the question, several explanations 
relating to Canada's federal system were given. Most charities 
feel that the combination of Canada's geographic size and small 
population, and the resulting economic costs, are not conducive to 
bringing people together under an umbrella organisation to discuss 
problems of mutual concern. Second, and a much more persuasive 
argument, is that charities are unsure of the federal government's 
power to influence the 'execution' of bio-medical research, since 
the institutions where research is conducted (universities and 
hospitals) fall within provincial jurisdictions. It was agreed 
that a national association, comprising medical research 
charities, might successfully lobby the federal government to 
increase its funding of the (C)MRC, but any subsequent input into 
the way in which 'research dollars' are spent would have to be 
negotiated with ten separate provincial governments. As one 
respondent remarked:
36
36British Interview; Association of Medical Research 
Charities, 4 March 1987.
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"In England, I can see why an association for 
medical research charities has been successful 
since they can go to Whitehall for everything ... 
they can ask for nore money and see the 
expenditures of- these monies right through to 
their end. In Canada, an association would have 
to lobby in Ottawa for 'research dollars' and if 
successful, it would then have to lobby from St. 
Johns to Victoria,
The absence of a national association could also be
attributed to the bilingual nature of Canada. The Psychiatric 
Research Society felt that it would be difficult to bring together 
francophone medical research charities from Quebec under an 
umbrella organisation dominated by charities from nine other 
anglophone provinces. An attempt to organise a coalition of
Canadian mental health research charities failed because the 
Quebec-based La Foundation pour La Recherche sur Melad Mental 
(FRMM) refused to collaborate with anglophone charities operating 
either inside or outside of Quebec. FRMM adopted this policy in 
the belief that anglophone mental health researchers from Quebec 
had previously received too much support at the expense of their 
francophone counterparts. Consequently, the FRMM funded the 
establishment of a research institute exclusively for francophone 
mental health investigators. 38
The absence of a Canadian interest association can also be 
explained by a difference in public awareness in each country of
37Canadian Interview; Canadian Mental Health Association, 18 
December 1986.
38Canadian Interview; Canadian Psychiatric Research
Foundation, 8 January 1987.
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the government's involvement in funding medical research. In 
contrast to the situation in Canada, the (B)MRC has a very strong 
standing in the minds of researchers, the public, and elected 
government officials. Because, the (B)MRC maintains its own
laboratories, and has a long and distinguished history of 
achievement, its public profile is firmly entrenched. 
Furthermore, British scientists reaching the pinnacle of the 
research community are publicly referred to as '(B)MRC scholars'.
In Canada, the same phenomenon does not exist, principally because 
the (C)MRC does not fund and administer its own laboratories. As 
a result, any recognition of the achievements made by (C)MRC - 
funded scientists tends to flow to the universities and hospitals 
where the research is actually conducted. Canadian medical 
research charities have benefited from this in so far as the 
public perceives them as being the only source of funding for 
medical research. As a spokesperson for the (C)MRC noted:
"Medical research charities have not created an 
association because they do not want to attract 
attention to the (C)MRC. To do so would 
dissipate their presence in the public's mind and 
perhaps limit their ability to raise voluntary 
donations."
39
The major drawback to this strategy - if indeed it can be 
correctly described as a strategy - is that Canadian medical 
research charities are unable to negotiate collectively when 
dealing with the federal government. From the government's
39Canadian Interview; Medical Research Council, 28 January 1987.
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viewpoint, the absence of a national association is preferable as 
they would rather negotiate with relatively weak individual 
charities as opposed to a strong association. This is 
particularly important since an association representing Canadian 
medical research charities and their volunteers might come to 
represent a coherent 'political vote'.
The fragmented lobbying effort in Canada is in sharp contrast 
to the highly co-ordinated activities spearheaded by the AMRC in 
Britain. Since most of the British public are aware of two 
sources of medical research funding - one public and one private- 
British charities have had nothing to lose, and everything to gain 
by drawing public attention to an issue such as cut-backs to the 
(B)MRC. In acknowledging government's shared responsibility for 
funding bio-medical research, British charities are also able to 
define their responsibilities vis-a-vis the (B)MRC's. For 
example, distinctions between British charities and the (B)MRC are 
easily drawn in relation to the type of research each funds, the 
type of support each provides and the duration of their research 
awards. These distinctions are highlighted in AMRC publications 
where it is argued that medical research in Britain is serviced 
best through a division of responsibility between government and 
charity. In doing this, the AMRC have argued that cutbacks to the 
(B)MRC translate into an increasing burden on charity to deliver a 
service historically defined as a shared responsibility. In 
Canada, a similar distinction between the respective role of the 
different bodies is blurred in the public's mind, principally
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because charities are mistakenly viewed as the sole provider of 
bio-medical research funds.
Lastly, Canadian medical research charities are ambivalent 
about the idea of a national association since they perceive 
Britain's AMRC as co-ordinating its member's fund raising 
campaigns. However, this is not the case; the AMRC's articles of 
association prevents the organisation from publicly campaigning 
for voluntary donations on its own behalf or for its individual 
members. In clarifying this point to Canadian charities, many 
respondents agreed that a Canadian association, comparable to the 
AMRC, would be a good vehicle for improving charity-state 
relations.
E. Duplication and scientific accountability
A universal problem for charity and governments dedicated to 
the efficient supply of medical research has involved making 
scientists fully acccountable for the financial support they 
receive. This includes making sure that scientists use charitable 
and government funds for the same investigations as those proposed 
in their grant application. To determine how this is enforced, 44 
British and Canadian charities were asked what control and 
accountability mechanisms were in place to ensure scientists 
utilized research grants for their intended purposes. The 
responses varied enormously. Only six charities (four Canadian 
and two British) admitted that the only guarantee that proper 
research had been conducted was the honesty and integrity of the 
scientists concerned. The remaining 38 charities required
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scientists to submit a number of progress reports during their 
investigations, and to publish final results in a recognized 
scientific journal, acknowledging their charity as the funding 
source. Publication of final reports in scholarly journals is an 
effective control device since scientists would be unable to 
submit a report on the project for which they received funds if 
they had substantially altered their research focus. Although 
initially it may seem an insignificant deterrent, an investigator 
seeking future grants could ill-afford a reputation for failing to 
do research as outlined originally in a grant application.
Many charities, like Britain's Multiple Sclerosis Society, 
enforce very strict accountability regulations to deter the 
misapplication of funding and to assess whether funding should be 
terminated or extended. On this point, the Executive Director of 
the Multiple Sclerosis Society stated:
"If a scientist fails to make satisfactory 
progress, then that person is required to appear 
before our sub-committee and also normally 
receive an on-site visit from people who sit on 
our Medical Advisory Committee."
40
Enforcing accountability also gives a charity current 
information to report to its volunteers and donating public. The 
annual reports of virtually all British and Canadian charities 
include progress reports on research completed or in progress. 
Obviously, volunteers who are family or friends of those afflicted
40British Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great 
Britain, 19 February 1987.
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by a particular disease would look unfavourably upon a scientist 
who changes the focus of his investigation. (A scientist funded 
to investigate alzheimer's disease, who later changed his focus to 
a related disease like huntington's disease or parkinson's 
disease, would alienate volunteers who had worked hard to raise 
money for their disease).
A number of medical research charities in both countries 
disagreed with the idea of making scientists accountable during 
their research since many investigations do not bear fruit until 
the projects are completed. Furthermore, they argued that 
scientists place a premium on freedom and independence, and any 
charity that tampers with this restricts progress instead of 
aiding it. Nonetheless, the vast majority of British and Canadian 
charities agreed that accountability upon completion of a research 
project should be compulsory.
The argument whether charities should enforce stricter 
guidelines to make scientists more accountable has heightened 
debate over the practicality of charities administering their own 
research facilities. Chapter five section V. A, listed the 
advantages and disadvantages that the (B)MRC enjoy over its 
Canadian counterpart in administering its own research units 
located in university science departments. The remaining question 
is whether other charities should emulate the Imperial Cancer 
Research Fund (ICRF) which, like the (B)MRC, funds and operates 
its own research laboratories. By carefully co-ordinating entire 
research teams, the ICRF claims it can influence the direction of
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scientific investigation. Multi-disciplinary cancer research is 
made possible through close scientific collaboration of its 
various research departments. The ICRF cites the difficulty in 
co-ordinating university-based research.
"Medical research charities cannot instruct 
university-based scientists to take a project 
down a certain road or to collaborate with a 
scientist from a different university. These 
investigators simply see themselves as 
individuals owing allegiance to their own 
university department as opposed to a donor 
charity."
41
On the other side of the debate, virtually all Canadian and 
British respondents identified the enormous costs of building and 
maintaining research facilities as the principal reason for not 
following the ICRF's approach. The Cancer Research Campaign, the 
ICRF's major competitor, was critical of the ICRF's inability to 
quickly shift its research focus quickly. For example:
"a large number of the ICRF's scientific staff 
are immunologists which is fine if the current 
thinking accepts that cancer is linked to 
deficiencies in man's immune system. However, if 
at a later date biochemists appear to be on the 
cutting edge of cancer research, the ICRF will be 
strapped with personnel possessing the wrong 
skills."
42
The Cancer Research Campaign further argued that the ICRF's
41British Interview; Imperial Cancer Research Fund, 19 
February 1987.
42British Interview; Cancer Research Campaign, 11 March 1987.
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research establishments only perform well as long as their 
directorships are not vaccant. If these positions became
available either because someone has quit, retired, or has died, 
the direction of a research unit is thrown into disarray. 
"Incoming directors have little mobility to tailor their own 
research thrusts since investigators are normally committed to the 
previous director's vision of success".43
il* Charity-State Co-operation;__Joint Supply q £ MedicalResearch
While this section is unrelated to the issue of duplication 
it is central to our discussion of medical research as a jointly- 
supplied public good by charity and the state. It illustrates 
that in the bio-medical research policy field, co-operation 
between public and private sectors can be measured by the degree 
of interaction between charity and the (B)MRC/(C)MRC. In both 
countries, there are remarkable examples of close collaboration 
between charity and government in the joint-funding and 
administration of medical research projects.
In Britain, the best examples of collaboration is the 
partnership between the (B)MRC and Cancer Research Campaign in 
funding the Institute of Cancer Research (ICR). According to the 
ICR's Annual Report. 1985. the collaborative venture costs each 
agency £3.5 million each year. 44 The ICR has a peculiar
43Ibid.
44Figures taken from, Institute of Cancer Research, Annual 
Report. 1985. London, 1986.
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constitution in that it is a limited company, with a board of 
directors, known as 'Members of the Institute'. The ICR is a 
registered charity. Its main function is to carry out research 
into cancer and in this capacity, it is closely linked with the 
Royal Marsden Hospital, where its staff have access to patients. 
In return, the Royal Marsden utilizes the Institute's laboratories 
for pathological tests and other work. The (B)MRC began to fund 
the ICR in the early 1950's because the latter was suddenly 
deprived of funds. The ICR had previously depended heavily upon 
the Royal Marsden Hospital and was taken over with it, by the 
Ministry of Health, in 1948. In 1951, the National Health Service 
(N.H.S.) separated the hospital from the ICR and stopped 
supporting the latter on the ground that it was engaged primarily 
in research. The University Grants Committee (UGC) refused to 
pick up the funding for the ICR because the Institute did little 
teaching. In the end, the (B)MRC approached the Cancer Research 
Campaign in an attempt to work out the details of a joint funding 
arrangement for the ICR. At first, it was intended that the 
Institute be administered by the (B)MRC as one of its own research 
establishments and that the staff should be brought into the 
Council's sphere of control. The senior members of the existing 
staff, along with the Cancer Research Campaign objected to this 
arrangement as it would threaten their independence and academic 
status. At the time, the Institute was registered as a 
postgraduate school of the University of London and, therefore, 
some members of the staff were fearful of losing their titles. As
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a result of this protestation, the ICR established its own 
Committee of Management, whose members were nominated by the 
(B)MRC and the Cancer Research Campaign. This meant that all 
management decisions and policy directives would be determined in 
close consultation between charity and government. 45
Premised on the high quality of research conducted by the 
ICR, this joint venture represents a remarkable example of 
charity-state co-operation in the area of medical research. It 
also exemplifies the government's dependence on voluntary 
contributions to maintain facilities and services now considered 
primarily to be a state responsibility.46
In Canada, there are similar examples of close collaboration 
between charity and government. The National Cancer Institute of 
Canada (NCIC) and the (C)MRC joint-funding of the Breast Cancer 
Screening Programme is perhaps the best. This research venture, 
costing each agency $8.5 million (£4.2 million), is implemented 
through a 'policy advisory group' representing the NCIC, (C)MRC, 
and the Department of Health and Welfare ( DHW). The NCIC has 50 
per cent voting rights, as do the (C)MRC and DHW combined, thus 
allowing each to participate in policy decisions affecting the
45lbid. For a more detailed account of how the Institute of 
Cancer Research is structured and administered see Fanny Mitchell, 
'The Research Councils' in D.C. Hague, W.J.M. Mackenzie, A. 
Barker, Public Policy and Private Interests. London: MacMillan, 
1975, pp. 224-228.
46Chapter seven section I assesses whether charities have 
become the victims of their own success. Evidence is given on 
both sides of the debate to evaluate whether the increasing income 
of medical research charities has allowed the British government 
to reduce its overall commitment to bio-medical research.
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programme's direction. The NCIC's Director of Research described 
the collaborative venture as, "one that allowed us and government 
to do something that neither could do-alone".47
In the non-cancer field, the Muscular Dystrophy Group of 
Great Britain (MDGGB) provides us with another example of 
collaboration between charity and government. The MDGGB funds a 
(B)MRC research fellow who is a leading expert on DNA at the John 
Radcliffe Hospital in Oxford. This researcher uses the 
'charitable money' to hire additional staff to work in the (B)MRC 
unit and, in turn, they investigate the relationship between DNA 
and muscular dystrophy. That is, the (B)MRC maintains the 
research unit which in turn, 'sells' the charity the laboratory 
bench space. The charity is not actually paying for overheads or 
rent, but it does provide the funds for a researcher to work in a 
(B)MRC unit. As the MDGGB's Executive Director explained:
"When there is a (B)MRC unit which is dealing 
with a specific scientific problem within which 
we can put our own very specific part of that 
problem, then we will try to do so. This is what 
we have done with the genetic study of muscular 
dystrophy. When we learned that the (B)MRC's DNA 
Laboratory was working on the whole human gene we 
approached them, put in our own people and 
concentrated exclusively on muscular dystrophy."
48
The British Heart Foundation, which also funds scientists working
47Canadian Interview; National Cancer Institute of Cancer, 28 
November 1986.
48British Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great 
Britain, 19 February 1987.
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in (B)MRC units, described these arrangements as "peculiar 
examples of charity directly subsidizing what is properly (the 
responsibility of) government". 49 In Canada, where the (C)MRC 
does not maintain its own research institutes, or units within 
universities, this type of collaborative venture is not possible. 
Instead, jointly sponsored research projects like the Breast 
Cancer Screening Unit are conducted by scientists from one or more 
university science departments.
In various disease areas where there has not been direct 
collaboration between charity and government, it is more difficult 
to determine whether each views the other as a partner or a 
competitor. Several of the larger British and Canadian charities 
view themselves as 'senior partners' and look to government to 
fill in gaps left by the charities. They claim they rely on 
government only for the provision of a scientific infra-structure 
-developed in Britain through the dual support system and in 
Canada through the (C)MRC. This infra-structure involves the 
(C)MRC and (B)MRC providing training fellowships so that the 
charities will receive future grant applications from qualified 
scientists. In contrast, smaller charities like the Multiple 
Sclerosis Society of Canada view the (C)MRC as an equal partner. 
"We look upon the (C)MRC as our older sibling; they have a little 
more experience with funding bio-medical research and have people
49British Interview; British Heart Foundation, 3 March 1987.
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III. Determination of Government Research Priorities
A slightly less obvious kind of collective good, and one that 
is often supplied by charities, is the work of a pressure group. 
If a pressure group works on behalf of a group of people with 
common interests, its activities are clearly a collective good to 
those people. Some pressure groups, however, represent people who 
share not so much interests as attitudes.51 For example, many of 
the supporters of the Cancer Research Campaign are not cancer 
patients and in the non-medical research field, most supporters of 
the Howard League for Penal Reform are presumably not likely to 
become clients of the prison service. Nevertheless, if collective 
goods are defined in reference to wants, the activities of this 
latter kind of pressure group would be collective goods to the 
groups of people who share the relevant attitudes. Many
commentators have argued there are certain kinds of pressure group 
activities that are collective goods and best provided by 
charities.52 Since the purpose of a pressure group is to exert 
influence on government, this is hardly an activity that can 
safely be left to government. Although there have been examples
50Canadian Interview; Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada, 3 
December 1986.
SIRobert Sugden, Voluntary Organisations__and__the Welfare
State, p. 72.
52N. Johnson, Voluntary Social Services. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell and Martin Robertson, 1981, chapter 3; and R.M. Kramer,
Voluntary Agencies in the__Welfare__State. Berkeley California:
University of California Press, 1981, chapter 11.
on their staff whom we can call on when we need advice".50
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of government-sponsored pressure groups (the Community Development 
Projects initiated in 1969 increasingly took on this role), a 
pluralist democracy has- traditionally relied on independent 
organisations that are able to criticize the government without 
any clash of loyalties.53 It is shown below that pressure group 
activity is undoubtedly a significant part of the work undertaken 
by British and Canadian medical research charities.
Whether British and Canadian medical research charities have 
large incomes or small, collaborate closely with the (B)MRC/(C)MRC 
or view themselves as competitors, all would like to see 
government spend more on researching the disease they represent. 
Given that the fund raising success of other, non-medical- 
research, charities has been inversely related to the role played 
by government, the statement is a surprising one. 54 Where 
government involvement has increased, public support of charity, 
through decreased voluntary donations has normally followed. For 
example, in Canada, with the federal government's expansion of the 
Department of Environment to address issues like acid rain, 
charitable support for organisations with similar aims and 
objectives has declined.55 However, one argument is that medical 
research charities support increased governmental presence in
53It is worthwhile mentioning that the Community Development 
Projects were eventually closed down by the government.
54See especially, Maria Brenton, The Voluntary Sector in 
British Social Services. London: Longman, 1985, pp. 15-20.
55Canadian Interview; Secretary of State - Voluntary Action
Programme, 27 January 1987.
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their policy area since the (B)MRC/(C)MRC fund a different type of 
research which attracts little public attention.
As previously discussed in chapter four, British and Canadian 
medical research charities tend to fund disease-oriented research, 
often referred to as applied research. Since many small and 
medium-sized charities are administered by disease sufferers or 
are influenced by volunteers who are sufferers, expenditures on 
research tend to be for investigations promising to yield 
immediate, practical results. In both countries, larger charities 
like those funding cancer research, can afford to support both 
applied research and to a lesser extent non-disease-related basic 
(or pure) research, which is the type of investigation that the 
(B)MRC and (C)MRC concentrate on. Most charities do not fund 
basic science, as it is difficult to raise money for research that 
has no apparent relevance to disease sufferers. It is important 
to add, though, that all basic research has a connection to a 
specific disease(s). sometimes this connection can be clearly 
identified before research is initiated; in other words it is only 
by chance that basic research leads to discovering the cause and 
cure of a disease. An example of the former is the previously 
discussed DNA research project supported by the (B)MRC which was 
thought to hold great potential for understanding the cause of 
Muscular Dystrophy. Similarly, basic research conducted by the 
(B)MRC/ (C )MRC into muscle fibre has long been thought to assist 
charity-funded scientists in understanding the causes and cures 
for, physical handicaps.
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Unlike charities, the (B)MRC/(C)MRC begin their research by 
examining the normal functions of a healthy body, for example: 
how muscle fibre works, how the brain functions or how the body's 
immune system operates. These types of studies provide the 
opportunity for the abnormal to 'spring-out' of an understanding 
of the normal. Occasionally it is advantageous for basic 
researchers to understand the 'normal' by examining disease 
conditions which pervert normality.
Both the (B)MRC and (C)MRC argued that they are in a 
difficult position to fund basic research since it is less 
appealing to the public than the disease-related research
supported by charities. In correcting this, both agencies have 
given priority to public education on the relevance of basic 
research in finding the causes of and cures for diseases. This is 
because it has become increasingly difficult to justify basic 
research to taxpaying publics who see people dying of specific 
diseases. In other words, the (B)MRC and (C)MRC's marketing 
strategy has been to strengthen the connection in the public's 
mind between basic research and applied research. As the (B)MRC 
respondent noted:
"Our adoption of this approach has been 
influenced - perhaps instigated is the right 
choice of words - by the large number of 
questions that we are asked either in Parliament 
or by the media. It's part of our mandate to 
prove ourselves accountable to the public in a 
way that the lay person can understand."
56
56British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
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In the process of doing so, the (B)MRC has written a computer 
programme which classifies their grants as to their relevance to 
specific diseases. The problem with this is that there are 
endless variations in the (B)MRC's formulation of their commitment 
to specific diseases, since basic research may overlap with ten 
different disease areas. For example, in response to a 
parliamentary question relating to the government's research 
commitment to cystic fibrosis, the figure of £1 million was 
supplied by the (B)MRC. The Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust 
described this figure as "... ludicrous since of that amount only 
£30,000 has ever been specifically earmarked by the government for 
cystic fibrosis research, the remaining £970,000 was spent on 
related chest and respiratory investigations".57 While the (C)MRC 
does not have a comparable computer programme, it has recently 
appointed an 'information officer', who liaises with the media, as 
a means of publicizing the (C)MRC's contributions to medical 
research progress. In both countries, these two approaches 
symbolize that governments are aware of its need to defend their 
research programmes.
Chapter four listed a number of reasons why charities 
representing less popular diseases like schizophrenia, bowel 
disease, and sexually transmitted diseases, encounter difficulty 
raising voluntary donations, despite the large number of people
57British Interview; Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust, 24 
February 1987.
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afflicted. One might argue that the state has a responsibility to 
fund disease areas that are under-funded by charity. If this is 
the case, then the question remains why successive governments 
have operated like their charitable counterparts by giving less 
support to unpopular and horrific diseases. Furthermore, why have 
the British and Canadian governments strongly endorsed cancer and, 
recently, AIDS research?
The combined government and charitable commitment to cancer 
research varies dramatically between Britain, Canada and the 
United States (U.S.). In the U.S. approximately £998 billion is 
spent on cancer research. With a population of 250 million, this 
represents almost £4 per capita. In Britain, with a population of 
50 million, approximately £75 million is spent on cancer research; 
this translates into £1.50 per person. With Canada's 25 million 
population, £25 million is spent on cancer research, representing 
£ 1 per person. Although Britain spends 30 per cent more per 
capita on cancer research than Canada, data indicate that this is 
far more than is spent on less popular diseases in each country.58 
The (B)MRC and (C)MRC have defended their records by arguing that 
they fund the best quality research applications which happen to 
come from scientists working in the cancer field. In the (C)MRC's 
own words:
"We would gladly support research into the less
58Data for cancer research expenditures in Britain, Canada 
and the United States obtained from the National Cancer Institute 
of Canada. Canadian Interview; National Cancer Institute of 
Canada, 28 November 1986.
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popular areas on a larger scale but we can only 
do that if we receive grant applications from 
skilled scientists who have better proposals than 
researchers in the area of cancer."
59
Herein lies the fundamental problem facing charities representing 
less popular diseases. Since these organisations encounter 
difficulties raising voluntary donations, they cannot afford to 
develop a pool of talented young investigators in their disease 
area. In contrast, large charities like the National Cancer 
Institute of Canada and the Cancer Research Campaign have the 
resources to groom researchers from the beginning of their careers 
until they are fully able to compete for government funding. 
Furthermore, the larger and more prestigious research awards 
offered by the cancer organisations often attract the best 
researchers, thus leaving less capable scientists to devote their 
careers to researching 'orphan' diseases. When these scientists 
apply for (B)MRC/(C)MRC funding they are less able to compete with 
the 'top-flight' cancer researchers. Lastly, because of their 
large incomes, the cancer charities are able to support a mixture 
of 'applied' and 'basic' research. When their scientists apply 
for (B)MRC/(C)MRC funding they are able to tailor research 
applications to the government's requirement for an orientation to 
basic research. In contrast, charities representing less popular 
diseases are limited to funding applied research. As a result, 
when their scientists later apply to the (B)MRC/(C)MRC,
59Canadian Interview; Medical Research Council, 28 January 1987.
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highlighting their disease-related research careers, they are less 
successful than their cancer counterparts.60
Obtaining figures on the level of (B)MRC and (C)MRC funding 
for specific diseases is difficult since their statistics are not 
calculated on the basis of disease but rather disease areas. For 
example, instead of the (B)MRC and (C)MRC listing figures relating 
to their research commitment to heart research, they provide 
information on the amount spent on researching the circulatory 
system. Based on this, some charities have been able to compare 
their research commitment to that of government's. The figures 
given by the charities representing less popular diseases, 
illustrate that these organisations often assume the leading 
research role vis-a-vis the government. For example, in Britain, 
while the MDGGB spent £1.6 million on muscular dystrophy research, 
the (B)MRC spent only £150,000 on all types of neuromuscular 
diseases.61 Similarly, in 1986, the Multiple Sclerosis Society in 
Britain allocated £2 million for research compared to the 
(B)MRC's £460,000.62 As the Executive Director of the Cystic
60A further problem with medical research charities 
representing 'orphan' diseases is that charitable donations are 
often wasted on funding the wrong type of research. Because of 
the pressures exerted by volunteers to fund applied research, 
charities frequently try to find the cure for their disease before 
they know its cause(s). The (B)MRC/(C)MRC grant policy does 
little to correct this problem, since for the reasons identified 
above, they fund little basic research into these less-popular 
diseases.
61British Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great 
Britain, 19 February 1987.
62British Interview; Multiple Sclerosis Society, 25 February
1987.
357
Fibrosis Trust explained:
"I have only heard of one project which could be 
called cystic fibrosis research that has been 
funded by the (B)MRC, and that was several years 
ago. Even that research project was funded at a 
token level of £30,000. As far as I an aware the 
(B)MRC does not fund a single investigation which 
is specifically related to our disease."
63
In Canada, it is also difficult for charities to know how 
much the (C)MRC is spending on specific disease research. Only 
one respondent - The Canadian Cancer Society - was able to give a 
precise figure. Of the remaining 17 respondents, 16 viewed 
themselves as the leading research funding agency. Likewise, 22 
of Britain's 26 charities interviewed saw government as funding 
less basic research in their specific disease area than applied 
research funded by themselves. Most respondents claimed that this 
knowledge was acquired by the scientists themselves who tend to 
know better than anyone, where research money emanates from.
Much of the existing Canadian and British science literature 
argues that the (B)MRC and (C)MRC are insulated from political 
influences over the allocation of research budgets amongst various 
disease areas.64 However, this can be challenged by focusing on 
how the (B)MRC/(C)MRC research policies are determined and the 
role played by charities and government in influencing this
63Ibid.
64See especially, A.C. Thomson, Half a Century of Medical 
Research. London: HMSO, 1975, p. 10, and for a Canadian
analysis, see. Medical Research Council, Newsletter. Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1985.
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process.
In Britain, one of the major influences on the (B)MRC, which 
is often overlooked, is the DHSS. This department has 
representatives on all the (B)MRC's Research Boards and senior 
officials attend all (B)MRC executive meetings. The DHSS is also 
involved in nominating members of the (B)MRC's four Research 
Boards giving them direct influence on research priorities.65 The 
DHSS' own priorities are, in turn, influenced by several forces 
including, strong lobbies organized by charities as well as 
pressures from elected officials. Not surprisingly, the strongest 
and most effective lobbies come from organized interests 
representing popular diseases like cancer. The cancer charities 
have the capital and human resources to sway the attitudes of 
elected officials which, in turn, are filtered down through the 
DHSS and eventually to the (B)MRC. As one executive director from 
a small British charity noted:
"In the medical research policy field politicians 
are reactionary - they respond only to strong 
pressure and unfortunately that has not been 
forthcoming from us, but it has come from the 
cancer research charities. It is not the civil 
servants that are controlling the government's 
research priorities, it is the politicians 
themselves who bend under political pressures. 
Until we develop a strong lobby, (disease name 
ommitted) will always be disregarded by
65The four Research Boards are the Neurosciences and Mental 
Health Board, Cell Biology and Disorders Board, Physiological 
Systems and Disorders Board, and the Tropical Medicine Research 
Board.
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government as a priority."
Similarly, the lobbiest for the Canadian Cancer Society remarked 
that "our success in influencing government research priorities is 
clearly a result of continual pressure being placed on both 
elected and unelected officials."67 The Canadian Geriatrics 
Research Society explained that, while millions of Canadians 
suffer from the debilitating effects caused by the aging process, 
the federal government's response in funding research in this area 
has thus far been limited. This is likely to change in 15 years 
when an extra 20 per cent of Canada's population turns 65 
(retirement age) and the financial burden of supporting an 
economically unproductive population becomes too great.68 In
Britain, the Back Pain Association has provided government 
officials with statistical evidence demonstrating the economic 
costs of this affliction, including the number of lost working 
days and related NHS costs. Thus, in both countries, evidence 
suggests that governments are often responsive to public pressures 
which include economic arguments when determining research 
priorities. One can argue this is being done to the exclusion of 
any substantial consideration of incidence rates.
66British Interview; March 1987.
67Canadian Interview; Canadian Cancer Society, 30 January
1987.
66
68Canadian Interview; Canadian Geriatrics Research Society,
12 January 1987.
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In Canada, departmental officials from Health and Welfare, as 
well as elected officials, frequently attend (C)MRC organisational 
meetings where research agendas are _ set. Furthermore, in the 
cancer and spinal cord disease areas it has recently been 
demonstrated that federal politicians have even by-passed the 
(C)MRC and become directly involved in acquiring research funds 
for popular, high profile, diseases. For example, in 1979, a 
young Canadian named Terry Fox, who had lost a leg from cancer, 
attempted to run across the country. His run evoked a tremendous 
charitable outpouring, eventually raising £26 million dollars (£13 
million) for the National Cancer Institute of Canada (NCIC). The 
Liberal government of the day dramatically increased its 
commitment to cancer research by $8 million (£4 million) in the 
one year period 1980 - 1981. As a result, the NCIC collected more 
money for research than was possible to spend, given the shortage 
of qualified cancer scientists. Prior to the Terry Fox run, the 
Canadian cancer research community had established an equilibrium 
of researchers to match existing resources. With the sudden 
insurgence of charitable money and (C)MRC funds (the latter for 
sheer political reasons) the cancer field, for a short time had 
more money than talent.69 Similarly, in 1986, Rick Hansen - a 
Canadian suffering from a spinal cord disease, successfully 
travelled around the world in a wheelchair. When Hansen arrived 
in Ottawa during what was popularly referred to as his 'marathon
69J. Brow and G. Harvey, Terry Fox. Toronto* Confederation 
Press, 1980. pp. 31-36.
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of hope', the current Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, staged an 
elaborate press conference where he pledged $1 million (£500,000) 
in taxpayers money for spinal cord _research. In response, one 
Canadian respondent explained:
"Where was the government money for spinal cord 
research before Rick Hansen came along? Better 
still, where do you think the government will 
stand on spinal cord research when Rick Hansen 
has finished his trip. I think it is disgraceful 
that medical research priorities are determined 
by political whims."
70
A. Determination of goverment research priorities:
Among medical research charities, the AIDS issue has 
triggered strong disapproval of the British and Canadian 
government's tendency towards funding popular diseases. In both 
countries, the government has approached the AIDS problem on two 
fronts, through education and research. On 26 February 1987, the 
British government announced that it would channel £14.5 million 
to the (B)MRC specifically earmarked for AIDS research.71 Prior 
to that, the government had funded a £20 million public education 
campaign that included the distribution of 23 million leaflets to 
every household bearing the slogan "AIDS Don't Die of Ignorance". 
This was augmented with a television advertising campaign urging 
people to read the literature. In January 1987, the Canadian
70Canadian Interview; Canadian Geriatrics Research Society, 
12 January 1987.
71The Times, 26 January 1987.
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government responded in a similar way by committing $39 million (£ 
19.5 million) to AIDS research and by funding a comprehensive AIDS 
awareness campaign through the media.72 As argued in chapter five 
section IV. A, the early response to AIDS in 1980 in both 
countries was slow when the disease was thought to affect only 
male homosexuals. When epidemiological studies revealed the 
potential danger to heterosexuals, government research and 
education funding was increased dramatically. Now the 
administrators of some charities have criticized the government 
for writing a blank cheque for AIDS researchers. Most respondents 
interviewed, felt the reversal in government policy towards the 
disease was influenced by public opinion to find a cure for a 
disease described daily in the media in such terms as, 'worse than 
the Black Death' and, 'a scourge of pandemic proportions'.
In 1984 the British government established a special Cabinet 
committee to consider the need for funding AIDS research, it was 
to collect evidence from many sources, including pharmaceutical 
companies, charities and the (B)MRC. In doing so, the 
government's response to AIDS differed from its response to 
funding other diseases. Normally the Advisory Board for the 
Research Councils (ABRC) makes its case to DES each year for the 
money it needs for bio-medical research, based on information 
collected from the (B)MRC. The ABRC's bid is then passed on to 
the Treasury where the funding level of the science budget is 
determined. However, in the case of AIDS, the Cabinet committee
72Toronto Star. 17 January 1987.
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liaised directly with Treasury officials to encourage the 
development of an effective AIDS research programme. The extra 
£14.5 million given to the (B)MRC was a result of public and 
political pressures combined with the (B)MRC's own special 
pressure on government for increased funding.73
As in Britain, additional funds for Canadian AIDS research 
were attributed to political interventions. Jake Epp, the 
Minister of Health and Welfare, established the National Advisory 
Committee on AIDS (NACA) to advise him on any issue relating to 
the 'research and prevention of this disease'. Similar to the 
special Cabinet committee in Britain, NACA was instrumental in 
negotiating the $39 million (£19.5 million) increase to the 
(C)MRC's budget. The (C)MRC's early response to funding AIDS 
research differed from the (B)MRC in that it bypassed existing 
peer review committees by running an 'open grants competition'.74 
In doing so, a respondent identified at least one problem that 
arises when medical research becomes politicized.
“Because there has been a lot of public pressure 
placed on the government to find a cure for AIDS, 
the politicians have dramatically increased the 
(C)MRC's research budget. However, in doing so 
they have also tampered with their granting 
mechanisms. The (C)MRC's open competition for 
AIDS research has called into question the 
(C)MRC's independence and scientific reputation. 
Via the rumour mill, you hear that AIDS research 
projects are being funded despite their inferior 
quality. In other words, successful AIDS
73British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987. 
74Toronto Star. 17 January 1987.
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research applications have been inferior to ones 
rejected in the regular (C)MRC competitions."
75
This has angered Canadian medical research charities for two 
reasons. First, by offering special 'AIDS Funding', some
charities have feared losing their best scientists who are 
naturally inclined to 'grab the carrot' being offered by 
government. Second, charities representing less popular diseases 
have argued that the money for AIDS research would be taken from 
other research programmes thereby displacing the already minimal 
investigations being conducted in their disease area by (C)MRC 
supported scientists.
The major criticism that British and Canadian charities 
expressed of their government's response to AIDS centred on the 
notion of incidence rates and their role in determining government 
research priorities. For example, in early 1987 the Cystic 
Fibrosis Research Trust argued that government spends £14.5 
million on AIDS research when a mere 389 people have died from the 
disease, while only £30,000 has been spent on cystic fibrosis 
research where 400 new cases are diagnosed each year in Britain.76 
Governments have justified their level of spending on AIDS 
research because the disease is not just debilitating but 
inevitably fatal. Yet, 95 per cent of all cystic fibrosis
75Canadian Interview; McMaster University Medical School, 
Department of Pathology, 19 January 1987.
76British Interview; Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust, 24
February 1987.
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patients also die by the time they have reached their early 
thirties.77 Similarly, in Canada, The Alzheimer Society argued 
"that it is scandalous that government earmarks $39 million (£19.5 
million) for AIDS research when 224 people have died from the 
disease compared to only $1 million (£50,000) for research to help 
the 30,000 existing alzheimer's sufferers".78 The charity's 
executive director recognized that alzheimer is not a contagious 
disease like AIDS but nonetheless argued that unlike alzheimer's, 
AIDS could be prevented by individual action. This last point has 
galvanized that charity's (and others) disaffection with the 
government's response to AIDS. As one respondent remarked:
"I personally feel bitter about the government's 
handling of the AIDS issue. It is frustrating to 
watch government respond to a disease like AIDS 
just to score political points when we are 
working tirelessly to raise voluntary donations; 
it strikes me as absolutely uneven and 
disproportionate. It is insulting when
government spends this amount on researching a 
disease that could be prevented by people simply 
exercising greater morality. In turn, government 
spends a mere pittance on researching our disease 
which cannot be prevented."
79
Both British and Canadian charities have had difficulties 
expressing public discontent with the government's handling of the 
AIDS issue. Medical research charities have not wanted to give
77lbid.
78Canadian Interview; Alzheimer's Society of Canada, 10 
February 1987.
79British Interview; Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust, 24
February 1987.
366
the donating public the impression that charities representing 
different disease areas are competing among themselves because 
inevitably this would dampen all fund'raising efforts. Again, the 
medical research charities have not wanted to condemn the state 
spending more on medical research, since overall this remains a 
fundamental objective of most organisations. Moreover, and this 
is an argument advanced by only a few charities, basic research of 
relevance to AIDS, which is funded through the (B)MRC/(C)MRC, 
might actually yield important results about the bodies immune 
system that might be relevant to other virus-based diseases.
AIDS has highlighted the extent to which the (C)MRC and 
(B)MRC are susceptible to political influences in the
determination of research priorities. One conclusion which 
departs from widespread belief is that medical research charities 
and the (B)MRC/(C)MRC are not 'fully' complementary, since charity 
and government fund the same popular diseases at unrealistically 
high levels in comparison to less popular diseases with high rates 
of incidence. Governments will continue to fund popular diseases 
in response to public pressure as a means of augmenting its 
support, while the level of voluntary support for charities will 
always be determined by the nature of the disease being 
represented (chapter five section IV. B). Unfortunately the 
forces at work on government and charity are the same, and the 
result is a dual bias in favour of particular diseases.
b . Charity and the disease lobby
Chapter three described the restrictions placed on charities
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with regard to their political activities. Despite the law 
British and Canadian charities have nonetheless become drawn into 
the political process to better achieve their aims and objectives. 
Because of the British and Canadian governments' susceptibility to 
public influences, and the resulting tendency towards funding 
popular diseases like cancer and AIDS, it is not surprising that 
charities representing less popular diseases have begun to lobby 
government as a means of correcting this imbalance.
The Back Pain Association (BPA) is one British charity that 
has successfully influenced government to increase its research 
commitment towards their disease area. In 1973, the BPA presented 
its own study to government using 'Whitehall statistics', 
illustrating the economic costs that back pain was levying on the 
National Health System. The study concluded that government and 
the British taxpayers could actually save money if more was spent 
on research and if a cure was found. The more interesting point 
is the ways in which this charity convinced elected officials to 
consider their reports
"Our report would never have seen the light of 
day in Parliament if it were not for our chairman 
- Stanley Grundy - who was at the same time the 
Chairman of the Conservative Association of 
Twickenham."
80
The Back Pain Association's chairman was able to induce his Member 
of Parliament (Tobby Jessel) to ask questions of the then Minister
80British Interview; Back Pain Association, 17 February 1987.
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of Health, David Owen, concerning the charity's report. In the 
end, the government did what it normally does when it is 
confronted with a unique problem; it ^appointed its own committee 
of inquiry. In 1976, the committee was established and chaired by 
Professor Archy Cochrane who presented his report three years 
later. It concluded that "the economic costs of back pain 
equalling 33.3 million lost working days warrants the government 
to make this highly debilitating disease a research priority."81
In Canada, too, charities have used economic arguments in 
their plea to government to spend more towards researching their 
particular disease. Many of the arguments strike at the root of 
other government policies relating to Canada's health-care system. 
For example, the Canadian Psychiatric Research Foundation (CPRF) 
has provided statistical evidence to government indicating that it 
could save tax dollars if a small proportion of the budget spent 
on institutionalizing mental health patients was redirected 
towards research. In CPRF's own words:
"If government took this money and reallocated it 
to research, it would more than pay back itself 
over the long run. Our lobbying efforts strike 
at the fundamental government policy which is 
impregnated in the system. The institutional
infra-structure already in place used for
'warehousing' mental health patients is proving 
difficult to dismantle."
82
81Ibid. This report has remained unpublished.
82Canadian Interview; Canadian
Foundation, 8 January 1987.
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Psychiatric Research
The CPRF further explained that decision makers have been 
unwilling to act on its advice since government has been inundated 
by other interest associations like“the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association. The demands made by them have been to maintain the 
status quo, and actually to increase the number of patients 
commited to psychiatric hospitals especially those people with 
past criminal convictions.83
In both countries, charities have become adept in utilizing 
personal contacts in their attempts to influence government to 
increase spending on researching their disease. Britain's 
Multiple Sclerosis Society explained that, "in the Houses of 
Parliament there is what I regard as a Multiple Sclerosis Party 
which is a group of members in both Houses who are sympathetic to 
the aims and objectives of our charity". 84 As with most
charities, the Multiple Sclerosis Society has long-standing 
relations with elected officials from both sides of the House. 
These relationships are mutually beneficial since charities have 
spokesmen to represent their interests in debates on science or 
health-care issues. In return, members are supplied with 
information and ideas on what needs doing in these policy areas. 
As one British charity executive remarked:
"If we need assistance, I know that I can go to 
certain members in either House and obtain that 
assistance knowing full-well that I'll get a
83lbid.
84British Interview; Multiple Sclerosis Society, 25 February
1987.
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sympathetic hearing. We can exploit this
relationship if we consistently keep our friends 
in Parliament informed of the progress that we 
are making and give them credit for the 
assistance they 'have given us in the past."
85
In both countries, executives from charities of all sizes 
spoke of their networking with politicians as a means of 
influencing government to spend more money on research in their 
disease areas. Politicians often attend 'gala' fund raising 
events where personal contacts are established and maintained. 
One British respondent, who asked that his or her identity not be 
revealed explained that: "Tony Newton, the present Minister of 
Health, is a good friend of this organisation. He was our keynote 
speaker at our last annual meeting and is closely attuned to what 
this charity is doing and what we want government to do".86 
Likewise, in Canada, the Diabetes Association spoke openly of the 
way in which they have used a senior aide to the Prime Minister as 
a means of increasing the government's commitment to Diabetes 
research.
"We feel that our contact in the Prime Minister's 
Office, who is himself a diabetic and a long time 
school friend of Mulroney, has his ear. We are 
optimistic that he will be able to get the CMRC 
to 'beef-up' its research commitment to
85British Interview; Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust, 24 
February 1987.
86British Interview; February 1987.
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Diabet.es."
Several British and Canadian charities were quite willing to 
provide the details of their contacts with elected and non-elected 
officials. However, the vast majority of respondents noted that 
they did not see lobbying or interaction with government over 
research-related issues as part of their formal mandate. One 
charity official explained that they had encountered a 'backlash' 
from the donating public when they began to lobby government over 
its research commitment. "If lobbying is executed with little 
discretion, it can often be viewed by the public as an intangible 
product and as a misapplication of charitable funds."88 In 
contrast, expenditures on medical research have always been seen 
as a 'hard product', something whose value can be easily measured 
and evaluated. This frustrated the Executive Director of the 
Kidney Foundation who argued that a small investment of $50,000 (£ 
25,000) to pay for a full-time lobbyist in Ottawa might possibly 
yield $2-3 million (£1-1.5 million) more for kidney research over 
a five year period. This forecast is based on similar results 
obtained by the Canadian Cancer Society (CCS) after they hired 
their own lobbyist for this specific purpose.89 The arrangement
87Canadian Interview; Canadian Diabetes Association, 4
December 1986.
88Canadian Interview; Canadian Foundation for the study of 
Infant Deaths, 8 January 1987.
87
89Canadian Interview; Kidney Foundation of Canada, 3 December
1986.
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has worked well for the CCS partly because it has involved the 
charity's volunteers. Their Ottawa lobbyist must report to the 
charity's 'public issvTes committee' which consists of 25 
volunteers from across Canada and which meets four times a year. 
The committee sets policies on various issues relating to cancer 
research and gives directives to its lobbyist. Ken Kyle - the 
CCS' lobbyist - described his responsibilities in the following 
way:
"My role is to advocate, which means I ai a small 
'1' lobbyist. I spend a lot of time with the 
media drafting news releases and I attend news 
conferences speaking on behalf of the Canadian 
Cancer Society. I also prepare briefs made to 
the government as well as write letters to 
ministers and government officials on various 
issues of concern to this charity. Aside from 
the 'research issue' my time is taken up with 
lobbying government on approximately twenty other 
issues."
90
Most medical research charities have not followed the example 
set by the CCS since they have encountered difficulties receiving 
the authorization from their Board of Directors to hire a 
lobbyist. In these cases it was explained that the people sitting 
on these boards are of two types. First, there are disease 
sufferers who have viewed patient services and medical research as 
a priority and lobbying as a mere 'luxury'. Second, there are 
high-profile business executives and lawyers who do not seem to 
apply entrepreneurial criteria when making administrative
90Canadian Interview; Canadian Cancer Society, 28 November
1986.
373
decisions on behalf of their charity. These people lose their 
eagerness to take risks, (such as hiring lobbyists) because of 
their responsibility to the public who have given voluntarily of 
their time and money. In making this point, the Canadian 
Alzheimer's Society gave an example:
"We presently have approximately $100,000(£ 
50,000) of investment income but our Board is 
adamant about putting this money in three-month 
term deposits at a mere six per cent interest. 
Their thinking is that we might need to withdraw 
the money in the event of an emergency. In the 
ten years that I have been here we have never had 
such a need. Alternatively, we could have had 
this money in one year term deposits accruing ten 
per cent interest. In other words, according to 
my calculations this equals $30,000 (£15,000) in 
lost revenue. This may not seem like very much 
but it is enough to fund a major research 
programme for three years."
91
Of course, a charity's refusal to hire a full-time lobbyist 
does not preclude them from presenting their views to government 
in many other ways. Most officials from British and Canadian 
medical research charities remarked that they 'could actually 
affect more substantial changes in goverment policy through more 
subtle means that did not involve professional lobbyists'. It is 
difficult to determine whether this is the case or whether medical 
research charities are simply reluctant to hire full-time 
lobbyists because of legal restrictions on their political 
activities. Of the 44 British and Canadian charities interviewed.
91Canadian Interview; Alzheimer's Society of Canada, 10 February 1987.
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all claimed they were not either intimidated by or confused about 
the requirements of this law, and they refused to identify it as a 
reason for not hiring lobbyists. - This response seems to 
contradict the views of the Charity Commission. In an interview 
with an official from the Commission it was revealed that recently 
they had given legal advice to several medical research charities 
on this very matter. The charities were informed that:
"any expenditure of charitable funds on objects 
outside of the organisation's remit or on 
activities deemed 'partisan' would be classified 
as unlawful political activities. Expenditures 
on non-partisan issues considered to be part of 
the charity's objects or ancillary to thereof 
would be acceptable activity according to the 
Charity Commission's interpretation of existing 
common law."
92
Since lobbying government for a greater research commitment 
would be difficult to turn into a 'partisan issue', and would be 
ancillary to a charity's object, an alternative explanation for 
the absence of paid lobbyists must exist. The most likely reason, 
as suggested above, is that medical research charities (indeed all 
types of British and Canadian charities) fear that lobbying public 
will take an 'edge-off' efforts to raise voluntary contributions. 
Many British charities stated unequivocally that they have never 
lobbied government on any issue and would never consider this as a 
'proper' activity for a charity to engage in. One British 
respondent boldly remarked:
92British Interview; The Charity Commission, 31 March 1987.
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"Charity and politics mix like oil and water. We 
are conscious that the public and our volunteers 
see charity as the antithesis of government. We 
are not part of the public policy process but 
rather free and independent of its forces."
93
This might seem convincing, indeed logical, given the existing 
literature describing the freedom and independence from government 
that British charities have historically enjoyed. Perhaps the 
best examples are those scholarly works describing the history of 
the Charity Organisation Society.94 However, in interviewing a 
retired senior DHSS official, a rather different scenario was 
described:
"When I sat in at meetings with Ministers when 
they received executives from medical research 
charities, their plea was typically that they 
wanted government to spend more on research in 
their disease area."
95
A list of the charities supplied by the respondent who made 
representations to elected officials in this fashion included 
three British charities that denied having any contact with 
government. The DHSS official went on to describe two instances 
where charity executives attempted to 'down-play', underscore or
93British Interview; February 1987.
94See, Michael Rose, The Relief of__Poverty.__1834-1914.
London: Macmillan, 1972 and David Owen, English Philanthropy
1660-1960. Cambridge Mass: Belknap Press, 1964.
95British Interview; February 1987.
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to cover-up their interaction with government:
"When I retired I had two of these charity 
executives approach me and- urge me not to make 
public that they met with Ministers to make a 
special plea."
96
Presumably, these charity executives did so as their meeting with 
Cabinet ministers somehow clashed with the 'spirit of 
volunteerism' which is grounded in this notion of independence.
In both countries, the relationship between medical research 
charities and government has traditionally been defined by a 
mutual acceptance of each other's autonomy. Historically, many 
smaller British and Canadian charities have viewed the (B)MRC and 
(C)MRC, respectively, as being the senior partner in the medical 
research 'firm'. These charities viewed their role vis-a-vis the 
government as simply adding money to a particular disease area 
also funded by the state. For many years, charities did not see 
themselves as being in competition with the (B)MRC/(C)MRC, since 
the two could co-exist independently yet be complementary to each 
other. Because of this, the charities did not appreciate the 
(B)MRC/(C)MRC telling them what kind of research they wanted 
funded and a similar attitude was adopted by the research 
councils. This did not pose serious problems since the financial 
contributions of charities towards research was modest in 
proportion to the research funded from the public purse. However, 
beginning in the early 1960's, and continuing throughout the
96lbid.
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1970's, many new research charities were established which quickly 
amassed large incomes through successful appeals to the public for 
voluntary contributions. _In both countries, the financial success 
of these charities afforded them the opportunity to examine and 
question for the first time, the manner in which their respective 
governments financed medical research. The types of lobbying that 
has been undertaken subsequently by charities, in both countries, 
appears to be symptomatic of their disaffection with the 
governments' apparent bias towards funding popular diseases at the 
expense of less popular, yet highly prevalent diseases.
(B)MRC and (C)MRC officials were asked to comment on whether 
the formal representations made by charities had any affect on the 
way in which they divided their research budget among the various 
disease areas. The (B)MRC explained:
"I suppose we may not even know which charities 
are trying to influence us in that sort of way.
It is difficult to determine whether DHSS is 
telling us about every instance where charities 
have lobbied them. However, the Minister has 
followed through on several occasions and asked 
us why we have not funded a certain area."
97
(B)MRC officials were quick to add that a DHSS directive to 
spend more on researching a disease should not necessarily be 
credited to a successful lobbying effort by charity but rather to 
the DHSS' s own appreciation of what is being funded by charity and 
government in a specific research field. In comparison to
97British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
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Britain, (C)MRC officials flatly rejected the assumption that the 
Canadian Department of Health and Welfare would ever acquiesce to 
the demands made by particular charities to have more spent on 
researching their disease. Dr. Belec, the (C)MRC's information 
officer added:
"We are aware of the increasing contributions of 
medical charities in this country and we see 
their growing politicization as a natural 
outgrowth of that. It is no surprise to us that 
the Canadian Cancer Society has hired a full-time 
lobbyist in Ottawa. To my way of thinking, this 
is an early signal that Canadian charities are 
moving in the direction of their U.S. 
counterparts who have employed 'hard-ball' lobby 
tactics for many years. The U.S. cancer lobby 
during the early 1970's, which succeeded in 
influencing Nixon to declare his 'war on cancer', 
is a prime example of what charities can 
achieve."
98
Lastly, it is interesting to note how the AMRC has responded 
to the British government's bias towards funding popular diseases 
like cancer and AIDS. For obvious reasons, the Association is 
unable to criticize government for spending too much on cancer 
research, since this would alienate the cancer charities which 
carry much of the financial burden of administering the AMRC. 
Instead, the Association is in the process of implementing a new 
educational programme that seeks to inform the public about 
diseases that are relatively neglected and under-funded by both 
government and charity. The approach is designed and implemented 
with two goals in mind. It is aimed at helping smaller charities
98Canadian Interview; Medical Research Council, 28 January 1987.
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raise more money for less popular diseases. Furthermore, it seeks 
to mobilize the public in pressuring government to allocate more 
research dollars for less popular diseases without decreasing the 
existing amount expended on cancer and AIDS research. As an 
adjunct to this, the AMRC has lobbied the government to increase 
the (B)MRC's budget for all types of research, with the view that 
a more equitable distribution among disease areas can be achieved 
with additional funds from the (B)MRC.
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Chapter Seven
Charities * Lobby Against Privatizing
Medical Research
This chapter examines both the state's declining 
responsibilities for financing medical research in Britain and 
Canada and also the response by charities to this development. In 
Britain, the (B)MRC's budget has been cutback so that it is no 
longer capable of supporting the 'alpha'-rated research 
applications it receives from scientists. These applications are 
now being sent to the charities for funding. In Canada, the 
(C)MRC's budget has been frozen and all future increases are to be 
calculated on the basis of extra money generated by the private 
sector - in particular money raised by charities. This suggests 
that, in both countries, the state has shifted a portion of its 
responsibility for the support of a bio-medical research infra­
structure to the charities. British medical research charities 
have used their association - the AMRC - to lobby against these 
cutbacks and in doing so, have succeeded in altering public policy 
decisions that affect the progress of 'disease related research'. 
In Canada, where no comparable association exists for medical 
research charities, similar attempts to influence public policy 
have been less successful.
We argue that medical research charities are not a 'perfect' 
alternative funding source to government. For example, charities
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are unable to support the 'basic' long-term research which has 
been the traditional target of the research councils in each 
country. In essence, this chapter exposes the interdependencies 
between charity and government in the medical research policy 
field. This supports the assumptions that the two are not 
necessarily competitors but rather mutually-dependent actors in 
the bio-medical research community. In illustrating this, the 
chapter divides into two sections. The first section describes 
the British government's declining commitment to bio-medical 
research since 1980 and discusses how British medical research 
charities have successfully managed to increase their incomes 
during the same period. Furthermore, arguments are outlined as to 
why charities are ill-suited to assuming a greater responsibility 
for funding medical research in the wake of declining government 
commitment to this policy field. Section II examines the federal 
government's newly introduced formulae for funding Canadian bio­
medical research. It is argued that with this new arrangement the 
Canadian government (like the British government) has shifted a 
portion of its responsibility for funding this policy field to 
charities.
I. Government Sponsored Research in Britain; A Period of 
Decline
Since 1980, the most important issue affecting relations 
between medical research charities and the state has been the 
state's declining contribution to the funding of research and 
development. In Britain, central authorities account for
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approximately half of the nation's total spending on research. 
However, as Figure 7.1 illustrates, a substantial proportion of 
this expenditure (approximately 50- per cent) is allocated to 
defence-oriented research. This pattern of resource distribution 
differs markedly from that of Britain's major competitors, 
including Canada, with the notable exception of the U.S. (see 
Figure 7.2). The priority that the British government has 
attached to defence research since 1980, results in a higher 
proportion of GDP being chanelled into this area than in any of 
the other major OECD nations shown in figure 7.3, with the 
exception of the United States. Furthermore, it is precisely this 
bias that has made government cutbacks to non-defence research 
areas seem unfair to medical researchers and their supporting 
organisations including the (B)MRC, AMRC and the individual 
charities.
British Government expenditures on 'non-defence' related 
research originates from many different sources. The data 
contained in Table 7.1 indicate that in 1983/84 government 
departments together accounted for 47 per cent of spending on this 
activity although there are marked variations in the contribution 
to this total from individual departments. However, it is the 
direct funding by government of research undertaken in 
universities and by the five research councils that is the 
specific concern of this section. As the Secretary of State for 
Education and Science stated in 1985:
"The Research Council's and Government
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Flfiure 7 -1
British Government Research and Development 
Expenditure by Broad Sector. 1983/84
Total spending * 3*923 Billion
Source* Cabinet Office, Annual Review of Government 
Funded R&D. 1985. London* HMSO, 1984.
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Figure 7 . 2
Government Funded Research and Developmenti Proportion 
of Total Allocated to Defence Research in Selected OECD 
Countries in 19~F3
Sourcei Cabinet Office» Annual Review of Government Funded 
RftD. 196■?. Londoni HMSO, 1986.
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Fifiure 7.3
Proportion of Gross Domestic Product Allocated by Government 
to Defence Research in Selected OECD Countries in 1983
Kingdom States
Source 1 Cabinet Office, Annual Review of Government Funded 
R&D 198S. London« HMSO, 1986.
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Table 7.1
Government Expenditure on Research and Dey.&lQpmcntbv Department In 1983/84.
Department _ Millions
Civil DeDartments
MAFF 118.6
DBS 11.4
DEn 34.0
UKAEA 203.8
DoE 32.4
ODA 20.8
DHSS 27.7
HSC 8.3
Home Office 12.2
DTI 313.1
DTp 27.8
HI Departments 14.3
Scottish Departments 49.5
Other Departments 33.2
Total Civil Departments 907.4
Rtataach Caunclla
AFRC 44.4ESRC 17.5
MRC 113.0
NERC 59.8
SERC 245.1
Total Research Councils 479.8
UGC etc 551.0
Total Civil 1938.2
Minlstrv of Defence
MOD (Research) 357.2
MOD (Development) 1555.8
MOD (Staff A Superannuation) 71.0
Total Defence 1984.0
Net Total 3923.0
Some«: cabinet office, Annual. Rc yIb» at flayer omen t funded BiP 1985. London: HMSO, 1986.
departments constitute the nation's science base 
which provides for our national research 
capability and trains the highly qualified 
manpower essential for our increasingly science- 
based society."
1
In 1983/84, universities and the research councils received a 
total of £1,031 million from the central government.2 This amount 
represented 26 per cent of all government spending on research and 
development during that financial year. However, since 1980, both 
arms of the dual support system have experienced severe financial 
pressures that have in turn raised concerns about the level and 
quality of medical research conducted in Britain. The Thatcher 
government has premised its economic policies on the idea that an 
economy grows in direct proportion to its efficiency. According 
to this theory people and institutions become more prosperous to 
the extent that they use their resources with decreasing 
wastefulness. This has been relatively uncontroversial in 
commercial enterprises but since 1980, the British government has 
applied the same theory to the management of essentially non­
commercial enterprises - including the NHS and bodies engaged in 
medical research. Budgets have been steadily reduced, since they 
represent a 'drain' on public expenditure; and reducing the Public
1H.C. Debs. (U.K.), Vol 80, Col 1125.
2This figure is calculated by adding the total research 
expenditure of the five research councils with comparable figures 
for the UGC. (see Table 7.1) These statistics are derived from
the Cabinet Office, Annual__Review of__Government Funded R and D,
1985. London: HMSO, 1986.
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Sector Borrowing Requirement is the sine-qua-non of policy.3
As discussed in Chapter five section V. A and B, one of the 
major sources of financial support for research within the 
university system is the UGC.4 This body distributes resources to 
the universities in the form of block grants to cover teaching and 
research. The precise allocation of UGC funds between these two 
activities is unknowns but research is now estimated to account 
for approximately £600 million of the total each year.6 In 
scientific fields, the UGC's input into research is designed to 
provide the basic necessities for research to be conducted in 
university departments. This is believed to be essential if 
speculative ideas are to be generated and developed to the stage 
where they may attract support from external sponsors.7 These
3The Lancet. 1 December 1985. The article went on to explain 
that when these expenditure cuts are discussed by ministers, there 
is nobody in the Cabinet who speaks up determinedly for medical 
and scientific research.
4Funds also come from research councils, government 
commissions, industrial sponsorship and charitable bodies.
5Estimates of the volume of UGC resources chanelled into 
research are based on a long-standing formula which allocates 
about one third of university workers' time to this activity. 
This division originates from an exercise undertaken in the 1960's 
in which university staff maintained a record of their activities 
for a period of one week New Scientist. 5 September 1985. However, 
apportionment in this way may be less relevant today and a study 
is currently in progress which it is hoped will provide better 
information on the volume and distribution of university research.
6Education, Science and Arts Committee, Report on the Future 
of the Science Budget. London: HMSO, 1985, Vol. 1, pp. 23-24.
7Cabinet office. Annual RevifiM__of Government,__Funded R— & D*
1985. London: HMSO, 1986.
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outside supporters would include bodies like the (B)MRC, medical 
research charities, and pharmaceutical companies. However, the 
UGC has experienced cuts in its budget since the start of this 
decade. Overall, University funding has declined by almost eight 
per cent since 1981/82 and according to AMRC publications there is 
evidence to suggest that budgetary cuts have fallen 
disporportionately on research. 8 Furthermore, it is estimated 
that the universities' budget is continuing to shrink at a rate of 
one and a half to two per cent per annum, allowing for increased 
costs and for the problems of setting salary increases within the 
government's national allowance.9
Reductions in available resources on this scale have 
inevitably had a severe impact on the provision of basic 
laboratory equipment, technician assistance and other elements of 
the scientific infra-structure required by medical researchers. 
In turn, this development has resulted in some (B)MRC funds 
intended for use as research grants being diverted to supply basic 
support facilities within university science departments. 
Furthermore, it has meant that able medical research groups have 
frequently been ill-equipped with research support, even in 
competitive fields where being at the forefront of new scientific
8HMSO, Advisory Board for the Research Councils, Science and 
Public Expenditure 1985. London: HMSO, 1985, pp. 41-42.
9'Where has all the stuffing gone?'. Nature. 6 September
1985.
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discoveries is of paramount importance.10
With regard to the (B)MRC, available data indicate that 
government pledges11 to protect the total combined income of this 
agency appear to have been fulfilled. Table 7.2 shows that over 
the period 1981/82 to 1984/85 the growth in the science budget 
exceeded increases in price inflation by four percentage points. 
However, this apparent 'surplus' should not be interpreted as real 
growth in the capacity to support medical research for several 
important reasons. Resources available to the (B)MRC have 
increasingly been deflected from 'investigative' uses to meet 
other non-scientific costs. In addition to the demands arising 
from the cut back in UGC funds noted above, a growing proportion 
of funds have been absorbed by superannuation and restructuring 
expenses. Unlike government departments, the (B)MRC has been 
required to meet both of these costs. Expenditure on
superannuation is a major financial commitment - for example, 
these costs absorbed 8.5 per cent of the (B)MRC's 1984/85
lOFor example, the March 1981 Public Expenditure plans stated 
that: "The Government wish to give protection to the support of 
basic science, an activity that underpins further development and 
is a particular strength of the United Kingdom. Within the 
declining level of the total programme for education and science, 
the plans allow for provision of science to be held broadly at the 
current level throughout that period. It should thus be possible 
for the research councils, along with other activities, to 
maintain their selective support for research in universities and 
polytechnics at broadly the current level at a time when provision 
for higher education is planned to decrease." See, HMSO, Public 
Expenditure Accounts. 1985/86. London: HMSO, 1986, p. 62.
llThis view was re-affirmed by (B)MRC officials when
interviewed. British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April
1987.
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Tabla. 7^ 2.
Science Budget la.1981^82 to 1988/89
YEAR CASH TERMS 
MILLIONS INDEX
REAL TERMS 
INDEX
1981/82 450.7 100 100
1982/83 481.6 107 100
1983/84 516.3 115 102
1984/85 549.9 122 104
1985/85 583.9 130 106
1986/87 projected 598.8 133 104
1987/88 projected 613.5 136 103
1988/89 projected 628.7 139 102
Source ; HMSO, Science and Arts Select Committee, The Future o£ 
the Science Budget. London: HMSO, 1986, p. 15.
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parliamentary grant-in-aid.12 According the the (B)MRC's Victoria 
Harrison, "restructuring costs have been generated by programmes 
of early retirement, redundancy and institute rationalization. 
But these measures are themselves a response to real reductions in 
income."13
Specifically, in the 1984/1985 financial year, the (B)MRC had 
to cope with an effective cut of £2 million out of the £135 
million total that it was able to spend.14 Of this, £600,000 went 
to shore up payments from the (B)MRC's pension fund. Another 
£400,000 went to meet wage settlements for researchers employed on 
short-term contracts to carry-out work on (B)MRC funded 
projects.15 The (B)MRC has had no control over these pay scales, 
which are negotiated between the Association of University 
Teachers, the universities and the Department of Education and 
Science. Furthermore, 'rounding down' somewhere in the Department 
of Education and Science slashed another, £500,000 off the 
(B)MRC's 1984 budget, and a further £200,000 went to pay increases 
in the (B)MRC's subscription to the European Molecular Biology 
Organization caused by the weakness of the British pound.16 Fire
12HMS0, Science and Arts Select Committee, The Future of the 
Science Budget. London: HMSO, 1986, p. 19.
13British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
14'Medical Science on Crutches', New Scientist. 30 August
1984.
15Ibid. p. 27.
16The cost of subscriptions for participation in 
international collaborative endeavours accounts for about ten per 
cent of the research council's total income. The largest
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damage at the Dunn Nutrition Unit accounted for a additional 
£200,000. Furthermore, the (B)MRC had to pay £100,000 more than 
it expected towards the running costs of the Synchrotron radiation 
source at the Science and Engineering Research Council's Daresbury 
laboratory. 17 Moreover, in 1984 the ABRC decided to 'tax' the
(B)MRC and the SERC in order to finance restructuring in two of 
its other departments, the AFRC and the NERC (in past years, in 
fact, a reverse flow operated). This taxation of the (B)MRC has 
continued up to the present, resulting in a lost income of £0.9 
million in 1984/85 and £1.8 million in 1985/86.18
The central government refuses to acknowledge that the 
difficulties facing the (B)MRC are a result of cutbacks, but see 
them rather as symptoms of mismanagement during a period of 
'level-funding'.19 However, one might expect that 'level-funding' 
means that researchers could buy the same this year as they did 
last year. Yet the (B)MRC has not viewed it this way. The major 
reason for this is that the 'cash-limit' within which all 
government departments have to budget is calculated on the basis 
of what the (B)MRC views as unrealistic estimates of inflation in 
both wages and the price of equipment.20 The costs of modern
proportion of this sum involved stems from the Science and 
Engineering Research Council's membership of the European Centre 
for Nuclear Research.
17British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
18The Lancet. 5 January, 1985, pp. 25-26.
19British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
20'Medical Science on Crutches', New Scientist, pp. 26-27.
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medical research have been increasing at a considerably faster 
pace than the costs of those items comprising the Retail Price 
Index (RPI) - which is the index used in calculating inflationary 
increases to the (B)MRC's budget. The electron microscope, for 
example, is of central importance to research in many different 
fields including bio-medical research as well as in metallurgy and 
solid state physics. Yet, the costs of the best machines have 
risen from £12,000 in 1968 to between £250,000 and £1.5 million 
today.21 The (B)MRC estimates that for the year 1984/85, actual 
inflation was approximately two per cent more than the 'cash 
limits' allowed for. An added annoyance has been the rigid 
accounting rules that prevent the (B)MRC from carrying funds over 
from one year to the next.22
Given the cutbacks to the (B)MRC's grant-in-aid, the agency 
in turn has had to impose spending limits on the researchers it 
supports. For example, in 1984 the (B)MRC ordered its researchers 
to make do with an average cut of 16 per cent in spending on 
laboratory consumables which amounted to a saving of £1.4 million. 
Labour M.P. Tam Dalyell, along with other politicians from both 
sides of the House, have used Parliament as a forum for 
criticizing the government's science policy. The general tenor of 
these criticism is evident from the following account.
"Take for example the (B)MRC Brain Metabolism 
Unit in the University on Edinburgh. It has a
21H.C. Debs. (U.K.), Vol. 80, Col 1136.
22'Medical Science on Crutches', pp. 26-27.
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complement of some 40 staff working on both 
clinical and basic scientific problems. The 
areas of research span such illnesses as 
schizophrenia depression, down's syndrome, 
parkinson's disease and alzheimer's dementia. 
All are crippling diseases suffered by a 
significant percentage of my, and every other 
M.P.'s constituents. For example, 5 per cent of 
people over 65, and 20 per cent of people over 
80, become demented and half of them suffer from 
alzheimer's dementia. I am appalled to learn 
from constituents who work in the unit that for 
the six months April to September 1984, they were 
given only £87,000 - a reduction of 45 per cent 
in their expenditure for the same period last 
year - and nothing for capital equipment. It is 
quite simply the opinion of the staff that 
research cannot be continued under such financial 
constraints."
23
The real impact of the government's 'level-funding' policy 
can be measured by the number of 'alpha-rated' research 
applications submitted to the (B)MRC that were unable to be 
funded. The (B)MRC received more first-class research grant 
applications in 1983/84 than in any single previous year. Yet, in 
1983/84 the (B)MRC was unable to fund 199 approved applications 
for project grants - usually of three year duration - and 22 
approved applications for longer-term support for research 
programmes.24 Largely as a result of this the total number of
23Quote taken from Tam Dalyell, 'Thistle Diary', New 
Scientist. 1 November 1984.
24The Lancet. 5 January 1985, p. 26. The recent cuts in 
public spending, which have led to a reduction in the (B)MRC's 
grant-in-aid from government is especially galling to medical 
scientists when their U.S. counterparts have had their medical 
research budgets substantially increased. For a statistical 
analysis of American research funding see J.K. Inglehart, 'The NIH
Appropriation', Hsh__England Journal__of Medicine> 31 (1984), pp.
1132-36.
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research grants submitted to the (B)MRC the following year 
decreased significantly from 672 in 1983/84 to 527 in 1984/85. At 
the same time, the (B)MRC's Secretary, Sir James Gowens, informed 
University Vice-Chancellors that the Council had to reduce 
provision for new 'out-of-house' programme grants by 25 per cent 
(in terms of the number of grants), for new project grants by 
about 7.5 per cent and for studentships in research and advanced 
courses by 30 per cent. Also, the (B)MRC reduced by ten per cent 
the number of intercalculated awards to medical students.25 This 
was seen as a serious blow to medical schools whose raison d'etre 
has been to develop the future generations of medical scientists. 
Table 7.3 lists data comparing the four research councils' funded 
grants with unfunded 'alpha-rated' grant applications from 1980 to 
1985.
In addition to the (B)MRC cutbacks which resulted in the 
abandonment or delay of many potentially valuable research 
projects, the scarcity of finance is also seen to have had an 
undesirable impact on the distribution of those funds that are 
available.26 Dr. P.0. Williams, the Executive Director of the 
Wellcome Trust, has suggested that;
"Under present circumstances, well-established 
research teams may be more likely to attract 
financial support than less well-known groups 
pursuing perhaps more innovative endeavours.
25J. Gowens, Letter to Vice Chancellors, 12 October 1984. As 
quoted in A. Buller, 'The Organisation of Medical Research', The 
Royal Society of Arts Journal. 53 (1985), p. 189.
26British Interview; The Wellcome Trust, 14 March 1987.
397
Source: 
HMSO, Science and Arts Committee, Report on the Future of the Science Budget. 
London: 
HMSO, 1985, Vol. 1.
Uncertainty surrounding future supplies of funds 
may in addition be fostering a situation in which 
'short-term' projects with easily attainable 
results are favoured and long-term more 
fundamental research is neglected."
27
Debate has also focused on what is seen by some science 
commentators as an increasing preference for economically relevant 
applied projects at the expense of basic pure research. In 
particular, concern has been expressed that the British government 
now spends a smaller fraction of its research and development 
budget in basic research, 'the seedcorn of tomorrow's 
technologies', than any of its major competitors.28 It is argued 
that further reductions could be highly damaging because progress 
in 'applied' fields depends on new insights in the related basic 
sciences.29 Consequently, adequate resources would need to be 
available to the latter in order to foster technological advance. 
Such support is also thought to be required to facilitate 
understanding of the developments emanating from research centres 
in other countries and to train the scientists and technologists 
who are responsible for transferring new knowledge from the 
laboratory to industry.
27The Wellcome Trust, Annual Report 1982-84. London: 1985,
pp. 16-17.
28The Times. 20 November 1984.
29Applied research embraces investigations 'with clear 
potential for wide-ranging uses in industry, medicine and so on, 
but where it is too early in the development of the work for 
specific applications and products to have been clearly 
determined'. See H.C. Debs. (U.K.), Vol 80, Cols 1187-1189.
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The developments described above have been associated with a 
number of other costs. In particular, morale within the research 
community is said to have been damaged and, as a consequence, able 
young people are rejecting careers in research while others, 
trained at great expense to British taxpayers, are seeking 
opportunities abroad. For example, it has been reported from the 
Department of Virology at Glasgow University that only three of 
the 15 British Ph.D's to graduate since 1981 are working in 
medical research within the United Kingdom - 10 of the group have 
gone to the United States.30
A. Financial success of British medical research charities
At the same time as medical research funding by the (B)MRC 
and UGC becomes increasingly constrained, financial support for 
this activity provided by the medical research charities has grown 
considerably. As illustrated by Figure 7.4 the volume of research 
money supplied by the medical research charities has increased 
from £37 million in 1979 to £115 million in 1984. The AMRC's 
1984/85 Annual Report records that the combined income of its 35 
members amounted to £137 million in 1984 and that £115 million of 
this total was committed entirely to research.31 Furthermore, the 
latter sum understates the overall charitable commitment to 
research funding because it excludes the contributions of many
30The Times, 21 January 1986.
31Association of Medical Research Charities, Handbook for 
1985/86. London: The Development Trust for the Young Disabled, 
1986, pp. 4-7.
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Figure 7.4
Association of Medical Research C haritlgg (AMRG) 
Income and Research Expenditure, 1979-1984
i. million
AMRC-2 * Total expenditure on research byAMRC 
member charities
(B)MRC = Total expenditure on research bythe British 
Medical Research Council
Sourcei Association of Medical Research Charities*
Handbook for 1985/86« Londoni TheDeveloproent 
Trust for the Young Disabled,1986,P.4.
other charities who do not belong to the Association. By
comparison, the (B)MRC spent £116 million on research in
1983/84.32 The charities' contribution to medical research in 
1979 amounted to just more than 50 per cent of that of the (B)MRC, 
while in 1984 the two sources were virtually equal. Even when 
price inflation is taken into account, this growth still 
represents a doubling of funds available from this source. It is 
clear that future income trends will reflect developments in the 
charities sector as a whole - changes in both overall voluntary­
giving and distribution of growth among competing medical research 
charities. Focusing on the latter, individual charities are 
increasingly employing new and more sophisticated techniques in 
order to gain a greater portion of this highly competitive 
'donations market'. This includes the hiring of professional fund 
raisers, the implementation of computerized mailing lists and the 
distribution of glossy fund raising literature. The extent to 
which medical research charities can adopt innovative approaches 
to marketing will therefore influence how successfully they can 
improve upon their present fund raising capabilities. In relation 
to other areas of charitable activity, it is evident from the 
available data that medical research charities have hitherto been 
successful in raising voluntary contributions. For example, in 
1984/85, 18 of the 35 AMRC members were included in the Charities 
Aid Foundation's list of the 'top 200 grant-seeking charities' and 
taken together attracted 16 per cent of the 200 club's voluntary
32Ibid.. p.5.
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income of £526 million.33 However, more recent data suggests that 
the income of British cancer research charities declined slightly 
in real terms in 1986.34
It is interesting to contrast the recent fund raising success 
of medical research charities with other types of charities. It 
may be estimated that the total 1984/85 income of these bodies 
amounted to £6.4 billion.35 In unadjusted cash terms this amount 
was 16 per cent greater than the previous year, 36 per cent up on 
the 1982/83 figures and growth may be expected to continue. One 
of the reasons for this optimistic outlook is that the recent 
famine crises in Africa may have led to a permanent increase in 
the numbers of people who wish to support charitable causes. The 
Executive Director of the British Heart Foundation explained:
"We feel optimistic that the Ethiopian Famine 
sparked a philanthropic nerve in people in this 
country that will benefit many charities 
operating in areas outside of Third World relief 
for many years to come. I personally feel the 
Live Aid fund raising drive educated people about 
being 'charitable' - it made giving fun, 
pleasurable and most of all a socially trendy 
thing to do."
36
33Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Statistics. 1984/85. 
Tonbridge: CAF, 1985, pp. 184-199.
34Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends. 1986/87. 
Tonbridge: CAF, 1987, p. 93.
35This estimate is calculated on the basis that the income of 
the 'top 200 grant-seeking charities' -£956.7 million in 1984/85 
- accounts for between 10 and 20 per cent of the total charitable 
income. See, Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Statistics. 
1984/85. Tonbridge: CAF, 1985, pp. 184-199.
36British Interview; British Heart Foundation, 3 March 1987.
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However, within the group of British medical research charities 
interviewed some argued that a substitution effect would take 
place over the 'long-run' which would see Third World relief 
charities prosper at the expense of charities operating in other 
unrelated fields. As the Executive Director of the Muscular 
Dystrophy Group of Great Britain explained:
"We are fearful the Ethiopian crisis will have 
serious implications on our ability to raise 
voluntary donations for many years to come. Our 
own studies tell us that while many of the Live 
Aid supporters will be 'one-off' types, some 
people may make that cause a personal favourite. 
However, it is too early to forecast whether we 
have lost supporters to this last group." 37
Furthermore, and as discussed in Chapter four section I. B, 
some potential also exists for growth in voluntary contributions 
made available by industry. The Charities Aid Foundation has 
calculated that the leading 200 corporate donors gave £43 million 
to charities in 1984/85. After adjustments for inflation and an 
especially large once only donation, this sum was ten per cent 
greater than in 1983/84. On average, each of the 200 corporations 
donated an amount equivalent to 0.2 per cent of their pre-tax
37British Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great 
Britain, 19 February 1987. According to a study conducted by the 
Charities Aid Foundation, charities adversely affected by the Live 
Aid appeal but which recovered the following year included many 
medical research charities (excluding those in the chest and heart 
field) youth organisations, arts related charities and benevolent 
funds. See Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends.— 1986/87, p. 
101.
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profits to charity.38 In interviewing the government's Chief
Scientist (1978-81), the respondent remarked that government 
officials view corporate giving as^ an area in which British 
charities should make a greater effort to increase their incomes. 
The government has supported this line of argument by illustrating 
that if British companies had matched the level of contributions 
estimated for the United States, the sum available from these 
sources would have exceeded £300 million in 1983/84.39 A number 
of British charities have rebuked the government's estimates 
arguing that drawing comparisons between the level of American and 
British corporate giving ignores cultural and economic 
differences.
At the time of writing, it is impossible to assess the impact 
of the 1986 budget, which contained proposals to revise tax laws 
on charity fund raising. These amendments have enabled
individuals and companies who contribute to charities to offset 
donations against tax. Some predictions indicate that the changes 
could lead to an increase in the annual income of the charities by 
30 per cent. 40 However, in the absence of more detailed 
information all that can be said is that charities obtain their 
income in different ways from a variety of sources so that the 
impact of any possible alteration in the tax laws is likely to
38Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Statistics. 1984/85. 
Tonbridge: CAF, 1985, pp. 104-105.
39British Interview; Chief Scientist (1978-81), Department of
Health and Social Security, 24 February 1987.
40The Times, 19 February 1986 
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vary from one organisation to another.
While long term trends may have to remain largely
speculative, there is a greater degree of certainty about the 
short-run prospects for charities' funding of medical research. 
Early in 1986, the Wellcome Trust sold one-fifth of its share in 
the Wellcome Foundation, the pharmaceutical company it wholly 
owned up to that point. The sale raised approximately £200 
million which in turn has been re-invested to generate an annual 
income of around £15 million. Dr. P.0. Williams - The Wellcome 
Trust's Executive Director - explained in an interview that "all 
of this new capital would be employed to support medical 
research."41
Consequently, if it is assumed that the other members of the 
AMRC maintain their current level of spending (in cash terms) then 
in 1989 charitable funding should amount to £133 million, thereby 
making them a larger financial contributor to medical research 
than the government via its grants-in-aid to the (B)MRC.42 
Already, British medical research charities are performing an 
increasingly vital role in sustaining the level and quality of
41British Interview; The Wellcome Trust, 14 March 1987.
42This calculation is based on assumptions that might turn 
out to be erroneous. For example, the projected growth in the 
funds made available for research by the charities may be
inaccurate as, indeed, might the value of the new investment 
income anticipated by the Wellcome Trust. In addition, the 
precision of the exercise carried out above is marred by 
differences in the financial 'year-ends' to which different 
charities operate. Nevertheless, on the basis of current
evidence, it seems likely that in the near future charitable 
bodies will be making a larger financial contribution to medical 
research than the government via its grant-in-aid to the (B)MRC.
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British science. These charities are, for example, now able to 
offer financial backing for initiatives that the (B)MRC have 
approved but has not been in a position to support. As Dr. 
Harrison of the (B)MRC explained:
"Because of these cut-backs we have passed on 
'alpha-rated' applications to charities whose 
remit embraces these proposed research projects. 
Additionally, we have found that the number of 
applications made to the MRC has decreased since 
the scientific community are well aware of our 
declining resources. Consequently, the charities 
have not only received more applications but 
higher quality ones."
43
The (B)MRC has expressed some concern with this development 
on the grounds that research grant applications submitted to the 
charities may not be subject to proper peer-review. This is not 
an entirely unfounded fear given that some charities have gained a 
reputation for supporting research projects based on emotion 
rather than on scientific merit (see Chapter five section IV. B).
B. Implications of privatizing British medical research
The AMRC has argued that it is erroneous for government to 
cite the recent financial success of medical research charities as 
a means of justifying further restrictions in the growth of 
resources allocated to the (B)MRC. The reasons behind this claim 
are easily understood. Dr. David Evered, the Ciba Foundation's 
Executive Director, aptly describes the paradox now facing British 
medical research charities;
43British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
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-We (British medical research charities) are the 
victims of our own success. It is plausible to 
assume that government is looking at our success 
in raising voluntary donations and saying to 
themselves ... 'here is privatization taking 
place without government having to legislate it' 
- so therefore lets cutback on the (B)MRC's 
budget even further."
44
In interviewing 26 of the AMRC's 35 member organisations, all 
agreed that the major challenge facing charities was to prevent 
the state from doing less in a situation where charities are 
steadily contributing more. The only apparent solution to this 
problem has been for the charities to rely on the AMRC to 
highlight the differences between medical research charities and 
the (B)MRC in terms of the type of research each supports. In 
doing so, the AMRC has argued that the implications of shifting 
from funding basic research to more applied research is that 
scientific investigations would become stultified and rendered 
impotent since basic research provides disease researchers with 
the building blocks of knowledge. As one Canadian scientist 
remarked;
"To do applied (disease oriented) research 
without relying on basic science would be like 
trying to understand how a light can be switched 
on without knowing what electricity is."
45
44British Interview; Ciba Foundation, 27 February 1987.
45Canadian Interview; McMaster University Medical School, 19 
January 1987.
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The irony of the (B)MRC cutbacks has been highlighted by the 
government's commitment to AIDS research and their own admission 
that the disease will likely be conquered by utilizing (B)MRC 
laboratories and basic immunology research. In essence, what 
further reductions in (B)MRC spending might do is eliminate the 
government's ability to respond quickly to new public health 
problems - especially those that medical research charities have 
been unsuccessful in addressing. This may pose serious problems 
for the (B)MRC if in the future another infectious disease gains 
public support in a way similar to AIDS. Cutbacks might also 
erode the broad base of research, into many disease areas, which 
has been a policy of the (B)MRC since its establishment. The 
fundamental basis of this policy has been to insulate government 
from public criticism, if the need arises, when public health 
problems escalate in seriousness. In such circumstances, 
governments have traditionally been able to respond to their 
critics by arguing that 'research into disease X has been 
financially supported in the past but that a greater research 
effort is currently required'.
Another major difference between the type of research funded 
by charities and by government relates to the research priorities 
adopted by the two funding sources. For example, a substantial 
proportion of the charities' total expenditure is directed at just 
two diseases - cancer and heart disease. As previously examined 
in Chapter five section IV. A and B, this pattern of distribution 
does not necessarily reflect the seriousness of such diseases as
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represented by their incidence rates. However, it has meant that 
other major illnesses such as senile dementia and sexually 
transmitted diseases are not significantly funded by charity. 
While it was shown that (B)MRC funding is also skewed in favour of 
popular diseases like cancer and AIDS, further cutbacks in (B)MRC 
funding would significantly impede any attempts to correct this 
bias.
Furthermore, the approaches to research funding adopted by 
the (B)MRC and the medical research charities are substantially 
different. The former has historically had a major commitment to 
long-term research; in fact the (B)MRC presently supports 60 major 
research establishments on a long-term basis, and these account 
for 60 per cent of its funds.46 On the other hand, the charities 
apply most of their funds - approximately two-thirds - to clearly 
defined projects of limited duration.47 Most unendowed charities 
have largely been unable to support long-term research programmes 
because of fluctuating annual incomes. For example, even a large 
charity like the Cancer Research Campaign which has an annual 
income of £35 million disperses two-thirds of that in the form of
46Association of Medical Research Charities, Handbook for 
1985/86. p. 5.
47Ibid.. p. 5. The charities that are members of the AMRC 
presently provide grants for more than 2700 research programmes 
and projects by comparison with 1800 supported by the (B)MRC. 
While many of the grants from the charities are for periods of one 
or two years the standard for the (B)MRC is a three-year project 
grant. The short-term grants serve two purposes - they provide 
funds for clearly-defined projects of limited duration, and also 
they provide seed money to test the feasibility of new ideas and 
new techniques.
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short-term grants - normally having a duration of one to two 
years. Charitable foundations, despite the fact that they are 
able to conduct long-term financial planning, have also 
contributed to the pattern of funding shorter term research 
projects. One reason for this relates to the spiralling costs 
associated with medical research. In other words, while a 
charitable foundation may be able to predict its income with some 
degree of certainty, it is more difficult for it to assess the 
costs of supporting long-term research. There are of course 
anomolies, like the ICRF, whose projects are normally funded for 
five to eight years; but this is practical in its case since the 
charity maintains its own research laboratories. However, this 
example provides no proof that charities generally represent a 
viable alternative to government as a funding source for medical 
research.
The charities also argue that they have also adopted this 
funding approach since government, via the (B)MRC, has always 
provided the long-term money for research. as one charity 
executive stated;
"If there is to be research facilities like the 
laboratory for molecular biology in Cambridge 
where they have won nine Nobel prizes, it takes a 
lot of money. It must be given regular support 
and employ a very large full-time staff. There 
simply is no charity in Britain which is large 
enough to do that."
48
48British Interview; British Diabetic Association, 2 March1987.
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The (B)MRC cutbacks have also had an impact on jointly funded 
charity-government research projects. Prior to 1980, medical 
research charities tried to use their money to 'pump-prime' 
research projects in their disease areas knowing that if they were 
successful that the (B)MRC would not let them fail. The charities 
have always justified their partial or complete withdrawal from 
successful projects partly on the grounds that they did not have 
guaranteed annual incomes. But they also believed, that if a 
programme was successful and had the potential to improve public 
health standards, it was a state responsibility. As one
respondent remarked, this proved to be a successful strategy prior 
to the cutbacks but now the reverse is true;
"Now we are beginning to find that government is 
doing the pump-priming because it doesn't have 
the money for 'continuation funding', they are 
looking at the charities to pick up the tab for 
long-term projects. We simply cannot operate 
this way."
49
Lastly, charities have argued that (B)MRC cutbacks have 
signalled government's failure to provide an adequate physical and 
human infra-structure for scientific investigation to flourish. 
Historically, the dual support system in Britain provided this 
bio-medical research infra-structure in the universities and 
hospitals. Increasingly, since 1980, charities have been placed 
under pressure to provide for a portion of the physical over-heads
49British Interview; Mental Health Foundation, 20 February
1987.
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such as equipment and consumables. Resistance to this has been 
marshalled by the AMRC which has argued that charities should not 
be funding items that are properly_government's responsibility. 
While this is perhaps true, there are other reasons why charities 
have not been prepared to take on-board such expenses. As Anne 
Luther, the AMRC's Secretary explained;
"It is very difficult for medical research 
charities to go to their volunteers and donating 
public and ask for financial contributions if the 
public knows that their donations are being used 
to employ a cleaner or pay for new lightbulbs. 
From this point of view, these cutbacks have the 
potential to detract from our members ' fund 
raising capabilities and from our overall 
contribution to medical research in Britain."
50
Unfortunately for the medical research charities the decision 
not to pay for these overhead costs poses a dilemma. In many 
instances, if the charities refuse to make financial allowances 
for the purchase of new equipment or for laboratory maintenance, a 
unit may be forced to shut-down. This then becomes problematic 
for charity executives who must explain to volunteers why 
promising research projects financed with voluntary donations have 
been terminated when charities ' annual incomes have been 
increasing.
The loss of personnel is another cost associated with the 
(B)MRC cutbacks since many 'top-flight' scientists are either 
leaving the country, or leaving the research field to take up
50British Interview; Association of Medical Research
Charities, 4 March 1987.
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private practice (if they have medical qualifications). 
Furthermore, young graduate students contemplating a future in 
research have begun to opt for other careers since the number of 
'career investigatorships' offered by the (B)MRC have been reduced 
by 30 per cent.51 In the past, universities have had tenured 
lectureships but these have dwindled in numbers since positions 
vacated by retiring professors have not been renewed. This same 
scenario has been apparent in the (B)MRC's own research facilities 
that are operated independently from the universities. This 
development is one that medical research charities have been 
unable to compensate for because of their limited funds. The 
problem is compounded by the fact that the cost of maintaining a 
tenured post until retirement for a researcher who is now 35 years 
old is £1/2 million.52 Not only is this expensive but it requires 
an expenditure which is premised on income stability - something 
that is virtually impossible for any charity. Alternatively, 
charities have lobbied government via the AMRC to make provision 
for the training of future researchers, as well as to develop a 
sound career structure that includes salaries competitive with 
those available in foreign countries. Their argument is that the 
career structure for scientists is ill-defined, in that the 
majority of young scientists are now employed under two or three 
year contracts and are continuously searching either for new
51'Medical Science on Crutches', New Scientist, p. 27.
52British Interview; British Heart Foundation, 3 March 1987.
414
positions or for new grants.53 As the AMRC's Secretary argued;
"Unless the issue of career structures can be 
corrected, medical research in Britain will 
remain an uncertain business and people will 
continue to be attracted to the United States 
where salaries are higher and job security more 
attainable."
54
Not only have budgeting restraints on the (B)MRC affected 
British medical research charities but so too have other cutbacks 
in the NHS. In 1984, the DHSS announced that there would be 
manpower controls placed on investigators involved in clinical 
research. Before medically-qualified researchers can become 
consultants they must attain the status of senior registrar. 
However, the government argued that there were too many senior 
registrars to fill the more limited number of consultancy posts. 
Rather than create more consultant posts, as the AMRC demanded, 
the government decided to make redundant a certain proportion of 
senior registrars to match the existing number of consultants. 
Yet in the process of doing this, the DHSS did not take account of 
the number of senior registrars funded by the charities.
53Many young investigators secure short-term contracts after 
completing their doctorates. Senior researchers will then spend a 
lot of time training them in advanced research techniques. The 
problem is that after they have received one or two contracts and 
are beginning to make substantial contributions many realize how 
limited the opportunities for advancement are and the best of them 
often look for employment elsewhere. To make matters worse the 
(B)MRC has refused to fund investigators after they have reached a 
certain age or after a certain number of years of contract work. 
This is largely because old researchers command higher salaries.
54British Interview; Association of Medical Research
Charities, 4 March 1987.
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Consequently, it was feared that the medical research professional 
career structure would be geared towards producing a proportion of 
researchers at levels based exclusively on the (B)MRC's staffing 
requirements. If this had happened the AMRC argued "that the 
medical research charities would be unable to find enough 
researchers to support disease related investigations."55 
Additionally, they were concerned that senior registrars funded by 
the charities who were to be stripped of their status would be 
ineligible to continue with projects in progress - some of which 
were near completion. If this were to happen, the volunteers and 
donating public would again question why projects had been allowed 
to remain uncompleted when consistently more money has been raised 
voluntarily each year.
The AMRC's initial response to this proposed staffing policy 
was so outspoken that the DHSS agreed to establish a Consultative 
Board whereby the charities were permitted to comment formally on 
the draft recommendations. The AMRC in turn, appointed Dr. P.0. 
Williams of the Wellcome Trust, and Professor Arthur Buller 
(Research Director for the Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great 
Britain), to put the charities case to government officials. In 
an interview Dr. Williams described his submissions to the 
Consultative Board in the following way:
"I pointed out to the government officials that 
given that charities support so many senior 
registrars the government should take account of
55British Interview; Association of Medical Research
Charities, 4 March 1987.
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this and inturn give the AMRC a quota of senior 
registrars which reflects the financial 
contribution made by the charities to medical 
research. The quota allocated to us, as compared 
to the (B)MRC should reflect the fact that 
charities collectively spend as much as the 
(B)MRC on research."
56
By the fall of 1986 the DHSS announced that it had 
reconsidered its initial quota of senior registrars by building 
into its new estimates the staffing requirements of the charities. 
In the end, the AMRC was able to secure a quota of 100 senior 
registrar positions specifically earmarked as non-governmental or 
externally supported investigators. Not only was this heralded as 
a success for the scientific community it also augmented support 
for the AMRC's bid to act as an effective lobbying vehicle for its 
member charities on issues of collective concern.
Given all of the concerns raised by charities in response to 
the (B)MRC cutbacks it is not surprising that their association 
has lobbied government over this issue. The main thrust of the 
AMRC's representation's to government has been that medical 
research charities are major participants in funding research in 
their own right and therefore should be involved in all decision­
making processes that impact on the way they operate. The 
implications of charities not having participated in public policy 
debates on issues of direct concern have posed problems in the 
past. For example, the Executive Director of the Muscular 
Dystrophy Group of Great Britain offered the following anecdote;
56British Interview; The Wellcome Trust, 14 March, 1987.
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"One of our funded researchers. Professor Alan 
Emery who was the head of the Genetics Department 
at Edinburgh University,. decided to retire 
about four years ago (1983). The government, 
without consulting us, simply decided to close 
the department, which effectively meant that our 
entire research efforts were terminated. We, and 
not the government, managed to help two of 
Professor Emery's research assistants acquire 
jobs elsewhere so that they could continue doing 
muscular dystrophy research."
57
Historically, it was never necessary for the medical research 
charities to become involved in politics since they merely 
provided a small financial supplement to the (B)MRC. Stated 
differently, the combined research budgets of all the medical 
research charities has always been modest in proportion to what 
was being given for research by the public purse. However, now 
that this position is becoming reversed, charities have begun to 
rely on the AMRC to lobby government on research-related issues 
ranging from the use of animals in experimentations to scientific 
staffing requirements. Indeed, one of these issues has centred on 
the (B)MRC's aspirations to compete directly with medical research 
charities in raising voluntary donations from the public. While 
as yet the (B)MRC has not launched a public fund raising appeal, 
it has published a booklet that is freely available to the public 
explaining how money can be bequeathed to the (B)MRC. There are 
two points to be made in connection with this. First, the
57British Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great 
Britain, 19 February 1987.
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budgetary cutbacks imposed on the (B)MRC have obviously forced it 
to search elsewhere for funding. Second, competing directly with 
the charities for funds, rather than seeking their financial 
assistance, is indicative of the (B)MRC's unwillingness to accept 
that its own 'senior position' in the research funding complex is 
being threatened by the charities. Several member charities who 
were interviewed wanted the AMRC to make representations to 
government urging them to impose regulations on the amount of fund 
raising the (B)MRC is able to engage in. However, since the 
(B)MRC has charitable status there is nothing illegal in its 
efforts to acquire non-government funds in the form of voluntary 
donations. These same charities argued that a more sensible yet 
temporary solution to the (B)MRC's fiscal problems would be for 
the charities to subsizide various (B)MRC projects that are in 
need of 'rescue money'. However, as one respondent argued, there 
is little possibility of this occuring.
"There is an enormous pride at the (B)MRC - as 
well there should be given its remarkable past 
achievements. It is unlikely that Sir James 
Gowen (President of the (B)MRC) would ask the 
charities for money, since the chaps he would 
have to talk to are the Executive Directors who 
are fund raisers. He simply will not ask for 
subsidies from a group of 35 generals, for want 
of a better phraseology - they are distinguished 
generals but they know nothing about science."
Quite separate from the fact that private donations help to 
lessen the financial crisis facing the (B)MRC is the realization
58British Interview; February 1987.
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that such funds give the (B)MRC flexibility to do certain things 
otherwise not immediately permitted with government funds. For 
example, in the past the (B)MRC has used private funds (which have 
always comprised less than 5 per cent of its total income) to move 
scientists from one research centre to another without having to 
wait for their salary increases to be approved by DES officials.59 
When departmental approval is given for such plans, and the money 
is forthcoming, the private (voluntary donations) budget is then 
reimbursed. As the (B)MRC respondent clarified;
"I do not want to give the impression that 
private funds are used for purposes which the 
Treasury would not approve of, rather these 
monies allows us to by-pass long and detailed 
administrative and bureaucratic procedures when 
something urgent needs to be done."
60
ii* Government Sponsored Research in Canada;_Changingthe Rules
The most important issue affecting Canadian medical research 
charity-state relations revolves around the federal government's 
implementation of a matching-grants scheme which in the future 
will affect the way in which the government calculates its level 
of support to the (C)MRC. At the time of writing the matching-
grants scheme had only been in effect six months. Thus, the 
following discussion represents the views of government and 
charity officials regarding the anticipated impact of the scheme
59British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
60Ibid.
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on the future funding of medical research in Canada.
Since 1981, the (C)MRC has operated under five year plans 
which have doubled its government grant-in-aid from $80 million 
(£40 million) (1981) to over $160 million (£80 million) in 1986. 
However, like the (B)MRC's budget, these apparently large funding 
increases have been eroded by high inflation associated with the 
costs of conducting medical investigations. In 1986, the (C)MRC 
was given initially an increase of $6.2 million (£3.1 million) but 
this was subsequently affected by a two per cent cut in overall 
government spending which produced a budget of $161.2 million (£ 
80.6 million). This represented only a two per cent increase over 
its 1985/86 budget.61 In February 1986, the federal government 
announced a series of new measures for funding the research 
councils that sought to replace the five year plan. In the 
remaining four years of the (C)MRC's five year plan (1987-1991) 
its budget is to be frozen at $161.4 million (£80.5 million). 
However, the (C)MRC will be able to supplement this through 
contributions to university research development from the private 
sector, and the federal government will match these contributions, 
dollar for dollar, up to a maximum of six per cent over the 
(C)MRC's previous year's budget. For the purposes of the 
'matching-grants policy', the term 'private sector', has been used 
to embrace profit-seeking businesses, individuals, designated
61Medical Research Council, Report of the President 1985/86. 
Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986, pp. 7-8.
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Crown Corporations, as well as charitable organisations.62
The main objectives of the matching-grant policy are two­
fold. First, it is aimed at increasing the overall level of 
university-based bio-medical research and research training 
through a partnership with the private sector. This growth will 
of course only take place if non-governmental organisations like 
charities are successful at increasing their annual incomes. 
Second, it is anticipated that the matching-grants scheme will 
increase the level of private-sector/university collaboration and 
increase the speed at which research results are transferred to 
the private sector for application. These objectives are examined 
in more detail beginning with the first.63
Many Canadian medical research charities are doubtful that 
the matching-grants scheme will increase the (C)MRC's income in 
real terms. As illustrated in Table 7.4 the anticipated private 
sector contribution during the first year of the matching grant 
scheme (1987/88) would be $10.0 million (£5 million). Most 
respondents believed that this is an attainable target income and 
that they would welcome the corresponding $10.1 million (£5.05 
million) that would then be matched by the federal government. 
However, for the (C)MRC's budget to continue to experience a real 
growth of six per cent it would be required to prove to government 
that private sources had contributed an extra $20.9 million (£10.4
62Ibi£L., p. 8.
63Department of Finance, Strengthening the Private
Sector/Univeraity__Research__Partnership;____The__Matching— PolicyRules. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986, p. 6.
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Tabla 7.f
The Canadian Federal Government's Five-Year Financial Plan 
Par University Research (SMllllons)
MEDICAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL
1985/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 TOTAL
(A) Previously 
Approved 
Budgets
161.4 130.8 130.7 130.7 130.7 130.7 653.6
(B) Budget - 37.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 159.9
(C) Federal
Matching of 
Private Sector 
Contributions 
(Maximum)
10.1 20.9 33.2 46.8 110.0
(D) Anticapted 
Private 
Contributions
” “ 10.1 20.0 33.2 46.8 111.0
(E) Total 161.4 167.4 181.6 203.2 227.8 255.0 1035.5
Source; Department of Finance, Strengthening the Private Sector/
University Research Partnership;__The Matching Policy
Rules. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986.
p. I.
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million) in 1988/89, $33.2 million (£16.1 million) in 1989/90 and 
$46.8 million (£23.4 million) in 1990/91. According to the same 
respondents, these targeted incomes would be virtually impossible 
to attain since charities have a 'limited market' from which to 
raise voluntary contributions. Some argued that if the federal 
government amended the Income Tax Legislation to encourage 
personal and corporate giving by offering tax credits, then these 
targets could, possibly be met.
The main criticism of the scheme is that the (C)MRC's budget, 
and ultimately the country's medical research infra-structure, 
would be susceptible to the whims of the donating public. For 
example, if the aggregate income of the medical research charities 
decreased from the previous year by 10 per cent because of a 'one- 
off' public out-pouring towards another charitable cause, then the 
availability of total research funds for Canadian investigators 
would decrease by 20 per cent since the (C)MRC matching-grants 
from government would decrease correspondingly by 10 per cent. In 
essence, the policy underlying the matching-grants scheme implies 
that charities would 'drive' the research growth in Canada. As 
one respondent explained, this would erode the complementary 
relationship that has characterized relations between medical 
research charities and state since the 1960's.
“As the senior partner in the research funding 
complex the (C)MRC has always been highly revered 
by Canadian charities. Because of their vast 
income in comparison to individual charities and 
the breadth of their research effort, the (C)MRC 
has always set the standards for the charities to 
adhere to. Now that the matching-grant programme
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has been introduced this relationship will be 
weakened - for it says that the (C)MRC's future 
ability to succeed will be determined by the 
success of the charities to raise more and more 
money each year. To think that the country's 
research infra-structure will depend on emotional 
appeals, garage sales and bingo games is, to say 
the least, a travesty."
64
The charities' fear of being unable to raise the voluntary 
donations required to meet the targeted income levels each year 
has raised speculation that the universities will likely begin 
launching their own fund raising appeals. The universities would 
aim to raise more voluntary donations in order to increase the 
matching-funds given to the (C)MRC which in turn would be 
dispersed to university-based researchers. However, if this 
transpires the medical research charities would then be forced to 
compete with the universities for the 'limited' number of 
voluntarily donated dollars. From the charities perspective, the 
implications are far reaching, especially since the alumni 
networks would be a lucrative means for the universities to 
capture a portion of the voluntary donation market.
An added concern of both universities and charities located 
in areas outside of Ontario and Quebec is that larger schools (for 
example, the University of Toronto and McGill University) will be 
able to raise more research money than smaller schools like Mount 
Allison University in New Brunswick. As a result, this would 
create an even greater disparity in the level and quality of the
64Canadian Interview; January 1987.
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research conducted in universities located in the 'have' and 
'have-not' provinces.65 The (C)MRC would be unable to 
counterbalance this as it has in- the past, since the largest 
proportion of matching-grants given by the government to the 
(C)MRC would in turn be given to those universities that have 
raised the most so-called 'private sector' money.
Furthermore, one respondent remarked that as part of the 
universities' efforts to raise their own research money, 
"scientists would themselves be relied upon to establish contacts 
with pharmaceutical companies as a means of securing corporate 
donations."66 The problem is that having senior scientists 
preoccupied with fund raising might lead to the neglect of 
teaching and development-training of young university researchers. 
As a result when the present research personnel retire, there may 
not exist an adequate number of scientifically qualified people to 
replace them.
65The terms 'have' and 'have-not' provinces are used to 
designate regions that require federal transfers payments in order 
to ensure that the range and quality of public services meets 
national standards. The actual computation of provincial 
'equalization payments' is complex. The initial calculations are 
based on a population-weighted average of provincial tax rates. 
Then these average rates are applied to each province's own 
revenue base, which yields a calculation of the potential per 
capita revenue to the province. Again, if a province's estimated 
per capita yield, from all the tax source, is below the national 
average per capita yield, the federal government makes up the 
deficiency. Based on 1984 figures, the 'have' provinces were 
Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia and the 'have-not' provinces 
were Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick, Quebec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan.
66Canadian Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Association of 
Canada, 5 December 1986.
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While Canadian medical research charities are generally 
ambivalent about the matching-grants scheme, they did respond 
favourably to its proposal during the consultation process with 
government. In 1985, the medical research charities received a 
copy of the draft proposal of the scheme and were asked for their 
comments. Most organisations supported the scheme under the false 
assumption that donations raised for a specific disease would be 
matched by government and given to the (C)MRC to be earmarked for 
research into that same disease area. Instead the charities later 
learned that all matching-grants given to the (C)MRC would be 
diverted into its general fund to be spent on the disease areas 
the (C)MRC so desired (typically cancer and heart). Consequently, 
the greatest challenge to the matching-grants scheme has come from 
the smaller charities representing less-popular disease who have 
argued that they will be subsidizing research into popular disease 
like cancer and heart. Indeed, this will indeed be the case, 
since the more money raised voluntarily, the more money the (C)MRC 
will receive from government to support its traditional research 
biases. As the Executive Director of the Canadian Diabetes 
Association commented;
"The way the programme is designed, I do not 
think it has a chance of succeeding. I met with 
the Minister of Health - Jake Epp - and simply 
put the following question to him. What incentive 
do the smaller charities representing low-profile 
disease have to go out and raise more money if 
there are no guarantees that one additional penny
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of government money will be spent our way?"
The matching-grants scheme has -highlighted the difficulties 
facing Canadian medical research charities in participating in the 
public policy process. The Executive Director of the Muscular 
Dystrophy Association of Canada admitted, "we wrote letters and 
made telephone calls to the minister's office but we had no 
illusions that our one voice would make a difference in the final 
decision of whether or not to go ahead with the proposed 
scheme."68 While British charities did successfully lobby the 
central government through their association to acquire a quota of 
senior registrars, Canadian charities have failed to achieve 
similar success on the matching-funds issue, partly because of 
their disorganized dealings with the federal government. 
Consequently, the establishment of an association comparable to 
the AMRC has been strongly endorsed by several Canadian medical 
research charities. As one respondent noted; "the impetus behind 
the formation of such an agency will likely come as the financial 
burden for the support of bio-medical research shifts from the 
public to private sector."69
It was mentioned that the second objective of the matching- 
grants scheme is to increase the level of private-sector/
67Canadian Interview; Canadian Diabetes Association, 4
December 1986.
68Canadian Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Association of
Canada, 5 December 1986.
67
69Canadian Interview; Arthritis Society, 19 January 1987.
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university research collaboration and to accelerate the transfer 
of these research results to the private sector for commercial 
application purposes. The charities have criticized this on the 
grounds that the type of scientific investigations conducted in 
the universities will shift from basic research to more applied 
research. Their thinking is that university researchers in search 
of non-governmental funds will enter into contractual-type 
research arrangement with pharmaceutical companies. If this 
happens, then basic research would be supplanted by more applied 
clinical investigations that reflect the research agendas of the 
large multi-national pharmaceutical companies. This would have 
the dual effect of limiting the number of researchers submitting 
basic research grant applications to the (C)MRC, as well as 
limiting the number of researchers submitting 'disease-focused' 
research grant applications to the charities. One respondent 
explained;
"I am convinced that government knows that basic 
research will be sacrificed by the matching- 
grants scheme but this merely confirms my 
suspicions that government does not see the 
(C)MRC as performing a particularly useful 
function. Very few politicians are scientists 
and therefore very few understand that you need 
basic research to build a stock of knowledge 
prior to making a practical research discovery."
70
In the non-medical research field a good example of basic 
research leading to a commercial application involves experiments
70Canadian Interview; December 1986.
430
on the nutritional requirements of grass and other plant forms. 
In 1954, biologists received money from the federal government to 
conduct basic studies of plant growth and in doing so 
coincidentally discovered the formula for 'weed killer'. That 
discovery alone spawned the growth of a $20 million (£10 million) 
fertilizer industry that has created 859 new jobs for Canadians.71 
The same opportunities exist for commercial products to spring 
from basic research in the medical sciences. However, if the 
matching-grants scheme reduces the level of government-sponsored 
basic research there will be no other source of funds for that 
kind of scientific investigation. This will be the case if 
charities continue to acquiesce to the demands placed on them by 
their volunteers to support 'disease-focused' research and if the 
pharmaceuticals continue to fund commercially oriented 'drug 
research'.
The matching-grant scheme cannot be compared directly to the 
(B)MRC cutbacks but the underlying government policy in both 
countries regarding bio-medical research funding is the same. The 
Conservative governments of each country have sought different 
ways of shifting the burden of responsibility for medical research 
funding to the private sector - to charities in particular. In 
both countries, this is symptomatic of the British and Canadian 
governments' attempt to reduce their deficits by limiting their 
public sector borrowing requirements. The steadily increasing 
incomes of both British and Canadian charities have made this
71lbid.
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government policy relatively easy to implement since the level of 
research conducted in both countries has remained constant. While 
the level of research is a concern of British and Canadian 
charities, so too is the shift away from basic research. This is 
not a problem that charities themselves in either country can 
correct by raising more voluntary contributions. Consequently, 
they will always see the provision of basic research as a 
governmental responsibility, disease focused research as their own 
responsibility, and commercial oriented research as the
responsibility of the pharmaceutical industry. In the past, this 
division of responsibility between each sector has been clearly 
defined. However, as one respondent noted:
"As the lines dividing the three sectors becomes 
blurred the question remains as to how the 
quality of our medical research will be affected.
It will remain to be seen whether Canada and 
Britain have the medical research infra-structure 
ten, twenty or thirty years from now to deal with 
public health problems comparable to AIDS."
72
This chapter has addressed an important theoretical question 
that has been raised often by economists when considering the role 
of charities in providing welfare services. This question can be 
simply stated: What advantages do charitable organisations have
over statutory ones in delivering similar services? One argument 
which appeals to those who believe that the public sector is 
necessarily wasteful is that charities can operate with lower
72Canadian Interview; McMaster University Medical School, 
Department of Immunology, 14 January 1987.
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cost. However, this chapter and previous ones have presented no 
evidence to suggest that charities are particularly cost-effective 
in 'supplying' medical research, except in the crude financial 
sense that volunteers do not have to be paid. Economic theory 
suggests that it is competition not private control, that is the 
best guarantee of cost effectiveness. As Judge has argued, this 
provides a strong case for purchase-of-service contracting once 
the state has accepted responsibility for financing and planning a 
service.73 However, in the context of medical research we have 
seen that the British and Canadian governments have not opted to 
'contract-out' to charities but rather to simply cut back their 
financial commitment to their own research infra-structure - the 
(B)MRC and (C)MRC. Assuming that British and Canadian medical 
research charities did supply their services on a contractual 
basis for government one might expect competition for contracts 
between agencies (whether from other charities, profit-seeking 
businesses or other statutory agencies) to reduce costs. In this 
context, however, the charity would essentially be acting as a 
firm, just as a building society does when it competes with 
private banks and Giro. This is very different from the claim 
that charities provide services more cost-effectively in resource 
terms than statutory agencies.74
73K. Judge, 'The public purchase of social care: British 
Confirmation of the American experience'. Policy and Politics. 
10(1982), pp. 397-416.
74R. Sugden, 'Voluntary Organisations and the Welfare State' 
in Julian LeGrand and Ray Robinson, Privatisation and The Welfare 
State. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984, p. 85.
433
Another common argument about the advantages charities have 
over statutory agencies is that the former are 'pioneers of the 
welfare state' and are inherently -more innovative. However, 
Kramer has criticized this theory as an outdated myth by arguing 
that statutory agencies are just as capable of innovation as 
voluntary organisations are.75 The traditional pioneering theory 
is that, at any time, there will be some welfare services that are 
not accepted as proper activities for the state; but if far­
sighted individuals combine to provide these services voluntarily, 
the general public will come to recognize their value and 
eventually the state will be able to take over. As Johnson 
explains, pioneers can make mistakes, and so new ventures must be 
regarded as experiments. Charities are often seen as
organisational structures in which experiments can be made. 
Creative ideas that work successfully can then be adopted by the 
state and those that fail can be abandoned at relatively little 
cost.76 The Wolfenden Report best documents how 19th century 
charities pioneered most of the main activities of the 20th- 
century welfare state.77 Indeed, there are numerous examples of 
more recent pioneering work by British and Canadian charities- 
including citizens' advice bureauxs, the Samaritans and hostels
75R. M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State. 
Berkeley California: University of California Press, 1981,
Chapter 9.
76N. Johnson, Voluntary Social Services. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell and Martin Robertson, 1981, Chapter 3.
77Wolfenden Committee, The Future of Voluntary Organisations.
London: Croom Helm, 1978, Chapter 3.
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for battered women. However, the application of the pioneer 
argument to either explain or justify state reliance on medical 
research charities to finance bio-medical research is not 
convincing. This is true since medical research charities are 
themselves (as is the state) constrained from developing 
innovative ideas by the nature of their charitable activity. As 
one Executive director of a Canadian charity explained:
"Medical research is different from providing 
relief to the poor since there is little room for 
developing creative solutions for problems. In 
addition, the creativity for solving health 
problems lies in the hands of qualified 
scientific investigators not in the hands of a 
group of charity administrators. Moreover, what 
little creative aspirations medical research 
charities have are further constrained by our 
volunteers who discourage us from funding the 
same kind of basic research that is supported by 
government."
78
In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing the point that medical 
research charities (in comparison to other types of charities) 
cannot be innovative in the area of research funded by government. 
This is true since medical research charities are under pressure 
from 'donors' not to fund basic research despite whether their 
investigation are innovative or not. In addition, many British 
and Canadian charities are too small to fund basic research and 
even the large charities suffer from significant variations in 
annual income to make it difficult for them to take on long-term
78Canadian Interview; January 1987.

Chapter Eight-
Medical Research Charities:__Lobbying qd
Non-Research Issues
While the previous three chapters have focused on medical 
research, this chapter examines patient service and public 
education issues. In doing so, it is demonstrated that volunteers 
and the donating public - themselves often disease sufferers- 
exert considerable pressure on a charity's executive to lobby on 
their behalf.
The chapter divides into three sections. The first deals 
with a number of patient-service-issues directly related to the 
pharmaceutical industry. It is shown that British and Canadian 
medical research charities have supported a number of lobbies 
organized by this industry. Explanations are given as to why this 
has happened and its impact on the charities fund raising 
capabilities. Section II examines patient-service-oriented issues 
unrelated to the pharmaceutical industry that have prompted 
medical research charities to lobby on behalf of disease suffering 
volunteers and financial contributors. It is shown that British 
and Canadian medical research charities have lobbied government on 
a host of issues, ranging from discrimination against disease 
sufferers in the workplace, to their members' restricted access to 
health-related statutory benefits. Section III differs from the
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previous two sections, in that it focuses not on lobbies organized 
around patient services, but rather lobbies organized around 
public education or preventive medicine. Specifically, it
examines the role of medical research charities in the anti­
smoking lobby. Here, the skill and sophistication of these 
organisations in pressuring government for legislative reform is 
revealed.
I. Medical-Research Charities and the Pharmaceutical 
Lobby
The economic success of the pharmaceutical industry has 
depended on its record of innovation. Worldwide, it is recognized 
that private enterprise and competitive multinational 
pharmaceutical companies are responsible for the discovery and 
development of new medicines. However, innovative-based success 
has been costly; one study illustrates that £50 million is now 
required to develop a successful new pharmaceutical drugl (see 
figure 8.1). For a corporation to expect limited success, at 
best, in pharmaceutical innovation it must invest significant sums 
of this order within short periods of time - a figure of £20 
million has been suggested.2 With investment of this magnitude at
IChemicals Economic Development Committee, Research and 
Development Costa, Patents and Regulatory Controls; a Consultative Document. London: National Economic Development Office, 1981,
pp. 16-20.
2lbid.. p. 18. In Britain, the pharmaceutical industry was 
spending over £350 million per year (1982 figure) on
pharmaceutical research and development. In real terms, this is 
about a six-fold increase over 1963 and three times the research 
budget of the Medical Research Council. Nevertheless by
international standards British company spending is fairly modest.
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Figure 8.1
Research and Development Costs per New Drug in Britain 
1968-1970 to 1979-1981
£ millions
Sources Office of Health Economics, Pharmacy»*
Innovation » recent trends, future prospects. 
Londons OHE, 1983. P.14.
risk, neither government research establishments [(B)MRC and 
(C)MRC], academic institutions nor medical research charities have 
been inclined or realistically capable of investing the funds 
necessary to discover new medicines. Nevertheless, the 
pharmaceutical industry's innovation record has largely depended 
on basic pharmacological and pathological knowledge developed in 
academic institutions and government research centres.3
While the economic success of British and Canadian drug 
companies has depended on their record of innovation their 
interest associations have argued that this has been threatened by 
increasing research and development costs brought on by various 
forms of government regulation. As a consequence, it is further 
argued that fewer companies are now financially capable of 
participating in the search for new medicines. For those 
manufacturers for whom this still represents a feasible strategy, 
cost escalation has placed a limit on the number of new 'chemical 
entities' (potential drugs) that have been submitted to the 
development process. As a result, the number of new drugs 
reaching the British and Canadian markets has also declined
It is estimated that by 1979 Hoffman - La Roche of Switzerland 
alone was spending about £150 million a year on research and 
development. Worldwide, the pharmaceutical industry is estimated 
to have spent about £4,000 million on research and development in 
1981. Thus Britain spends about eight per cent of the worldwide 
pharmaceutical research budget, although its home market accounts 
for only four per cent of total world sales. Figures taken from
M. Burstall, Multinational Enterprises.___Governments---end
Technology:__Pharmaceutical Industry. Paris: o ec d, 1981, pp. 33-
34.
3British Interview; Association of British Pharmaceutical 
Industries, 9 April 1987.
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significantly since the early-to-mid 1960's (see figure 8.2).
Given the regulatory climate in Britain and Canada, it is not 
surprising that pharmaceutical companies from both countries have 
lobbyied their respective governments to relax industry controls 
that hitherto have limited profitability. In their efforts to do 
so, pharmaceutical companies have encouraged medical research 
charities to collaborate with them in various lobbying compaigns. 
British and Canadian organisations responding favourably to this 
request have done so for an obvious reason: to seek the
continuation of financial support from the pharmaceutical 
industry. While the data listed in Figure 8.3 do not indicate the 
amount of pharmaceutical donations given specifically to British 
medical research charities it does reveal the total amount of the 
industry's corporate donations in comparison to other industrial 
and commercial sectors. In interviewing a spokesman for the 
Association of British Pharmaceutical Industries, it was explained 
that, although precise data was not available, a 'large 
proportion' of the industry's corporate contributions go to 
medical research charities.4 In most instances, this has been a 
relatively easy policy decision for charity executives to justify 
to volunteers and the donating public, since a relaxation of 
regulatory controls would increase industry profits and in turn, 
increase the amount of pharmaceutical research. This is a 
priority of disease sufferers whose hope for the future lie in the
4British Interview; Association of British Pharmaceutical 
Industries, 9 April 1987.
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Office of Health Economics, Pharmaceutical innovation» 
recent trends, future 
prospects, Londoni 
OHE, 1983» P»12.
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development of new drugs. However, as is discussed in section I. 
C, charities that have lobbied on behalf of the industry have 
risked internal division between those interested in patient 
services and those interested in medical research. This is true 
since a relaxation of some industry regulations has resulted in 
higher drug prices.
A general theme developed in this section is that medical 
research charities formulate their policies in consideration of 
their fund raising bases. Many of these policies relating to the 
pharmaceutical industry have included decisions to lobby 
government for both legislative and regulatory reform. In doing 
so, further proof is given that medical research charities are not 
free and independent of the policy formation process but rather a 
participant whose function has yet to be fully understood.
Section I of this chapter examines four types of government 
regulation that industry spokesmen claim have limited their 
profitability. Although each of these four issues are 
interelated, each is best described individually. These issues 
include 1) regulatory pressures on prescribing 2) regulatory 
erosion of patent protection 3) regulation of drug development 
and 4) government restrictions on promotion.
A. Regulatory pressure on prescribing
British and Canadian pharmaceutical companies claim that 
industry regulations have reduced the number of drugs that are 
covered under government drug plans. Consequently, they argue 
that many patients have been unable to pay the total cost of
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certain medicines required for treating their afflictions. As a 
result, fewer products are being sold and less profits are being 
generated by the industry.
In most countries, there are some arrangements for 
pharmaceutical companies to be reimbursed under social security 
schemes covering at least part of the population. Britain lies at 
one extreme with a centrally tax-funded health service, fully 
controlled by the central government. In countries like West 
Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland and Canada, both private and 
government health insurance schemes exist covering virtually the 
entire population. These are financed by a variety of insurance 
funds and treatment is provided by government, charitable and 
private health care organisations. The United States lies at the 
other extreme in that the nation's two publicly funded health care 
schemes - Medicare and Medicaid - cover just 22 per cent of total 
medical expenditures. Only 50 million out of the total population 
of 250 million are covered by these two programmes. The remainder 
of the expenditure, by the vast majority of the population, is 
covered either by private insurance or involves direct patient 
payments for treatment received. Thus the United States alone has 
a substantial private market for medical care, whereas in all 
other countries the bulk of health care expenses are prepaid 
through collective health care schemes.5
Focusing specifically on pharmaceutical reimbursement, the
5G. Teeling-smith, The__Future__for__Pharmaceuticals ;___ The
Potential, the__Pattern and the Problems. London: white crescent
Press Ltd., 1984, p. 20.
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British and Canadian governments - unlike the United States- 
cover part of the cost of pharmaceuticals supplied to patients on 
doctors' prescriptions. However, in each case, patients must pay 
a portion of the cost of all, or part, of the medicine which they 
receive. In Britain, patients pay a fixed charge of £2.60 per 
item prescribed, but 78 per cent of prescriptions are exempt from 
this charge, either because of the age or indigence of the 
patient, or because a person is suffering from one of a number of 
specific diseases. Overall, 94 per cent of the cost of all 
prescribed medicine is reimbursed in Britain.6
In recent years, two principal methods of attempting to 
control pharmaceutical costs have been introduced in Britain, 
Canada and a host of other countries. This has included the 
creation of 'positive' and 'negative' lists for medicines which 
may be reimbursed under social security schemes. The first sets 
out a limited list of medicines which are reimbursed while the 
second sets out a list of medicines which are not. In the absence 
of either a positive or negative list, all medicines prescribed by 
doctors would be reimbursed under the government's social security 
scheme.7 Table 8.1 summarizes the government policy in seven 
countries regarding the implementation of these lists. It is 
clear that Japan is an an«m»ly since doctors are given complete 
freedom to prescribe the medicines of their choice and all drugs
eibid-., p. 19.
7R. Chew, Pharmaceuticals in Seven Nations. London: Office
of Health Economics, 1985. p. 43.
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Table 8 . \
The Existence of ’Positive» and ’Negative* Lists 
tp Restrict Prescribing in Seven Countries.
'Positive Lists’ 'Negative Lists'
United Kingdom - Yes
Canada - Yes
West Germany - Yes
F ranee Yes -
Japan No No
Switzer 1 and Yes -
United States - Yes
Source: R. Chew, Pharmaceuticals in Seven Nations. London:
Office of Health Economics, 1985, p. 43.
w
are paid for by the state.
In countries where 'positive lists' have been implemented 
problems have arisen when government's have reduced the number of 
drugs eligible for reimbursement. This has especially been a 
problem in Britain when the government decided in 1984 to withdraw 
tranquillizers and a number of other drugs from the National 
Health Service's medicine exemption list. Mental health patients 
and other disease sufferers affected by this decision were forced 
to bear the total cost of their prescribed medicines. The British 
pharmaceutical industry whose profits were threatened, and medical 
research charities whose members 'out-of-pocket' drug expenses 
increased, began to lobby government to change their 
prescriptions, policy. The way in which this lobby was organized 
is particularly interesting. For example. Sir John Cox, the 
Executive Director of the Spastics Society explained:
"In 1984, our Medical Advisory Committee noticed 
that when the drugs on the NHS exemption list 
were being reduced, three drugs used by cerebral 
palsy sufferers were among them. A number of 
pharmaceutical companies approached us and asked 
us to endorse a much longer list of drugs which 
they were lobbying on behalf of. Our response 
was only to support those drugs which affected 
cerebral palsy patients."
8
The respondent also explained that had the Spastics Society 
received larger corporate donations from the pharmaceutical 
industry, the charity would have had to acquiesce to all their
8British Interview; Spastics Society, 23 February 1987.
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demands. Instead, because the organisations had derived only a 
small proportion of their income from the pharmaceutical industry 
the charity's directors chose to lobby DHSS officials on their 
own.
Several British medical research charities explained that 
they were offered money by pharmaceutical companies - which they 
accepted - for the specific purpose of influencing government to 
put a number of their products on the NHS exemptions list. One of 
these charities, the Mental Health Foundation, explained that it 
had not received a charitable donation from a pharmaceutical 
company during the course of its 15 years of service prior to the 
government cutbacks to the NHS prescription list. However, when 
these cutbacks were announced in 1984 this changed:
"I was offered money by a pharmaceutical company 
if I succeeded in getting the Secretary of our 
Grants Review Board - who is one of the most 
eminent scientists in Britain - to get certain 
drugs included on the exemption list. It was an 
offer we could not refuse since the money allowed 
us to fund several projects that our volunteers 
have wanted for many years."
9
Medical research charities have not always accepted large 
donations from pharmaceutical companies as they have not wanted to 
create the impression to volunteers that one company's products 
are being endorsed. Several charities explained that had they 
close financial ties to the Distillers Company Limited in 1962,
9British Interview; Mental Health Foundation, 20 February
1987.
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when the 'crippling' drug Thalidomide was sold to the public, its 
credibility and fund raising capabilities would have been 
undermined permanently. Other charities, like the Canadian
Foundation for the Study of Infant Deaths, argued that it was 
'financial suicide' for any charity to rely on just one large 
corporate sponsor like a pharmaceutical company that might, for 
any number of reasons, withhold future support. For example, in 
the event of this taking place, charity's with funded research 
projects for periods longer than twelve months would have 
difficulties meeting their commitments.10 As a result, most 
medical research charities that have opted to accept voluntary 
donations from pharmaceutical companies have done so from more 
than one source. As one respondent remarked; "by accepting large 
corporate support from many different drug companies, charities 
are not fearful of leaving themselves vulnerable to outside 
tampering and agenda setting by their financial contributors."11 
Most respondents denied encountering similar problems to those 
facing charities in the non-medical research field that derive 
most of their income from government. One Canadian medical 
research charity executive explained:
"We are not like the Canadian Wildlife Foundation 
which receives approximately 78 per cent of its 
income from the federal government and has 
Officials from the Department of Environment 
sitting on the charities Board of Directors. The
lOCanadian Interview; Canandian Foundation for the Study of 
Infant Deaths, 8 January 1987.
UCanadian Interview; December 1986.
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problem with that arrangement is that government 
officials try to tailor the charity's programmes 
around existing or proposed government 
environmental policy."12
British charities that have involved themselves in the NHS 
exemption list issue have done so not only to secure corporate 
contributions, but also to represent the interests of their 
Volunteers who are concerned with lowering drug prices. Since the 
volunteers and donating public are often disease sufferers, from a 
fund raising perspective the issue of drug prices has become an 
important matter for each organisation. Most executive directors 
of British charities remarked that political involvement in the 
NHS issue has been time consuming and expensive but vital to 
maintaining their fund raising infra-structure. In some cases, 
the pressure from volunteers has been so great that charities have 
no* only attempted to get various drugs reinstated on the NHS 
exemption list but also to obtain new ones on the list. For 
example, medication for alleviating symptoms of cystic fibrosis 
have never been reimbursed by the British government. The reason 
for this is that individuals below the age of 16 are not required 
to pay prescription charges for any of the medicines they receive. 
When the NHS exemption list was first drawn up in 1948, there were 
very few cystic fibrosis patients who lived past the age of 16- 
pneumonia often claimed their lives. However, since pneumonia has 
been controlled effectively cystic fibrosis patients are now 
living into their twenties and are having to pay enormous sums of
12ibid.
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money for their medicines. Since the period of suffering has 
increased and more 'layers' of people surrounding these victims 
have been affected, pressure on the Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust 
to influence government policy has increased. As the Executive 
Director of this charity remarked:
"The CFRT has made this issue one of its 
priorities and its something we are beginning to 
lobby quite fervently on. For example, we have 
gained support in Parliament, particularly from 
Mr. Pollock and Mr. Ivan Thomas who act as 
spokesman for the CFRT in the House. They have 
managed on occasion to get an adjournment debate 
in order to get the Cystic Fibrosis medications 
put on the NHS exemption list. Furthermore, both 
the CFRT and our two parliamentry supporters are 
constantly making representations to government, 
particularly the DHSS, for this kind of reform."
13
The same respondent was asked how these two Members of Parliament 
came to support the CFRT. In both cases the M.P.'s were fathers 
of cystic fibrosis children.
In terms of their lobbying methods, most medical research 
charities have tended to utilize their own in-house scientific 
staff to negotiate with similarly qualified people at the DHSS. 
Since many scientists working for medical research charities hold 
cross-appointments with the (B)MRC (see chapter six, section I.
C.) contacts within the governments' scientific network have 
usually been well established. As one respondent remarked:
"We are well aware that given the present
13British Interview; Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust, 24
February 1987.
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government's commitment to reducing public 
spending the reform that we are interested in 
will only come about with the strong support of 
senior officials from within DHSS. To think that 
we could affect change by walking up and down 
Whitehall with placards shouting and chanting is 
completely ridiculous."
14
In conclusion, the regulatory controls on prescribing 
illustrate that both charities and the pharmaceutical industry 
have an interest in seeing that more drugs are eligible for 
reinbursement under the government's social security scheme. If 
this happens, pharmaceutical companies would sell more of their 
products and generate larger profits. For charities, a greater 
number of drugs on the NHS prescription list would mean that 
disease sufferers would pay less for their medicines. The 
pharmaceutical industrys' efforts to entice medical research 
charities to join their lobbying campaigns have been largely 
effective. However, charities have not only supported the 
industry's lobby but have also participated in the debate in order 
to satisfy the demands placed on them by volunteers. Charities 
failing to do so have feared jeopardizing their fund raising 
infra-structure.
B. Regulatory erosion of patent protection
Both Canadian and British pharmaceutical companies have 
argued that profits have been eroded by generic drug companies who 
are allowed to make inexpensive copies of existing drugs without
14British Interview; February 1987.
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spending large sums of money on research and development. In the 
past, this has been deterred by manufacturing patents which 
restrict generic competition for a specified period of time (this 
period varies from country to country). Pharmaceutical companies 
have lobbied government to extend the period of patent protection 
so that larger profits can be generated. The longer companies 
hold a monopoly in a product area, the larger their profits become 
- profits which the industry claims, are necessary to finance the 
escalating costs of discovering and developing new medicines.
In most countries, pharmaceutical products are covered by 
patents. In general, two types of patent protection are 
available. One covers the actual medicine itself - a 'product 
patent' - the other covers only the method of manufacture - a 
'process patent'. The latter provides only weak protection for 
the innovator, as it is often possible to produce a person's novel 
medicinal chemical by a different production process (referred to 
as a generic drug), thus circumventing the intended patent 
protection. In addition, it is extremely difficult to prove that 
an imitator is actually using the patented production process, 
particularly if the onus of proof lies with the original patent 
holder. Until the 1950's, most countries relied on process 
patents for pharmaceutical products. However, since then, all 
countries, with the exception of Canada and several other non- 
European nations have had the stronger 'product patents' for at 
least 20 years. Canada has continued to rely only on 'process 
patents', thus enabling pharmaceutical imitators (generic drug
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companies) to operate freely in their country. In EEC countries 
'product patents' now run for 20 years from the date of 
application. In the United States they last for 17 years and in 
Japan for 15.15
Canada's postwar government inherited the original British 
provision in the patent laws which allowed generic drug companies 
to apply for compulsory licences for pharmaceuticals, and which 
required the Controller of Patents to grant such licences unless 
he could see good reason for refusing to do so. In Britain, this 
provision of the Patent law was repealed in 1977. However, 
instead of repealing this provision, the Canadian government chose 
to extend its application to permit importation of generic 
products as well as their local manufacture. Thus while Britain 
strengthened its patent protection, the Canadian government in the 
1970's substantially weakened the protection afforded to new 
pharmaceutical discoveries. Furthermore, under its provincial 
health insurance plans, Canada has allowed substitution of generic 
medicines in place of the original brands prescribed by the 
doctor.
The effect of these substitution laws were strengthened by 
the introduction of 'Maximum Allowable Cost' provisions into the 
Social Security Schemes. Thus pharmacists have been reimbursed 
only at the price of the cheap generic copy product - they could 
not afford to dispense the original brand which had been
ischew, Pharmaceuticals in Seven Nations, p. 37.
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prescribed.16
According to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
Canada the effects of these provisions on the Canadian 
pharmaceutical industry have been disastrous. Canada now carries 
out little significant pharmaceutical research and much of its 
pharmaceutical requirements are met by imports.17 Figure 8.4 
illustrates the decline of Canada's negative balance of 
pharmaceutical trade during the late 1970's, while Britain's 
positive trade balance at the same time improved.
Conversely, there are those advocating strongly the presence 
of generic drug manufacturing in Canada since it provides both 
lower drug costs and employment as well. Take for example, a 
typical 60 year old man whose doctor has recently diagnosed him as 
having an ulcer and has prescribed medication to control the 
problem. If this man is part of the 15 per cent of Canadians who 
are not covered by provincial drug programmes or private insurance 
plans, he must bear the entire cost of his medications. A one 
month supply of Tagamet, made by the multinational pharmaceutical 
company. Smith Kline and French would cost him $36.88 (£18.44) but 
the same number of pills of Cimetidine, the generic equivalent of 
Tagamet, would cost only $11.60 (£5.80). The quality of medicine 
is the same. Even if that same man was covered under a provincial 
health plan or private health insurance scheme, his monthly
16lbid.. p. 56.
17J. Poulis, Canada's Pharmaceutical__Industry;__a Survey Of
Recent Trends. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1985, p. 6.
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Figure 8.4
Comparison of British and Canadian Pharmaceutical 
Trade Balances. 1975-1979
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Ft. Chew, Pharmaceuticals In Seven Nations. 
London« Office of Health Economics, 1985,p. 57.
premiums would also increase substantially. 18
In the future Canadians may not be able to get lower-priced 
generic copies of new drugs. At the time of writing, the Canadian 
Parliament is debating legislation (Bill C-22) that would take 
away an individual's right to choose between generic and non­
generic medications. If the Bill is passed, new drugs would not 
face lower-priced generic competitors for ten years.19 Canada 
would enforce product patents on newly discovered medicines 
similar to those found in Britain, the United States and Europe. 
Prior to 1969, Canadians would not have had that choice. 
Multinational companies introducing a drug into Canada would hold 
a monopoly on that drug until the patent on it expired - which at 
the time was up to 17 years. Without any competition, drug prices 
stayed high; in fact, three major federal reports during the 
1960's found that Canadians were paying among the highest prices 
in the world for their medicines. Finally, in 1969, the federal 
government passed a bill allowing for compulsory licencing. Since 
then even if a drug is patented, a generic drug company can go to 
the Commissioners of Patents in Ottawa and get a licence to import 
and sell the drug in Canada. In return, the company receiving the 
licence pays the patent holder a royalty.
The multinational drug companies which lost their monopolies 
were naturally unhappy about the proposal to allow generic drug
18Joe Lexchin. a— Critical Analysis of the Canadian Drug
Industry. New York: Riverrun Press, 1982, p. 91.
19Toronto Star. 18 April 1987.
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companies to take-over a portion of their Canadian market. Their 
interest group, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
Canada, spent more than $75,000 (£125,000) lobbying against the 
1969 legislation. A number of scare tactics were utilized in an 
attempt to generate opposition to the proposal. Canadians were 
warned that in the event of an epidemic, the necessary drugs might 
not be available. As such, people would die due to the poor 
quality of drugs the generic companies would supply.20 After 
1969, the multinationals kept up their lobbying efforts, and by 
1984, the pressure started to have a political impact. The 
federal government appointed University of Toronto economist, 
Harry Eastman, to conduct an inquiry into all aspects of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Eastman held public hearings during the 
fall of 1984, and issued his report in May 1985. His findings 
indicated that contrary to the companies' claims, the 
multinationals had profited well under generic competition; in 
fact profit levels in Canada were higher than in almost all other 
western industrialized countries. Growth in the pharmaceutical 
industry from 1969 to 1984 was even better in Canada than in the 
United States where generic drug competition is not permitted. 
Furthermore, he concluded that the multinationals had lost only a 
small 3.1 per cent of the Canadian market to generic drug 
companies.21
20Lexchin, A Critical Analysis of the Canadian Drug Industry# p. 52.
21 Department of Finance, Royal___Commission__on__Canada' 8
Pharmaceutical Industry. Hull: Queen's Printer, 1985. p. 61.
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It is true that the multinationals were not doing much 
research in Canada, but it has been argued they never had, even 
before 1969. The reason for the lack of research in Canada, 
according to one Canadian pharmaceutical spokesman is easily 
understood: "virtually all companies do most of their research in
their home country".22 Since there are no multinationals 
headquartered in Canada there is little pharmaceutical research 
conducted in the country. Finally, and most importantly, Eastman 
found that in 1983 compulsory licencing had stimulated competition 
and as a result saved Canadians at least $52.5 million (£26.25 
million) in drug costs. On a national drug bill of about $1.4 
billion (£700 million) annually, compulsory licensing was shaving 
16 per cent off the cost of prescriptions.23
By the time the Eastman Report was published, a federal 
election had been held that brought to office the Progressive 
Conservative Party led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. During 
the election campaign Mulroney supported the position of the 
multinational drug companies. Once in office the Government
initiated discussions with the United States regarding a 
comprehensive free-trade agreement, giving American-based 
multinational drug companies another means to exert pressure. Not 
only could U.S. based pharmaceutical companies directly lobby the 
federal government but they could also use their considerable
22Canadian Interview; Connaught Laboratories, 11 February 1987.
23Department of Finance, Royal Commission on Canada's
Pharmaceutical Industry, pp. 26-27.
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influence in Washington to press their case. This so-called 
'Washington connection' proved very powerful. Both U.S. President 
Ronald Reagan and Vice-President George Bush raised the subject 
during bi-lateral negotiations with their Canadian counterparts. 
In addition, the chief U.S. trade representative, Clayton Yeutter, 
publically rebuked Canada for taking too long to respond to the 
U.S. pharmaceutical industry's demands.24
Finally, in November 1986, Consumer and Corporate Affairs 
Minister Harvie Andre tabled Bill C-22 in Parliament. If enacted 
by the House of Commons, the Bill will give drug companies a ten 
year monopoly on any new drug they introduce, that is, 
pharmaceutical companies would restrict competition from cheaper 
generics for a period of ten years. The price of drugs already 
available would not change. There would be some provision for the 
creation of a Drug Price Review Board to ensure that prices for 
new drugs do not increase dramatically. However, the person 
likely to be appointed to head the board, Harry Eastman, has 
argued that without competition for ten years, new drugs would be 
more expensive than if there was competition.25 The Consumers 
Association of Canada has estimated that Bill C-22 would add an 
extra $300 million (£150 million) to drug costs by 1995.26 In 
return, for their ten year monopoly, the multinationals have
24Globe and Mail. 23 May 1986.
25Department of Finance, Royal Commission on Canada's 
Pharmaceutical Industry, pp. 26-27.
26Consumers Association of Canada, Revising Canada's Patents 
Law3. Toronto: Kranston and Feeber, 1986. p. 4.
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offered to invest $1.4 billion (£700 million) in research and 
development in Canada over the next ten years and create 3,000 new 
'high-technology' jobs. An information paper from the Department 
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs speaks of creating 'a world- 
class industry' in Canada, a goal the Eastman Report warned was 
'virtually impossible'.27
In the context of relations between medical research 
charities and the state Bill C-22 is significant in that drug 
companies have attempted to encourge charities to join their lobby 
in support of the legislation. As in the case of the British 
pharmaceutical industry's handling of the NHS exemption list 
Canadian drug companies have pressured charities to either support 
the Bill or have their corporate funding reduced. As a result, 
serious problems have been raised for Canadian medical research 
charities; support for the legislation would mean alienating 
patient service advocates. This group includes drug-dependent 
volunteer fund raisers and the donating public who are disease 
sufferers. Their demands have consistently been for their 
charities to lobby on their behalf for lower priced medicines - in 
other words, for generic competition. As a result, the typical 
response of most organisations that have research and patient 
service programmes has been to remain neutral on this issue. The 
Canadian Cancer Society (CCS) explained that when the issue first 
emerged its Executive Director sent a telegram to the Prime
27Department of Finance, Royal Commissi
Pharmaceutical Industry, p- 29.
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Minister opposing the proposed amendments to the patents Act. His 
opposition was grounded in the belief that tens of thousands of 
cancer patients would be adversely affected by increased drug 
prices. However, when the Director of the CCS's Research 
Committee became aware of this, an emergency Board meeting was 
convened whereupon it was decided to withdraw the telegram and 
launch a study into the issue. As Ken Kyle, the CCS's Ottawa 
lobbyist explained:
"When the facts and complexity of the debate over 
Bill C-22 started to emerge, it became clear that 
we had shot ourselves in the foot by sending the 
telegram. People within our research wing were 
threatening to resign as well as to go public. 
As a result, the decision was made to withdraw our 
criticism of the Bill and remain neutral until we 
had a better grasp of the facts. To help us do 
this we commissioned two Carleton University 
researchers to study the proposed Bill and make 
recommendations to us, bearing in mind the two 
very different camps within our charity."
28
Of the 18 Canadian charities interviewed, eight stated that 
their charity had no official policy regarding the proposed 
legislation. Two charities were in full support of the 
pharmaceutical industry's bid to extend the patent protection and 
three were firmly opposed. Surprisingly, five respondents refused 
to make comments regarding their position on the grounds that it 
was a sensitive issue for their fund raisers. Of this last group, 
two executive directors later agreed to make comments 'off the
28Canadian Interview; Canadian Cancer Society, 30 January
1987.
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record' if anonymity was guaranteed.
Full support for the pharmaceutical industry and the proposed 
patent legislation has been demonstrated by charities like the 
Canadian Geriatrics Research Society (CGRS) which devotes all its 
funds to research. As the charity's Executive Director explained:
"Our Board of Directors like Bill C-22 since it 
will facilitate the pharmaceuticals to make 
larger profits and in turn, do more research in 
Canada; perhaps more research into Gerontology."
29
The same respondent was asked whether the CGRS had been contacted 
by pharmaceutical companies or their association to lobby in 
support of the proposed legislation. It was revealed that such 
contact had been continuous, since two of the charities' board 
members were senior pharmaceutical executives:
"Dr. Bill Cochran - Vice President of Connaught 
Laboratories - and Mr. Jim Dougherty - Vice 
President of Life Sciences at Connaught 
Laboratories - both sit on our Board of 
Directors. They have provided detailed studies 
showing us how our charity will benefit from the 
Bill as a result of the increase in Canadian 
pharmaceutical research."
30
Since this same charity also derives approximately 21 per cent of 
its income from pharmaceutical companies, it is not surprising 
that it has supported unconditionally the industry's lobby for
30Ibid.
29Canadian Interview; Canadian Geriatrics Research Society,
12 January 1987.
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greater patent protection, 
following way:
Its support was described in the
"We have written the Minister of Health Jake Epp 
and Consumer and Corporate Affairs Minister 
Harview Andre on several occasions expressing our 
support for Bill C-22. We have used our monthly 
newsletter to urge people to write their M.P.'s 
and the opposition party leaders demanding that 
the Bill be passed by the House as quickly as 
possible. Finally, we have also allowed the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
Canada to add our name to its list of 
organisations supporting the legislation. It's a 
small effort, but if there is enough like-minded 
people in charitable and non-charitable 
organisations that lobby in this sort of 
controlled and responsible way then the 
legislation will most certainty succeed."
31
The charities that have suffered the most as a result of Bill 
C-22 are organisations that have relatively strong patient service 
programmes as well as medical research programmes, and which are 
heavily dependent on donations from the pharmaceutical industry. 
For example, the Parkinson Foundation of Canada receives money 
from four drug companies, Sandos, Markshop, Dali and DuPont. At 
the time of interviewing the largest sponsor - Sandos - had 
already threatened to withold future funding for scientific 
conferences organized by the foundation if the charity did not 
alter its 'neutral' policy. However, due to the influence of 
parkinson's sufferers on the charity's Board of Directors these 
corporate donations have been foregone as the price for containing 
drug prices. At present, Canadian Parkinson sufferers have two
31Ibid.
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generic drugs available to them which means their present 
prescription charges are approximately half what they would be if 
ten year patents were in effect. Given that Parkinson sufferers 
require large amounts of medication and can live many years with 
their affliction, fighting higher drug prices has become a 
priority for both themselves and for their charity.32
Several smaller Canadian medical research charities 
representing less popular diseases have also lobbied against Bill 
C-22. For example, the Canadian Foundation for the Study of 
Infant Deaths has argued there is nothing in the proposed 
legislation that will actually force the multinationals to commit 
their newly generated profits towards research in Canada. The 
charities claim that the Bill says there will be a review of the 
legislation after four years and again after ten years. On the 
one hand, it is only presumed, that if the companies have not kept 
their promise to do more research, their ten year patent
protection may be revoked. On the other hand, it might not 
actually be revoked, depending on the whim of whichever party is 
in power in Ottawa at the time. Thus, several medical research 
charities have written letters to various ministers seeking the 
inclusion of a 'sun-set' provision in the legislation. As one 
respondent explained:
"The 'sun-set' provision would re-evaluate the
research commitment of all the drug companies in
Canada every two years. If they were not meeting
32Canadian Interview; Parkinson Foundation of Canada, 20
January 1987.
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pre-determined research levels or quotas then the 
bill would be scrapped and we would revert back 
to the present day system. The re-evaluation 
provision that is now being proposed does not 
set-out a detailed formula for calculating how 
much of the 'new profits' shbuld be ploughed back 
into Canadian research. Instead, the
pharmaceutical industry is merely proposing a 
"dummy" sun-set provision. As such, there will 
be nothing for us to do but watch newly generated 
profits flow south of the border."
33
Smaller Canadian charities representing low profile diseases 
have also refuted drug company claims that greater patent 
protection and resulting increased profits would allow for the 
discovery of important new drugs. These charities argue that 
"pharmaceutical companies operate on the profit motive - if there 
was no money to be made in producing new medicines, the companies 
would be in some other line of business."34 Furthermore, the 
charities claim that, to minimize the risks involved in investing 
large sums of money for the development of new medicines, there 
has been a tendency on the part of manufacturers to concentrate 
their efforts on disease areas where both knowledge already exists 
and market potential is promising. In other words, British and 
Canadian pharmaceutical companies, like their governmental and 
charitable counterparts, have skewed their research efforts 
towards 'popular diseases' like cancer and heart. Interviews with 
pharmaceutical company executives in both countries revealed that
33Canadian Interview; Canadian Foundation for the Study of 
Infant Deaths, 8 January 1987.
34Canadian Interview; January 1987.
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much drug-related research is conducted in these two popular 
disease areas because of the considerable amount of basic and 
applied research knowledge supplied by cancer and heart research 
charities and government. This has left those afflicted with 
multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy and cystic fibrosis with 
little promise for new medicines as their comparatively small 
numbers have not constituted profitable markets. Furthermore, 
several of the smaller British and Canadian charities argued that 
most of the pharmaceutical companies' research and marketing 
efforts are directed towards merely improving existing drugs that 
have the greatest sales and profit potential - not necessarily the 
greatest health need. Both British and Canadian respondents noted 
that as a result, 'research clustering' occurs in disease areas 
where medicines are already available. For example, in 1983 
eleven new drugs for the treatment of ischaemic heart disease were 
added to the list of 33 products already available for this 
affliction.35 A further example of this type of practice is non­
steroidal drugs for which 14 are presently available on the 
Canadian market for treating arthritis - a figure that is 
anticipated to increase to 20 by 1990.36 As the Executive 
Director of the Arthritis Society explained:
"If you read the medical literature you will find 
that by and large not one of these drugs is 
superior to any of the others. So why do they
35British Interview; Chest, Heart and Stroke Association, 20 
February 1987.
36Canadian Interview; Arthritis Society, 20 January 1987.
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keep appearing? The answer is simply that the 
Canadian market for arthritis drugs for one year 
is a lucrative $100 million (£50 million)."
37
Furthermore, one Canadian scientist explained that approximately 
24 new drugs are introduced into Canada each year, but that only 
about ten per cent of these represent major therapeutic gains over 
already existing products. In addition, 60 per cent of these new 
drugs offer little or no therapeutic advantage; instead they are 
brought out because the companies believe there is money to be 
made in selling them.38
In conclusion, the conflict over Bill C-22 reveals that most 
Canadian medical research charities tend to formulate their policy 
decisions in consideration of those who supply their funding. 
Again, in Britain, medical research charities heavily dependent on 
pharmaceutical donations have lobbied the government to include 
various drugs on the NHS exemption list. In each case, the 
decision to actually lobby was partly determined by those who 
controlled the organisation's fund raising efforts namely, their 
corporate sponsors. Pressure was also exerted by volunteers and 
the donating public who are sympathetic to the welfare of disease 
sufferers though in the Canadian patent case this tended to work 
against the interest of the drug companies. Both organisations 
have had to respond in some way to these various demands in order
37Ibid.
38Canadian Interview; McMaster University Medical School,
Department of Pathology, 19 January 1987.
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to avoid undermining their fund raising infra-structure. As one 
fund raiser noted:
"It is not good for business- if a charity creates 
the impression that high drug prices is not worth 
lobbying government for reform. This is 
especially true if the organisation's volunteers 
are heavily dependent on drugs."
39
C . Regulation of drug development
Before new medicines are sold to the public, pharmaceutical 
companies must test their products for any potential adverse 
effects. In Britain and Canada the time required to do so is 
approximately ten years. In both countries, the pharmaceutical 
industry, and more recently medical research charities, have 
lobbied for the time period of 'regulatory testing' to be 
shortened. The industry's main argument has been that excessive 
government regulation in this respect has dramatically increased 
the costs of developing new medicines, thus fewer products are 
reaching the market.
The history of regulation in the pharmaceutical industry goes 
back more than a century and a half. In the United States the 
Vaccine Act of 1813 was enacted to regulate the production and 
sale of medicine for smallpox. However, the first major
regulation to control the testing and marketing of new medicines 
were introduced in the U.S. by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) in 1938 in response to a disaster with the elixir of
39Canadian Interview; January 1987.
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Sulphanilami.de. This occurred because the manufacturers used a 
toxic solvent to produce the elixir which killed 107 people before 
the mistake was realized.40 It was the Thalidomide tragedy in 
1962 which precipitated the much stricter pharmaceutical 
regulations in force today, embodied in the 1962 Amendments to the 
Food and Drug Regulations in the United States, in the 1968 
Medicine Act in Britain and in the 1970 Hazardous Product Act in 
Canada.41 The 1968 British legislation gave statutory backing to 
voluntary drug safety arrangements which had been introduced in 
1964 under the Dunlop Committee.
40 J. Crout, The Nature of Regulatory Choices • Rochester s
Centre for the Study of Drug Development, 1978, p. 12.
41Thalidomide was the name given to a drug developed in 
Germany in the 1950's that was taken primarily as a sedative and 
sleeping pill by pregnant women. Through a licencing agreement 
the drug was marketed in Britain by the Distillers Company Limited 
during the late 1950's and early 1960's. After reports from 
abroad that pregnant women taking the drug were producing 
physically deformed children, the drug was withdrawn from the 
British market. This incident brought to the government's 
attention the need to increase its regulation of the
pharmaceutical industry's product development programmes.
Moreover, the incident for the first time raised the need for 
government to provide long-term compensation (on a large scale) to 
those adversely affected by defective medicine. While this 
important theme is outside the main focus of this thesis, the 
point must be made that the British government (through the DHSS) 
provided a considerable sum of money (originally £3 million) to 
the Rowntree Memorial Trust Family Fund to dispurse to Thalidomide 
sufferers and their families. By organizing a 'compensation 
package' through a non-state agency (a charity) the argument has 
been made that the state deflected the antagonism about the under­
supply of such 'compensation' away from itself. See Jonathan 
Bradshaw, 'The DHSS-Rowntree Memorial Trust Family Fund: an
innovation in quasi-government', in Anthony Barker, Quangos in
Britain:__Government and__the__Networks__o£— Public Policy-Making.
London: MacMillan, 1982, p. 109.
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In an interview a British pharmaceutical spokesman argued
that:
"The Thalidomide disaster - must be taken in 
perspective - between 1940 and 1980, 250,000 
childhood deaths were avoided by medical 
developments. In contrast, the number of British 
children tragically damaged by Thalidomide was 
fewer than 500. That is over 500 lives saved for 
each damaged child. I am not arguing that such a 
ratio makes the Thalidomide disaster 'acceptable' 
in any sense. But it does indicate that benefits 
and risks from medicines must be seen as a 
question of balance."
42
However, critics of the pharmaceutical industry have provided 
contemporary examples to show why government should not succumb to 
industry pressure to shorten the development time for new 
medicines. Their best arguments have centred on the drug 'Opren' 
- an anti-arthritis drug, made by Eli Lilly in the United States, 
introduced to Britain in 1980 and given to 500,000 patients. It 
is now alleged the range of side effects from Opren includes 
internal bleeding, kidney and liver diseases, skin rashes, blood 
disorders, distorted nails and abnormal hair growth. There have 
been, it is alleged, nearly 100 Opren related deaths and the 
number of injured plaintiffs seeking compensation is over 1,000 in 
the United Kingdom alone.43
Industry critics have also been concerned about over-zealous 
pharmaceutical researchers who falsify, invent or otherwise
42British Interview; Astro Pharmaceuticals, 6 March 1987.
43Sunday Times Magazine. 29 March 1987.
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present misleading scientific data on new products to expedite 
product 'approval' by government regulatory officials. In a 
recent case, an eminent British scientist working in an Australian 
University faked important research which gave a new 'birth- 
control' pill an 'all-clear' report on its side-effects. 
According to an inquiry. Professor Michael Briggs, former head of 
Deakin University's science department and a world authority on 
the 'pill', failed to do any of the research in Australia that he 
claimed to. Not only did Briggs not have a personal laboratory to 
perform his alleged research, he was never seen conducting 
experiments. He nevertheless published influential scientific 
papers on the pill's side-effects which he claimed to have 
produced at Deakin between 1976 and 1984. The low-dose 
'triphosic' pill gained the most from Brigg's unethical efforts, 
with them being presented as the least likely to produce risks of 
heart disease and other serious illnesses. Had this impropriety 
not been detected and the drug not 'called-back', two million 
British women who were using the drug may have been adversely 
affected.44
The British and Canadian pharmaceutical industries have not 
opposed all forms of government regulation of drug development. 
Since the Thalidomide tradegy, the industry has recognized a need 
for government to provide additional safeguards to reduce the risk 
of adverse reactions from medicines. Indeed, the industry has 
welcomed a system of licensing of medicines prior to marketing in
44The Sunday Times Magazine. 29 March 1987.
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order to keep out irresponsible manufacturers who might otherwise 
be tempted to 'cut-corners' and bring the industry into
disrepute.45 Nevertheless, the industry has complained that the 
inevitable element of bureaucracy involved in a government scheme 
of regulatory controls has associated costs. The Association of 
British Pharmaceutical Industries notes that these costs include 
"the manpower needed in both government and industry to deal with 
the regulatory affairs in each country."46 More importantly, from 
the industry's point of view, the 'costs' include delays in 
marketing new medicines. A recent British study estimated that, 
apart from other factors, the 1968 Medicine Act. and its
subsequent regulations, had by themselves resulted in annual costs 
of between #30 and #85 million (at 1978 prices), absorbed the time 
of over 1,000 staff, and added two years on to the time required
to develop a new medicine. This is in addition to the increased
costs and longer delays caused by the greater sophistication of 
pharmaceutical development as a whole which the industry has 
identified.47
Hartley and Maynard concluded that "in the circumstances of 
mounting criticism and genuine doubts about the value of the 1968 
Medicine Act we would argue that now is the time for a serious re-
45British Interview; Association of British Pharmaceutical 
Industries, 9 April 1987.
46Ibid.
47K. Hartley and A. Maynard. Xhfi__Regulation__Ql__the U.K.
Pharmaceutical Industry:___A Coat-Benefit Analysis- London: OHE,
1980, p. 122.
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appraisal of the U.K.'s regulatory arrangements."48 In fact, 
since the Hartley and Maynard study was conducted, there has been 
an important move to reduce the effects of regulation by the 
introduction of a Clinical Trial Certificate Exemption Scheme. 
This has cut out much of the purely bureaucratic delay which had 
occured in Britain before a new medicine could be tested on 
patients, but the pharmaceutical industry argues that it has not 
substantially altered the overall problem of excessive drug 
development regulations. Similarly, in Canada, there have been 
moves to relax regulatory measures required before new medicines 
can be introduced. Nevertheless, the average delay between the 
first discovery of a new pharmaceutical chemical entity and its 
marketing in both countries is still approximately ten years.
Those British and Canadian medical research charities with 
strong patient service programmes have supported the 
pharmaceutical industry's lobby to reduce the development time for 
new medicines. Both groups have stated to their governments that 
a society as a whole would benefit if delay could be reduced and 
if new medicines could be made available sooner without reducing 
their margin of safety. As the Executive Director of the Cystic 
Fibrosis Research Trust explained:
"He have had two recent cases of medication which 
have been unnecessarily delayed in being approved 
by government regulatory officials. One drug 
involved the preparation of enzymes for digestion 
which two commerical firms had developed. These 
preparations were tested and were found to be
48IbifL., p. 122.
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extremely effective since they could reach the 
digestive tract before being disipated to other 
areas of the body. The government took quite a 
long time to approve these drugs for public 
consumption which has meant longer periods of 
suffering for our members." - 
49
Charities in this position have had to respond carefully. On the 
one hand, they have had to appear to be representing the interests 
of their fund raisers and donating public (many of whom are 
disease sufferers). On the other hand they have had to lobby 
discretely and separately from the drug manufacturers. As the 
Executive Director of the Arthritis Society explained:
"Several Canadian pharmaceutical companies have 
asked us to join the lobby organized by the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
Canada to reduce drug development regulations. 
They clearly did so since they know we are 
pressured by our members to get new drugs for 
arthritics on the market as quick as possible. 
Our response has been to make our own little 
noise in Ottawa but to distance ourselves from 
the industry's much larger and aggressive 
lobbying campaign."
50
Apart from safety measures before a new medicine is approved, 
there is a particular concern about the effectiveness of what is 
described as 'post-marketing surveillance' after a new medicine 
has actually been sold to the public. This has arisen largely 
from the experience with the anti-rheumatic drug Benoxaprofen
49British Interview; Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust, 24 
February 1987.
50Canadian Interview; Arthritis Society, 20 January 1987.
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which was withdrawn from sale in 1982 after 61 deaths had been 
reported in Brtain. The Committee on Safety of Medicines, 
headquartered in London, which recommended the suspension of the 
preparation's licence for sale after reports of the deaths had 
been received, was accused of acting too slowly.51 As a result, 
in many countries, there have been discussions between government 
regulatory officials, pharmaceutical corporations, and several 
medical research charities to examine ways of improving the 
detection of potentially 'toxic' drugs that are already on the 
market. Medical research charities have examined the feasibility 
of providing government officials with lists of patients in 
emergency situations such as when a drug is first suspected of 
being defective. In doing so, pharmaceutical companies and 
government experts could design clinical trials to confirm or deny 
suspicion of 'product failure'. The charities would be an obvious 
source of this information as most organisations keep lists of 
disease sufferers, since many are volunteer fund raisers or 
financial contributors to their organisations.52
In conclusion, the issue of 'drug development' is complicated 
since pharmaceutical companies and medical research charities want 
new drugs available on the market as quickly as possible yet for 
them to be completely free of adverse side-effects. As with other 
pharmaceutical-related issues, British and Canadian medical
5 ITeel ing-Smi th, Hie___ Future___Ql Pharmaceuticals;____The
Potential, .the Pattern and the Problems, p. 16.
52British Interview; The Wellcome Trust, 19 March 1987.
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research charities have lobbied in support of the pharmaceutical 
industry for regulatory reform. On the one hand, if the period of 
drug development is shortened pharmaceutical companies would be 
able to sell their products to the public sooner, and in doing so 
to reduce their drug development costs. On the other hand, 
charities would be able to claim victory for representing the 
interests of their volunteers and donating public who would have 
quicker access to new medications. The respondents in this study 
that had participated in these lobbies freely acknowledged that 
they had done so in order to preserve their fund raising infra­
structure. In most cases, organisations were fearful of losing 
corporate support as well as support from disease suffering 
volunteers. This issue differed from the issue of 'patent 
protection' in that charities which have lobbied for regulatory 
reform have not alienated those members and others interested in 
medical research. Consequently, internal debate between patient 
service advocates and medical research advocates on this issue was 
not evident in any of the charities studied.
d . Government restrictions on promotion of pharmaceutical products
In Britain and Canada there exist both voluntary and 
statutory restraint on the pharmaceutical industry's sales 
promotion activities. In Britain, since 1958, the industry has 
had its own Code of Practice to ensure that advertising is 
accurate and responsible. This is policed by a committee under 
the chairmanship of an independent barrister. In addition, the
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1968 Medicines__act imposed further restrictions; for example,
every advertisement must be approved by both a doctor and a 
pharmacist before it is published. Each medicine must have a 
'Data Sheet' which sets out the limits of the claims which can be 
made for the medicines, and its adverse effects and contra­
indications. Furthermore, the volume of 'permitted' sales 
promotion in both Britain and Canada is limited to ten per cent of 
sales; any spending above this limit is added back to profits in 
price negotiations under the Price Regulation Scheme in each 
country.53
These voluntary and statutory controls on the industry's 
sales promotion have generally been effective in preventing 
misleading claims and in ensuring a reasonably balanced and honest 
presentation of a medicine's advantages. There are, however, very 
real difficulties in trying to cutback on promotion expenditure 
once a drug is being sold on the market. Thus, in both countries 
there is apparent extravagence in spending by certain companies. 
The industry's relatively strict Code of Practice which 
specifically prohibits excessive entertainment of doctors has been 
particularly hard to administer. Doctors are naturally flattered 
by generous 'entertainments' provided to attract their attention 
to certain products. In addition, competition between companies 
has resulted in each trying to out-do the others in their efforts
53Teeling-Smith, The___Ensure__for___Pharmaceuticals:____ The
Potential, the Pattern and the Problems, p. 20.
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to get doctors to prescribe their product brand.54
In response to public pressure and consumer interest groups 
the British and Canadian governments have contemplated increasing 
their regulation of pharmaceutical promotions. However, the 
Office of Health Economics (OHE), has claimed that further 
restrictions on both the content and volume of information 
provided to doctors will 'crystalize existing drug consumption 
patterns'. This, they argue, would delay the introduction of 
genuine advances in treatment that hold new promise for a large 
number of disease sufferers. For example, it has been estimated 
by the OHE that if the introduction of all new medicines of the 
1940's, 1950's and 1960's had been delayed by a year almost 10,000 
additional children would have died because they would have been 
denied the benefits of the medicinal innovations of those years.55 
As Mrs. Francis Charlesworth from the Association of British 
Pharmaceutical Industries explained:
"If the introduction of treatment for today's 
fatal diseases, such as cancer and heart disease, 
are delayed, unnecessary mortality in adults 
would occur. There is already evidence that 
doctors have become slower to adopt the use of 
new medicines since the Thalidomide tragedy in 
the 1960's."
56
54Ibid.. p. 20.
550f f ice of Health Economics, Pharmaceutical__Innovation:
Recent Trends. Future Prospects. London: OHE, 1983.p. 9.
56British Interview; Association of British Pharmaceutical 
Industries, 9 April 1987.
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Despite these arguments stricter government regulation of 
product promotion is being contemplated in both Britain and 
Canada. Pharmaceutical companies have begun to rely on medical 
research charities to promote their products. For example, as 
part of their 'public education programme' the Arthritis Society 
has recently produced a video about their organisation which is 
financed entirely by three pharmaceutical companies. For their 
part, the three companies received a credit at the end of the film 
and on all printed material promoting the charity and its cause. 
As the Executive Director of this charity explained:
"The pharmaceutical companies sponsor these kinds 
of activities in order to get our 'good-name' 
associated with their products. We must be 
careful to avoid promoting the products of just 
one company since we know that our members are 
vulnerable to the advice we provide them."
57
The same charity also explained that one pharmaceutical company 
recently provided a donation of $10,000 (£5,000) to organize a 
symposium in Toronto to be attended by leading medical experts on 
arthritis disease. Again, while the charity was given the credit 
for staging this event the donating company was present at the 
symposia in order to promote its products.58 Another very 
important marketing tool for the British and Canadian 
pharmaceutical industry has been the information magazine 
published by medical research charities for their disease
58lbid.
57Canadian Interview; Arthritis Society, 20 January 1987.
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sufferers. As the spokesman for the Canadian Diabetes Association 
explained:
"They (the pharmaceutical companies) finance the 
entire production of our monthly newsletter to a 
tune of $200,000 (£100,000). They do this 
principally through advertising space for their 
products. However, we are extremely careful not 
to give exclusive advertising rights to any one 
company and we refuse to endorse products."
59
A (C)MRC official explained that government regulatory 
agencies have only recently come to appreciate the extent to which 
the pharmaceutical companies are promoting their products through 
charities.60 Their main contention is that drug companies are 
able to spend more than ten per cent of their profits on product 
advertising since the monies given to charities are not included 
in the calculation of that figure. This is the case since money 
earmarked for product promotion is normally treated as a 
charitable contribution. Furthermore, in Canada, not only does 
this allow the corporations to spend more on advertising, but it 
allows them also to do so at a reduced cost since voluntary 
contributions to registered charities are tax deductable to the 
donor. As the Executive Director of the Asthma Research Council 
noted:
"The pharmaceutical companies are getting a great
59Canadian Interview; Canadian Diabetes Association, 4 
December 1986.
60Canadian Interview; Medical Research Council, 28 January1987.
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deal when they use our news-magazine to advertise 
their product since their message is going 
directly to the consumer. We both know that 
doctors are the ones prescribing the medicine. 
However, we both recognize that people are more 
knowledgeable and less trusting of the medical 
profession and are beginning to state their 
preference for various treatments when consulting 
with a physician."
61
Respondents from the pharmaceutical industry defended their 
financial support for medical research charities on the grounds 
that corporate contributions normally flow into an organisation's 
core budget whence expenditure is then determined by the charity. 
In other words, the industry has suggested that contributions are 
not given to medical research charities for the purpose of 
promoting their products. However, as one Canadian respondent 
argued:
"It is true that they (pharmaceutical companies) 
direct their money into our general revenue fund 
since they are then able to claim their donation 
as a charitable contribution from Revenue Canada. 
Nevertheless, they do specify on what projects or 
programmes they would like their money spent."
62
Of the ten British and Canadian medical research charities 
interviewed that had neither public education or patient service 
programmes not one had received financial support from the 
pharmaceutical industry. British and Canadian charities that 
exclusively fund medical research offer no valuable service to the
61British Interview; Asthma Research Council, 10 March 1987.
62Canadian Interview; January 1987.
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pharmaceutical companies. For example, drug companies have not 
made donations to these charities for the purpose of 'contracting 
out* part of their own research. As explained by the Charity 
Commissioners, there is an important legal reason for this.
"Since medical research charities are registered 
under the education category, all funded research 
results must be of an educational nature and must 
be published. Scientific results must be
published so that other interested parties- 
whether they be other researchers or 
pharmaceutical companies - can build on that 
knowledge for the benefit of the community."
63
Since the success of pharmaceutical companies in developing new 
products is contingent upon keeping scientific results secret from 
their competitors, charities have not been good vehicles for 
conducting contractual research. With this in mind, the corporate 
contributions that have been made to medical research charities 
must be seen to be for other non-research related purposes, such 
as for projects like product promotion. This being the case, 
contributions from the pharmaceutical industry should not be 
viewed as purely philanthropic gestures but rather as quid pro quo 
transactions in return for commericial services.
In conclusion, the four areas of government regulation, 
namely regulatory pressures on prescribing, regulatory erosion of 
patent protection, regulation of drug development and regulations 
of pharmaceutical promotions, have all affected the pharmaceutical 
industry's ability to generate larger profits. Since evidence has
63British Interview; The Charity Commission, 31 March 1987.
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been given showing that medical research charities have
participated alongside the pharmaceutical industry in support of 
their various lobbies, the question remains as to how much credit 
should flow to these organisations if public policy is affected. 
To do this quantitatively or qualitatively is virtually 
impossible. However, what can be concluded is that voluntary 
donations are being used by charities to seek regulatory reforms 
so that non-charitable organisations can generate larger 
commercial profits. One would not want to overstate the degree to 
which charitable funds are being used to support purely non- 
charitable purposes but an argument can be made that this 
potential does exist and can be exploited further.
ii. Medical Research Charities and the Patient ServiceLobby
This section of the chapter examines issues unrelated to the 
pharmaceutical industry that have prompted medical research 
charities to lobby on behalf of their constituents. As with their 
lobbying for the drug companies, charities have responded to these 
demands to largely maintain their fund raising infra-structures. 
British and Canadian medical research charities have lobbied on 
behalf of disease sufferers on a host of issues ranging from 
discrimination in the workplace to restricted access to health- 
related statutory benefits. Since health care is not a federal 
responsibility, Canadian charities have lobbied provincial 
governments, on issues concerning patient services. As such, most 
representation to governments are executed either through a
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charity's provincial office or its local branches. Nevertheless, 
the national wing of most Canadian medical research charities are 
actively involved in developing patient service policies and in 
getting these services delivered at comparable levels of quality 
in each region of the country. British medical research charities 
have largely focused their patient service lobbies on the central 
government, particularly the DHSS. However, occasionally 
representation will be made on behalf of disease sufferers to 
local social service offices. Very seldom do local branches or 
regional offices participate in these lobbying activities instead, 
most policy and personal advocacy is executed through a medical 
research charity's national office.
A. Personal advocacy
In Britain, the Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust has been 
actively involved in personal advocacy on behalf of their 
patients. The DHSS now provides an 'attendance allowance' for 
individuals whose medical conditions have meant they require a 
large amount of 'home care' and attention beyond what is normally 
required. Medical experts have recently found that children 
suffering from cystic fibrosis require extra physiotheraphy, extra 
dietary care and constant monitoring with regard to personal 
hygiene. However, these additional benefits have normally been 
denied to cystic fibrosis patients when they first apply for the 
attendance allowance. According to the trusts' Executive 
Director:
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"Most cystic fibrosis patients seem to have to go 
through a negotiative process with local DHSS 
officials before they qualify for assistance 
under this programme - this is when we are called 
in. Usually we will advocate on a child's behalf 
to government officials and present them with the 
'grim realities' of this disease. Having done 
that we have been successful 95 per cent of the 
time in getting our members this money."
64
Likewise, the Kidney Foundation of Canada, has met with Ministry 
of Health officials on behalf of patients who have failed to 
receive the statutory services they are entitled to. Don Lamont, 
the Foundation's Executive Director remarked:
"Our most celebrated case involved a woman living 
in Sudbury who tried for five years on her own to 
get a home-nurse. Through one of our fund 
raising appeals she heard of our organisation and 
contacted us. Over the span of just one week we 
managed to convince Ministry officials that her 
kidney disorder required daily medical attention. 
Needless to say both her and her family have 
subsequently become very committed financial 
contributors to this charity."
65
Other areas of personal advocacy in which charities have 
involved themselves, centre on issues of discrimination. For 
example, in the area of employment the Canadian Cancer Society 
(CCS) has represented several cancer patients who have been 
refused jobs or released from their positions after being 
diagnosed with the disease. Similarly, the Canadian Diabetic
64British Interview; Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust, 24 
February 1987.
65Canadian Interview; Kidney Foundation of Canada, 3 December
1986.
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Association CDA recently advocated on behalf of a person in 
Winnipeg whose employer - the Canadian National Railway - demoted 
him to a clerical position strictly because he was a diabetic. 
For seven years that person was forced to work at a lower paid job 
because he was deemed physically unfit to handle the 
responsibilities of his previous position. However, after making 
representations to the Canadian Human Rights Commission the CDA 
succeeded in influencing a decision which upheld the charge of 
discrimination.66 The CCS has also involved itself in issues of 
discrimination in the area of immigration. For example, according 
to the charity's Ottawa lobbiest:
"We recently had a case where a married couple 
had gained an entry visa to live in Canada and 
therefore sold all their property in the United 
States. However, when they arrived at the 
boarder they were refused entry because one 
member had had a problem with cancer five years 
earlier. Our volunteers have pushed us hard to 
lobby government to put an end to this kind of 
discriminatory harassment and it's something we 
have had to respond to immediately."
67
B. Statutory and regulatory reform
In Britain and Canada, those volunteering their time and 
money have urged their organisations to affect permanent 
legislative and regulatory reforms to improve the welfare of 
disease sufferers. The Canadian Foundation for Ileitus and
66Canadian Interview; Canadian Diabetes Association, 4 
December 1986.
67Canadian Interview; Canadian Cancer Society, 30 January
1987.
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Colitus has lobbied the Ontario provincial government and the 
insurance industry to reimburse bowel disease sufferers for the 
cost of 'parenteral-nutrition' treatment while convalescing at 
home. Presently the government's Ontario Health Insurance Plan 
(OHIP) will cover these same costs when a patient is in the 
hospital. The problem is that the government now classifies 'out- 
of-hospital' parenteral nutrition as 'food' not as 'drugs'. 
Consequently, many people suffering from bowel disease remain in 
hospital for much longer periods of time than is necessary, as 
they are unable to afford 'home treatment'. The Executive 
Director of this charity explained:
"Our volunteers have repeatedly asked us to raise 
the issue with government decision makers. In 
response, we have prepared a very lengthy and 
detailed document that explains the economic 
reasons why this treatment should be covered 
under government health schemes and private 
insurance. In doing so, we have made direct 
comparisons to diabetics who get their insulin 
free of charge regardless of whether they are in 
hospital or at home. Furthermore, we have shown 
that home-treatment costs only $60 (£30) a day 
whereas hospital treatment costs $380 (£190). We 
have given statistics relating to 'lost-time' at 
work and explained how this translates into 
higher health care expenses and inevitably higher 
taxes."
68
Similarly, the Parkinson Foundation of Canada has lobbied 
government officials to cover the cost of home nurses for their 
disease sufferers. The charity has explained to Ministry of 
Health officials that Parkinson sufferers are in chronic care
68Canadian Interview; Canadian Foundation for Ileitus and 
Colitis, 12 January 1987.
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facilities costing taxpayers $400 (£200) a day. Since many 
parkinson sufferers are diagnosed in their 40's and 50's and 
normally do not die of the disease, the cost of hospitalization 
for 20 or 30 years is enormous. The charity has argued that these 
patients would be better off living at home either with their 
family or with a 'home-nurse' and paid for with tax credits.69
An interesting dimension to the patient service lobby in both 
Britain and Canada is that charities facing similar problems- 
such as shortages of home nurses - have established coalition 
groups to articulate their concerns to government. As an example, 
the Canadian Neurological Coalition (CNC) was formed in 1980 as an 
umbrella organisation representing among others alzheimer's 
disease, huntington's disease, epilepsy, and multiple sclerosis. 
The main purpose of the Coalition which is itself a registered 
charity, is to negotiate with provincial governments for more 
comprehensive statutory programmes to help disease sufferers and 
their families cope more effectively with their afflictions. In 
doing so, CNC has presented government with innovative suggestions 
to help their constituents and at the same time reduce public 
health care expenditures. One proposal has been for government to 
establish 'day-care centres' so that people forced into employment 
can 'drop-off' their ailing husband or wife during the day while 
they go to work. The CNC have presented the economic arguments to 
government that this programme would be less expensive than
69Canadian Interview; Parkinson Foundation of Canada, 20 
January 1987.
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permanently institutionalizing people in hospitals or nursing 
homes.70 Likewise, in Britain the Spastics Society was active in 
the late 1970's in establishing the Community Care Campaigners 
(CCC) whose membership now also includes Dr. Barnardo's, MIND, and 
MENCAP. Like their CNC counterpart in Canada they are principally 
concerned with affecting legislative changes with a view to 
increasing the welfare of their constituents. In an interview 
with Sir John Cox, the CCC's principal spokesman, the coalition's 
contact with government was described in the following way:
"The coalition is active in lobbying each of the 
poltical parties to include certain items in 
their manifestos. In addition to that and to 
extensive letter writing, I meet face to face 
with elected officials. I will be meeting the 
Minister of Employment tomorrow, I talked to the 
Health Minister Tony Newton two weeks ago, I 
talked to John Major the Minister for Social 
Service last week and to George Younger, who is 
the Housing Minister, a few weeks before that. 
Furthermore, I personally have given evidence on 
behalf of the CCC to the All Party Disablement 
Group in both Houses."
71
The same respondent was asked whether or not the coalition and its 
individual members feared being deregistered for breaking the 
political bar rule. The response was that this has never been a 
concern as their issues have not been 'party political'.
Furthermore, the coalition claims to have made equal
representations to each of the political parties thereby avoiding
70Canadian Interview; Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada, 3 
December 1987.
71British Interview; Spastics Society, 23 February 1987.
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being partisan in any overt way. As an example, it was explained 
that John Major from the Conservative Party wanted to have in- 
depth discussions regarding a number of proposals put forward by 
the coalition and therefore organized a one-to-one meeting that 
lasted an entire day. Again, Michael Meacher, the Labour Party's 
Social Service spokesman arranged for the CCC to give a 
presentation to the entire front bench of the Labour Party. 
Furthermore, Cox argued that, if either party endorsed the CCC's 
initiatives, the Charity Commission would not interpret that as 
party political but rather as a charity representing the views and 
interests of the physically disabled.72
The Muscular Dystrophy Association of Canada (MDAC), which 
has not utilized coalitions in their lobby of government, have 
raised several other important patient service issues. First, the 
charity has presented a number of reports to the Ontario Housing 
Commission, advocating the introduction of 'barrier-free designs' 
to the province's Building Code. For many years muscular 
dystrophy patients confined to wheelchairs, have demanded that new 
buildings be constructed with access ramps and elevators. The 
charity is unable to claim victory in affecting permanent changes 
to the Building Code, but nonetheless argues that architects and 
construction companies have been educated about the needs of the 
disabled. Second, MDAC has also lobbied government to restore 
funding to programmes that supply 'aids' required for daily living 
to muscular dystrophy patients. In Ontario, Quebec, Alberta and
72Ibid.
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British Columbia, provincial governments have reduced financial 
subsidies covering the cost of wheelchairs and specially modified 
home products ranging from toilets to home-computers. The MDAC's 
provincial offices in these regions have mobilized their 
volunteers to write letters to Members of the Provincial 
Legislature. At the time of writing, only the Alberta government 
had discontinued its policy, and it has actually increased its 
coverage for home-care services for muscular dystrophy patients 
under its provincial health care system.73
The Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada has made one of its 
patient service priorities to lobby the federal government to 
allow its constituents to deduct home air-conditioning units from 
their personal income tax. The charity has presented strong 
medical proof to Revenue Canada officials that cool temperatures 
are effective in reducing several of the uncomfortable side- 
effects associated with multiple sclerosis.
"We recently had a lawyer write an article in our 
newsletter who encouraged multiple sclerosis 
sufferers to claim the purchase of air- 
conditioning units as tax exemptions. It has 
turned out that in some cases Revenue Canada has 
given the exemption and in other cases they have 
refused it. As a result we are trying to raise 
money to finance a test case that will force the 
courts to make a final ruling on this issue."
74
73Canadian Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Association of 
Canada, 5 December 1986.
74Canadian Interview; Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada, 3 
December 1987.
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The Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great Britain has also 
attempted to lessen the impact of government cutbacks to statutory 
services available to muscular dysjbrophy patients. As its 
Executive Director explained:
"In 1985 we set up a special trust which is a 
subsidiary of this charity called the Joseph 
Patrick Memorial Trust with the specific aim of 
financing the 'adoption of cars, wheelchairs and 
other products' which under the Chronically Sick 
and Disabled Persons Act. 1970 should be covered 
by the state. Unfortunately, there are numerous 
areas where government has simply neglected to 
fulfil its statutory obligations."
75
The MDGGB has argued that greater success in influencing DHSS 
to spend more on 'aids for daily living' has been limited. Part 
of the reason is that the charity has been involved actively in 
other areas of patient service that have consumed much time, money 
and manpower. Since the early part of the 1980's the MDGGB began 
to receive numerous complaints from volunteers that recently 
diagnosed patients were being treated badly by doctors. 
Specifically, it was charged that children diagnosed with muscular 
dystrophy were being told very little about the disease and the 
types of social and medical problems they should anticipate. In 
response, in 1982 the MDGGB financed the creation of 'Family Care 
Officers' (FCO's) who are either trained nurses, occupational 
therapists, physiotherapists and social workers. These people are 
employed by a hospital and are 'attached' to a consultant-
75British Interview; Muscular Dystrophy Group of Great 
Britain, 19 February 1987.
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normally a pediatrician or geneticist. Because the FCO's are 
health service employees the MDGGB pays their salaries to the 
hospitals which, in turn, distribute the money accordingly. If 
the charity paid these salaries directly to the FCO's they would 
effectively be 'brought out' of the health service which would 
threaten their benefits and pensions. The FCO's main purpose has 
been to contact the family of recently diagnosed muscular 
dystrophy patients in order to provide much more detailed
information about the disease. During the initial stages, an FCO
will visit the home frequently to allow those involved with the
affliction to vent their fears and frustrations.76
As the Executive Director of the MDGGB explained:
"There are three traumatic moments for muscular 
dystrophy patients and their families. The first 
is the diagnosis, the second is the wretched 
experience of being placed in a wheelchair at the 
age of ten or eleven. Finally, there is
inevitable death in their late teens or early
twenties."
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The FCO's are more than emotional counsellors, since they are also 
actively involved in informing families about the statutory 
benefits they are entitled to including; 'Attendance Allowances', 
'Aids for Daily Living' and 'Mobility Allowances'. The MDGGB 
views the FCO programme as an important charitable contribution 
but it nevertheless would prefer to see this service being
76Ibiti.
77ibid.
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provided by the state. The programme's unique feature is that 
volunteers initially called on the charity to deliver the service 
to fill a gap left by the state. However, given the success and 
increasing demand for FCO's, these same volunteers are now 
encouraging their organisation to lobby government to assume a 
greater financial responsibility for the programme. The MDGGB's 
Executive Director explained:
"We recognize that much more could be
accomplished in the area of patient counselling 
at home if statutory funding was provided. As 
such we have discussed the issue with DHSS 
officials and in some very heated debate we have 
threatened to withdraw our support for the FCO 
programme. However, DHSS officials are a lot of 
things, but they are not all daft ... they know 
we were bluffing since our volunteers and 
donating public would never allow us to withdraw 
completely and allow the proramme to disappear.”
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Another good example of medical research charities involving 
themselves in the policy process, relates to the British and 
Canadian Diabetes Associations' demands to increase government 
regulation of the food industry in their respective countries. 
The medical research charities have insisted that government force 
food producers to include the 'sugar-content' on the outside 
packaging of all their products. The charities have argued that 
this would save the lives of hundreds of diabetics who die each 
year as a result of accidental sugar overdoses. However, the 
Executive Director of the Canadian Diabetes Association explains
78Ibid.
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that while this is an important issue, there is some concern that 
their lobby might violate the ban on political activity.
"At one level Revenue Canada might interpret our 
lobby of the food industry as partisan since, the 
Conservative Party has tended in the past to 
reject any regulatory interference which 
threatens to raise the cost of doing business in 
Canada. As such, our lobby might help some 
patients but if we are deregistered we might be 
doing a much larger dis-service to diabetics."
79
In Britain, where sugar and caloric labelling has been gradually 
introduced on a voluntary basis, diabetics have frequently 
criticized the accuracy of the information provided by food 
producers. The most frequent problem is that food producers, who 
have changed the size or contents of their products for marketing 
purposes, have not made the necessary adjustments to their 
packaging information. As the Executive Director of the British 
Diabetic Association (BDA) remarked:
"I know it's a serious accusation to make but we 
suspect that diabetics have either died or become 
blind simply because food producers have been too 
cheap to change the printing on their packages. 
We have raised this concern to government 
officials and are awaiting a response. In the 
meantime we have had to spend a lot of our 
resources on monitoring changes to the volume and 
the content of food available to diabetics."
80
79Canadian Interview; Canadian Diabeties Association, 4 
December 19B6.
80British Interview; British Diabetic Association, 2 March1987.
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Lastly, the BDA has worked hard to influence DHSS officials to 
permit general practitioners to prescribe plastic syringes to 
diabetics at no cost to the patients, as is presently the case 
with the insulin they receive. Until now, the government has 
denied tnis request since permitting diabetics to use the syringes 
once - as prescribed - would be too expensive. However, the 
charity has submitted scientific evidence to government officials 
showing that diabetics have been capable of using the plastic 
syringes ten times before the needles become too blunt. Given 
this, the BDA has illustrated to government that by removing the 
'single use warning' from the syringe package, and by allowing 
diabetics to receive them free from their doctors, the cost to the 
NHS would be reduced greatly.81
h i . Medical Research Charities and the Anti-Smoking Lobby
Medical research charities participating in the anti-smoking 
lobby are unique since the issue is neither directly related to 
patient services nor to medical research. Instead, the issue 
could be organized under the category of either 'public education' 
or 'preventive medicine'. Charities representing diseases where 
the cause is known are able to educate the public as to their 
prevention through radio, television, newspaper and postal 
advertising. These charities have also pressured government to 
enact legislation that would regulate 'controlled factors' known 
to contribute to the increasing incidence of various diseases.
81Ibid.
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Unfortunately, there are many diseases where the causes are still 
undetermined and where public education campaigns are unable to be 
organized; this would include diseases like multiple sclerosis, 
cystic fibrosis, leprosy, parkinson and alzheimers to list a few. 
Conversely, there are the minority of diseases like some cancers, 
certain heart disorders and AIDS for which causes are known, and 
where governments have been pressured to invoke measures aimed at 
reducing incidence rates. For example, the governments of 
Britain, Canada and the United States have funded media campaigns 
urging individuals to use condoms during sexual intercourse as a 
means of limiting the spread of AIDS. In addition, intravenous 
drug users have been cautioned about the hazards of sharing 
needles especially with other AIDS-contaminated drug addicts. 
However, there are other disorders, including lung cancer, with 
which charities have been largely unsuccessful in influencing a 
government response. Nonetheless, the extent of medical research 
charities involvement in the anti-smoking issue, especially in 
Canada, is revealed in the increasingly sophisticated tactics 
employed by these organisations in pressuring government for 
legislative reform. British medical research charities involved 
in cancer research have not directly participated in the anti­
smoking lobby since this movement is spearheaded by other non­
char itable, non-medical organisations such as Action on Smoking 
and Health (ASH). British cancer research charities, through 
their membership with the United Kingdom Cancer Co-ordinating 
Committee (UKCCC), have limited their role in the anti-smoking
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issue to one of providing scientific data on the tar and nicotine 
contents of new products entering the consumer market. This is 
done with a view to reaffirming the correlation between tobacco 
consumption and various types of cancer.82 In contrast, the 
Canadian Cancer Society (CCS) has involved itself in a wide range 
of issues related to smoking, including the banning of smoking on 
domestic airline flights of two hours or less, raising taxes on 
all tobacco products, increased regulation of tobacco advertising, 
and providing public funds for crop or income substitution for 
tobacco farmers.
The CCS has lobbied not only by itself on the anti-smoking 
issue but also as a member of an umbrella group known as the 
Canadian Council on Smoking and Health (CCSH). However, CCS 
officials noted that their individual lobbying efforts have been 
far more successful than those organized by the CCSH for a number 
of reasons. First, they explained that the coalition has shied 
away from 'hard-nose' lobbying tactics and has instead opted to 
involve itself in non-political programmes like 'National Non- 
Smoking Week' and 'Weedless Wednesday'. Furthermore, the CCS 
argued that the coalition has made it easy for the individual 
member charities like the Canadian Heart Foundation and the 
Canadian Lung Association to opt out of their responsibilities to 
lobby individually against the tobacco industry. Since the CCSH 
has accomplished little in the way of legislative reform, partly 
as a result of being underfunded and understaffed, the CCS has
82British Interview; Medical Research Council, 2 April 1987.
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developed into the most active and vocal organisation in this 
campaign. As the CCC's Ottawa lobbyist explained:
"We suspect that the reason why the Canadian 
Heart Foundation has not done much lobbying is 
because their Executive Director is a heavy 
smoker. I've also heard that the Association 
does not want to see a strong Canadian Council on 
Smoking and Health because they are worried that 
the Council will get into programmes similar to 
their own which would hurt their fund raising 
efforts. The end result is a pretty weak 
Coalition that has done relatively little to 
affect legislative changes."
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There are two additional reasons why the CCS has been the 
only charity to lobby the federal government directly on the anti­
smoking issue. First, respondents from the Heart and Stroke 
Foundation of Ontario (HSFO) and the Canadian Heart Foundation 
(CHF) explained that a more vocal and active involvement in the 
anti-smoking lobby would undermine their fund raising efforts in 
the tobacco growing belts in southern Ontario. As Susan Lawson 
from the HSFO explained:
"We know that the friends and families of those 
who stand to lose their farms and manufacturing 
jobs as a result of stricter tobacco laws will 
not support this charity if we are instrumental 
in that process. We are primarily a research- 
based charity and we are not willing to risk 
jeprodizing our fund raising base over this one 
issue."
84
83Canadian Interview; Canadian Cancer Society, 30 January
1987.
84Canadian Interview; Heart and Stroke Foundation of Ontario, 
22 December 1986.
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According to the CCS, the Canadian Lung Association has been 
reticent to lobby the federal government individually since it is 
fearful of losing the 'Sustaining-Grant' it receives from the 
Department of Health and Welfare. As Ken Kyle the CCC's lobbyist 
explained; this has not been a problem for his charity.
"I have a copy of a letter which was recently 
sent by the President of the National office of 
the Canadian Lung Association to the Minister of 
Health and Welfare. It disassociates themselves 
from comments made by the President of the 
Canadian Council on Smoking and Health at a news 
conference which were extremely critical of that 
Minister for not moving fast enough in this area 
(the area of increased taxes on tobacco 
products). Because the Canadian Cancer Society 
is totally independent from government financing 
we have the added flexibility and autonomy to 
lobby in any way we see fit."
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Since the CCS has been the most active charity in the anti­
smoking lobby, it is worthwhile reviewing its methods and 
accomplishments. The CCS has made formal representations to the 
federal government regarding this issue since 1979. However, over 
this nine year period, successive Ministers of Health and Welfare 
have been reluctant to act on various recomendations put forward 
by the charity's National Executive. Consequently, in 1986 the 
CCS supported a Private Members Bill, Bill C-204, and known as the 
Non Smokers Health Act, which was sponsored by an opposition M.P. 
from the New Democratic Party. The Bill set forth a number of
1987.
85Canadian Interview; Canadian Cancer Society, 30 January
recommendations, ranging from a complete ban on smoking in public 
establishments (including restaurants, stores and sports 
facilities), to a complete ban on all tobacco advertising and 
promotions. The CCS's strategy has been to mobilize its 130,000 
volunteers to support the bill through a series of public 
demonstrations and letter writing campaigns. As a result of these 
representations the CCS claims to have succeeded in getting Bill 
C-204 selected by an 'all-party committee' to be debated in the 
House of Commons. Their strategy has been to support the proposed 
legislation in order to force the Minister of Health and Welfare, 
Jake Epp, to formulate his own legislation that would be at least 
as comprehensive as Bill C-204. As Dr. Schofield of the CCS 
explained: "our strategy is contingent on the governing
Conservative Party not wanting to be seen by Canadians as allowing 
the NDP to be running the country. "86 However, as a result of a 
busy legislative agenda (due to free trade talks with the United 
States and several other long and complicated pieces of
legislation). Bill C-204 was unable to be debated before the 1987 
summer recess. Consequently, the CCS has continued to lobby the 
federal government as it did prior to the introduction of the 
Bill. The CCS has taken a number of individual issues and lobbied 
federal departments as a means of educating M.P.'s about the human 
costs of lung cancer and the financial burden it places on the 
country's health care system.87
86Canadian Interview; Canadian Cancer Society, 28 November 1986.
87Ibid.
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As mentioned above, one of the charity's main goals was to 
push for smoke-free domestic airline flights lasting two hours or 
less. After meeting with John Crosbie, the Minister of 
Transportation in March 1986, the government agreed to implement a 
pilot project. Soon after, it was reported that the major 
Canadian tobacco companies had asked all their employees to 
boycott Air Canada's experimental smoke-free flights between 
Ottawa and Montreal. In response, the CCS immediately countered 
by urging its 130,000 volunteers to patronize these flights and to 
ask for a similiar service from other Airlines. This was 
immediately followed with meetings between the CCS, the Deputy 
Minister of Transport and officials from the Air Transportation 
Association of Canada. These discussions generated further 
support for the smoke-free flight concept on the basis that 
greater in-flight safety and reduced cleaning costs would 
result.88 The CCS described its most recent lobbying efforts in 
the following way:
"We met with Don Mazenkowski - the former 
Minister of Transport and presented several 
briefs to him. We then followed this up with 
meetings with the Transportation and Health 
critics from the Liberal and New Democratic 
Parties. In the final analysis it is clear that 
this was a worthwhile exercise since the 
government has already decided to extend the 
pilot project for another year until permanent 
legislation can be enacted."
89
1987.
88Canadian Interview; Canadian Cancer Society, 30 January
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Another smoking related issue that the CCS has involved 
itself concerns the tax on tobacco products. Before the February 
1987 federal budget, CCS officials met with Michael Wilson the 
Minister of Finance and asked him not only to increase the taxes 
on cigarettes, but also to put a 'quantum tax increase' on fine- 
cut, 'roll your own' cigarettes. These products give individuals 
twice the lethal dose of tar and nicotine at half the cost of the 
manufactured variety. However, unlike the smoke-free flight issue 
the CCS has had far less success in lobbying on this issue. 
Canadian tobacco manufacturers have given $100,000 (£50,000) to 
establish a new group called the Smokers Freedom Society (SFS) 
whose aim has been to protect smokers' rights, including the 
protection against unfair product prices. The SFS has also 
denounced studies showing a scientific correlation between second­
hand smoke and lung cancer arguing that such studies are 
'inconclusive and contradictory'.90
The CCS has been actively involved though, in blocking the 
industry's bid for the creation of a National Tobacco Marketing 
Board. In 1985, the Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers Marketing 
Board and its counterpart in Prince Edward Island asked the 
federal government to approve this proposal on the grounds that 
import and export prices could be controlled, thereby increasing 
industry profitability. To fight the proposal, CCS joined with 
charities -like the Canadian Lung Association and other non­
90lbid.
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charitable non-profit associations to form the Committee for 
Responsible Public Policy on Tobacco (CRPPT). In doing so, the 
CCS hired a lawyer and an economist to represent the CPPRT at 
hearings before a panel of the National Farm Products Marketing 
Council. As a result of this intervention, the proposal for a 
Marketing Board was dropped in November 1986.
While the CCS have succeeded on a number of small issues 
related to smoking, it has not realized its major goal namely, a 
comprehensive ban on the sale of tobacco for personal consumption. 
The CCS explained that this is a reflection of the strength and 
sophistication of the tobacco industry's lobby.
NI believe that the Minister of Health is in 
favour of our proposal but I understand that he 
has met some opposition from individual cabinet 
ministers who are opposed for philosophical 
reasons and for other political reasons. For 
example, the tobacco industry is very powerful in 
Canada; (since 1979 they have given $1 million 
(£500,000) in political contributions to the 
Liberal and Conservative Parties since 1982). 
Furthermore, the federal Minister of Agriculture 
comes from a tobacco growing riding and has done 
absolutely nothing to help reduce the number of 
cancer related deaths. And lastly, the chief 
Fund raiser for the federal Conservative Party is 
a Senator from Ontario and the President of the 
largest Canadian tobacco company."
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This chapter has revealed that British and Canadian medical 
research charities are engaged in many non-research related 
lobbying campaigns. This is because disease sufferers who either
91Ibid.
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collect or contribute money towards charity look to their 
organisation for some form of political representation. This 
representation has in most instances _ been forthcoming from the 
charities to preserve their fund raising infra-structure.
The lobbying now being conducted by these charities is 
sophisticated and well organized to the extent that a number of 
regulatory and legislative reforms have been achieved. 
Furthermore, the legal rule restricting charities from engaging in 
political activities seems not to have been an irritant to 
organisations interested in lobbying on behalf of their patients. 
Instead, most British and Canadian charity executives have viewed 
this activity as an essential role for their organisation in 
representing the views and interests of disease sufferers that 
otherwise would not be articulated to government decision makers.
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion
In this thesis the major theme concerning relations between 
charities and the state in Britain and Canada has centred on the 
former's political activities. It was argued in chapter three 
that all charities are restricted from engaging in many forms of 
political action. However, in our case study of British and 
Canadian medical research charities numerous examples of political 
involvement by organisations in a wide variety of issues have been 
presented. In the light of this, it is possible to summarize why 
the law might be seen to be at variance with ‘present
circumstances' which see medical research charities being drawn 
into the political process. This involvement should not be seen 
as an expressed invitation from the state to do so, but instead as 
a response by charities to government's own involvement in this 
policy area. When the first medical research charities were 
established in Britain and Canada the government of each country 
made no contribution of their own towards research into the 
prevention and cure of disease. Later, during the 1940's when 
political pressures came to bear on scientists to address war- 
related health problems a system of dual provision of funds for 
research - from charity and state - became firmly entrenched. The 
degree and complexity of interaction between charity and state has
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steadily increased since that time due in part to the increasing 
number of medical research charities established in both countries 
since then and the public's increasing desire to see all diseases 
conquered. In response to this pressure (as discussed in chapter 
six, section I) charities and the state were forced to address 
mutual problems such as co-ordinating research in an effort to 
reduce wasteful duplication. However, had the state not 
encroached into charities' domain as the sole provider of 
'research funding' the need would not exist, for example, for 
British charities to interact with DHSS and (B)MRC officials to 
avoid duplicating research.
British and Canadian medical research charities have been 
drawn into the political process in other ways in recent years. 
As explained in chapter seven, the large financial resources of 
the state, as compared to those of medical research charities, 
have meant the latter has now come to depend on the former for 
medically qualified personnel, technical advice, basic research 
and physical overheads - in short, a 'science infra-structure'. 
Given that the level and quality of this infra-structure has 
suffered budgetary cutbacks and has, arguably, become sub-standard 
in recent years, it is not suprising that medical research 
charities have been outspoken in their criticism of such 
government policies. Conversely, it is true that the state has in 
turn come to rely on charities to play a more active role in 
funding bio-medical research as well as providing important 
patient services (see chapter eight). Consequently, the inter­
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dependency between charity and state has meant that when the 
policies and actions of either charity or state is perceived to 
adversely affect the other, the potential for conflict is present. 
However, medical research charities argue that, from a legal 
viewpoint, they are disadvantaged in that many methods of 
expressing dissatisfaction with government policies come into 
conflict with charity law. They further make the point that, in 
order for charities to reach their objectives, they must lobby 
aggressively to change the direction of government policies. This 
means that medical research charities would like to see the 
boundaries of permissible political involvement expanded. Prior 
to concluding whether this demand is justified it is necessary to 
address the question whether the activities in relation to 
government in which these charities presently engage (as described 
throughout chapters five to eight) violate existing laws.
In posing this question it must first be restated that the 
courts, not to mention the charities themselves, find it difficult 
to determine whether particular political activities are illegal, 
given the vagueness of British and Canadian law in this general 
area. Another problem relates to the fact that there are very few 
legal precedents where charities (and, particularly, for the 
purposes of this thesis, medical research charities) have had 
their charitable status revoked for engaging in impermissible 
political activities. Indeed, of the 44 charities interviewed (26 
British anti 18 Canadian) not one had even been cautioned by the 
Charity Commission or Revenue Canada for engaging in unlawful
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political activities.
This raises two points. First, it is certain that most of 
the politically-related activities of British and Canadian medical 
research charities described in this study - ranging from lobbies 
against (B)MRC cutbacks to charities participating in the anti­
smoking campaign - are acceptable under existing law. But second, 
it is also true that neither the Charity Commission nor Revenue 
Canada have the resources to detect and prosecute charities that 
over-indulge in their political involvement. This is not an 
unrealistic conclusion since, as was shown in chapter two, section 
I. C. (iii), many types of financial frauds are being committed by 
charities in both Britain and Canada which remain undetected.
For those non-medical research charities that have come into 
conflict with the law such as Oxfam, War on Want and MIND, the 
central issue under dispute has had more to do with the style and 
stridency of their lobbying rather than the amount of lobbying 
conducted or the objectives they have been pursuing. This sheds 
light on why British and Canadian medical research charities have 
avoided serious legal confrontations with, respectively, the 
Charity Commission and Revenue Canada. So far, their approach to 
influencing government has utilized more formal channels of 
communication, rather than the alternative vocal and 
confrontational approaches that rely on the mass media and public 
demonstrations.
In applying the specific rules regarding the ban on political 
activities outlined in chapter three, it seems clear that most
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medical research charities would not come into conflict with the 
law. However, this is only true of the law since 1948 when it was 
ruled in the National Anti-Vivisection case to accept as a valid 
'charitable purpose' any political activity that is ancillary and 
in furtherance of an organisation's main charitable purpose(s). 
Had this study been conducted prior to the addition of the 
'ancillary' clause, when the Bowman decision of 1917 was being 
applied on its own, it is certain that much of the political 
activities of British and Canadian medical research charities 
would violate the law. For it was Lord Parker in the Bowman 
decision who first enunciated a four-fold classificaiton regarding 
impermissible political activities listed in chapter two, section 
I. C, as including:
1) attempts to bring about or oppose changes in the law;
2) furthering the aims of political parties and promoting 
political doctrines;
3) affecting foreign relations;
4) propagandizing, including attempts to persuade the public to 
adopt a particular attitude towards some broad social 
question.
We have seen no evidence presented in this study to suggest 
that medical research charities have engaged in activities having 
the potential to affect foreign relations. However, this is not 
the case in regard to the remaining three categories outlined by 
Lord Parker. Examples of attempts at bringing about or opposing 
changes in the law are numerous: a short list would include those 
British medical research charities, discussed in chapter eight, 
section II. B, that lobby for increased statutory payments for the
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physically disabled under the government's 'Aid for Daily-Living 
Programme', 'Mobility Allowance Scheme' and 'Attendance Allowance 
Programmes'. Likewise in the same „section it was shown that 
Canadian medical research charities have lobbied for amendments to 
construction codes to facilitate the access of wheelchair patients 
in newly-built and renovated buildings and for state subsidies to 
defray the cost of home nurses for disease sufferers.
In this thesis, fewer examples were provided of lobbying 
activities of British and Canadian medical research charities 
directly furthering or dampening the electoral fortunes of one 
political party. Nevertheless, a good example of this, given in 
chapter eight, section II. B involves both the British and 
Canadian diabetes research charities' lobby to require food­
processing companies to include the sugar and caloric contents on 
the outside packaging of their products. This has been a proposal 
strongly rejected by Conservative governments in both countries 
where the policy to reduce excessive regulatory costs to the food 
industry have been advocated. Furthermore, in the case of the 
anti-smoking movement, dealt with in chapter eight, section III, 
the Canadian Cancer Society has not hesitated to publicize its 
strategy to support a Private Member's Bill sponsored by the New 
Democratic Party as a means of pressuring the governing 
Conservative party to introduce more progressive legislation to 
limit the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products. This, 
again, is - a measure which runs counter to the Conservative 
government's general policy of not intervening in the provision of
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goods and services by the market.
British and Canadian medical research charities have also 
been active in their lobbying campaigns to propagandize, including 
attempts to persuade the public to adopt a particular attitude 
towards broad social issues. Again, the most obvious example is 
given in chapter eight section III in describing the Canadian 
Cancer Society's programme to distribute public education 
literature on the hazards of smoking. However, smokers, not to 
mention tobacco manufacturers, argue vehemently that such 
literature fails to provide a balanced assessment of the pleasures 
derived from tobacco products as well as accurate data on the 
'real' side-effects associated with the various products being 
sold. Since each of the examples of lobbying described above do 
not consume a major proportion of charities' resources and because 
such lobbying is in furtherance of their main charitable 
purpose(s), they are regarded as operating within the law. This 
raises the question that, if the law now permits charities to 
lobby in a 'limited' way, combined with the fact that the Charity 
Commission and Revenue Canada are under-resourced and incapable of 
making such decisions, is there an increasing need to preserve the 
distinction between charity and politics? The answer to this 
question might be said to vary depending on the area of charitable 
activity under discussion. Third world relief charities, anti­
abortion and anti-vivisection charitable organisations frequently 
engage in excessive political activities. From our case study of 
British and Canadian medical research charities we conclude that
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funding scientific investigations and supporting patient service 
programmes are not politically sensitive areas under normal 
circumstances. However, in a climate where statutory services are 
being cutback and where governments have 'off-loaded' a number of 
their services to charities, it is not surprising that chapter 
seven was able to list numerous examples where organisations have 
been drawn increasingly into the political process to resist such 
efforts. While one might conclude that their lobbying activities 
have increased dramatically over the last ten years, not one of 
the organisations included in this study expressed great concern 
over the possibility of being deregistered as a result of such 
changes. Again, with the present law permitting a blurring of the 
distinction between charity and politics it might be asked whether 
legal reform to preserve the non-political nature of charity is 
overdue.
In the light of the evidence presented in chapter eight, 
section I, the urgency of such reform is indeed heightened by the 
revelation that some British and Canadian medical research 
charities have forged close economic alliances with pharmaceutical 
companies and, consequently, have been obliged to support a number 
of that industry's lobbying campaigns. In these circumstances 
corporate contributions to charities should not be viewed as 
purely philanthropic gestures but rather as quid pro quo 
transactions in return for commercial services. Since charities 
in both countries have been granted a privileged tax exempt 
status, there is a strong case to be made that collaborative
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charity/industry lobbies could, in effect, provide corporate 
interests with financial subsidies from the state. While there is 
no evidence to suggest that British or Canadian pharmaceutical 
companies have created their own charities exclusively, or at 
least principally for this purpose, the potential does exist for 
this to occur on a much larger scale. This is especially true 
given conclusions, reached in chapters two and three, concerning 
the general ambiguity of the prohibition on political activities 
combined with the law's poor enforcement. From a slightly 
different perspective it may be asked whether those who first 
decided to extend a tax exempt status to charities foresaw the 
possibility that government might be financially supporting a 
lobby of itself. It is clear from the evidence presented in 
chapter two, section II. A, concerning late 19th century legal 
decisions, that judges were particularly interested in making 
charities accountable to the state for their tax deductible 
revenue. However, the application of such funds by charities 
towards political activities was not perceived by the courts at 
that time to be a significant problem.
Given the extent to which British and Canadian medical 
research charities now pressure their respective governments on a 
wide-range of issues the case can be made for rethinking the 
traditional justification for extending such tax exemptions. If 
reforms to tax laws are contemplated the argument likely to be 
advanced against them is that the increasing freedom to lobby has 
permitted charities to articulate the views of otherwise
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unrepresented interests and to integrate these views in the policy 
process. However, in chapter six, section III. A, we concluded 
that there are a number of important pressures - excluding the law 
- that have affected British and Canadian medical research 
charities, and which have created great disparities in the amount 
and types of campaigning that different organisations are able to 
engage in. Consequently, it is frequently the case that only a 
few of the larger, more wealthy, charities are able to conduct 
effective lobbying campaigns and achieve substantive policy 
victories in their bid to defend these otherwise unrepresented 
interests. Despite these disparities the defence supplied by 
those supporting a greater lobbying role for medical research 
charities as listed in chapter six, section III. A, is that their 
resources are manifestly inadequate to deal with the problems they 
seek to address: finding the cause and cure of specific 
disease(s). Charities have lobbied government to spend more on 
researching their disease areas because they recognise that it is 
perhaps more prudent to spend part of their voluntary income to 
initiate or augment (B)MRC/(C)MRC research programmes that are 
capable of making a more sizable impact. This is preferred to 
simply restricting themselves to 'tinkering' at the edges of a 
problem. The potential achievements of the state with its 
enormous resources, are obviously far greater than any charity is 
now able to accomplish on its own. This is even true of the 
largest British and Canadian cancer research charities whose 
income represents a comparatively small fraction of the total
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income of either the (B)MRC or (C)MRC. Figure 7.4 illustrates 
that the combined research expenditure of all 35 British medical 
charities belonging to the AMRC is st.ill smaller than that of the 
(B)MRC's. In the historical context of relations between medical 
research charities and the state this is a dramatic turn of events 
from half a century ago when charity saw itself, rather than 
government, as better suited to funding scientific research.
It must be emphasized that, while present circumstances have 
drawn British and Canadian medical research charities into the 
political process, only the larger organisations have been able to 
affect public policy change to their advantage. This raises two 
points. First, in light of the fact that the law and its poor 
enforcement has permitted charities to engage in political 
activities, some might argue that the barriers to access in 
influencing the policy process should be reconsidered. This, it 
is argued, would permit small medical research charities 
representing less popular diseases, like alzheimers, to compete 
equally with the cancer and heart charities. Second, and a more 
realistic viewpoint, is that legal reforms aimed at preserving the 
distinction between charity and politics should be tailored 
specifically to address the problems of lobbying associated 
especially with larger British and Canadian cancer research 
charities. As shown in chapter five, section II, most British and 
Canadian medical research charities were established in the 1950s 
and 1960s,~ although others, like the major cancer research 
charities, were established much earlier - in the 1920s and 1930s
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respectively. The cancer research charities in each country are 
clearly the most cohesive and stable organisations included in 
this study. Their incomes are not only the largest, by far, but 
their networks of volunteers who sustain the activities of local 
branches, regional offices and national headquarters are much more 
developed and sophisticated than those of the smaller research 
charities. Consequently, it is not surprising that their lobbying 
activities are also more sophisticated than the smaller more 
recently established organisations. For example, it was noted in 
chapter six, section III. A, that the Canadian Cancer Society is 
an anomaly in that it employs a full-time Ottawa lobbyist. Other 
smaller British and Canadian charities have met resistance from 
volunteers and the donating public when more formalized lobbying 
arrangements - such as paid lobbyists - have been proposed by 
permanent paid staff members. The major complaint by the 'rank 
and file' in these charities has been that lobbying serves to 
'water-down' an organisation's philanthropic contributions by 
diverting funds away from its main objective - to fund research.
For those medical research charities that have adopted a less 
formalized lobbying approach, the tensions between paid staff and 
the volunteers is an important force mitigating against a more 
sophisticated representation of interests to government. In 
chapter five, section II we concluded that in smaller medical 
research charities, which naturally represent less popular 
diseases, volunteers (frequently disease sufferers themselves) 
often restrict their paid executives from lobbying government-
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even in influencing the (B)MRC/(C)MRC to spend more on researching 
their disease area. As a result, there is often an under-supply 
of qualified scientists in these less_ popular disease areas for 
whom charities are later able to provide research grants. This is 
because young investigators define their areas of expertise in 
relation to the availability of (B)MRC/(C)MRC research funds, 
which are skewed in favour of the popular diseases. The lobbying 
activities that are sanctioned by the volunteers in these smaller 
research charities tend normally to be in the area of personal 
advocacy and patient services (which in many cases are issues tied 
to more general lobbying campaigns orchestrated by the 
pharmaceutical industry). However, even with this type of lobby, 
a frequent complaint of volunteers is that money should not be 
'wasted' on what is perceived as the 'exotic' business of lobbying 
but rather should be devoted to its main charitable purpose: 
funding bio-medical research.
A less significant factor in determining the extent of a 
charity's lobbying activities but nevertheless one worth 
considering, relates to the nature of the disease being 
represented. In chapter five, section IV. B, it was seen that 
some organisations, such as those representing cancer and heart 
diseases, are more actively involved in lobbying government since 
the causes of these afflictions are largely known - for example 
the correlation between smoking and lung cancer. As a result, the 
involvement of these charities in seeking a wide variety of 
legislative reforms is a natural extension of their main purpose.
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to control the incidence of the disease they represent. The 
nature of a disease is significant in determining the extent of a 
charity's lobbying activities in a different way. For those 
charities that represent diseases such as cerebral palsy, 
parkinson and cancer, where individuals tend to spend much of 
their lives with an affliction, albeit in a disabled state, 
charities are increasingly drawn into the lobbying process to 
represent their membership's needs. In chapter eight, section II. 
A and B, this was shown to include personal advocacy and more 
general patient service lobbying to secure greater statutory 
benefits. As a result, lobbying is formally incorporated within 
the charity's organisational structure. With charities 
representing diseases where the period of convalescence is short 
(for example, cot-death and AIDS) the number of comparable 
patient-service-oriented issues which a charity can negotiate with 
government are comparatively few in number. Consequently, the 
organisational structures of these charities reflect non- 
formalized characteristics that are principally geared towards 
maintaining a fund-raising base in order to support bio-medical 
research.
In considering the need for legislative reform to preserve 
the distinction between charity and politics (at least in the 
context of medical research charities) it is also concluded that 
the need varies between Britain and Canada. Charity law reform 
and increased supervision of the political activities of British 
medical research charities is especially necessary given their
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effective use of a national association (the AMRC) to articulate 
and represent their views to government. For example, in chapter 
seven, section I. A and B, it was not^d that, in acknowledging the 
government's shared responsibility for funding bio-medical 
investigations, British medical research charities have been able 
to define their responsibilities vis-a-vis the (B)MRC's and 
publicize their views to government through the AMRC. 
Distinctions between British charities and the (B)MRC have been 
drawn in relation to the type of research each funds, the type of 
support each provides and the duration of their research awards. 
These distinctions are highlighted in AMRC publications where it 
is argued that medical research in Britain is serviced best 
through a division of responsibility between government and 
charity. In doing this, the AMRC have been drawn into the 
political process, arguing that government cutbacks to the (B)MRC 
budget translate into an increasing burden on charity to deliver a 
service presently defined as a shared responsibility.
In Canada, this blurring of the distinction between charity 
and politics is less of a problem, particularly in relation to 
issues of collective concern to medical research charities, given 
the absence of a comparable national association. This is 
symptomatic of the fact that lobbying activities are greatly 
affected by the federal structure of the Canadian political 
system. If governmental jurisdiction in a policy area is shared, 
as is the case of medical research, then the lobbying activities 
must be tailored to address 11 governments rather than just one-
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as is the case in Britain. As concluded in chapter five, section 
I. D, this is not only expensive but also difficult to co-ordinate 
since parallel provincial offices would be required, at great 
expense, to lobby effectively. Consequently, Canadian medical 
research charities have had no 'single-voice' to represent their 
views on issues of common concern. This has benefitted federal 
politicians who have preferred dealing with individually weak 
organisations as opposed to a single strong collective association 
of interests. Not surprisingly, those Canadian medical research 
charities with comparatively large incomes, operating in 
prosperous provinces like Ontario and Quebec, have been more 
effective at lobbying government for legislative reforms. This is 
true to the extent that the level and quality of services 
available to their constituency (specific disease sufferers) 
varies considerably among different regions of the country. In an 
effort to correct this disparity we concluded in chapter five, 
section III, that the federal government has offered financial 
support to medical research charities under their 'Sustaining 
Grants for Voluntary Health Organisations' programme if they 
developed a national profile. Accepting this grant includes a 
commitment by medical research charities to broaden and 
standardize the level and quality of their patient services being 
offered in each region of the country. However, the limited 
government funding of both British and Canadian medical research 
charities is reflective of the fact that accepting such funds 
takes an 'edge-off' their fund raising appeal (by appearing to be
523
'Quango-like') and also restricts their freedom to lobby 
government for legislative and regulatory reform if in the future 
the need arises.
In summary, we conclude that a charity's income, the nature 
of the disease being represented, the role of volunteers and the 
participation of formalized interest groups are key factors which 
determine both the amount and style of lobbying that is conducted. 
Any future attempts at legal reform to preserve the distinction 
between charity and politics would have to take account of the 
fact that not all charities confuse their philanthropic role with 
their public policy role. For those that do, it is also concluded 
that not only would more specific guidelines, as to what 
constitutes impermissible political activities, need to be 
included in the law, but more importantly that the Charity 
Commission and Revenue Canada be given adequate resources to 
enforce the law. At present it appears to be the case that 'self­
regulation' by both volunteers and to a lesser extent the donating 
public, play a greater role in preserving the non-political 
features of charity than does either the Charity Commission and 
Revenue Canada.
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The Conduct of the Research in Britain and Canada
Appendix I
The research for the case-study of medical research charities 
was conducted in two stages. The first included 32 personal 
interviews in Canada between 19 november 1986 and 11 February 
1987. The second included a further 36 interviews in Britain 
between 17 February and 6 March 1987. In all there were 68 
personal interviews with charity executives, non-elected
government officials, pharmaceutical spokesmen, research 
scientists and interest group representatives. Fifty-two of these 
interviews were with charities and of this figure 44 respondents 
(26 British and 18 Canadian) were from different charitable 
organisations. Where multiple interviews with the same
organisation occured the objective was to gain a more detailed 
understanding of its total operation by meeting with respondents 
working at the national, regional (in the case of Canada- 
provincial) and local levels. Twenty-one Canadian interviews were 
carried out in Toronto, seven in Ottawa and four in Hamilton. 
Thirty—one British interviews were conducted in London with single 
interviews being conducted in Teddington, East Grinstead, Bromley, 
Colchester, and Horsham. Response rates to written letters of 
introduction and requests for interviews was 100 per cent. 
Although one Canadian charity initially declined to be interviewed 
it later reversed this decision when informed it would be 
identified in this thesis as 'unavailable for comment'.
All interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed. The
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average length interview lasted approximately 70 minutes, with the 
shortest being 30 minutes and the longest being 3 hours. In 
discussing 'sensitive topics' respondents often requested the 
tape-recorder be switched-of £. In one instance a Canadian 
respondent requested a portion of our tape-recorded coversation be 
erased. Information provided by respondents 'off-the-record' 
which is re-produced in this thesis is cited as showing the 
country but excludes their name as well as the organisation they 
represented.
In selecting the charities to be interviewed three criteria 
have been satisfied. First, the sample of organisations almost 
constitute a 'complete' list in that all large and medium sized 
British and Canadian medical research charities have been 
interviewed, but several very small charities were not. These 
were all charities which had no paid staff and often no national 
organisation. Their exclusion should not distort the reliability 
of the data compiled on this sub-sector of charities or make any 
of the generalizations made about this policy area less valid. 
This is true since their financial contribution to the total 
charitable research effort in both countries is calculated to be 
less than one per cent. Second, 16 of the 18 Canadian medical 
research charities interviewed can be directly compared in terms 
of the disease(s) they represent to those included in the British 
interview schedule. This facilitates cross-national comparisons 
of organisations where the 'disease' being represented plays a 
significant role in shaping relations between medical research
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charities and the state. Third, the list of organisations 
interviewed in both countries includes a good mix of large, 
medium, and small charities representing both popular and 
unpopular diseases. This facilitates charities to be compared and 
contrasted with each other and allows for precise conclusions to 
be drawn about how an organisation's size, and the type of disease 
being represented, affects its relationship with the state.
List of Interviews in their Chronoliqical Order
19 November 1986
28 November 1986
28 November 1986
28 November 1986
3 December 1986
3 December 1986
4 December 1986
4 December 1986
5 December 1986
18 December 1986
18 December 1986
19 December 1986
22 December 1986
22 December 1986
8 January 1987
8 January 1987
12 January 1987
12 January 1987
12 January 1987
Canadian Foundation for Ileitus and Colitis 
(Hamilton Chapter)
National Cancer Institute of Canada 
(National Office)
Canadian Cancer Society (National Office) 
Canadian Cancer Society (National Office) 
Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada 
(National Office)
Kidney Foundation of Canada (Ontario Branch) 
Ontario Federation for the Cerebral Polsied 
(Head Office)
Canadian Diabetes Association 
(National Office)
Muscular Dystrophy Association of Canada 
(National Office)
Canadian Mental Health Association 
(Ontario Division)
Canadian Mental Health Association 
(Ontario Division)
Canadian Hemophilia Society 
(National Office)
Heart and Stroke Foundation of Ontario 
(Head Office)
Canadian Council of Better Business Bureaus 
(National Office)
Canadian Psychiatric Research Foundation 
(National Office)
Canadian Foundation for the Study of Infant 
Deaths (National Office)
Canadian Geriatrics Research Society 
(National Office)
Canadian Foundation for Ileitus and Colitis 
(National Office)
Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Research
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19 January 1987
19 January 1987
20 January 1987
20 January 1987
26 January 1987
27 January 1987
28 January 1987
29 January 1987
30 January 1987
30 January 1987
10 February 1987
11 February 1987
17 February 1987
18 February 1987
19 February 1987
19 February 1987
20 February 1987
20 February 1987
23 February 1987
23 February 1987
24 February 1987
24 February 1987
25 February 1987
25 February 1987
26 February 1987
26 February 1987
2 March 1987
2 March 1987
3 March ~ 1987
4 March 1987
4 March 1987
Foundation (Head Office)
McMaster University Medical School, 
Department of Pathology 
McMaster University Medical School, 
Department of Immunology 
The Parkinson Foundation of Canada 
(National Office)
The Arthritis Society (National Office) 
Canadian Heart Foundation (National Office) 
Federal Government, Secretary of State, 
Voluntary Action Programme 
Federal Government, Department of Health 
and Welfare, Medical Research Council 
Federal Government, Secretary of State, 
Promotion of Official Languages Programme 
Federal Government, Department of Health 
and Welfare, Sustaining Grants for National 
Voluntary Health Organisation Programme 
Canadian Cancer Society (National Office) 
Alzheimer Society of Canada 
(National Office)
Connaught Laboratories (Head Office)
Back Pain Association (National Office) 
Development Trust for the Young Disabled 
(National Office)
Muscular Dystrophy, Group of Great Britain 
(National Office)
Imperial Cancer Research Fund 
(National Office)
Chest, Heart and Stroke Association 
(National Office)
Mental Health Foundation (National Office) 
Spastics Society (National Office)
The British Digestive Foundation 
(National Office)
Cystic Fibrosis Research Trust 
(National Office)
Department of Health and Social Security, 
Chief Scientist
The Iris Fund (National Office)
Multiple Sclerosis Society 
(National Office)
Blonde Mclndoe Centre for Medical Research 
(National Office)
Ciba Foundation (National Office)
Brain Research Trust (National Office) 
British Diabetes Association 
(National Office)
Arthritis and Rheumatism Council 
(National Office)
Association of Medical Research Charities 
National Fund for Research into Crippling
528
Diseases (National Office)5 March 1987 Association for Spina Bifida and 
Hydrocephalus (National Office)6 March 1987 Foundation for the Study of Infant Deaths 
(National Office)6 March 1987 Astro Pharmaceuticals9 March 1987 Migraine Trust (National Office)10 March 1987 Foundation for Age Research 
(National Office)10 March 1987 Asthma Research Council (National Office)
11 March 1987 Cancer Research Campaign (National Office)12 March 1987 Charity Christmas Card Council 
(National Office)19 March 1987 Wellcome Trust (National Office)31 March 1987 Charity Commission2 April 1987 Department of Education and Science, 
Medical Research Council3 April 1987 lep ra (National Office)3 April 1987 LEPRA (National Office)8 April 1987 British Union for the Abolition of 
Vivisection9 April 1987 Association of British Pharmaceutical 
Industries
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Charity Christmas Card Council. 1985 Shop Sales
Appendix II
PLACE CHARITY TOTAL «
GROSS OF TOTAL
SALES SALES
1 Royal Academy 11,761 4.52
2 Save the Children 10,424 4.01
3 World Wildlife Fund 9,209 3.55
4 NSPCC 8,974 3.45
5 British Diabetic Association* 7,579 2.95
6 Cancer Relief 7,408 2.85
7 Cancer Research 7,078 2.72
8 Imperial Cancer Research Fund* 6,986 2.69
9 Held the Aged 6,875 2.64
10 Queen Elizabeth's Foundation 6,480 2.49
11 Multiple Sclerosis Society* 6,398 2.49
12 Dr. Barnardo's 6,027 2.32
13 British Heart Foundation* 5,941 2.29
14 Guide Dogs for the Blind 5,456 2.10
15 British Red Cross Society 5,413 2.08
16 Family Welfare 5,065 1.95
17 Leukaemia Research 4,951 1.90
18 Chest/Heart/Stroke* 4,917 1.89
19 Cystic Fibrosis* 4,882 1.88
20 Christian Aid 4,790 1.84
21 Shipwrecked Fishermen 4,794 1.83
22 Richmond Fellowship 4,598 1.77
23 RNLI 4,306 1.66
24 Missions to Seamen 3,933 1.51
25 RNID 3,922 1.51
26 Malcolm Sargent Cancer Fund 
for Children
3,851 1.48
27 Blackfriars Work Settlement 3,738 1.44
28 AS BAH 3,719 1.43
29 Arthritis & Rheumatism Council* 3,460 1.33
30 Bone Marrow Research 3,354 1.29
31 MIND 3,267 1.26
32 Sue Ryder 3,251 1.25
33 SENSE 3,169 1.22
34 Royal Commonwealth Society for 
the Blind
3,128 1.20
35 RAF Benevolent Fund 3,117 1.20
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36 Aid to Russian Christians 3,101 1.19
37 Samaritans 3,022 1.16
38 Marwell Zoological Society 2,932 1.13
39 SSAFA 2,885 1.11
40 CARE 2,876 1.11
41 Handicapped Children's Trust 2,862 1.10
42 Parkinson's Disease Society 2,752 1.06
43 National Society for Epilepsy 2,741 1.05
44 National Children's Home 2,566 0.98
45 Birthright 2,533 0.97
46 SOS Children's Villages 2,531 0.97
47 John Groom's 2,502 0.96
48 Home Farm Trust 2,494 0.96
49 International Voluntary Service 2,446 0.94
50 Gardener's Royal Benevolent Society 2,383 0.92
51 Counsel & Care for the Elderly 2,257 0.87
52 Army Benevolent Fund 2,147 0.83
53 National Autistic Society 2,105 0.81
54 British Trust for Ornithology 2,096 0.81
55 Brain Research* 2,037 0.78
56 National Deaf Children's Society 1,786 0.69
57 CRUSE 1,629 0.63
58 Inland Waterways 1,454 0.56
59 National Canine Defence League 1,354 0.52
60 Queen Charlotte's Fund 1,263 0.49
61 King George's Fund 1,236 0.48
62 Population Concern 1,222 0.47
63 Oxfam 1,093 0.42
64 Winged Fellowship 988 0.38
65 Sea Cadets 808 0.31
66 Methodist Homes for the Aged 776 0.30
67 Royal Agricultural Benevolent Fund 766 0.29
68 Nat Assoc of Leagues of Hospital 
Friends
747 0.29
69 Friedreich's Ataxia Group 739 0.28
70 RUBKA 638 0.25
Source; Charity Christmas Card Council, Annual Report. 1986.
London: 1986.
Note: *indicates charities included in interview schedule.
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Appendix IV
The 1924 Ministry gf Health/Medical 
Research Council Concordat
Ministry of Health Medical Research Council
1. To survey existing
knowledge with a view to its 
applications or applicability 
to practical uses.
To survey existing 
knowledge with a view 
to right direction of 
new research efforts.
2. To survey by statistical
or other means existing states 
of national (and international) 
health and environment, both 
absolutely and in relation to 
to past history.
Medical research by 
statistical methods 
(primarily for the 
development of new 
methods).
3. To provide investigation 
(by use of existing 
knowledge and recognised 
methods) of scientific 
problems arising in the 
current administrative work 
of the Ministry.
4. To initiate research by 
reference to the Medical 
Research Council or by 
encouraging local authorities 
or other agencies to direct and 
carry it out, and to initiate 
and themselves to direct 
research by such investigations 
as can best be carried out by 
the Ministry, in the interests 
of public health administration, 
applied knowledge or medical 
services.
To give assistance to 
current medical research 
investigations, whether 
pathological, 
biochemical, or other 
kinds (including studies 
made into the better 
standardisation of 
materials or methods).
To promote new knowledge 
by the initiation and 
organisation of research 
in the medical sciences.
5. To propagate the results 
gained under all the 
foregoing heads by 
publication, by suitable 
information to local 
authorities or to the general 
public, and in general to 
promote the applications or the 
results in practical life.
5. The publication of the 
results of research work 
in such a form as to aid 
research workers in 
general and to secure 
available application.
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Appendix V
1964 Argentina
Australia
Canada
Republic of Ireland 
Italy
United Kingdom
United States of America
1965 Belgium
France
German Federal Republic 
Switzerland
1966 Denmark
Israel
1968 Austria
Greece
1969 German Democratic Republic
Netherlands
New Zealand
Spain
Sweden
Yugoslavia
1970 Czechoslovakia
Norway
Poland
1973 Cuba
Hungary
1975 South Africa
1980 Brazil
Uruguay
1981 Mexico
1969 Finland
1972 India
1973 USSR
1979 Iceland
Portugal
1980 Egypt
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Turkey
1981 Pakistan
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